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This thesis aims to tackle three interrelated questions; does the genre of contemporary art have a 
distinct logic to the extent that it can be described as being axiomatic? Do these axioms relate to 
the socio-political conditions of our era as they are understood to be shaped by the politics of 
the extraction, sale and burning of petroleum hydrocarbons, and the attendant externalities of 
this process? And, if these questions can be answered in the affirmative, what is the politically 
transformative potential for Contemporary Art? The thesis understands the tentacular reach of 
oil into culture through the political economy of extractive accumulation and how it is reliant on 
the huge value drawn from fossil fuel exploitation from the early 1970s to now, and the 
exhaustion of this commodity. It argues that, at an axiomatic level, Contemporary Art has been 
conditioned by, and conditions, current variants of Liberalism that emerged in the latter part of 
the twentieth century, and that these variants are underwritten by the oil industry. It does this 
through a reading of economic theory, art theory, critical race studies and their intersections with 
ecological thought. This approach differs from multiple other adjacent projects in that it 
attempts to synthesise a critique of the logics of contemporary art and questions of political 
transformation in relation to the growing literature on the oil industry and climate change, rather 
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Capitalism is a totality: its economic components rely, ultimately, on political choices; 
these political choices in turn rely on a set of cultural meanings; these cultural meanings 
in turn rely on aesthetic conventions; and these conventions in turn rely on economic 
fundamentals […] the social, cultural, economic, political, aesthetic, and ideological 
components of capitalism all fit together in non-linear and non-causal ways. 




Insofar as contemporary art is a multifarious field that claims no fundamental ideological 
adherence, as distinct from other historically or geographically distinct regimes of art, seemingly 
has no internal guiding principles, there appear to be many contemporaneities – what is specific 
within one spatio-temporal context may or may not appear within the next – the contemporary 
moment seems to be characterised by a proliferation of specificities, rather than an universal or 
general “logic”. As such, is it legitimate to argue for something like an axiom of contemporary 
art? Whilst artworks might exemplify one or multiple modes that make them contemporary, their 
specificities seem to forever escape absolute logical categorisation. The proliferations of discrete 
iterations of particularities that contemporary art exemplifies reduces our capacity to articulate 
something generic – is there such thing as art in general? Does the name contemporary art 
represent a genre? Can we say that there exists some guiding principles – something axiomatic – 
in contemporary art? 
 
In this thesis, I develop a set of working concepts, axiomatics, that determine how the field of 
contemporary art in the second age of oil – what I will call petroculture – operates. This field is not 
isolated from the socio-political-economic-biological-ecological domains from which culture 
draws both its resources and materials, but also its ideological and psychic elements. Instead, 
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these fields are seen as interwoven. As Max Haiven (2015) suggests, elements in each field 
engage and work on each other, producing forms of power that ‘animates and is animated by a 
host of social institutions’ (Haiven 2015: 39). However, it is important to understand the 
epistemic differentiation at work here. I will not assert that these fields are the same, nor that all 
elements of these fields can be qualified/quantified by the same measure. This thesis is an 
attempt to understand how the field of art is, in part, determined by, and in turn, determines, the 
field of the socio-political. In this instance, I understand the current socio-political world to be 
dominated by the condition of petropolitical – which is to say, it is the oil industry and its 
attendant effects, iterations and the resistance to it that form the determining logics of this 
current conjuncture. The task is to track the varied roles petropolitics has played in the 
formation of the concepts and logics at play in contemporary art. Which is to suggest that it is 
not only possible to articulate linkages between contemporary art and the oil industry, but that 
these linkages are sedimented enough to be able to understand them as logically determining 
concepts, what Deleuze and Guattari might call coding (2003). Specifically, this thesis 
understands these concepts as axiomatics, and that these axiomatics are constructed through the 
interrelation between multiple local sites. It is this task that I concern myself with, and it is such a 
task that is the original contribution made to the field art theory. This project necessarily 
incorporates many fields of study and as such is epistemically promiscuous, drawing inspiration 
and applying analysis from unusual spheres, for example, learning the lessons of ecological 
economics to better understand art theoretical concerns.  
 
To progress here it is important to understand what I mean by axiomatics, or “an axiom”. As the 
rest of the thesis will concern itself with elucidating the description of axioms of petroculture, I 
shall limit myself here with providing a general description of the axiomatic as it appears in a 
number of sources.  
 
Within mathematics, according to Alain Badiou (2007), an axiom delineates a fundamental 
statement that is taken as true, and from which rules, laws and norms emerge. Concepts become 
articulated as axioms by their liaisons within the system – they take on axiomatic status through 
their relation to the systems within which they operate. This Hilbertian thesis1 of formalisation is 
 
1 Badiou’s (2007) work offers a reading of David Hilbert’s Foundations of Geometry from 1899. This work is a 
complete refiguration of Euclidean geometry, and takes the axiom as a fundamental element of mathematics, 
as Badiou quotes Hilbert; ‘only the whole structure of axioms yields a complete definition. Every axiom 
contributes something to the definition, and hence every new axiom changes the concept’ (Hilbert cf. Badiou 
2007: xxvii). 
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paradigmatic for Badiou, axiomatic systems are thus the formalisation of foundational statements 
within a system of rules, concepts and notions where formalisation ‘allows mathematical practice 
to achieve an indifference to representation’ (Fraser, in Badiou, 2007: xxxvi). As Badiou suggests: 
 
A formal or symbolic system is nothing but a game of inscriptions, whose rules are 
explicit and which foretell every case without ambiguity. Beginning with an initial set of 
statements (the axioms), one derives theorems according to the rules of deduction.  The 
sense of the game is bound to its internal characteristics: the game could not, for example, 
have any sense (any interest) if all statements were theorems: one would not have any 
need to play, so to speak; every inscription being legitimate, the rules of deduction would 
serve no purpose. It will therefore be required that there exist at least one statement that 
is not derivable from the axioms by application of the rules.  This is the fundamental 
property of the system’s consistency.  
(Badiou, 2007: 19) 
 
Within the system of inscription, the actions of constructing axiomatics, and Badiou always 
understands these in multiple, it is a theoretical practice that inscribes into history the effects of 
those practices. Thus, the axiomatic operates as a statement that defines a formal system. The 
game of inscriptions ‘aims at being an experimental mathematical apparatus (dispositif), that is a 
system of inscriptions which obeys specific conditions’ (ibid.: 23). Understood as such, an axiom 
is what determines the field of inscriptions and representations. A set of guiding principles 
around which practices and inscriptions can formalise through a mode of deduction. An axiom 
does not need to be verifiable but comes to operate as a starting point for further theorisation, as 
such, it becomes the foundation for a chain of reasoning. What occurs in the chain of reasoning 
does not inflect back on the axiom from which the reasoning embarked, which is not to say that 
the process of reasoning cannot go on to produce new axioms. 
 
According to Deleuze and Guattari, an axiom ‘deals directly with purely functional elements and 
relations whose nature is not specified, and which are immediately realized in highly varied 
domains simultaneously’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2003: 454). Thus, an axiom is, as Roffe (2016) 
asserts, in a move that chimes with the Badiouan rendition, ‘a rule indifferent to the nature of 
what is applied to and to the context of its application’ (Roffe, 2016: 134). Specifically, an axiom 
determines the field or domain without being determined by it – it exists in a formal system, the 
expressions of which occur through concretisation. Which is to say, that each particular axiom is 
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neutral in relation to qualitative or evaluative positions in the domain which it determines, not 
specific to those domains or expressive of specific relations. As such, axioms have a higher 
formal unity and constructively determine regimes and domains through their formalisation. In 
Deleuze and Guattari, ‘the worldwide axiomatic, instead of resulting from heterogeneous social 
formations and their relation, for the most part distributes these formations, determines their 
relations, while organizing an international division of labor’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2003: 454). 
Axioms, as regulative statements that are isomorphic with models of realisation, are taken to be 
true without needing to be proven and act to structure and delimit what is reasonable and 
articulable within a domain. The capitalist system that has capitalised nearly every domain is the 
‘cofunctioning in the same field of immanence of processes of extreme abstraction and utter 
concretisation’ (Massumi, 1999: 133). Which is to say, the system that regulates, demarcates and 
delimits what is profitable, that ‘determines how superabstraction is embodied in particular 
situations’ is the capitalist axiomatic that functions ‘by inclusive conjunctive synthesis’ (ibid.). As 
Brian Massumi asserts, when the axiomatic offers an effectively infinite variety of choices, 
capitalism extends the presence of the commodity relation in every point of time and space – 
real subsumption. This extension, where everything must obey ‘specific conditions’ (Badiou, 
2007: 23) forces everything in the domain to obey the axiomatic. Thus, we should understand 
the processes of capitalisation as a continual extension of the axiomatic into novel domains, not 
just the synthetic inclusion of those domains into capitalist modes of production. Domains are 
made to obey the rules of the game – forced to obey the axioms.  
 
As subjects to the axioms of capital, the proletariat are ‘subjected to the technical machines in 
which constant capital is effectuated’ whereas, the capitalists are subjects of the enunciation, 
(Deleuze and Guattari 2003: 457) which is to say, have the capacity to determine and modify the 
enunciation (the speech act(s) that puts in place the axiomatic). The restriction of this capacity of 
the proletariat to be subjects of the enunciation is what underwrites systemic oppression – any 
project to reimagine the axioms of our current paradigm must include a democratic 
reformulation of who gets to participate in this enunciation. A system that includes democratic 
control of the enunciation will be known as Democratic Socialism.  
 
As I will attempt to parse later in this thesis, an axiom of contemporary art is what comes to 
determine the field of contemporary art without relying on specific occasions of “art as such” to 
construct or ratify it. Thus, an axiom of contemporary art holds true whether or not a specific 
work of art (the concretisation of the formal system) abides by every axiom that is determinable 
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– an axiom does not need to be provable, but just operates to “bootstrap” reasoning. 
Henceforth, then, we should understand a contemporary art axiomatic to be one that codes for 
the general condition of artworks under the hegemony of contemporaneity, not for specific 
formations and relations within the field. However, as I will explore, there at one time exists a 
necessary dialectical relation between the axioms of a particular paradigm and the artworks that 
exist in that paradigm to the extent that this historically determines the axiomatic. Contemporary 
art exerts an axiomatic hold over the individual expressions within the system in that each 
expression is derivable from the axioms, but the axiom allows, or even legislates for, a challenge 
to that axiomatic.2 Contemporary art then, conditions for tolerable expressions of disruption, 
disagreement or non-contemporary art-ness much the same way that, for Deleuze and Guattari, 
the capitalist axiomatic operates: 
 
[D]oes not the world capitalist axiomatic tolerate a real polymophy, or even a 
heteromorphy, of models? […] capital as a general relation of production can very easily 
integrate concrete sectors or modes of production that are noncapitalist. (Deleuze and 
Guattari 2003: 455) 
 
Thus, the DeleuzoGuattarian capitalist axiomatic – and my contemporary art axiomatic (as 
derived from the logics of petroculture that I elucidate in this thesis)  – can accommodate 
alternate models to the extent that they exist as models, either concrete or theoretical, precisely 
because to capitalise on all modes of production is an axiom of capitalism (and also 
contemporary art). Within this thesis, of course, I wish to draw linkages between operations of 
capitalisation – the propensity to accord financial value to natural resources so as to extend the 
domain of capitalisation – and the capacity that contemporary art has for a methodologically 
similar process of expansion. Any petrocultural axiomatic, then, must account for this activity of 
capitalisation, and the preconditions of accumulation and exploitation that make this process not 
only possible, but normal and seemingly necessary. Congruent with this type of normativity, we 
must understand axioms as ‘operative statements that constitute the semiological form of Capital 
and that enter as component parts into assemblages of production, circulation and 
consumption’(ibid.: 461), which is to say, the capitalist/petrocultural axiomatic must be 
understood in terms of its instrumental capacity within the domain. In other words, an axiomatic 
 
2 Insofar as any hegemonic system exists alongside counter-hegemonies, the challenges or resistances to that 
system, it can be said that these systems “afford” their counter, however, as I explain later in this thesis, what is 
particular about the current, neoliberal, paradigm is the way it mobilises those counter movements – this, I 
suggest is true of contemporary art. 
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is a “pragmatics” insofar as it constitutes tools for the construction of laws, norms and 
conventions – ways of behaving and thinking. 
 
While axioms are not determined by the subsequent chain of reasoning, they are, unless 
mathematical, not ahistorical. Insofar as the axioms of a political sequence come to determine 
the operation of that sequence, the axioms themselves are not necessary, but contingent on 
formations of socio-cultural conditions and ideological articulations. Any given political 
axiomatic is posited by a confluence of agents, speech acts, arrangements and institutions, if not 
explicitly, then through the production of norms, exclusions (who is allowed to speak and what 
is allowed to be said) and affect. Thus, the rationality of any given political sequence rests on 
unverifiable, but operative statements that reflect, but also determine, the spirit of the times. 
 
It is important not to elide the capitalist and petrocultural axiomatics; whilst they share certain 
conditions, the task of this thesis is, in part, to distinguish something particular to the 
petrocultural that is not present in the capitalist axiomatic; or more precisely only evident in the 
capitalist axiomatic because of how it draws value from the biophysical/petro-energetic world. 
The operative pragmatics overlap, there are logical similitudes, but their differentiations must be 
noted.  
 
In short, the petrocultural axiomatic incorporates the logics of contemporary art, understanding 
the historic trajectory of the field as historically coterminous with that of the political-economy 
of the latter part of the twentieth century, specifically what we understand as the era of 
neoliberalism. However, the task of this thesis is to extend an analysis beyond the political and 
the economic, in one direction into the industrial-ecological and in the other into the cultural. 
Specifically, I understand the relationship between contemporary art and the oil industry, a 
relationship that passes through the political-economic realm, as one of axiomatic entanglement. 
The petrocultural is an analysis that articulates the tentacular roots of contemporary culture as 
buried in the deep seams of energy rich liquid hydrocarbons under the surface of the earth. 
Whilst it is both far-fetched and incongruous to claim that all contemporary art draws some kind 
of “inspiration”, or content from the oil industry (although there are works of art, artistic 
practices or even modes of analysis that do this, however, this study is explicitly not about this), the 
claim I am making rests on the operative statements that structure both the fields. Thus, I 
understand the petrocultural axiomatic to be a normative pragmatics – an ethical philosophy that 
‘pack[s] a potential in the way a crowbar in a willing hand envelops an energy of prying’ 
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(Massumi, 1999: 8). And, precisely a mode of analysis that emerges out of the turbulent 
coterminous histories of the cultural, economic, political, biophysical, industrial conditions of 
recent past. Thus, axiomatic statements must be considered primarily through the pragmatic 
force they assert on the political, cultural and social domains. As such, it is not only a description 
of the domain or time it is attached to, but a performative operation that seeks to delimit the 
values inherent in any given system. Of course, in any given axiomatic there exists counter 
trajectories that seek to deligitimise the axiomatic through critique or counter hegemomic 
operations. What composes society is a confluence of multiple factors and their interactions, 
both the axiomatic and the challenge to the axiomatic are incorporated in the composition 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 2003, Boltanski and Chiapello, 2007). Counter-axioms come to operate as 
important pragmatic “crowbars” in their own right; society as such, is composed of the double 
movement of axiomatic and counter-axiomatic statements. Drawing on the work of Polanyi 
(2001), Boltanski and Chiapello (2007) and Wright and Nyberg (2015) chapter four will deal in 
some detail with the counter movements and their utilisation.  
 
Thus, the Second Age of Oil is marked, importantly by a challenge to the petrocapitalist 
axiomatic – in the form of the environmental movement – and the more powerful doubling 
down on the use of extractive technologies, the acceleration of petroleum backed economic 
growth and increased denial of the limits of exploitation (Di Muzio, 2015, Klein, 2015, Mitchell, 
2013, Wright and Nyberg, 2015). This acceleration is more noticeable after the OPEC energy 
crisis of 1972, where the price per barrel of oil increased 400% (Mitchell, 2013) and the 
subsequent economic growth was concentrated in the financial services sector (Mitchell, 2014). 
What this thesis explores is this surge in financial capitalism and the “double-movement” of the 
1960s and 70s environmentalism (Wright and Nyberg, 2015). Drawing on Polanyi’s (2001) work, 
Wright and Nyberg understand this economic expansion and concomitant social challenge to the 
expansion in increased awareness and institutional responses in terms of Boltanski and 
Chiapello’s incorporation of critique (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2007). For Wright and Nyberg 
this transmutes into “corporate environmentalism” that purports to offer an ideal scenario, 
‘[u]nlike conventional neoclassical economic thinking, in which environmental protection is 
viewed as a threat to profitability, corporate environmentalism promotes a “win-win” vision of 
business augmenting profits by improving their environmental performance; in short, “do well 
by doing good”’ (Wright and Nyberg, 2015: 41). As I explore in Chapter Two, this expansion of 
economic growth underwritten by the biophysical exploitation inherent in the oil industry, lays 
the axiomatic foundations for what we think of as petrocultural conditions.  
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While it is not within the scope of this study to evaluate the contingencies or necessities inherent 
in the relation between other pre- or non-capitalist modes of governance and the burning of 
fossil fuels – for example, in the Soviet Union in the early to mid-twentieth century or in non-
Western paradigms – we can suggest that while all industrialised nations have contributed in vast 
amounts to the degradation of the planet’s ecosystem, it is the precise confluence of 
neoliberalised, financialised oil marketization that has created the specific conjuncture I am 
concerned with in this study. Which is to say, it is specifically the convergence of certain 
economic forms with the fact of the Earth as resource that has led to the production of the 
specific axiomatics that I will explore. Not to be restricted to a strictly Marxist analysis, we must 
also understand the role of culture in this formation – that cultural, economic and ecological 
forms intersect and recursively re-structure society (and each other) in the shape of these 
axiomatics. It is this tripartite analysis that has been missing from recent studies. While many 
writers (Bridge and Le Billon 2016, Di Muzio 2016, Engdahl 1992, Malm 2016, Klein 2015 etc) 
discuss the interrelatedness of the oil industries and economic structures, and some art theorists 
(TJ Demos, Haiven, Toby Miller, for example) are concerned with how art interrelates with 
ecology or economic systems, there is a gap in the literature. It is the task here to account for 
that gap – and more precisely to understand the correlation between cultural tropes and the 
ideological structures that the oil-economy nexus instituted – and how we might wish to institute 
otherwise. 
 
A significant inspiration for describing the axiomatics of contemporary art comes from the work 
of Suhail Malik. He has done more than anyone to articulate a theory of the genre of 
contemporary art in this way, and it is beyond the scope of this thesis to rehearse his arguments 
in full. However, in these introductory remarks I want to point to the theoretical underpinnings 
of his understanding of the axioms of contemporary art in order to frame my work in relation to 
his – I do not so much depart from his work, but seek to approach the same questions from an 
adjacent, sometimes interrelated position. I see Malik’s work as both a challenge and a 
productive foil to my work, however, as his book on these issues is still forthcoming, I can only 
work from fragments of his argument as presented in talks and essays – as such, his work cannot 
form a central component in this thesis as I do not think these fragments fully flesh out his 
ideas, and I cannot hope to do justice to them here.  
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Malik makes two initial claims, firstly, that contemporary art does indeed have a logic (and it can 
be identified) – while counter intuitive, this claim is coherent with the analysis I present in this 
thesis – and secondly, contemporary art should be seen not just as instances of artworks, but as 
‘a field of activity that not only includes artworks but also common places, idiolects, received 
ideas, judgments, justifications, social and administrative quasi structures, power operations, and 
so on’ (Malik 2014). Here, he understands the diffuseness of the field of art to be linked not only 
to the artworks themselves, nor just their circulation, but to a whole panoply of attendant 
activities, objects, institutions and power relations – precisely the ethos of the field of art. These 
affects revolve around what he calls the indeterminacy of contemporary art, which ‘as a field 
draws its legitimations from the affirmation of indeterminacy (ibid.), resulting in all sorts of 
benevolence, but also ‘all sorts of abuses of power’ (ibid.). It is precisely these abuses of power 
that will return in this thesis to mark out my critical appraisal of contemporary art. While my 
argument does not rest solely on this claim around indeterminacy, I do touch on these ideas later 
in the thesis.  
 
For Malik, contemporary art has a systemic logic that needs to be understood in order for us 
critically engage with it at the level not of the singular artwork, but the system in general – a co-
determining logic between art and its field. There are, he suggests, generic qualities to art that 
formalise in this logic. Malik’s insistence not to rely on particular concrete examples of art for his 
argument, but instead speak to the conditions and axioms of art as such, is, for me, a legitimate 
approach. While in this thesis there may be occasions where I illustrate or exemplify these 
conditions, and use particular works to do this, this should not be seen as exhaustive – these are 
merely examples, and any counter argument can come up with an equally persuasive set of 
examples of art not adhering to these axiomatics in an attempt to undermine my argument. 
However, my claim here is that this is a heuristic approach, whereby I am attempting to make 
sense of a set of tendencies within contemporary art that have cohered enough to understand 
them as forming axiomatics. Malik suggests, as I do, these descriptions of art’s axioms are not 
meant to claim them as ahistorical, but historically contingent, formed by, as I argue, the 
historical processes that emerge within the current paradigm. As he suggests, the logic of 
contemporary art cannot be disassociated from its ‘historically organised structure […] its 
sociology and politics’ (ibid.). In my work, I extend this to suggest that these discussions around 
art cannot be removed from a conception of earth as resource – precisely a capitalist mode of 




Malik’s understanding of contemporary art revolves around what he calls the “anarcho-realist 
maxim”, whereby art demands a more sincere, more authentic or more public engagement. The 
claim made from this critical approach being that already existing artworks and practices are not 
“real” enough, and in order to escape the conditions of inauthenticity that besets contemporary 
art, all we need is a retreat into the real. Malik identifies this tendency to desire more authenticity 
– or, to put it negatively ‘less private, narcissistic, inauthentic, socially detached; less abstracted 
from real, concrete conditions, life; etc.’ (ibid.) – as foundational. We might understand this as a 
form of romanticism, whereby, on the one hand, art is seen as being able to provide access to a 
realm of life that is divorced from mundane existence under late stage capitalism (as represented 
by fast pace, abstract relations of capital and power, and complexity), and on the other where 
there exists a “more true” art beneath, or behind, the false consciousness of contemporary art. 
As identified later in this thesis, this desire for authenticity besets not just the art world, but also 
the environmental movement when it articulates a “back to the land” approach that focuses on 
the prelapsarian beauty of pre-industrial landscapes, or an idea of “nature” as opposed to 
“culture”. This romanticism, I argue, misunderstands the complex power relations at play in our 
world and provides an insufficient analysis and limited, or limiting, mode of action – at its heart, 
this approach suffers from what I call myopia. Insofar as multiple contemporary approaches 
express this desire for the “real”, I consider this an axiom of petroculture – we can find this in 
many forms; the call to resist or escape capitalist relations (autonomy), the desire to appeal to 
consumers’ environmentalist leanings (greenwashing/exemplification) and the expression of 
value as a mode of investment in human capital.  
 
Another perspective on the notion of contemporary art comes from the work of Peter Osborne, 
whose important intervention into this debate, Anywhere or Not At All: Philosophy of Contemporary 
Art (2013) represents a formidable exegesis of the theory of contemporaneity as it applies to art. 
In the opening chapter to this work, Osborne provides an historical overview of the use of the 
term contemporary, understanding it in a twofold fashion; as a construction, idea or fiction or as 
the time of the global transnational. As he suggests, what seems to characterise this period most 
pertinently is the way in which the conceptual grammar of contemporaneity is understood 
precisely as a ‘coming together not simply “in time” with our contemporaries – as if time itself is 
indifferent to this existing together – but rather the present is increasingly characterized by a 
coming together of different but equally “present” temporalities or “times”, a temporal unity in 
disjunction, or a disjunctive unity of present times’ (Osborne 2013: 17 emphasis in the original). As 
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such, Osborne’s conception of contemporaneity relies on the idea of the bringing together in 
time disjunctive elements under the unifying principle of the present. The capacity for art as such 
to construct this conjoining fiction that unifies otherwise disjunctive elements supposes that 
despite the inexistence of an actual shared subject position from which the whole scope of 
history can be lived, it acts as though there is. Contemporaneity, then, supposes a unifying, or 
totalising positionality whereby the temporal becomes the unifying fiction. Osborne also points 
to the idea that contemporaneity relies on the construction of a global trans-nationalism, 
whereby the differences of different cultures, nations, communities and so forth, are presented 
as though available to a universal viewpoint. Here, art functions as a kind of passport. The artist 
as a global citizen, capable of traversing borders and boundaries in time and space. As I shall 
explore in more depth in Chapter Three, for Osborne, art appears as a transcategorical form, no 
longer bounded by such things as genre, medium or material. Contemporary Art functions as a  
fictionalising transnationalism that unifies all forms of cultural practice (even looking back and 
utilising the art historical as conceptual material) into a sense of presentness. Thus, it is important 
to view claims made in this thesis with this in mind; there is a tendency in contemporaneity to 
quickly universalise. A question that emerges from this, is whether this universalising project 
emerges in the context of colonialism.  
 
Throughout this thesis I explore these axiomatics. Contemporary art’s logics run parallel to and 
intersect with those of the current socio-political paradigm as it has been shaped by the oil 
industries – the demand for the “real” that is found in both inferential spheres is fundamental 
here and Malik’s analysis can help us frame this discussion. The axiomatics that I focus on in this 
study act as statements taken to be true from which a formal system emerges, they are as follows: 
 
- The human is adequately described by the rationality of homo economicus 
- The earth is calculable as resource with no limit 
- “Society” consists of collections of individuals 
- Freedom is figured as an escape from coercive norms and laws 
- Virtue is articulated as a mode by which individuals can increase their investability 
- The individual and the universal relate in one of two ways; i) directly, immediately, or ii) 
there is no relation. 
 
While it is somewhat difficult to reduce the complexity of the following chapters to these 
statements, and certainly I have no expectation that the axiomatics herein are reducible as such – 
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indeed, my conception of axiomatics does not require them to appear in this way, as easily 
digestible, short phrases – these sentences act as grounding, or foundational statements. Equally, 
I do not suppose petroculture to be exhaustively captured by my work herein, the systemic 
complexity of this paradigm – art in the Second Age of Oil – opens out on to wide vistas, no 
single thesis is adequate to a total description. 
 
Indeed, the historical and conceptual phrase “Second Age of Oil” does a lot of work in this 
thesis, the majority of the explanation for my periodisation appears in Chapter One, but it is 
certainly important now to outline how this phrase operates in conjunction with the idea of 
“petroculture”. The literature on petroculture has been growing in recent years, in large part due 
to attention drawn to it by Imre Szeman’s work, specifically his edited volume on the subject 
with Sheena Wilson and Adam Carlson (Wilson, Carlson, Szeman 2017), however, what Wilson, 
Szeman and Carlson call the petro-humanities is still a relatively under theorised field in relation 
to the larger fields of new materialism or posthumanism that it tangentially relates to. Given the 
overwhelming presence of oil in our daily lives, politics and its effects on the planet, this is 
somewhat concerning. What the authors in the edited volume on petroculture turn their 
attention to is the ways in which oil imaginaries have appeared, or in many cases, have failed to 
appear, in literature, art, film and so on in the modern period. As suggested, they ‘position oil 
and energy as the fulcrum around which many of today’s most pressing social, economic, and 
political issues must be analyzed and understood’ (Wilson, Carlson, Szeman 2017: 4). In an 
attempt to grapple with the consequences of the transformation to almost total reliance on 
energy drawn from fossil fuels, which has characterised the condition of modernity, the authors 
are keen to explore the ways in which culture has been shaped by oil. Throughout the essays in 
this volume there is a focus on the ways oil relates either to specific works of culture, or to how 
cultural works narrativise the conditions of modernity as shaped by fossil energy and 
petropolitical power. Attendant to the compelling idea that fossil fuel energy has defined 
twentieth century politics, society and culture, these essays draw on specific cultural artefacts in 
order to argue that oil is a resource that has determined the current logics by which we live. The 
predominant argument could be characterised as the idea that recent cultural artefacts have 
drawn our attention to the importance of oil in our lives, have taken a critical approach to that 
fact and have sought to imagine post-petroleum futures. As the editors suggest, ‘freedom, 
identity, success: our deepest ideals and most prominent social fantasies are mediated and 
enabled by the energy of fossil fuels’ (Wilson, Carlson, Szeman 2017: 11).  
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Another contribution to this field is Mel Evans’ Artwash: Big Oil and the Arts, and other work 
emerging from either a theoretical or an activist space that links the oil industry to the art world 
through the channels of funding. These contributions, although salutary in themselves, are not 
the focus of this thesis, and while the way art is funded should be an object of critical discourse, 
it does not directly relate to the way I understand the formation of the concept of the 
petrocultural – however, in chapter four, I do expand on the concept of greenwashing to 
understand how attention economies utilise marketing tactics in neoliberal ways.  
 
While Reza Negarestani’s work on oil and cultural logics, specifically his extend study of the 
‘Tellurian lube’ of oil (Negarestani 2008), has influenced my thought, this thesis does not rely 
heavily on his earlier work. I do return to his work on the concept of inhumanism later in this 
thesis. However, it is certainly worth noting how oil, for Negarestani, underwrites history. He 
suggests that oil is the ‘undercurrent of all narrations, not only the political but also that of the 
ethics of life on earth’ (Negarestani 2008: 19). This idea of oil’s omnipotence is instructive when 
considering how entangled culture and ecology are, perhaps a later study could articulate a 
Negarestanian analysis along these lines, but for this occasion that project is not pursued. For the 
sake of this thesis, I shall hold on to the idea of the historical importance of oil that Negarestani 
makes us alive to. 
 
What is missing in the above accounts, and what I hope to expand upon in the following pages, 
is a thoroughgoing analysis of how the petroleum industries and their attendant effects have 
shaped not just our current political conjuncture, but how they have shaped and are recursively 
shaped by, specific artistic logics inherent in this historical period. I suggest that the intersection 
of art theory and petropolitics has yet to have been elucidated satisfactorily, instead, many of the 
theorists of petroculture are content to let “art” remain untheorized in their contributions to the 
discourse. Contemporary Art, in my analysis, however, must be understood as an historical 
category that has its own logics and methodologies – its own axioms – and by historical I mean 
contingent on historical events and movements rather than invariable through time. When we 
speak of contemporary art, then, we speak of logics bound to a certain European modernist 
conception that acts as a universal referent for all forms of art today, that have emerged in the 
last fifty years contiguous with the Second Age of Oil. As Wilson, Szeman and Carson suggest 
‘the colonial project of the nation relies on the pillage of natural resources and the construction 
of race, class; and gender, which reify some people as resources to be exploited, resulting in 
socio-cultural paradigms where some lives matter more than others’ (Wilson, Carlson, Szeman 
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2017: 11). The unrealised promise of this analysis is one in which contemporary cultural forms 
are analysed as part of this process of colonialism, tied as they are to this European logic. This 
analysis is unrealised precisely because the concept of art itself is never problematised. Instead, 
the theorists in this volume (and elsewhere) often argue that it is a certain type of cultural, artistic 
or visual practice that is problematically linked to the petropolitical instead of looking at it as a 
systemic problem.  
 
It is at this level that my work plays out. Instead of delivering my verdict on one or other 
instance of art, I seek to understand the systemic nature of this entwinement between art and oil. 
At its root, this analysis sees contemporary art as both historically contingent and revisable – the 
truly democratic capacity to determine ourselves not just what “counts as art”, but the way the 
logics of art are structured, indeed the axioms of art, must be asserted. This is not to say our 
aims here should be to delink art from oil, although perhaps that would be a useful project, but 
to understand precisely how the historical condition known as the Second Age of Oil has 
participated in the production of the axioms of contemporary art, and how, precisely because of 
this fact, these axioms are available to revision – with enough force. The argument could be 
extended, perhaps something to be attempted in future work, into other inferential systems, 
understanding how a project to change systemic socio-political conditions could be embarked 
upon.  
 
This thesis is divided into six chapters, each but the last corresponding to an analysis of the 
axioms of petroculture. Chapter One opens with a discussion of how oil has shaped our world 
and worldviews, the ideological components of this paradigm are fleshed out, understanding the 
oil industries, oil itself and the counter reaction to these phenomenon as paradigmatic features of 
the latter part of the Twentieth Century. We encounter many of the ideas the rest of the thesis 
focuses on in nascent form here – concepts such as freedom and responsibility, or homo 
economicus appear. This chapter tells the story of The Second Age of Oil, the time period from the 
early 1970s until now that is historically contiguous with both neoliberalism and contemporary 
art. There is a discussion of democracy and its attenuation through the concept of the 
petropolitical, and a critique of Liberalism is hinted at. This chapter and the next act as an 
historical overview of the last fifty years, providing a set of working definitions for this period 
that can help frame a discussion of the petrocultural. I also outline how environmentalist logics 
that have emerged in the same period determine certain sets of action and behaviour – it is 
important to understand that these logics are also codified by the axiomatics of this period; the 
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petrocultural or petropolitical is not just what emerges from the oil industries, but also the 
counter reactions to that industry – as such, environmental movements should be described as 
being shaped by these axiomatics, and seen as petropolitical insofar as they adhere to a set of 
axioms. 
 
Chapter Two introduces an economic analysis, understanding the transition from oil into money, 
and how this shapes, and is shaped by, conceptions of how the economy works. The analysis of 
homo economicus is extended and I engage in a long discussion of how calculation and economic 
rationality have come to act as organising principles of our age. This chapter is where I embark 
on a dive into the concept of neoliberalism, and provide a review of the literature in this area. I 
introduce the concept of neoliberal virtue in this chapter, understanding how virtuous behaviour 
participates in the increase in economic value of individuals as enterprise units. Here, economics 
becomes the proof and alibi for action, whereby value is calculated along economic lines – an 
action is valuable only if it has a good return on investment. In this chapter we encounter the 
idea of the entanglement between the market capitalisation of oil and civilisation – putting paid 
to the idea that we could just exit the conditions of petropolitics by fiat.  
 
No conceptual component of ideology is ahistorical, and the concept of freedom is no different. 
Chapter Three identifies the shifting ways the term signifies, tracking this through a number of 
different fields to produce a theory that understands current articulations of freedom through a 
particular lens. The way the concept of freedom emerges within a Liberal paradigm is seen as 
coherent with the project of autonomy in contemporary art. This framing helps us see how the 
differential power produced by oil industrial capitalism feeds in to and from this paradigm – 
utilising the economic theories from the previous chapter to understand how current economic 
orthodoxy avows and disavows modes of thought and operation that is coherent with a critical 
history of Liberalism. This formulation of freedom sees the capacity to extract unlimited 
resources from the earth and current ideas of autonomy within art to have the same logical root. 
The idea of the limitlessness of nature as resource (and the assumption by economic theory that 
capital’s debts do not need to be paid, which further exacerbates economic and political 
inequality) coheres with a view of autonomy in art as a mode of negative liberty. If I am free, it is 
argued, I understand myself to be uncoerced or unregulated. As such, freedom to extract, sell 
and burn fossil fuels unhampered by government regulation or restriction due to the potential to 
cause social or environmental harm, is precisely seen as a mode of reasoning that emerges from 
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this liberal frame. Contemporary art’s understanding of autonomy as an escape from norms and 
laws is coherent with this liberal signification.  
 
Chapter Four opens with the story of BP’s rebranding exercise. This example points to the 
axiomatics I discuss in this chapter; greenwashing, or what I call exemplification. This technique 
of marketing is analysed in order to discuss how contemporary art’s discursive elements, its 
content, so often promotes a progressive world view, while the effects of its actions at the level 
of what it “does”, the way it participates in a social world, or in the economy, is antithetical to 
that progressive content. This contradiction, I suggest, is at the heart of the condition of the 
Second Age of Oil; what starts as a critical counter to capital, gets taken up by capital in the 
service of marketing. The occlusion or defence of the illiberal consequences of liberal activity is 
central to Liberalism throughout history, but in its neoliberal form, this occlusion takes on a new 
character – whereby the occluded illiberalism is presented as a form of immanent critique and 
mobilised for the sake of increased legitimacy. This chapter explores how these contradictions 
emerge in the context of contemporary art, and, in fact form a central axiomatic of this genre of 
art.  
 
The final axiom of petroculture is presented in Chapter Five – this centres on the idea of 
myopia. In this chapter I take up the question of the capacity of art to produce political change, 
specifically asking how the particular can have traction at a universal level. This argument weaves 
through the abstract and concrete as it seeks to understand the way contemporary art thinks its 
relation to political change. My argument rests on the claim that due to a dissolution of genres in 
the recent history of art, the way art gains traction at more general levels of society has changed. 
Precisely, the anomie felt by many in a neoliberalised society – whereby the social and legal 
institutions that would ostensibly be there to support an individual’s challenge to political power 
have withered – tracks directly on to the world of art. The massive economic growth 
underwritten by the oil industries in the latter part of the twentieth and early part of the twenty 
first centuries has been centrally important for the exacerbation of this anomie. Ratcheting 
inequalities and the disenfranchisement of significant proportions of society has caused many to 
lose faith in their political capacities, and retreat into the field of change they do have immediate 
access to – themselves. This move is coherent with a move in the history of art, to understand 
this as a form of myopia helps us articulate a critical perspective on political responses and their 
liberal framing.  
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The final chapter in this thesis embarks on a critique of Liberalism as it describes images of the 
human in the world. Holding the work of Sylvia Wynter, Reza Negarestani and Charles Sanders 
Peirce in constellation, I attempt to address some of the previous chapters’ critiques through a 
properly pragmatic approach that seeks to reinstall ideas of value beyond economic calculation. I 
also return to a discussion of norms that I had started in Chapter Three. In this chapter I give 
culture its place in the project of constructing new axiomatic statements. Within culture, we can 
commit to the ratification and elaboration of what is possible – but only, it must be noted, in 
conjunction with a material project of systemic change. Here the concept of labour, or 
commitment to a project, returns and intervenes in a discussion around history and the avant 
garde. It is my contention that European avant gardist notions of freedom from, or erasure of, 
history delimit certain conventions and descriptions, denying the labour needed to rework or 
work on the given environment. Only a project that understands the continuities present in our 
historical time can hope to provide justice. Here a demand for a revalorisation of the institutional 





























The dominant consciousness in the liberal state includes a characteristic view of the 
relation between man as an agent or a thinker and the external world, between man and 
his fellows, and between man and his work or social place. With respect to the first, it 
emphasizes the subjection of nature to human will as the ideal of action and the choice 
of the efficient means to a given ends as the exemplary procedure of reason. With regard 
to the second, it underlines the separatedness of person, the artificial character of society, 
and the ties of reciprocal need and hostility among individuals. As to the third, it focuses 
on the ambivalent value of work as a both a manifestation and a surrender of personality.  






We live in a world both ecologically and politically determined by the oil industry, an industry 
that runs on the confluence of fetishistic imaginaries of power, wealth and greed (Weszkalnys, 
2013). This industry concentrates global wealth into the hands of a small minority of 
shareholders and CEOs, acting as both a driver of inequality, and the secret excuse for ongoing 
wars waged predominantly in, and on, oil rich nation states (Beaumont and Walters, 2015). The 
impacts of the oil industry, in the form of ratcheting economic and political power, disruption to 
communities and the acceleration of anthropogenic climate change filter, as Kate Ervine (2018) 
suggests, ‘through the complex and often highly unequal social, political, and economic 
structures that define human social systems globally’ (Ervine 2018: 29). She continues, ‘efforts to 
mitigate climate change and ameliorate its impacts are likewise channelled through the very same 
structures’ (ibid.). Not only have these structures conditioned the ways in which economic and 
industrial activity operate, they determine our responses to their deleterious effects. Insofar as 
these structures also underwrite cultural phenomena, we can understand them to be compossible 
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with the cultural logics of late stage, neoliberal capitalism. It is the challenge of this thesis to 
understand how these cultural, social and political logics appear in contemporary art and how 
contemporary art seeks to produce political transformation in relation to them.  
 
As Gavin Bridge and Phillipe De Billon (2013) identify, oil is a political actor on a global scale 
and any question of political transformation must be couched in relation to oil and its marginal 
social costs and political effects. Oil, while being understood as a natural resource, becomes, 
through the acts of discovering, recovery, distribution and use, ‘unavoidably political’ (Bridge 
and De Billon 2013: 3), and in turn, politics becomes unmistakably oily. Discussions of “nature”, 
then, must be attenuated through discussions of power and politics. The downstream 
externalities of oil production and distribution – pollution – and the actions of oil industrial 
capital reproduce power differentials through, as Ervine suggests, colonial superiority:  
 
Colonizing territories and peoples around the world; privatizing, extracting, and stealing 
their resources; turning communities and families into slaves to be brutalized and sold 
like common cattle; and demanding servitude so that imperialist nations could prosper – 
these were the prices to be paid to feed limitless expansion. Accompanied by discourses 
of European and American cultural and racial superiority, which lent credence to the 
belief that colonialism offered the “gift” of civilization and modernity to the world’s 
“backwards” and “barbaric” peoples, it is the historical processes of colonialism and 
imperialism, and the specific geography that came with them, that set in motion the 
evolution of capitalist economic growth as a highly uneven system dependent on 
exploitation. 
(Ervine 2018: 45) 
 
The concept of limitlessness, that legitimises the continued exploitation of land, bodies and 
labour though “civilising” narratives that hold the “virtue” of economic freedom as justification, 
forecloses claims of indigenous populations to justice, preventing reparative decolonialist action. 
However, it is also, precisely these narratives that come to determine well-meaning attempts to 
mitigate or ameliorate the deleterious effects of the climate emergency – as I will explore in 
Chapters Four and Five the universalisation of a neutral “referent-we” of much climate activism 
reproduces the colonial structures inherent in imperial extractionism.  
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How we conceive of ourselves, our communities, the social world and broader spectra in the 
light of the colonial extractive economies and critical temporalities of the petrochemical 
industries is a fundamental question for us today.3 The future will depend in great part on how 
we construct our new energy systems, and what sorts of modes of governance can be created by 
them, or how we fail to produce these systemic changes and have to confront the results of such 
a failure. Whether we think this future is modifiable by us, as citizens/subjects/individuals, or is 
hygienically insulated from our involvement, the project of critical transformation is an 
important question. Culture is often theorised as the site of this transformation; the question of 
how culture, or more specifically contemporary art, relates to or engages with (or not) the 
broader sphere of politics emerges from presuppositions about the nature of these two spheres 
and their interactions. The challenge is to produce forms of thought and action based on an 
expanded epistemology, learning from critical theorisation about this political conjuncture. This 
first part, Chapters One and Two, will outline the political conjuncture created by the “Great 
Acceleration”,4 the increased extraction and use of liquid hydrocarbons, and how it is related to 
the ideological and economic project of neoliberalism, taking a few key world events and 
theoretical ideas as starting points for discussion – this period, from roughly 1973 until now, I 
name The Second Age of Oil. As I shall discuss in more detail later, the Second Age is 
characterised not only by the economic growth and expansion of industries underwritten by oil, 
but a so-called counter movement that sought to challenge global petro-hegemonic power. In 
this analysis I shall focus on the concepts and ideologies produced, ratified and mobilised during 
this period and aim to understand how these play into the formation of contemporary politics, 
power and culture. I understand the axiological nature of contemporary art in a specific way.  
Neither a fundamental, invariant logic, nor a contingent logic of utmost chance; the axiomatic 
logics of contemporary art are bound by historical relation to the socio-political contexts they 
emerge from and intercede into, but also maintain a semi-invariance across those contexts. Thus, 
in my analysis the Second Age of Oil provides the context for these logics to emerge. 
 
Multiple authors have engaged broadly in questions around critical art practices and the 
biosphere, oil production and its subsequent deleterious effects on the planetary ecosystem, the 
 
3 Of course, any use of the words “us” and “we” here must be put in scare quotes to indicate their problematic 
usage in the history of discussions such as this. I will address this later in the thesis. 
4 This is a term employed by scientists to describe the dramatic uptick of human impact on the surface of the 
globe. Generally considered to be congruent with the rapid economic expansion from the 1950s until now, this 
acceleration has been recorded on the impact to climate, ocean acidification, terrestrial biosphere degradation 
and fish capture. For more information see: http://www.futureearth.org/blog/2015-jan-16/great-acceleration 
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relation between oil politics and culture, questions of transformation of current political 
conjunctures and the growth of financialised neoliberalism and its relation to the petroleum 
market. This thesis is concerned with these issues and more, as a point of entry below is a short, 
and not exhaustive, review of the growing literature in these fields. 
 
There is an abundance of scholarship on the relation between oil, economics and politics, some 
such as Bridge and Le Billon (2013), Collier (2010), Di Muzio (2015), Engdahl (2004), Heinberg 
(2005), Malm (2016), Mitchell (2013) Roberts (2005), Silverstein (2014), Smith-Nonini (2016), 
Weszkalnys (2013) and Yergin (2008) foreground fossil fuels in discussions of political economy. 
Specifically, Bridge and Le Billon, Collier, Di Muzio, Engdahl, Mitchell, Smith-Nonini and 
Weszkalnys understand the relation between current political conjunctures and the extraction 
and burning of fossil fuels, especially oil, to be intrinsic. Mitchell and Smith-Nonini, as I shall 
discuss in some depth later, think the emergence of the global economy through the rapid 
acceleration of oil production, understanding the birth of financialised neoliberalism to be linked 
directly to issues of energy sovereignty, oil wealth and the development of petroleum 
hegemonies. Di Muzio, is concerned with developing a theory of capitalism that underscores the 
importance of the carbon industries, and their effects at a civilizational level. While Engdahl, 
understands the important links between the “new world order” of oil hegemony and war, 
detailing how global geopolitical power relies heavily on the manipulation and sabotage of oil 
markets – something Mitchell is also keen to stress in his work. Equally, Yergin’s extensive study 
on the relations between oil, money and power discusses how the oil industry has been utilised in 
the production of mastery over nature and populations. An interesting approach that provided a 
starting point for this research and continues to haunt it is the multiple works of Negarestani 
(2008 and 2011). These theory fiction works understand oil as a lubricant of the historical 
emergence of capitalism – a point ratified by Mitchell – coming from a background of 
speculative thought these discussions are concerned with, variably, constructing a true to the 
earth realism, understanding the geopolitical as emerging from the tentacular pipelines of oil and 
the solar economy as central to the emergence of global capitalism.  
 
Equally significant are ecocritical studies of capitalism from the perspective of growing concern 
around ecological changes and global warming/climate change, specifically looking at concepts 
of the Anthropocene/Capitalocene. Some important work has been done in recent years from, 
among others: Argyrou (2005), who looks at the logics inherent in the environmental movement 
and understanding ecological crises through the lens of postcolonialism; Bommeuil and Baptiste 
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(2017), whose analysis underscores the shocking nature of the realisation of the human 
involvement in planetary degradation that came with the birth of the term “Anthropocene”; 
Costanza, Graumlich and Steffan (2011), whose work extends the discussion started in the early 
1970s by the Club of Rome’s important classic Limits to Growth and ask questions about the most 
critical problem facing human life in the next century – planetary degradation due to climate 
collapse. Moore’s (2015) work on ecology and the accumulation of capital understands the 
development of global capital through a lens of human and natural co-production, capitalism is 
seen as a process of organising nature to the extent that the law of value becomes the governing 
logic of the natural world; Klein (2014) and Stern (2015) take a more journalistic approach to 
discussions of climate change and the necessity to alter critical aspects of our global economy, 
while Wright and Nyberg (2015) are keen to stress the role of corporate power in the growing 
ecological crisis. Bookchin (1994), Cooper (2008), Gorz (2012), Guattari (2005), Robbins (2012), 
and Schmidt (2014) take broader looks at political ecology, the relation between nature and 
capital accumulation and the rise of current socio-political conditions. Whereas, Northcott 
(2013) takes the unusual approach to provide discussions of climate crisis and global capital from 
a theological perspective. Haraway (2016) and Mies and Shiva (2014) provide important 
discussions of ecological degradation through a feminist lens, while Vergès (in Johnson and 
Lubin, 2017), Yusoff (2018) and McKee (2017) provide racialized understandings of the effects 
of climate collapse, specifically drawing on concepts of decolonisation that will become 
important in the latter part of this thesis.  
 
The literature on the relation between art and the oil industries is small, but growing in recent 
years; Bloom (2015), Wilson, Carlson and Szeeman eds. (2017), and artist collectives/activist 
groups Imagine 2020, Liberate Tate and Platform have engaged this issue, all working on the 
edges of the art or cultural field to discuss concepts of green/art-washing, cultures beyond oil 
dependency and how art operates to produce political transformation. But specifically, these 
theorists and artist groups discuss oil through the lens of its biophysical deleterious effects; 
missing, is an art theoretical engagement with the modes by which cultural formations appear 
out of the political conditions created by the oil industries. What is much more prevalent are 
studies of ecocriticism from the site of art and culture, work on the relation between art and the 
anthropocene/capitalocene and much more generally, and with a longer historical trajectory, 
philosophical studies on the relation between culture and nature. The first two areas of critical 
analysis are provided by, amongst others, Araeen (2010) whose work imagines an ecoaesthetics 
that transforms aspects of contemporary art and current politics, Demos (2017) whose work 
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takes a critical look at visual culture and the environment, specifically understanding the former 
as more than just an awareness raising tool, but one that can be intrinsic in the move beyond the 
fossil fuel economy, and Miller (2018), whose recent work on the role of culture in the practice 
of greenwashing complements Wright and Nyberg’s arguments about corporate responsibility 
and marketing. 
 
In a significant sense, this thesis is not concerned with repeating these somewhat limited 
arguments about the roles of art and culture in combatting climate collapse. There is something 
myopic about assuming that art or visual culture has significant traction on this complex global 
issue without providing a nuanced and complex argument as to precisely how cultural processes 
and phenomenon have that political traction. As Gabriel Rockhill (2014) analyses, a significant 
shortcoming of recent debates around art and politics is how the relation between artwork and 
the social world has been theorised. Inherent in these discussions, Rockhill suggests, is the risk 
of bracketing out the ‘intricate social relations at work in aesthetic and political practices’ 
(Rockhill 2014: 6). In these instances, the social world is disregarded, focussing on the assumed 
capacity for works of art to make leaps into the abyss of political action. As he suggests: 
  
By setting aside to a greater or lesser extent the social world – and hence the political 
realm as it is commonly understood – the politics of art is largely reduced to the magical 
powers of talisman-like objects to more or less miraculously produce political 
consequences (or fail to do so). 
(Rockhill 2014: 6) 
 
Instead, I attempt here to provide a multiple and variegated discussion about the logics inherent 
in contemporary art and the political space created by the global oil industry – learning lessons 
from unusual sources in the literature around political ecology. This is not to suggest that art can, 
or should, provide the site for climate collapse amelioration, but that we must account for the 
modes by which culture extends and amplifies logics that emerge from the petropolitical, and 
how we might attempt to think beyond those logics – or indeed, to mobilise counter logics. 
Equally, this thesis is not limited to an engagement with the literature mentioned above; as we 
shall discover later the discussion ranges through multiple discursive fields, during which key 
literature will be discussed at some length.  
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No discussion about the nature, politics and downstream effects of the extraction and burning of 
liquid hydrocarbons for energy would be complete without an acknowledgement of the term 
“anthropocene”. Highly championed in the humanities as the new framing concept for 
contemporary thought, the term was coined by atmospheric chemist Paul Crutzen and biologist 
Eugene Stoermer in 2000 as a way to describe an epoch of geological time coterminous with 
human activity on the planet. The concept names not only geological and temporal dimensions, 
but, as it is so often employed in the humanities, a dimension of existential crisis. It throws into 
doubt our collective future, asking how it is possible to exist on a planet that we are in the 
process of destroying. It would seem, as McKenzie Wark puts it, to be almost impossible to 
‘think of a social or political future without thinking about the Anthropocene’ (Wark, 2015). 
Indeed, anthropocene names a way of thinking about our world that at one and the same time 
throws us into a state of shock, and forces us into action or paralyses us with fear (Bommeuil 
and Baptiste, 2017). However, as there have been numerous, and far reaching studies to date that 
deal with the anthropocene in exhaustive depth and breadth I shall not attempt a lengthy 
exegesis here, nor claim that this thesis is within the field of “anthropocenic thought”. Instead, I 
will focus on the industrial extraction, trade and burning of liquid hydrocarbons, and how these 
have produced a very specific set of political conditions, not just the downstream externalities of 
these activities, such as pollution and climate change, but specifically how petrodollars came to 
be recycled into what we now know as the finance economy and how the conditions of our 
political situations were in part determined by the geopolitical hegemony formed during the 
period of accelerated economic growth in the latter part of the twentieth century.  
 
At the heart of the attitude of the agents of oil extraction there is a fundamentalism, what Naomi 
Klein calls “extractivism” (Klein, 2014), a cultural worldview of dominance over nature.5 Oil not 
only produces forms of political organisation, but inculcates a type of subjectivity. Central to my 
study will be an understanding of oil as the key historical author of forms of subjectivity and of 
capitalism that, as both the lubricant of accelerated socio-economic growth and planetary disaster 
has accelerated both our expansion and our potential demise.  
 
This double nature of oil is important; at one and the same time it is the historical remedy to 
economic stagnation and the significant actor in global ecological catastrophe – not to mention 
the cause of (or prize in) multiple, on-going military interventions. Capitalism is intrinsically 
duplicitous in this way, what it gives with one hand, it takes away with another, leaving both 
 
5 For an extensive overview of the literature on the domination of nature see Northcott (2014). 
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economic prosperity (for some) and socio-ecological degradation (for others) in its wake. As 
Vergés (in Johnson and Lubin, 2017) points out, climate catastrophe hits the poorest populations 
(often these populations are racialised) the hardest, however, the effects of ecological decline will 
have profound and unprecedented socio-political effects on all but a very small proportion of 
the world’s population. As such, the further downstream we travel in the narrative of oil, the 
greater and greater the level of inequality we find. This is true both when we consider the 
geographical sites of oil exploitation, as is evidenced by what is often known as the “resource 
curse”,6 and those most adversely affected by climate catastrophe. According to a study 
published in Nature magazine, global economic production is adversely affected by just a few 
degrees rise in global temperature (Burke, Hsiang, Miguel 2015). The implications of this are 
huge, the authors of the report describe the effects of climate change on the planet as a massive 
transfer of wealth from the hotter south to the cooler global north. Journalists, political theorists, 
and economists from Nicholas Stern to Naomi Klein, from Michael S. Northcott to Timothy 
Mitchell, agree that current capitalist practices are borrowing not just from the poorest regions of 
the globe, but from our very future; as the global surface temperatures rise to levels not seen in 
human history, life on the planet will become increasingly precarious, especially for those in the 
global south. As Vergès suggests, we must integrate the long history of colonialism into our 
discussions of the Anthropocene; it is only possible to transform nature into cheap resource 
through the labour of people of colour, and through understanding how the catastrophic 
environmental change precipitated by the burning of fossil fuels unequally affects poorer, 
racialised populations (Vergès in Johnson and Lubin, 2017). 
 
Global economic inequality and racial and gender divisions will be exacerbated by global 
warming, just as they have been through the capitalisation on the oil market that has led to 
increased capital accumulation for a small minority and the very basis of the system of 
exploitation will be ineradicably reduced by environmental exhaustion. However, despite 
neoclassical economics’ inbuilt temporal limit, its “future myopia”, surely systemic destruction of 
the very material resources, both “natural” and human, that it relies on is undesirable? This thesis 
argues that economic praxis, what Mitchell calls “economentality” (Mitchell, 2014), is precisely 
the limit to thinking of the natural world as a finite resource of intrinsic value to be protected 
 
6 The resource curse names a well-known tendency in oil rich countries whereby what should be seen as a gift, 
becomes a curse as it impacts governance and democracy, creating often violent or ultra-capitalist conditions. 
See Paul Collier (2010) for an indepth discussion of this. The important point to remember is that having oil (or 
any natural resource in abundance) makes your country ripe for colonisation. The curse is not so much a curse, 
as a target.  
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and is the condition for (eco)systemic destruction.  As such, I shall trace the history of our 
current period through the twin pillars of the fossil fuel industry (specifically oil) and the 
politico-economic system developed and employed in the last fifty years, what could be called 
neoliberalism. I mark the 1970s as the decade of radical change, pinpointing key world events, 
policy developments, publications and shifts in cultural attention as markers of that change. As 
artist Stan Douglas suggests in the press release for a 2001 exhibition at David Zwirner gallery, 
the current global distributions of power were the ‘secret meaning of the 1970s’ (Douglas, 2001). 
The period from then until now shall be henceforth known as the “Second Age of Oil”.  This 
chapter is an explication of that shift to the Second Age, marking an intrinsic, but increasingly 
disturbing relation between our socio-politico-economic activity and the ‘Tellurian lube’ of oil 
(Negarestani, 2008).  
 
Oil isn’t just the backdrop to capitalist realism,7 but the very lubricant of it. Reciprocally, 
capitalism’s logics structure the processes by which we extract millennia old, decayed, vegetable 
matter and burn it for energy, releasing such significant levels of carbon into the atmosphere we 
risk causing runaway greenhouse effects that are already causing global species death, increased 
social and economic tensions as migration is increasing due to areas of the globe already 
becoming unliveable and the terminal destruction of wildlife, habitats and indeed vistas of 
imagination as our landscapes are changing irreparably . Thus, we may be entreated to replace 
the term “anthropocene”, laying the responsibility as it does at the door of the whole of the 
“anthropos”, privatising and localising such responsibility, with “capitalocene”, a speculative 
term deployed by Moore (2015 and 2016), Haraway (2016) (although she moves beyond it 
towards a more speculative “chthulucene”) and others to indicate where exactly they see the 
blame for this crisis to lie. Capitalocene, like the name suggests, indicates how the responsibility 
should be held by capitalism and capitalists, not the whole of human kind (who have unevenly 
contributed to the crisis). 
 
As a note here, it is increasingly difficult to discuss these issues without using language that 
seems hyperbolic, but the urgency of this is such that language at times appears to break down. 
The emotional responses to severe climate collapse as our species faces a significant threat to its 
future existence, drives, in large parts, cultural responses. Climate collapse mitigation is deeply 
complex, and because amelioration relies on a large scale, multilateral agreement that may have 
to curtail the economic freedoms that many of us assume we enjoy, despair amongst many 
 
7 Mark Fisher (2009) provides an extended discussion of this idea 
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communities seems rampant. Thus, anthropocenic shock results in planetary depression. The 
way a response to this manifests in individuals is symptomatic of the ideological frame of 
neoliberalism; privatised responsibility (energy saving light bulbs, reduced personal carbon 
emissions, recycling, etc), while offering localised, affective amelioration, is at best limited and at 
worst limiting. It is coherent to argue that the ideology of personal responsibility for saving the 
earth from the climate emergency removes the political dimension from the debate, making it 
only a matter of ethical personhood. This will be returned to in Chapter Five.   
 
To understand the complexities of the Second Age of Oil, a manifold construction is needed. As 
a world increasingly shaped by multiple technological, social, geophysical, ecological, political, 
economic and cultural actors the Second Age is complex in nature and cannot be grasped from 
one perspective alone. This is important. It is only because of the increasing sophistication of 
technological measurement and climate modelling that we can understand climate at a macro 
level, as opposed to only weather at a micro level; computational modelling is vital (Edwards, 
2010). Just as vital, is the capacity to combine and extend multiple epistemologies and 
cosmologies, not just rely on pre-existing and connected knowledges – thus, a multidisciplinary 
approach is necessary. At stake is an epistemic expansion; techno-scientific knowledge about the 
role oil has played in the construction of our politics is paramount to the way we can move 
beyond this particular paradigm. But knowledge alone is not enough, we cannot rely solely on 
the revelation of contradiction or on critique. Any theory of change must combine both theory 
and practice, so, while this thesis takes a theoretical approach, it is with the understanding that 
the social world is influenced by our practical interventions. 
 
The beginning of The Second Age of Oil is marked a number of key events that have been 
important to the construction of our current ideological paradigm and indicate oil’s importance 
in the shaping of this new world. They are: the publication in 1972 of The Limits to Growth by the 
Club of Rome and its subsequent reception (including the increasing popularity of the 
environmental movement); the Yom Kippur War/Oil Embargo of 1973-4 and resulting “oil 
shock” which saw the price per barrel rise by 400%; the “Nixon shock”, a series of economic 
measures undertaken in 1971 onwards that saw the unilateral divorce of the American dollar 
from its convertibility to gold (the end of the Gold Standard); the entry of neoliberal economic 
ideas into policy in the 1970s, including, but not limited to, the Chilean experiment, Thatcher’s 
and Reagan’s elections in 1979 and 1981 respectively; and, the increasing cultural attention paid 
to issues of environment, global warming, peak oil and nuclear proliferation. In my reading of 
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this period three “projects” occur concurrently; the Second Age of Oil, neoliberalism and the 
historical “genre” we call contemporary art. It is not the intention to draw direct parallels 
between each project, but to show their linkages, complicities and compatibilities. One important 
historical development is the rise of finance capitalism and how this implicates both oil and art 
as commodities, as I shall explore in Chapter Two, this relies less on the production than the 
circulation of commodities, whereby profit is extracted through transactions within financial, not 
“real”, markets. The implications for democracy are significant.  
 
 
1.2 PetroPolitics Not Democratisation 
 
 
At between 5000 and 8000 feet below the surface of the earth deep wells of liquid hydrocarbon, 
the decayed and pressurised matter of long dead vegetation, has provided us with almost 200 
years of incredibly cheap accelerated economic growth – identified by Jason W. Moore (2015) as 
one of the “four cheaps”, energy as drawn from fossil fuels has provided opportunities for 
capitalist accumulation for nearly two centuries. Beginning in the mid 1800s, the Age of Oil is 
implicated in the development of global capitalism and current forms of governance. Doing 
justice to the myriad ways this occurs is beyond the scope of this study, but I shall begin by 
picking out a few key examples of how oil and politics are intrinsically connected. As Timothy 
Mitchell (20130) asserts, ‘fossil fuels helped create both the possibility of modern democracy and 
its limits’ (Mitchell, 2013; 1). Mitchell identifies not only a deficit of so called democracy in 
countries that are rich in oil, in the Middle East for example, but the way that the very extraction 
and trade of “black gold” is intrinsically tied into the construction of democracies around the 
world.8 We might wish to amend the term democracy here, that in fact the form of governance 
we experience with the birth of the oil age is not simply democracy, but rather a version of 
democracy conditioned by oil backed capitalist accumulation. Indeed, as Mitchell suggests, 
energy is a significant factor in the production of a new form of governance, that of the 
economy. In what follows I will begin to unpack how this form of administration via the 




8 For a discussion of the “resource curse” and expansion of “democracy” into resource rich nations, see Collier 
(2010) 
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Mitchell traces an historical narrative through the radical transformation of the energy industries, 
from coal to oil and, to a lesser extent, unconventional forms of extractive technologies, such as 
hydraulic fracturing (fracking) and strip mining. Modern democracy and the use of fossil fuels at 
a global scale are both recent phenomena, both appearing, according to Mitchell, in the late 1700 
and early 1800s. The birth of the new age of extractive technology, and famously the start of the 
Industrial Revolution came in 1775 when Boulton and Watt pioneered a new form of efficient 
steam engine that made the extraction and transportation of coal quicker, safer and easier 
(Mitchell, 2015: 13).  Heralding an age of exponential supply, energy was freed from its locality. 
For the first time in human history energy was easily transportable great distances, allowing for 
massive infrastructural and political expansion, not to mention a level of personal freedom 
previously not experienced. No longer were populations tied to large areas of land required for 
the production of grain for their animals, or woodland for fuel (ibid.: 15).   
 
With the advent of the ability to distribute a large quantity of energy in the form of coal, came 
the concentration of the production and ownership of that energy into the hands of a smaller 
proportion of the population. This ‘apparatus of energy supply’ (ibid.: 19), the infrastructure 
required to transport coal, built the democratic politics of the late nineteenth and twentieth 
century. Not just concentrating enormous wealth in specific geographical locations, but within 
the hands of specific individuals. As energy became a necessity, coal producers, much like oil 
producers today, had a monopoly on the market. Unlike today, however, the politics of coal 
played an important role in the democratisation of the labour force, and wider society. Whereas, as 
we shall see later, the exploration and extraction of oil required the colonial spread of a brand of 
Westernised “democracy” to oil producing nations, coal production intrinsically relied on a level 
of worker autonomy that came to challenge the control of private employers. By exploiting the 
ability to ‘slow, disrupt or cut off [the] supply’ of coal, miners were able to leverage industrial 
action as a mode of political power (ibid.: 19). Levels of militancy and strike action rose 
considerably between 1881 and 1905. Relying heavily on the internal architecture of mines 
themselves, workers were able to defend their autonomy precisely because they were, in the 
depths of the mines, separated from supervision. Capable of making their own decisions and 
forming close bonds within the labour force, Mitchell suggests, miners made significant demands 
on the democratic power of the day. Precisely because coal was intrinsically tied into the means 
of production, networked so extensively through national and international infrastructure, and 
miners could leverage new forms of political consciousness that was emerging, these demands 
forced power to listen. Thus, democratic politics became structured around industrial action as 
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the method of political change. Except in unionised industries, the political landscape is 
considerably different today. In part, as we will discover, this is due to changes to labour power 
enacted by a shift from coal to oil. 
 
As oil is liquid energy, drawn from the earth as crude and refined into multiple forms, kerosene, 
petroleum, polymers, it is transportable in much greater quantity far more efficiently than coal. It 
is driven to the surface under pressure, and does not need large quantities of human labour to 
extract it. As such, once oil is discovered, labour power is considerably reduced, workers are in 
closer proximity to supervision, and power within the production and transportation of this 
precious commodity is greatly concentrated (Mitchell, 2015: 36). The introduction of pipelines 
made it increasingly difficult for workers to disrupt or cut off the supply of energy, making 
industrial action or militancy near ineffective (except, as we shall see later, as part of a purposeful 
self-sabotage by the oil companies to reduce supply on to the global market). Furthermore, oil 
was far more easily shipped worldwide, making it a key player in geopolitics, not to mention in 
military expansion. As Bridge and Le Billon (2013) explain, oil has a much higher calorific value 
than other sources of energy, it ‘packs a greater energy punch than coal or natural gas: nearly 
twice as much as coal by weight, and around 50 percent more than liquefied natural gas by 
volume’ (Bridge and Le Billon  2013: 8). Meaning that greater quantities of energy can be 
transported more efficiently and reliably than ever before, and can be used to fuel faster and 
more powerful engines. At the beginning of the twentieth century oil not only provided the 
means by which to accumulate significant wealth, and to expand the global reach of power, but 
was precisely the commodity capable of delinking labour power from political power. No more could 
fossil capital be held to account by labour. Through the simple introduction of a new source of 
easily extracted, cheap energy, the face of local and global politics shifted decidedly in the favour 
of capital. 
 
Governing this new resource relied on a concerted effort of control and manipulation. 
Comparatively few regions of the globe give easy access to usable oil fields, the Middle East 
being one of the largest such oil fields, and as such, new forms of democratic politics had to be 
developed to convince those nation states to grant the already industrialised nations access. As 
Mitchell asserts, large scale military power, while available, was too expensive and ineffective a 
method of control (Mitchell, 2013: 68). Instead, a new instrument was used; self-determination. 
Made rich by the accelerated growth endowed upon them by coal, industrialised nations in the 
global north were able to exert their imperial power over much of the world. Utilising a political 
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instrument that was developed during industrial action, that of autonomy, these developed nations 
could export a form of democracy to oil rich nations as a way to usurp ruling ideologies in those 
nations. Self-determination, or individual freedom, became an ideological concept that came to 
undermine pre-existing non-democratic power. This form of liberalisation bore with it the 
aggressive programme of accumulation known as capitalism. Mitchell tells us: 
 
The principle of self-rule was not […] in contradiction with the idea of empire. On the 
contrary, the need for self-government could provide, paradoxically, a new justification 
for overseas settlement and control, because only the European presence in colonised 
territories made a form of self-rule possible. 
(Mitchell, 2013: 71) 
 
Drawing on J. A. Hobson’s study of imperialism, Mitchell shows how a minority of European 
imperialists were able to put a large portion of the world under a “democratic” form of rule, 
precisely because they believed that these “backward” nations were unable to govern themselves 
and needed training in this regard. Thus, came the linkage between the oil industry and racialised 
domination. According to Vandana Shiva, because natural resources needed to be developed by 
human activity – technology, inventiveness and industry – oil gave the alibi for colonial 
expansion. As she suggests, ‘[s]ince nature needed to be ‘developed’ by humans, people had also 
to be developed from their primitive, backward states of embeddedness in nature’ (Shiva in 
Sachs 2010: 229). For nature to be manipulated into useable material resource, Western powers 
had to “civilize” those deemed to be “wild”.  
 
European and American interests had to build a governing body that could administrate these 
nations newly under political and economic control. In 1917 The Labour Memorandum on War 
Aims was drawn up. Expressly devoted to the project of expanding individual freedoms abroad 
in line with similar expansions at home (in response to industrial action and social disruption at 
home and the two Russian revolutions) the Memorandum called for ‘“the complete 
democratization of all countries” which required “the placing of foreign policy, just as much as 
home policy, under the control of popularly elected Legislatures”’ (Mitchell 2013: 76). One 
innovation of the Memorandum was the League of Nations, which would become the 
administrator of dependent territories, the required governing body was born. It operated as ‘an 
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economic mechanism to replace, not war between states, but its taproot – the conflict over 
material resources’ (ibid.: 75).9  
 
The list of war aims expressed in Labour’s Memorandum were translated by the Liberal Prime 
Minister Lloyd George into a principle of self-determination based on the “consent of the 
governed”. The Labour document had mentioned neither principles, but had spoken of a 
process of democratisation. As Mitchell says, ‘[d]emocracy had been won at home not by 
manufacturing the consent of the governed, but by developing the means to withhold consent – in 
particular through the threat of general strike’ (ibid.: 79, my italics).  Lloyd George’s translation 
of the memorandum explicitly exported a form of democracy that required no process of 
democratisation to occur, instead, applied it as a set of logics to be followed, thus allowing 
restructuring programmes to employ concepts of democracy as a mode of manufacturing consent. 
 
One key aspect of the desire to expand the international oil trade to these dependent territories 
was the necessity to exert political control whilst simultaneously occluding it. As such, 
democracy born from the manufactured consent of the governed became the tool to secure the 
agreement vital to international trade. This form of governance was parachuted into multiple 
Middle Eastern countries as a cut and paste set of operations, without recourse to the specifics 
of the nation state nor its culture. As Cornelius Castoriadis suggests in his analysis of the relation 
between governance and the individual, this conception of democracy as a ‘mere set of 
“procedures”’ is so closely tied to ‘what is rather ridiculously called contemporary 
“individualism”’ that it is unable to think democracy as a process of socialisation (Castoriadis, 
1997: 1). Instead, this form of democracy is intrinsic to an imperial project of political and 
economic liberalisation that holds central the concept of individual freedom as a totem rather 
than a process of liberation. Giorgio Agamben describes this form of democracy as the economic-
managerial paradigm. Instead of being a process of legitimation, democracy became a ‘technique 
of governing’ (Agamben, 2009: 1), suggesting it would be naïve to imagine democracy as a way 
of constituting politics through an intrinsic relation between people and the law. Human 
freedom is imagined as a subset of democratic rule, that can be applied without the concurrent 
“democratisation” of the social. Politics, then gets reduced to the application of procedures, not 
a battle between the people and the state as constituted by the law. Opposed to this conception, 
 
9 After the Second World War the League was replaced by the United Nations, which sought to control 
international finance and investment through The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, but 
without the democratic elements the labour movement proposed in the Memorandum (Mitchell, 2013: 77). 
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Castoriadis describes “democracy as a regime” as a substantive and ongoing project of 
reproduction, a project of social modification that involves a collectivity. “True” democracy is 
thus an open regime of participation, not a postulate given over to individuals from above. He 
asserts there can be no democratic society without socialisation and the recursive instauration of 
democratic institutions.  
 
Democracy as a regime is therefore the regime that tries to achieve, as far as it possibly 
can, both individual and collective autonomy and the common good such as it is 
conceived by the collectivity in each particular case. 
(Castoriadis, 1997: 16) 
 
The democracy exported to the Middle East as put forward by Mitchell is the form described by 
Castoriadis as a mere set of procedures. We must understand this as a project inherently tied to the 
exploration and mining of fossil fuels and other precious resources, but overwhelmingly to liquid 
hydrocarbon extraction. Democracy thus becomes a tool in the arsenal of major oil importing 
corporations and nations, heralding in a new age of individualism precisely as a mode of 
economic expropriation, hand in hand with liberalism’s imperial tendencies. As Domenico 
Losurdo (2014) tells us in his far-reaching counter history of liberalism,  
 
While for some peoples it involved subjection to a form of servile labour, for others 
“master-race-democracy”, which was now on the point of becoming established on a 
planetary scale, issued in decimation or destruction. 
(Losurdo, 2014: 229) 
 
Liberal politics, born from a domestic project of winning freedom against one’s masters, 
instrumentalised this freedom as an article of faith to be professed by the “liberating” European 
and American forces. However, as Losurdo suggests, recalling John Stuart Mill’s Utilitarianism, 
freedom really only applied to those with the required level of maturity, and not for the 
inhabitants of nations under British colonial rule. As Jodi Dean has written more recently, 
democracy employs the same logic as capitalism; she asserts, ‘contemporary democratic language 
employs and reinforces the rhetoric of capitalism: free choice, liberty, satisfaction, 
communication, connection, diversity’ (Dean in Bowman and Stamp, 2011: 74). These sets of 
axiological relations between capitalism and democracy allowed, historically, the introduction of 
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the former under the guise of the latter, heralding in the association between liberal democracy 
and capitalism.  
 
Linking democracy to a form of economistic thinking, Kirsten Ross’ (Ross in Agamben and 
McCuaig 2012) analysis understands the way democracy has come to indicate a numerical 
calculation – the rule of the greatest number – as opposed to a conception of it as a form of 
‘potentiality or enablement: the capacity of ordinary people to discover modes of action for 
realizing common concerns’ (ibid.: 89). The obsession with democracy as an expression of 
calculation rather than a mode of political struggle that foregrounds the ability of anyone to 
participate in the process of governance is, as Ross points out, a modern development. Counter 
to the modern, liberal frame, ancient democracy was conditioned by the power of the demos, 
which was ‘neither the power of the population nor its majority but rather the power of 
anybody. Anybody is as entitled to govern as he or she is to be governed’ (ibid.). The cold 
calculus of modern democracy, bound by majority rule, shares its DNA with the liberal 
conception of the individual. As Noberto Bobbio (2005) explains, the relation between liberalism 
and democracy revolves around the ways they understand the relation of the individual to 
society. As he suggests: 
 
Liberalism amputates the individual from the organic body, makes him live – at least for 
much of his life – outside the maternal womb, plunges him into the unknown and 
perilous world of the struggle for survival. Democracy joins him together once more 
with others like himself, so that society can be built up again from their union, no longer 
as an organic whole, but as an association of free individuals. Liberalism defends and 
proclaims individual liberty as against the state, in both the spiritual and the economic 
sphere; democracy reconciles individual and society by making society the project of a 
common agreement between individuals. 
(Bobbio 2005: 43) 
 
However, as Bobbio continues, liberal democracy, a form of democracy differentiated from, for 
example, socialist democracy, foregrounds a defence of the individualist insistence on private 
property and economic freedom. Liberal democracy, thus, in an analysis shared by Roberto 
Unger (1975), is bound by the conception of the individual as separated from the society that she 
is democratically mandated to participate in forming. Socialist democracy, in Bobbio’s eyes, is 
therefore preferable to liberalism precisely because it is (a) bound by a mandate devised by the 
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people in ways that liberal (or, as he calls it capitalist democracy, is not), (b) allows the all men 
and women to participate in decisions of an economic nature (whereas liberal democracy 
forecloses this process from the people), and (c) expands not just political power to the people 
(as in liberal democracy) but a more equal redistribution of economic power as a mode of 
redistributing political power. Liberalism, because of its insistence on private property and 
economic freedom cannot provide the basis for this economic redistribution. Instead, it 
privileges the demands of capital over the demands of the people, and redraws democratic 
commitments to the individual’s capacity to intervene in the creation of society in line with 
capitalism’s wishes to be exempt from control by the people.  
 
Democracy’s modern liberal framework, as described by Chantal Mouffe (2005), foregrounds the 
central notions of liberal discourse. As Mouffe suggests, liberalism and democracy, although 
bound together in this historical period, are constitutively different. The liberal tradition, 
exemplified by ‘the rule of law, the defence of human rights and the respect of individual liberty’ 
(Mouffe 2005: 3) should be disentangled from the main ideas of the democratic tradition; 
‘equality, identity between governing and governed and popular sovereignty’ (ibid.). These two 
competing logics, Mouffe argues, are incompatible in the last instance, providing liberal 
democracy with an unreconcilable tension between liberty and equality. It is the contingent 
hegemonic stabilisation of this tension that provides each era with its particular character – 
neoliberalism then, emerges as a specific interpretation of this tension, challenging the viability of 
democratic institutions with an insistence on individual liberty over equality. However, as Mouffe 
suggests, the particular rendition of this stabilisation in neoliberalism, specifically the Clinton-
Blair nexus, relies on a deliberative consensus. Drawing on Rawls and Habermas, Mouffe, in a 
well-known formulation, critiques the neoliberal, deliberative model that seeks to avoid, occlude 
or resolve tension between individual rights and equality. Her claim to agonistic pluralism poses 
a counter to the third-wayism that dominated this era, precisely understanding agonism as the 
site of political discourse and recognition. She argues that third-way politics delimits the demos 
to those who apriori agree with the rational principles of deliberation, understanding rationality to 
be the deciding factor in determining who is “in” or “out” of political discourse. Under this 
rubric, then, those deemed “unreasonable” would be disincluded. As I will outline in Chapter 
Six, this disinclusion so often happens along racial, class or geographical lines as certain subjects 
are seen as “unreasonable”. In many senses, the distinction between reasonable and 
unreasonable also falls along lines demarcated by neoliberal capital. As I will explore in Chapter 
Two, rational economic interest delimits engagement in the game of politics insofar as those who 
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appear not to follow economic logics – perhaps because other values are more important – are 
seen to be irrational and thus incapable of participating in democratic politics. Thus, democracy 
as such, when seen not to be adhering to economic principles, gets undermined. As Mouffe 
suggests, the deliberative model that seeks consensus, and in the process occludes the power 
relations at play, jeopardises democracy (ibid.: 31). As democracy gets emptied out by liberal 
consensus politics, it signifies not struggle between opposing forces, but a non-adversarial form 
of technical management – a feature of neoliberalism – coherent with the above description of 
democracy as a set of procedures to be followed no matter what national context they are 
applied to. Technical management emerges here as a form of expertise applicable within 
petropolitical contexts, providing pragmatic or economic legitimation for extractive activities, 
whereby the management of resources outside the frame of adversarial politics adheres to logics 
of economisation. 
 
Drawing on Rimaud’s poem “Démocratie”, Ross (Ross in Agamben and McCuaig 2012) 
understands how democracy has shifted its meaning over time, from the idea of democracy as 
‘the demands of the peuple [sic] in a national class struggle’ to a situation whereby democracy is 
being used to ‘justify the colonial policies of the “civilized lands” in a struggle on an international 
scale between the `west and the rest, the civilized and the noncivilized’ (Ross in Agamben 2012: 
95). This shift has occurred, it is clear, coterminous with the preponderance of liberal democracy; 
precisely in line with capital’s demands for the expansion of its territory. As such, democracy acts 
as a banner or slogan; a proof of civilisation, a marketing tool in the toolbox of colonial 
capitalism. International development, the spread of democratic forms, and global governance 
utilises the term and idea of democracy in order to justify their extractive and exploitative 
behaviours.  
 
Insofar as it shares a set of features, liberal democracy is tied to the petropolitical, the two are 
mutually reinforcing; the liberal focus on consensus and economic rationality provides the 
conditions for greater exploitative expansion, without the radical demands that democracy would 
bring. Thus, Petropolitics becomes a politics only in name, a politics devoid of adversaries, a 
managerial mode of governance tied closely to the administration of the economy and the 
generation of consensus.  
 
Petropolitics is a reduction of the political to forms of consensual, managerialism, reliant not on 
the concept of disagreement between parties but the preprescribed association between resource 
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and capital value. Constructed on a global scale to intervene in the body politic of nations rich in 
natural resources, it brings with it both economic rationality (what we might term market 
fundamentalism) and the promise of individual freedoms for the population. But, sworn over on 
the back of these promises, it extorts and plunders, expropriating surplus value from below the 
surface of the earth and turns this value into, on the one hand, capital assets for a relatively small 
number of shareholders and CEOs, and the on other, negative downstream externalities in the 
form of CO2 emissions that further degrade the commons, disproportionally affecting the poor 
and populations of the global south. It is a politics won not through withholding consent, such 
as in industrial action, but through the manufacturing of consent by a ruling class for their own 
financial benefit. Accordingly, petroleum has weakened the democratic agency that was gained 
during the period when coal was the predominant energetic resource, resulting in the 
organisation of politics according not to the general will of the population, but to an instrument 
of organisation known as the economy.  
 
Oriented towards a certain, and perverse, sense of the future as an unlimited horizon of growth, 
the economy acts as though there is no natural limit to its expansion. As I shall examine further 
in Chapter Two, neoclassical economics treats all areas of the earth as available for the extraction 
of surplus value, whilst maintaining the myth of inexhaustibility. This form of pathology infects 
our current political institutions just as much as it did those of the early twentieth century, how 
we respond to the twin horrors of global inequality and existential crises such as those produced 
by climate collapse will determine our collective future. As Castoriadis’ prescient analysis points 
to, political leverage that relies solely on the instrument of individual freedom will never be 
adequate to the task of constructing a democratic politics that is more than a mere set of 
procedures. Instead, we must mobilise forms of political analysis and action that can expand our 
logical, political and technological capacities whilst simultaneously prevent us from rehearsing 
the colonial past.  These capacities must be developed in our response to these crises of 
energetic resources. To do this, we need to first understand how the pathology of petropolitics 





1.3 Freedom on an Indifferent Globe 
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Just as the oil industry, backed by Euro-American imperialism, mobilised the concept of self-
determination for the sake of spreading a form of democracy, so too the ideological insistence 
on individual freedom is inherently tied into the very pathology required to extract and burn 
carbon at such ferocity. What Klein (2015) calls “extractivism” is a mentality that allows the 
continual exploitation of the resources of the earth without attempting to replenish those 
resources. It is ‘a non-reciprocal, dominance based relationship with the earth, one of purely 
taking […] the reduction of life into objects for the use of others, giving them no integrity or 
value of their own – turning living ecosystems into “natural resources”’ (Klein, 2015: 169). 
Relying on the belief in the inexhaustibility of natural resources and the concurrent disavowal of 
the marginal social costs of the use of the resources, extractivism is the ideological counterpart to 
petropolitics. Moreover, it is a fundamentalist, almost fanatical, association between nature and 
profit that disavows the market effects and externalities of its actions. According to Klein, this 
association belies an economics based on ever expanding growth that was never viable to begin 
with (ibid.). To a greater extent than coal had before, oil promised ever increasing freedom from 
the restrictions of the terrestrial bounds of the earth (literally, in the case of air and space travel). 
The emergence of the market economy concurrent with the fossil fuel economy was no accident 
(ibid.: 173). Individual freedoms were multiplied by, for example, the capacity for escape from 
exhausting manual labour that was given by the development of white goods, from the 
availability of time efficient (if not energy efficient) personal transport technologies and from the 
abundance of new consumer goods. There is a very real relation between the rise of 
commodification and the increased availability of cheap oil, seen as the expansion of personal 
freedom allied with the concept of economic freedom. Oil became then a progenitor of what 
Isaiah Berlin calls both negative and positive freedom, (negative freedom is the freedom from 
coercive restrictions and positive freedom is the expansion of individual capacity). Berlin 
suggests ‘[t]he “positive” sense of the word “liberty” derives from the wish on the part of the 
individual to be his own master’ (Berlin, 1958: 8). Of course, the expansion of our freedoms was 
won at the expense of the contraction of the freedoms of other nations. 
 
If, as Castoriadis argues, individual freedom and collective freedom are recursively interlinked, 
there cannot be one without the other, the continual burning of fossil fuels marks the rejection 
of the claim to collective freedom. It holds positive individual economic freedom (the freedom 
to consume, to increase wealth) against the negative freedoms (the freedom to be without 
limitation on a full life) of the global population who will experience greater and greater 
restrictions on their freedoms as the social and political effects of the externalities of the oil 
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industry are felt.10 Thus, the petropolitical model is inadequate to the task of increasing collective 
freedoms.  
 
However, expanding and very real individual freedoms give extractivism its alibi and its political 
rhetoric. Voters at home would be very unlikely to give up their personal freedoms in favour of 
limiting the extraction and burning of fossil fuels, so much so that up until recently no serious 
political candidate (certainly in the US and UK) would have based their manifesto on the 
reduction of fossil fuel usage. Even today, the British Conservative Party’s “green” agenda, as far 
as it exists, is based not on the growth of sustainable energy, but investment in carbon capture 
technologies. The assumption is that renewables still don’t provide sufficient energetic output to 
leave the safety of fossil fuels. 
 
What drives the extractive industrial capitalists behind the major oil companies to continually 
increase production as though oil reserves were limitless? The limit point of the extraction and 
burning of oil is not solely linked to the actually existing reserves in the ground, what we would 
know as Peak Oil, but to the proposed amount of carbon that can safely be pumped into the 
atmosphere to give us a 50% chance of maintaining a global temperature increase below 2 
degrees centigrade. A 2 degree rise above pre-industrial temperature levels is the benchmark set 
by numerous reports and protocols over the last four decades, these include the Stockholm 
Environment Institute in 1990, the Rio Earth Conference 1992, the Kyoto Protocol 1997, the 
Cancun 2010 summit, the regularly produced IPCC reports, and the Stern Report in 2006. 
Indeed, Stern’s (2015) recent work on this matter identifies many of these key moments in the 
history of the debates around climate change, and translates many of the findings from his report 
into a book for general audiences. Stern calls climate change a market failure, one that presents a 
significant and unique challenge for economics (Stern, 2015).  It is important here to note that 
“limit” should be understood as both the geo-physical limit of reserves of extractable oil left in 
the ground and, more pressingly, the amount that must remain there to keep us within a safe 
spectrum of global warming.  
 
According to the robust scientific consensus, if that limit is breached, there will be disastrous 
consequences for the global population.11 Thus, an economics that proceeds according to a 
 
10 The difference between positive and negative freedom is outlined in Isaiah Berlin’s “Two Concepts of Liberty”. 
11 NASA recently published a report that indicates there is 97% consensus amongst the world’s climate scientists 
- https://climate.nasa.gov/scientific-consensus/ 
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limitless supply of burnable oil, or other forms of fossil fuels, dangerously condemns the very 
system that it draws its value from to decline. Moreover, that decline hits certain populations 
hardest. Paraphrasing Ivan Illich, Michael S. Northcott, argues that ‘[a]ccess to and use of energy 
comprise one of the main drivers of inequality in industrial societies’ (Northcott, 2014: 15). 
According to Northcott, the fanatical chase after energy reserves stored in the form of oil binds 
us into a dependent lifestyle, sustaining political ideologies and economies of extraction (ibid.). 
The winners of the extractive industries comprise a tight group of some of the wealthiest people 
on the planet, it is in their interests to push at, and indeed deny, any supposed limit to their 
economic activities. Not least because any regulatory restrictions on the production of future oil 
will drastically limit their capacities to fulfil already made commitments. Northcott:  
 
The capital and stock value of fossil fuel companies, which are the most powerful of 
modern economic corporations, rest in part on their claimed reserves of fossil fuels. If, 
as climate scientists claim, the burning of these reserves will destabilise the climate, 
extinguish myriad species, inundate coastal cities, and lead to the desertification or 
flooding of much farmland, then the value of these reserves is contentious. 
(Northcott, 2014: 17) 
 
In the name of maintaining stock price, and thus shareholder value, any limit to growth, whether 
it exists or not, must be denied, climate disaster be damned. As Klein, Northcott, Stern and 
many others argue, the limit to the amount of oil that should be drawn from the earth has to be 
respected if we have a hope of avoiding radical climatic decline. However, capitalisation on 
global oil reserves has led to disastrous consequences. As Moore suggests,  
 
For oil, gas and coal, the transition from appropriation to capitalization has brought with 
it a monstrous turn towards toxification on a gigantic scale – from unprecedented oil 
spills, to the “hydraulic fracturing” of natural gas exploitation, to coal’s mountaintop 
removals, energy production in late capitalism increasingly manifests as a qualitative 
erosion of the conditions of human, never mind extra-human, well-being  
(Moore, 2015: 149) 
 
Market capitalisation on oil resources results in the erosion of the lifeworld we rely upon. 
According to Mitchell (2013), this is not a geological issue, our energy needs can be adequately 
met by the available resources, but an economic and political one. To force the hand of the oil 
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producers to leave the oil in the ground, to resist the downward pressure of declining oil 
revenues if they do so, requires both political will and economic regulation. It requires the 
curtailment of the economic freedoms of key oil capitalists and the attendant industries.  
 
As far as a worldview consistent with the expansion of economic freedoms on the surface of a 
globe to be exploited goes, Kant’s short essay on cosmopolitanism, A Perpetual Peace, is 
paradigmatic. Kant, enthusiastic for humankind's emancipation, asserts the right of men to share 
terrain ‘by virtue of their common ownership of the earth's surface’ (Kant, 2003: 16). In this 
declaration Kant characterises the globe as commonly owned. For Kant, commerce is made 
possible by the right to ownership of the earth's surface that ‘belongs in common to the totality 
of men’ (ibid). Kant's comprehension of cosmopolitanism, one that relies on a conception of the 
globe as commonly owned and that ownership to be the prerequisite for the possibility of trade, 
defines a politics attenuated through Enlightenment thought that leads humanity to reason. 
Thus, human emancipation comes at the expense of the division and ownership of the land as 
“natural resource”, simply put, privatisation. Kant posits commercial interest, as determined by 
antagonism, competition and envy, as a determining factor to avoid military conflict. Libidinal 
mimesis, the desire to emulate one's neighbour, is here given its place as the driving force of 
capitalism's liberating force. As Kant proposes in “Idea for a Universal History”, the state of 
nature, as the condition of pre-legislative competition between beings, is to be thanked for 
creating the conditions for progressive sociability. And thus, for commerce, which, for him, is 
the ideal strategy to ensure peace. As he writes: ‘thanks be to nature for the incompatibility, for 
the distasteful, competitive vanity, for the insatiable desire to posses and also to rule’ (Kant cf. 
Saint-Armand, 1996: 153). 
 
In the epilogue to his Laws of Hostility, Saint-Armand (1996) outlines Kant's insistence on 
commercial competition as the actually existing progenitor of peace, creating an interdependence 
between nations required for trade.  
 
Commerce seeks to deny confrontation; it inaugurates forms of reciprocity that are 
cognizant of the violence inherent in human relations; it is enlightened. Commerce 
deflects human violence towards objects of the world, thus averting the possibility that 
people will take each other as objects of conflict […] Direct identification is averted. 
Mimesis, diverted onto things, is absorbed into competitive acquisition of objects. 




Contra to both Kant and Saint-Armand, who saw capitalism as the rightful administrative 
paradigm through which an everlasting peace would be obtained, the economic historian Polanyi 
insists that the emergence and subsequent degradation of the self-regulating market in the 
nineteenth century had disastrous consequences for social cohesion (Polanyi, 2001). Tracing the 
historical precedents for the First and Second World Wars, Polanyi identifies the reliance on 
haute finance as the progenitor of a series of crises that engulfed the world twice in the last 
century. For a hundred years prior to the outbreak of WW1, the peaceful accord maintained 
between nations by a sophisticated trading mechanism relied on four institutional pillars: the 
balance of power system; the international gold standard; the self-regulating market; and the 
liberal state (ibid.: 3). For Polanyi, these interconnected institutions were what gave the world a 
hundred years of peace between 1815 and 1914, but at their heart was the international 
economic system. A system that relied on the assumption of economic self-interest. As Polanyi 
suggests, freedom in the self-regulating market is freedom to act in one’s own self-interest, based 
on the assumption that ‘in his economic activity man strove for profit, that his materialistic 
propensities would induce him to choose the lesser instead of the greater effort and expect 
payment for his labor’ (ibid.: 257). Known as economic rationality – a guiding principle of 
economic thinking that asserted the spontaneous emergence of markets based on the free will of 
economic actors – this view relies on individual responsibility for conscious, rational choice. 
Under this rubric, homo economicus can be held accountable for their own choices in a market 
guided by the assumption of freedom from constraint.  
 
However, this economic view – what we might call economism (a belief that attacks planning 
and regulation as a denial of freedom, and lauds free enterprise and private ownership as the 
essential ingredients of freedom (ibid.: 265)) – belies the truth that economic rationality just 
doesn’t translate into what we know about human behaviour. Following Frank H. Knight, 
Polanyi asserts that human motives are never specifically economic, implying that spontaneous 
markets cannot arise from the basis of “natural” human behaviour (ibid.: 258). With the 
mechanism of rational choice, it is possible to convince a population that societal orientation is 
natural and spontaneous, that they willed it that way by making free choices. If populations can 
be convinced they chose a course of action freely, they won’t feel coerced. Yet, because economic 
behaviour is subject to variably irrational desires, rather than purely rational decisions, it is 
capable of being manipulated. I shall return to this later, but for now it is important to note that 
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the myth of economic rationality allows the burden of responsibility to be shifted on to the general 
public. Predominantly figured as consumers, we are entreated to make ethical choices through 
our purchasing decisions – organic food, energy saving light bulbs, low carbon means of 
transport etc. – yet these decisions provide the excuse for not making larger systemic changes. 
This is broadly the argument posed by the political centre-right in this country; the population 
are considered to be individual economic actors making rational purchasing choices, rather than 
political subjects engaging in the discursive articulation of opposing positions.12  
 
Stengers (2015) mobilises a similar narrative. The tragedy of the commons (from a book of the 
same name by Garrett Hardin), is, for Stengers, a fable that came to legitimise the enclosure of 
land (Stengers, 2015: 79). Based on the assumption that users of common land would pursue 
their own economic self-interest, tragic over exploitation is the “natural” outcome. This 
pessimistic view of human behaviour allows land to be privatised and profit to be drawn for the 
landowner, or as Stengers, channelling Marx asserts, primitive accumulation of capital (ibid.: 80). 
The Enclosures Acts between 1604 and 1914 matter today because contemporary capitalism 
relies on, extends and actualises this logic. As Stengers suggests, ‘[t]he privatization of resources 
that are simply essential to survival, such as water, is the order of the day, as well as that of those 
institutions which, in our countries, had been considered as ensuring a human right, like 
education’ (ibid.).  Thus, privatisation is legitimised by the assumed tragic exploitation of the 
commons by the supposed rational economic activity of all. However, this does not prevent 
private interests acting to exploit the commons for their own good, it is possible private 
companies operate significantly more like homo economicus, determined as they are by the wishes of 
their shareholders.  
 
Because, as Polanyi (2001) asserts, human behaviour is not economically rational, markets need 
to be, and historically have been, imposed, a result of ‘conscious and violent intervention’ 
(Polanyi 2001: 258). Freedom of the market – and its corollary, freedom of the individual – a 
central claim of capitalism, is, in fact, the result of a governmental imposition that produces a 
dialectical relation between the two. On the one hand, the freedom of market actors is truthfully 
only afforded to sufficiently powerful capitalists (the subjects of the enunciation), while the very 
freedom that neoliberal capitalism would tell us is universal is refused to the subjects of the 
axiomatics of capital accumulation, for want of a better word, the proletariat. By occluding its 
 
12 As I shall explore in chapter two, this market fundamentalism dangerously colours the climate change debate, 
perhaps preventing action at the highest level. 
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coercive nature with the unrealisable promise of individual rational choice, capitalism prevents us 
from seeing the ways in which it denies freedom to significant portions of the population. 
Polanyi: ‘It appears that the very means of maintaining freedom are themselves adulterating and 
destroying it’ (ibid.: 262). For Polanyi, then, the self-regulating market, largely based on the myth 
of economic rationality, could never last, precisely because it continually destroys itself through 
the exploitation of its base. Nineteenth-century civilization disintegrated ‘as the result of […] the 
measures which society adopted in order to not be, in its turn, annihilated by the action of the 
self-regulating market’ (ibid.: 257).  
 
The logic of capitalism that absolutises personal freedom, as expressed by economic rationality, 
relies precisely on the extraction of surplus value, not just from labour, but primarily from the 
earth itself. Because we are able to use as “resource” a portion of nature, we can mobilise vast 
energetic and technological innovations in the pursuit of human happiness and economic 
growth. This relies precisely on economic evaluation. As Polanyi suggests, “land” is ‘an element 
of nature inextricably interwoven with man’s institutions’ (ibid.: 187). The naming of an area of 
the surface of the earth as “land” isolates and marketises it, bringing it within the logic of the 
pricing mechanism. The production of “land as resource” is both reliant on, and the progenitor 
of, economic value. Without it there would have been no capitalism. As such, any theory of 
capitalism, and concurrently, theory of post- or anti-capitalism, requires a theory of ecology so as 
to understand the inextricable relation between economic value and nature. And subsequently, 
any theory of ecology, requires an economics. Therefore, economic freedom (what the ideology 
of individual freedom has been in practice based on under capitalism), is locked into the use of 
nature as a resource. Furthermore, the emergence of the catastrophe of global climate collapse, 
throws into crisis the evaluative process of economics. It is no longer based on a nearly free, and 
abundantly available, natural resource, but must understand the critical relationship it has to 
ecology. Thus, nature provides the occluded evaluative structure for the entire economic system 
and in the time of the anthropocene the failure of that economics precipitates climatic collapse.  
 
Up until the mid-1930s economic evaluation was based on a natural resource, gold. But, under 
pressure to stimulate the economy in the wake of the depression, the Federal Reserve moved to 
loosen the relationship between dollar currency and the Gold Standard. Under orders from 
congress, all banks handed their gold reserves over to the U.S. Treasury in exchange for gold 
certificates. This allowed Roosevelt to depress the value of the dollar against gold to encourage 
international trade in the hope of stimulating the domestic economy. Money became 
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conveniently manipulable in ways that it had never been previously. As I shall explore in Chapter 
Two, the birth of financial evaluation delinked from metallic reserves had significant effects on 
the global market, not least because in the early 1970s the introduction of fiat money – born 
from the evaluation of another natural resource, oil – had global impacts for both real and 
financial markets.  
 
Personal economic freedom is not only intrinsically entwined with, and thus limited by, global 
scale industrial extractive activity, i.e. with the resources drawn from the earth, but is given as the 
very reason for these activities in the first instance. Still suffused with the rhetoric of 
individualism and liberty, capitalism took a significant ideological shift in the early part of the 
1970s. Chapter Two will deal in more depth with the development of neoliberal ideology and 
policy in this period, attenuating it through the OPEC oil crisis of 1973 and the current reaction 
to the crisis of climate disaster, but first we need to account for how environmentalism 
attempted to build a cultural and political movement to limit economic activity in the name of 
planetary stewardship. What Polanyi called a “counter-movement”. 
 
 
1.4 The Problematic Logic of Environmentalism 
 
In 1972 the Club of Rome, a global think tank of heads of state, politicians, UN bureaucrats, 
economists, scientists and others, published The Limits to Growth. As warnings to humanity go, 
this was the one of the most serious, most dire. Lead by environmental scientist Donella 
Meadows, the team examined five variables to model possible outcomes of global growth trends. 
These variables were world population, industrialisation, pollution, food production, and 
resource depletion. The first chapter listed the three main conclusions: 
 
• If the present growth trends in world population, industrialisation, pollution, food 
production, and resource depletion continue unchanged, the limits to growth on this 
planet will be reached sometime within the next one hundred years. The most probable 
result will be a rather sudden and uncontrollable decline in both population and 
industrial capacity. 
• It is possible to alter these trends and to establish a condition of ecological and economic 
stability that is sustainable far into the future. 
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• The sooner the world's people decide to strive for this stability, the greater will be their 
chance of success. 
(Meadows et al. 1972: 24 cf Meadows, D.L. 2007) 
 
In the subsequent decades after the publication of this urgent report many of the predictions 
about global growth trends came true. Ratified by both independent scientific studies and the 
mainstream media, there has been significant and growing concern about species collapse, oil 
depletion, climate change and other major ecosystem malfunction.13 If the last forty years have 
been bookended by the Limits to Growth at one end and the most recent IPCC report (among 
other major reports on climate change) at the other, both providing conclusive prediction and 
evidence of climatic breakdown and societal collapse, you would expect the world's leaders to be 
awake to the dangers inherent in continuing with these growth trends. And yet this has not 
historically been the case. In response to increasing demand we have been globally tied into ever 
more damaging extractive industries (for example, the unconventional extraction of oil and gas 
by means of hydraulic fracturing – fracking – and strip mining, Alberta Tar Sands for example) 
to the point where global investment in unconventional fossil fuel production outstrips the 
investment in renewables by a ratio of three to one (Klare, 2013), and governments worldwide, 
including our own, are committed to ever increasing levels of economic growth. As fast 
developing nations such as China and India experience unprecedented growth to rival those of 
the OECD countries, and growth in those developed nations shows no sign of slowing, we are 
set on a destructive course.  
 
Why, if so few climate scientists deny the existence of anthropogenic climate change, nor the 
correlation between it and industrial economic growth, are we still at an impasse when it comes 
to mustering the political will to make significant changes in our habits? As Dennis Meadows 
(Meadows ed. 2007), one of the Limits' authors analyses in a subsequent report from 2007, there 
was a vested interest in reducing the impact of the original report when it was first published. He 
focuses on a review published in the New York Times by three young economists – Peter 
Passell, Marc Roberts and Leonard Ross – who, as he points out ‘claimed no shred of expertise 
in either the biological or the physical sciences’ (Meadows in Meadows ed. 2007: 408). Two of 
these authors had conflicts of interests, as they were about to publish a book which would lose 
 
13 As a caveat to this argument, it is important to point out that the Club’s predictions that foreground questions 
of runaway population growth could be utilised for a neo-Malthusian argument that this thesis will not be 
pursuing. Any form of population limitation historically favours powerful actors over those with less power, 
often on class, race and gender lines – this would be an unacceptable conclusion to draw from this research.  
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its rationale and audience were the claims made in the Limits to Growth validated (ibid). But, 
importantly, these economists’ views reflected an ideological tendency that was as prevalent then 
as it is today; the denial or obfuscation of the scientific truth of the environmental impact of 
economic activity. The book review denied the claims of the report precisely because a world 
view, the conclusion of which is there are “limits to growth”, must be suppressed. Under the 
prevailing logic of neoliberal capitalism, economic growth must be of primary concern, and any 
model that challenges that must be denied. 
 
The Paris climate agreement, COP21 (the 21st Conference of Parties), has as its manifest aims 
the stabilisation of greenhouse gas emissions to avoid ‘dangerous anthropogenic interference 
with the climate system’ as asserted by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 
2014: 19.1).  The motivation behind this global, and near universal, response to imminent climate 
catastrophe is broadly figured into two camps: the economic argument and the moral argument. 
According to Stern these are not mutually exclusive, apparently, we can have economic growth 
with green technologies and structural change (Stern, 2015). The moral case for a significant 
technical response to the climate emergency can be made from the position of 
environmentalism. However, as Vassos Argyrou (2005) argues, the environmental movement, in 
the attempt to undermine the assumed dominance of man on the surface of the earth (the neo-
colonial spirit of extractivism), creates a new problematic logic.  
 
Argyrou describes the cultural conditions required for thinking a shift from “man” as a dominant 
figure on the surface of an earth that he exploits for the furthering of humanity's escape from the 
bondage of nature, to “man” as human being within and part of an environment. This shift, he 
proposes, produces the environment as a tragic victim to be cared for by man the steward, and 
any “facts” within this system to be filtered through the cultural hegemony of environmentalism. 
Previously, the modernist paradigm held man as distinct from and in command of a nature that 
must be escaped and mastered in the service of human freedom.  
 
Nineteenth century European “man” perceived himself to be thoroughly cultural, in 
control of his body and his passions and through the power of his reason and his 
physical power, increasingly invested in machines, in control of external nature as well  
(Argyrou, 2005: 11) 
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This cultural figure understood himself as distinct from the surface of the earth precisely because 
he had escaped the bonds holding him to it, his freedom was won through the mastering of 
himself and the world with the power of reason. European man understood the ground beneath 
his feet to be solid and free from obstruction. The picture that European man created of the 
world was one whereby legitimacy was granted not by a transcendental god figure, but internally 
by man himself. Man rejected the Christian god and ‘assumed the role of creator and guarantor 
of the world’ (ibid.: 94), becoming the universal determination of the world itself rather than an 
object within it. Man, as subject of the world became the measure of all things, universalising his 
own status as human. Thus, human finitude came to determine the limits of the real, delimiting 
the possibility to think outside of the human relation. Within environmentalist discourse this is 
seen as both arrogance and hubris; the defining cultural conditions for the exploitation of the globe. Indeed, 
as Shiva (2014) argues, against a patriarchal Prometheanism, the worsening global climate crisis 
and injustice is the ‘destructive Anthropocene of human arrogance and hubris’ (Shiva 2014: xix). 
As such this universal, modern European man is blamed for ravaging the planet and creating the 
global ecological crisis. As we will see, Argyrou argues that this blaming of European man is used 
as a weapon in political power play at the highest level, as ecological concerns come to dominate 
the field.  
 
The last half-century of thought has done much to de-centre man from his post-Enlightenment 
position, but also, as Argyrou suggests, place him in a tragic relation to the sacred earth, crossing 
out “nature” in favour of an environment that must be protected if it is to support life. The 
environmentalist logic that is the subject of Argyrou's critique proposes an attempt to return to 
some form of prelapsarian totality, or unity between man and nature, the unproblematically 
conceived claim of oneness, sameness or identity between human culture and the natural world – 
the authentic or more “real” nature.14 Modernity's humanism attempted to dissolve all divides 
between people in the name of a universal human subject (although problematically, as we are 
aware, returned the European male subject to the centre, claiming to eradicate difference under 
the guise of unity, only to dangerously occlude particularity in favour of a unification based on a 
western ideal – an idealism challenged by ecofeminist writings). According to Argyrou, against 
this humanism, environmentalism posits the dissolution of the final great divide, the divide 
between human and nature. It rejects many of modernity's claims of dominance and mastery, yet, 
furthers the very logic of unity via an expansion of the idea of the Same, into a conjoined man 
and nature. Perversely, and no doubt unwittingly, this final unification threatens to re-embed an 
 
14 Recall here the claims made in the Introduction around art’s appeal to something more “real”. 
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animistic humanism in nature, unknowingly reinstalling the human measurement that it sought 
to efface, i.e. value as handed down by man. This final occluded act is performed by an 
ecocentrism that attempts a radical expansion of 'life', or human qualities into non-teleogical 
animals or the inorganic, and thus paradoxically recentres the human. This form of animistic 
humanism is prevalent in discourses that attempt to reconcile humanity and nature into a vibrant 
material whole, or place human intentionality within non-human objects, or claim “we are all 
stardust” and so on.   
 
Environmentalists, according to Argyrou, perform a double move, on the one hand to propose a 
final unification and on the other to posit the human as the protective steward; no longer 
conceived as a trap to escape, nature is seen as a supportive and nurturing but fragile system to 
protect and care for. Thus, the logic of environmentalism creates a totalising unity between man 
and nature, but then returns man to the outside of the globe by conceiving of it as something 
that must be protected by him – nature becomes victim, but also the site of an authentic 
encounter with our own true selves. For Argyrou this double move is the unthought of 
environmentalism that means it is destined to repeat what it seeks to reject in modernity, namely 
the assumption of unity, that finally resolves in an occluded division. 
 
Thus, we have a double logic at play. The European spirit of capitalist accumulation on the 
surface of a globe man thought himself to be distinct from and dominant over, what we might 
call, following Walk, the metabolic rift – the distinction between nature and culture (Walk, 
2015(1)). And the obverse tendency in the latter part of the twentieth century to try to stitch up 
the wound created in the rift between culture and nature under the name of environmentalism. 
For Argyrou, both these tendencies have their problems, and neither are adequate to the task of 
thinking the problem of anthropocenic shock created by the deleterious effects of the burning of 
fossil fuels. For us, we must learn the lessons from this assessment. We must find ways to 
motivate socio-political change on the basis of an expanded epistemology that protects us from 
repeating the mistakes of the environmental movement whilst also taking forward their spirit. I 
will argue that cultural strategies can be mapped across from this movement as a way of 
producing political transformation. Culture here should be understood as a mode of thought and 
operation that validates, valorises, legitimates and ratifies human expression – how the human is 
conceived, is thus pertinent for the question of culture. If, on the one hand, the dominant mode 
of conceiving the human – as an economic individual, divorced from the responsibilities they 
have to their environment – and on the other – as a part of an undifferentiated nature whereby 
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we are all part of the logic of the Same – coexist, then culture emerges as an expression of both 
simultaneously in varying degrees. These two world views are fundamental axioms that shape 
many of our ways of conceiving our relations to the world, to each other and so on. But we can 
identify a third mode of relating the human to the world, or “nature”, whereby the human is 
seen as a plague, a disturbance, or a violence on an innocent nature. It is these kinds of narratives 
that are behind the Limits’ authors’ assertions about runaway population growth, the persistence 
of the term Anthropocene, whereby the whole of the Anthropos is to blame for climate change, 
and romantic claims to authenticity. This view occludes or prevents a political challenge to 
power, instead replacing it with blame meted out on a universal humanity – giving credence to 
the idea of limiting human populations, a somewhat Malthusian approach to the issue – thus 
providing the alibi to more authoritarian political formations (the undergirding of ecofascism). 
Assumptions that there are undifferentiated responsibilities, it must be noted, often result in 
ways that favour not just the most powerful, but those who have gained the most from creating 
the crisis conditions in the first instance. 
 
The three logics go; Human as separate from and dominant over nature, human as intrinsic and 
the Same as nature, human as plague on nature whereby nature exists as something prior to and 
separate from the human as an intrinsically “good” location and the human as a destructive 
force. These logics are of course, poles of attraction, most worldviews tend to include features of 
each, yet, I would argue, none of them are sufficient descriptions of the world, nor are they 
normatively desirable. In Chapter Five I take up the questions of the relation between the 
particular and the universal – understanding that discussion as an example of the battle between 
these three ideologies is important. 
 
It is precisely in the valorisation process that these ideologies emerge – what is seen as important 
depends on the framing device through which we look and experience the world. As Northcott 
argues, ‘in modernity “values” in the earth system are only recognised when they become part of 
the human economy of making and production and are given monetary equivalence’ (Northcott, 
2014: 128). Economic evaluation of the ecosystem is based on the usability of nature for human 
agency, rather than an intrinsic value. Capitalist economy requires nature have equivalent value, 
but neo-classical economics (the dominant economic school) has prevented us from 
understanding value as anything other than a usable resource for the increase of private wealth. If 
we wish to stitch up the metabolic rift, then we must find new methods of evaluation. However, 
what if we do not wish to stitch this wound? What if we do not think that stitching up the 
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wound is the way to redistribute wealth, to reduce economic and socio-political inequality, to 
create ecological justice? Instead of attempting the production of unity between us and nature, 
which would reduce politics to the administration of energetic flows and give capitalism a free 
ride, how can we understand our role in relation to nature, and more precisely, how can we 
reconcile the intrinsic value of a natural material such as oil with its indifference to value? That is 
to say, how do we draw equivalences across the oil still in the ground and the marginal social 
costs to society as a result of burning that oil? 
 
Argyrou’s critique of universalist environmental discourses that seek to, one, place the figure of 
the human as the protector of a fragile earth-as-victim and, two, understands the only way to do 
this through a reversal of modernity’s scientific and technological developments in favour of a 
prelapsarian retreat to a form of eco-localism, allows us to understand the conjoined challenges 
we face. This thesis aims to understand the project of political transformation not as an escape, 
retreat or relapse, nor as a project of protecting the earth-as-victim in the name of a more 
authentic personal experience, nor, indeed as a project of returning a universal referent to the 
centre of political discourse. Instead, as I will outline in the following chapters, the project of 
reengineering that lays ahead is one that requires a complex understanding of the socio-political 
dimensions of the relation between culture and nature; insofar as this relation is, and must be 
conceived of, as mediated by the political rather than by the technical, the project returns 

























[The modern economic] order is now bound to the technical and economic 
conditions of machine production which to-day determine the lives of all the 
individuals who are born into this mechanism, not only those directly concerned 
with economic acquisition, with irresistible force. Perhaps it will so determine 
them until the last ton of fossilized coal is burnt 
(Weber, 2005: 123) 
 
This means that the genre-specific preprescribed truth of economics must itself 
analogically elaborate an ethno-class descriptive statement mode of material provisioning 
that can, law-likely, be only that of homo oeconomicus’s single absolute model of 
free-market capitalism. This model’s imperative supraordinate telos of increasing 
capital accumulation thereby predefines it as the only means of production 
indispensable to the enacting of the economic system of free-trade-market 
capitalism’s unceasing processes of techno-industrial economic growth. In this 
mode of material provisioning, therefore, there can ostensibly be no alternative 
to its attendant planetarily-ecologically extended, increasingly techno-automated, 
thereby job-destroying, post-industrial, yet no less fossil fuel-driven, thereby 
climate-destabilising free-market capitalistic economic system, in its now extreme 
neoliberal transnational technocratic configuration. 







2.1 Economics: Emerging out of oil 
 
Emerging in the mid twentieth century as a new form of governmentality, the economy – as a 
model of calculation that determines and distributes ‘scarce resources to alternative ends’ 
(Foucault, 2008: 269) – started to gain dominance. Mitchell (2013 and 2014) understands this 
new “object” as intrinsically linked to the flow of fossil fuels. Economic growth, underwritten by 
the extraction and burning of fossil fuels for energy, and the emergence of the theory of 
economic analysis went hand in hand. Referring to a distribution of resources, but also as a 
mode of administration, this new term designated not only a way to understand financial activity, 
but the ‘efficient management of human lives and material resources’ (Mitchell, 2014: 481). It 
came to determine not just a system of governance, a way of doing things, but a way of being 
human. Historically, the fathers of modern economic theory, Jevons, Ricardo, Smith, paved the 
way for a new understanding of fossil fuels as the source both of new forms of growth and of 
calculation, but it wasn’t until Keynes that the value of money was bound to the movement of 
oil rather than coal (Mitchell, 2014: 123). This chapter understands how, in the post war era, 
economic expertise developed in direct relation to the hydrocarbon age. Whilst, neoclassical 
economic theory attempts to delimit its understanding to “human affairs”, there is an historic 
precedent to the intrinsic linkage between money flows and oil flows. The current cycle of 
capitalist accumulation is importantly and dangerously linked to the capacity to drill, sell and 
burn fossil fuels. In this chapter, I shall start to understand how human subjectivity is 
determined by these processes, developing a theory of petro-subjectivity bound to a cultural 
analysis that depends on theories of contemporary art.  
 
As Mitchell asserts, the shape of democratic politics from the 1930s onwards was determined in 
large part by the application of new forms of economic expertise (ibid.: 124). As this new mode 
of analysis gained significance, the role of administration and calculation grew, spreading the 
mechanisms of economic planning and practice to wider spheres of life – ‘[t]he deployment of 
expertise requires, and encourages, the making of socio-technical worlds that it can master’ (ibid.: 
124). The economy became both a tool for understanding markets and, significantly, the 
machine for producing the world in its image, becoming the central object of democratic politics 
in the West (ibid.: 125).15 Drawing on Polanyi, Mitchell understands the economy to be a self-
regulating system that subordinates other social systems. As we shall see later, this 
characterisation is also found in Foucault and Andre Gorz amongst others, whereby economic 
 
15 It is possible here to understand this as an axiomatic procedure  
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practice comes to determine the social, political and cultural spheres. My claim (in agreement 
with Mitchell) is that economic practice rests not just on the value drawn from oil, but the values 
and norms generated by the oil industry. Political formations, and the attendant socio-cultural 
tropes, operate according to these values and norms, proceeding as they do from the conditions 
of energy production and expenditure prevalent in any given historical period. The world of the 
coal economy of the nineteenth-century, according to Mitchell, produced ‘writing about political 
economy [that reflected] the world of coal mines and steam engines. The mines and the engines, 
however, did more than provide objects of reflection. They helped form a world of calculation, 
circulation and control of which the doctrines of political economy became a part’ (ibid.: 127). 
The gold standard, for example, was made possible because of the steam-powered rolling mills 
that produced coinage – the highly transportable abstraction of bank held gold. This in turn 
drove colonial expansion, spreading certain political forms around the globe and determining 
politics back at home. The political theory of liberalism then, relied significantly on the material 
conditions of coal, and later oil, power. In the transition from liberalism to neoliberalism we 
encounter different conceptions of economic valuation, calculation and determination that 
reconfigure our relation to natural resources. Importantly, this finds its prominence in the 
conception of the limits of these resources and to what ends they can feasibly be put. It is a 
battle over these limits that defines our contemporary period. 
 
To understand how the nature of economic analysis inflects our cultural, social and political 
worlds, we must attend to a number of significant developments in recent economic thought. As 
Mitchell understands it, the “economy” as an object is distinct, both conceptually and 
historically, from “political economy” – a mode of governance that administers society in 
accordance with certain ideological conditions – and distinct from a process of “economising” – 
as in, making prudent use of resources. During the early part of the twentieth century the word 
started to be used to designate an activity that conceptualised the flow of monetary circulation 
and specifically about future activity. Mitchell: 
 
We can show how the economy appears to be a new object: a thing made up of 
aggregate price levels, wages, consumer spending, money supply, purchasing power, and 
savings, all of which could now be estimated, thanks to new business procedures, 
banking reports, household tax re- turns, and other forms of accounting 
(Mitchell, 2014: 483) 
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Importantly, these forms of accounting were used to divide the world into a series of units, and 
to determine how these units relate to each other on both micro and macro-economic scales. 
Thus, the economy became about the partition of the world into discrete chunks, manageable, 
governable and calculable. What is calculable is just as important as how it is calculated – what is 
available to calculation. When Marx and Engels wrote in their manifesto that ‘[capital] has 
drowned the most heavenly ecstasies of religious fervor, of chivalrous enthusiasm, of philistine 
sentimentalism, in the icy water of egotistical calculation’ (Marx and Engels, 1985: 82), they were 
keen to articulate the overbearing presence in our lives of the role of calculation. Calculation that 
hubristically seeks to determine, partition and delimit the world, thus articulating what is 
available to calculation and what is not. We could understand the history of capitalism as the 
continual expansion of what is calculable. The economic actor gives power to calculation 
precisely because of its assumed objective nature, that, delimits the subject from ‘giving meaning 
to decisions and from accepting responsibility for them’ (Gorz, 2011: 127). As Andre Gorz 
suggests: 
 
The imperialism of “cognitive-instrumental” reason and particularly of economic 
rationality, in its capacity as a guide to decision-making, draws its force, at the individual 
level, from the apparent objectivity of the criteria of judgement provided by calculation. 
(Gorz, 2011: 127) 
 
Economics then, is assumed to be the best mode of analysis to provide objective, non-
ideological, grounds for decisions – the subject is not required to give reasons for a decision, as 
calculation is the final ground. As we shall see, this methodological assumption – the objectivity 
of calculation – comes to configure the basis for all spheres of activity within a neoliberal 
paradigm.16 It also provides the basis for the Hayekian ratification of Adam Smith’s free play of 
market forces, specifically the theory of the “invisible hand”, and the proclamation by Milton 
Friedman that society has no need to wrestle with ethical problems – these are the domain of the 
 
16 It is not sufficiently clear whether this rationality still holds. While the economic crisis of 2008 was arguably 
the greatest challenge to orthodox economics, the response was firmly within the “playbook” of neoclassical 
economic thought – it is however, more and more apparent that this playbook is losing legitimacy. At a time of 
significant political upheaval in the Anglo-American world, not to mention increased proliferation of radical 
right- and left-wing movements around Europe and the Middle East, the rise of the economic power of China 
and the BRIC nations and the shifting sands of political movements centred around on the one hand identity 
politics and on the other a renewed class analysis drawn from descendants of Marxist thought, we could argue 
that the ground is set for an overwhelming challenge to the orthodoxy. However, this study falls on the brink of 
this moment and concerns itself mostly with an analysis of this recent history – a further study might account 
for what comes next. 
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individual only (Friedman, 2002: 12). The assumed consequence of this rational (non)guiding 
force without ideological commitment is to allow the actor to operate freely within a rational 
field; Friedman was keen to insist that it is only economic freedom that provides the basis for 
personal freedom. Accordingly, this results in a superior rationality and efficiency. Individuals are 
‘free optimally to adjust their actions to the changing situation’ (Gorz, 2011: 128). Planning, or 
calculation then, does not exist on a systemic or operationally structural level, not at the level of 
society, but at the level of the individual – in this way, each individual working towards his or her 
own self-interest will, it is assumed, optimally create the best possible outcome at the level of 
society. As I shall explore later, this is a deficient mode of analysis that prevents economic 
thought from thinking the consequences of economic action – precisely at the level of 
externalities such as pollution.  
 
The economy was the name of the system of valuation that made possible the ‘mathematical 
measurement of progress, rates of growth, and the depletion of resources’ (Mitchell, 2014: 130). 
In the age of oil, the economy becomes an important arbiter of capacity, limits of growth and 
projected profit, seemingly perfectly suited to describe and manage the flows of oil out of the 
ground. However, as Mitchell notes, the historical phenomena of economic practice became an 
arbiter in the relation between human activity and natural resources, between culture and nature 
as it were – ‘economics became […] a science of money; its object was not the material forces 
and resources of nature and human labour, but a new space that was opened up between nature 
on the one side and human society and culture on the other – the-not-quite-natural, no-quite-
social space’ (Mitchell, 2014: 132). This space between human society and so called “nature” that 
the economy occupied importantly allowed economic analysis to remove nature and material 
resources, transforming it into simply “price”. The machinery of calculation then, attenuated or 
framed natural resources through the conditions of a means to an end (economic expansion) 
rather than an end in itself – economics was not just the mediating force between culture and 
nature, but what allowed culture to utilise nature for its own ends. This mode of valuation has 
determined for over two centuries an approach to the natural world that finds calculation as the 
final determinate operation; Foucault identifies this form of rationality as a “realism” that 
understands the economic as the final arbiter, conditioned by nothing but its own logics 
(Foucault, 2008: 269). To act in an economic way is to act rationally, without recourse to 
ideology, and determined only by a cost benefit analysis that calculates return on investment 
(ROI). Neo-classical economics, importantly, places outside of that analysis any social marginal 
costs – externalities – that could occur due to economic activity. To attempt to include human 
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labour or nature in self-regulating economic systems is, as Polanyi asserts, a utopian dream 
(Polanyi, 2014: 136). To try to include the marginal social cost in economic analysis would be 
seen to be bound by an ideological commitment, rather than economic rationality and would be 
seen as incompatible with this form of reasoning.17 Thus, to be operative, neo-classical analysis 
must refuse to be bound to anything other than calculation – to bind it to an idea would be 
another form of rationality.  
 
As Ha-Joon Chang suggests, the birth of the term “economics”, as distinct from the previously 
used term “political economy”, was an attempt to purify the field; ‘the Neoclassical school 
wanted its analysis to become a pure science, shorn of political (and thus ethical) dimensions that 
involve subjective value judgements’ (Chang, 2014: 120). As such, economics as a discipline 
imagined its relation to the real to be one of objective description, but as Donald Mackenzie 
suggests, economic valuation is performatively linked to the real, and thus ‘does things, rather 
than simply describing […] an external reality that is not affected by economics’ (Mackenzie, in 
Mackenzie, Muniesa and Siu, 2007: 54). This analysis challenges the assumption that economics 
acts as a pure science, understanding instead the mechanisms at play as productive of real world 
effects – one of which is the way the futures market binds us, through the method of 
discounting (which adjusts for future value), to the extraction and burning of fossil fuels. The 
language of neoliberal economics, as Susan Buck-Morss suggests, is deeply inadequate, ‘the 
abstract models of which exclude the referential world of human bodies and material nature that 
appear in the discourse as “externalities”, bracketed out of truth claims by these models’ (Buck-
Morss, in Hlavajova and Sheikh, 2017: 161).  
 
Similarly, Charles Hall and Kent Klitgaard (2006) suggest that current economic systems, 
specifically the neo-classical school, are inadequate for dealing with the sites from which value is 
originally drawn – ‘one question rarely asked in economics is the relation between energy and 
any economic activity’ (Hall and Klitgaard, 2006: 5). Identifying the occlusion of the fact that 
economic activity requires a commensurate increase in the use of energy, Hall and Klitgaard 
critique current economic modelling as having a limited conception of the world it tries to 
describe. In contradistinction to this they propose a “biophysical paradigm” for economic 
thought as a mode of redressing imbalances.  
 
 
17 For a substantial appraisal of what a zero marginal cost society would look like, see Jeremy Rifkin (2015). 
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Historically, there has been an inadequate theorisation applied to the linkages between economic 
practice and political theory in neo-classical economics, as Meiksins Wood asserts:  
  
[There has been a] rigid conceptual separation of the ‘economic’ and the ‘political’ which 
has served bourgeois ideology so well ever since the classical economists discovered ‘the 
economy’ in the abstract and began emptying capitalism of its social and political 
content. 
(Meiksins Wood, 1981: 66) 
 
Concurrent with this separation is the separation between economics, politics and the 
biophysical world.18 As Sandy Smith-Nonini suggests, following Hornborg, economic analysis 
misses the ‘underlying exchange system based on energy that allows complex societies to exist’ 
(Smith-Nonini, 2016: 57). Identifying the way that global power was shaped by neoliberal 
ideology and speculative finance, Smith-Nonini’s analysis draws attention to the paucity of 
academic studies (until recently) that focus on the relation between energetic resources and 
global finance. The literature in this area has, she suggests, been marginalised, attention instead 
being placed on debt, overaccumulation, inflation, and capital flows.  
 
So, despite being an inadequate system for analysing the uses of natural resources, the economy 
(as determined by the rules of the neo-classical school) has been foregrounded in this role. 
Economics has ‘superseded law as the technical language of administrative power’ (Mitchell, 
2013: 137), dominating all fields of activity – even to the extent that academic literature until 
recently has missed the relation economics has to ecology. Mathematical evaluation, the 
reduction of all value to price, has reproduced its own logics and structures across other spheres 
of activity and institutional forms. Specifically, how it determines what is of value in terms of 
resource value, how it delimits activity, how it accounts for the marginal social costs of this 
activity, and the way it constructs an idea of the human. Mitchell connects the assembling of the 
economy to a transition from a coal to an oil based society (ibid.: 139), understanding Keynesian 
economics as precisely a form of “petroknowledge”. In this analysis Mitchell identifies a 
recursive relationship between the economic models used to represent the world and the world 
itself, echoing the work of Mackenzie (2007), signalling the performative nature of economic 
theory. As such, petro-economic analyses come to determine the functioning of the economy as 
 
18 Recent analysis in the field of ecological economics such as the work of Moore (2015) and Hall and Klitgaard 
(2006) has sought to address this separation. 
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a whole, articulating a transformative potential in the language used to describe the economy. 
Price, then, comes to delimit evaluations and thus what is considered worthy of valuation. The 
conditions given by adhering to economic rationality frame the relationship humanity has to the 
“natural world”, as such determining how it is treated.  
 
Wendy Brown (2015) identifies this as a new form of political rationality that models all 
behaviour on economic practice. Drawing on Foucault, she understands this practice as a 
product of economisation, a process of the expansion of economic rationality into previously 
non-economic spheres; education, healthcare, and so on. As Mitchell, and others, show, this 
political project, neoliberalism, relies specifically on an axiomatics of petro-economisation and 
seeks to determine all behaviour according to its rationality. The emergence of the petro-political 
world order comes to determine the modes of governance and economic procedures, but those 
modes and procedures cannot, in turn, adequately account for the source of value extraction – 
land and labour. The task of this chapter is to understand the construction of these forms of 
political economy, and how they emerge in the cultural logics we adhere to.  
 
 
2.2 Neoclassical Economic Thought and Neoliberalism  
 
Among others, David Harvey (2007) and Wolfgang Streeck (2014), have analysed the economic 
origins of the historical transition to neoliberalism in the 1970s and early 80s, focusing on fiscal 
crises and “stagflation”, the loss of legitimacy of Keynsian economic policies and the declining 
productivity of the market. In response to declining wages and increased social demands, 
governments responded by finding ways to relieve employers of their (costly) social and political 
responsibilities and introduce restructuring processes. As Streeck asserts, 
 
Beginning in the early 1980s central elements of the social contract of postwar capitalism 
were gradually revoked or called into question in the societies of the West: politically 
guaranteed full employment, collective society-wide wage formation negotiated with free 
trade unions, worker participation at workplace and enterprise level, state control of key 
industries, a broad public sector with secure employment rights as a model for the 
private sector, universal social rights protected from competition, tax and income 
policies that kept inequality within tight limits, and government cyclical and industrial 
policies to secure steady growth. 
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(Streeck, 2014: 28) 
 
Market expansion and increased competition was given as the justification for the introduction 
of these policies both at home and abroad (where the IMF and World Bank were instrumental). 
The restructuring programmes allowed capitalist countries in the West to ‘shed the responsibility 
they had taken on in mid-century for growth, full employment, social security and social 
cohesion, handing the welfare of their citizens more than ever over to the market’ (Streeck, 2014: 
31). Despite a focus on the political and economic roots of these axiomatic shifts, political 
historians, including Harvey and Streeck, and Daniel Stedman-Jones (2014), Jeremy Gilbert 
(2013), Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin (2013), among others, reserve a scant few pages for a 
discussion of the biophysical basis for global economic shifts. It is important then, to understand 
how not just economic prosperity, but economic logics and functions derived historically from 
the oil fields. In what follows, then, we must understand how the economic and political 
conditions described by these historians are isomorphically related to the petro-political. As 
Gavin Bridge and Philippe Le Billon suggest,  
 
the politics of oil [is] more than a zero-sum game over a fixed and declining resource – a 
scramble at the end of the “Age of Plenty” for nature’s unclaimed gifts. Instead, the 
politics of oil concerns the relationships of competition, conflict, and cooperation that 
define the social and geographical distribution of the various “goods” and “bads” that 
can be produced through oil 
(Bridge and Le Billon, 2013: 3) 
 
 
I am not, then concerned with understanding the production of the current conjuncture only 
through an economic lens, but instead with outlining three specific aspects of this conjuncture as 
it relates to the biophysical world. One, the relation between, or transmutation from, neoclassical 
economics to neoliberal thought. Two, the modes by which extractive technologies and oil play 
into the construction of a political and economic orthodoxy. And three, how the activities and 
institutional formations produced in this era, including specifically the cycle of capitalism known 
as financialisation, result in associative rationalities and cultural logics. Oil saturates each level of 
these analyses.  
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To begin with I shall provide an overview of the literature in the field, giving a somewhat broad 
description to the terms, focusing specifically on Foucault’s reading of neoliberalism through his 
College de France lectures, and subsequent readings of Foucault from Brown (2015), Gilbert 
(2013 and 2014) and Mitchell (2014), and historical/critical studies from Fisher (2010), Gorz, 
(2011), Harvey (2007), Phillip Mirowski (2014 (i) and (ii)), Steadman-Jones (2012) and Streeck 
(2016). The aim of this overview is to draw out a set of associated logics that we could determine 
as proper to neoliberalism, these can then be applied to the three analyses named above to build 
an argument that draws together ideas around extractive technologies and ideologies (the 
petropolitical) and neoliberalism that can later be mobilised to produce the concept of the 
petrocultural logics of neoliberalism. 
 
Gilbert (2013) describes neoliberalism as a ‘broad family of ideas’ (Gilbert, 2013: 7) originating 
from the Mont Pelerin Society centred around liberal theorists Friedrich Hayek, Ludwig von 
Mises and, proxy architect of the economic restructuring of Chile after the Pinochet coup, 
Milton Friedman – it is understood in critical scholarship as both a set of ideas and as a set of 
political and economic policies. Policies variously applied in such scenarios as the Chilean 
experiment under Pinochet, the governments of Thatcher and Reagan in Britain and the US 
respectively through the 80s and early 90s, IMF and World Bank restructuring programmes 
globally, through to Blair’s New Labour, Obama’s presidency, Cameron’s “Big Society” and even 
the current ethno-nationalist variants that adhere to political phenomena such as Trump, Brexit, 
Johnson, Bolsanaro and so on.  The various different variants of neoliberalism associated with 
different political regimes or institutional activities appear somewhat diverse, but share certain 
characteristics and themes. Gilbert asks we think of the project in multiple ways, 
 
[A]s an aggregation of ideas, a discursive formation, an over-arching ideology, a 
governmental programme, the manifestation of a set of interests, a hegemonic project, an 
assemblage of techniques and technologies, and what Deleuze and Guattari call and 
“abstract machine” 
(Gilbert, 2013: 8) 
 
What in the middle of the twentieth century was seen as the ‘scribbles of academics’ (Stedman-
Jones 2012: 2), emerged as a response to the demise of the post war settlement, which had been 
‘hastened by a series of catastrophic events: the Vietnam war, the first oil shock of 1973 and the 
near collapse of industrial relations in Britain’ (ibid.: 1). As Friedman (1962/2002) himself 
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asserted ‘[o]nly a crisis – actual or perceived – produces real change. When that crisis occurs, the 
actions that are taken depend on the ideas that are lying around’ (Friedman, 1962/2002: xiv). 
From near obscurity, neoliberal ideas have become the global orthodoxy in less than half a 
century. This hegemonic achievement has had many supporters and detractors over the years. 
Diverse as these figures are, however, what is clear, is that economic structural adjustment in line 
with a suite of policies and a shift in global culture, and a shift in the relation between local and 
global culture, has been in ascendancy and in concert since the mid-70s. 
 
Brown suggests neoliberalism 
 
‘is not simply a set of economic policies; it is not only about facilitating free trade, 
maximizing corporate profits, and challenging welfarism. Rather, neoliberalism carries a 
social analysis that, when deployed as a form of governmentality, reaches from the soul 
of the citizen-subject to education policy to practices of empire. Neoliberal rationality, 
while foregrounding the market, is not only or even primarily focused on the economy; it 
involves extending and disseminating market values to all institutions and social action, 
even as the market itself remains a distinctive player’  
(Brown, 2015: 39-40) 
 
This hegemonic rationality impacts all forms of life to the extent that market rationality, what 
Mark Fisher calls a business ontology (Fisher, 2009), seemingly dominates all our actions and 
behaviours – it is, as Foucault asserts ‘a whole way of being and thinking […] a type of relation’ 
(Foucault, 2004: 218). However, it is important to note with the above that Brown understands 
the processes and effects of neoliberalism to be not only economic. Whilst the economy is an 
important mode of analysis, we must be sure to keep in mind that a restricted view of this as a 
problem of extending markets will only limit our understanding. Brown’s claim is specifically 
about how the values inherent in market ontologies are extended. Further to this check on our 
analysis, we should look to the long history of feminist critique that Bear, Ho, Tsing and 
Yanagisako (2015) invoke in their “Gens: A Feminist Manifesto for the Study of Capitalism”. 
Their ‘alternative approach focuses on the full range of productive powers and practices through 
which people constitute diverse livelihoods (and from which capitalist inequalities are captured 
and generated) as they seek to realize the potentialities of resources, money, labor, and 
investment’ (Bear, Ho, Tsing and Yanagisako, 2015). The authors have found that an “economic 
logic” becomes the driving force in analyses that try to encompass diverse ranges of fields of 
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study, to the point where ‘[t]he economic is repeatedly and relentlessly imagined as a singular 
logic that is derived from a pre-made domain and expresses itself in historical and cultural 
realities’ (ibid.). The modes of analysis that centre capitalism seem to repeat capitalist dreams – 
they tend to recreate the assumption that “there is no alternative” – thus creating totalising 
frames through which to view the world. Against this mode, the authors of Gens are not 
invested in a singular origin point, their aim is to provide an understanding of capitalism as 
‘formed through the relational performance of productive powers that exceed formal economic 
models, practices, boundaries, and market devices’ (ibid.). Despite, at times, eliding “the 
economy” with “capitalism” (they stress how capitalism exceeds economic models, but then 
replace the word economy with the word capitalism), this analysis is an important check to both 
Brown’s and Mitchell’s methodologies. Gens approaches the problem of capitalism through the 
lens of anthropological study, asserting that the economic should not, and does not, have 
dominance over all modes of life – instead, they suggest that capitalism is formed from 
heterogeneous processes of ‘aligning multiple projects, converting them toward diverse ends that 
include (but are not limited to) the accumulation and distribution of capital’ (ibid.). As such, we 
need to be alive to the importance that non-economic analyses have in this particular frame; my 
thesis is keen, for example, to foreground not just the economic, but the biophysical and cultural 
aspects of this argument. I claim that the “multiple projects” approach is correct, and in what 
follows, it is important to remember that the assertion of Foucault’s understanding of the 
extension of economic interpretations into non-economic domains does not restrict us from 
articulating the importance of other projects in the formation of the neoliberal conjuncture. In 
fact, as I will show, it is precisely biophysical and cultural critiques that limit capitalist 
accumulation within neoliberalism, and come to form equally important spheres of analysis in 
this thesis. I embark on this process by utilising analyses from multiple sources, not for example 




2.3 The Economic Individual 
 
Neoliberal ideology interpellates us not just as consumers, as competitive indviduals, but, 
significantly, as entrepreneurs of ourselves; for Foucault, the theory of human capital provides 
the ‘possibility of giving a strictly economic interpretation of a whole domain previously thought 
to be non-economic’ (Foucault, 2008: 219). It must be remembered here of course that Foucault 
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has been vital in the historical analysis of multiple ways of approaching the current conjuncture – 
through sexuality, punishment, madness and so on. So, the centring of the economic in the 
College de France lecture series is not directly counter to the claims made by the Gens manifesto 
outlined above. In fact, we could understand the idea of self-entrepreneurship as an adequate 
formulation of a non-economic economic analyses. By asserting the concept of interest, Foucault is 
not assuming that this is purely economic interest, in fact, it could be classified as social, cultural, 
sexual and so on; it is only that the logics of economic analysis come to attenuate these particular 
spheres. As he suggests, ‘interest is the criterion of utility [and] interest is now interests, a 
complex interplay between individual and collective interests, between social utility and 
economic profit’ (Foucault, 2008: 44). And further, at length  
 
On the basis of the new governmental reason – and this is the point of separation 
between the old and the new, between raison d’Etat and reason of the least state – 
government must no longer intervene, and it no longer has a direct hold on things and 
people; it can only exert a hold, it is only legitimate, founded in law and reason, to 
intervene, insofar as interest, or interests, the interplay of interests, make a particular 
individual, thing, good, wealth, or process of interest for individuals, or for the set of 
individuals, or for the interest of a given individual faced with the interest of all, etcetera. 
Government is only interested in interests. The new government, the new governmental 
reason, does not deal with what I would call the things in themselves of governmentality, 
such as individuals, things, wealth and land.  It no longer deals with these things in 
themselves. It deals with the phenomena of politics, that is to say, interests, which 
precisely constitute politics and its stakes; it deals with interests, or that respect in which 
a given individual, thing, wealth, and so on interests other individuals or the collective 
body of individuals. 
(Foucault, 2008: 45) 
 
 
Under the neoliberal conjuncture all of our choices are assumed to be within the market, such 
that, as Mirowski (2014: i) amongst others, has analysed, when faced with difficult ethico-
political judgements, such as how to best combat the deleterious effects of climate change, we 
are compelled to make decisions based on a series of seemingly free choices provided by the 
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market.19 Stern (2015), despite being an advocate of reimagining the conditions of extractive 
technologies, still cannot think outside of this paradigm when he calls climate change a “market 
failure”. His analysis rests on the assumption that this crisis can also be an opportunity – but an 
opportunity that can provide new markets, new sites of capital accumulation and extraction and 
so on. Under current rationalities of course, the market becomes the key actor in the process of 
climate change amelioration; as such, a number of market based instruments (such as carbon tax) 
have been developed that seek to make small adjustments to ameliorate systemic crises, instead 
of challenging the system as such. What is true of the analysis at the level of the economy is true 
at the level of individual. If we adhere to the concept of the competitive individual – which 
becomes not just the base unit of calculation in liberal economic doctrine, but significantly the 
sole actor through which responsibility for tackling crises is taken – we understand ethical 
personhood to be articulated only through a market logic. We are obliged to make personal 
sacrifices/choices so as to “feel” as though we are participating, while, due to the framing of 
choice through the market, the system itself remains unopposed. 
 
The competitive individual, as Gilbert (2014) asserts, has long been the been the base unit 
around which economic systems are designed, and subsequently, under neoliberalism, has come 
to construct, in interesting ways, the field of the political not just the economic. Gilbert’s study 
describes how Hobbesian conceptions of society still persist in many political and social 
institutions. Leviathan politics makes the assumption that no lateral, horizontal bonds exist 
between members of a society, and the only bonds that exist are vertical ones to the ‘central or 
superior locus’ (Gilbert, 2014: 50). As he asserts, the fear amongst the liberal elite that 
collectivity, which in this conceptualisation can only be seen as some form of meta-individual, 
will turn into mass demagoguery tended towards a suspicion of democratic forms that place too 
much emphasis on the power of the people. Indeed, as the arch-neoliberal Friedman, while 
asserting the necessity to fight for individual freedom against the backdrop of fascist 
collectivities in Europe, demands that ‘collectivist economic planning has […] interfered with 
individual freedom’ (Freidman, 2002:11). This fear of collectivity and state intervention in socio-
economic policy has become the defining myth, or as Gilbert calls it the ‘popular delusion’ 
 
19 Of course, that we might ourselves make non-rational decisions (from the point of view of neoclassical 
economics), and chose to follow other guiding principles, such as a desire to be environmentally friendly, can be 
theorised in terms of the concept interest, as I start to do below, and continue in more depth in Chapter Four. 
The important aspect is that neoliberal logics provide us with choices through which to exemplify our interests. 
For an in-depth discussion about an alternative to the rational self-interest argument put forward by 
neoclassicism, see Brian Massumi (2015). 
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(Gilbert, 2014: 53), of our times. However, as we shall note later, state intervention, while being 
abjured in the popular rhetoric is an intrinsic part of the neoliberal conjuncture, forming one of 
the key differences between classical liberal and neoliberal political economy. 
 
Where the theory of the competitive individual of classical liberalism as homo economicus focuses 
on the rational behaviour of isolated actors in relation to capital through the method of the 
market where homo economicus is a partner in an exchange, Foucault (2014) understands recent 
formulations of homo economicus through the lens of human capital to understand that the basic 
element of neoliberal economic analysis is not the individual, but the enterprise. The concept of 
competitive individualism found in Hobbes then, is combined with notions of entrepreneurship, 
to give us the “entrepreneur of the self”; the neoliberal subject operates not as a rational, 
bounded economic individual, but as an enterprise-unit that is concerned with increasing his/her 
interest (Foucault, 2010: 225). This entrepreneur of the self becomes a source of his/her own 
earnings, ‘he produces his own satisfaction’ (ibid.: 226). As such, the neoliberal subject as 
entrepreneur of the self is invested in an “environment” within which he/she subsists – 
governmentality, or the conduct of conducts, is concerned primarily with orchestrating this 
environment. Under classical liberalism the individual is left alone to pursue his/her own rational 
decisions, so that it ‘converges spontaneously with the interest of others’ (ibid.: 227).  The 
neoliberal subject, instead is a figure 
 
who responds systematically to modifications in the variables of the environment, 
appears precisely as someone manageable, someone who responds systematically to 
systematic modifications artificially introduced into the environment.  Homo economicus is 
someone who is eminently governable.  From being the intangible partner of laissez-
faire, homo economicus now becomes the correlate of a governmentality which will act on 
the environment and systematically modify its variables 
 (Foucault, 2010: 270-1) 
 
The Foucauldian conception here is instructive; if homo economicus is to increase their value, or 
interest, they must do so within the frame described above: the competitive free market. Their 
worth is tied precisely to their own governance because they respond to modifications in their 
environment. The neoliberal subject is one intrinsically intervened upon by governmentality 
whilst concurrently being assured their freedoms are being upheld through the popular delusion 
of the classical liberal concept of homo economicus. And, thus, judges their own value in direct 
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relation to these rationalities. It is precisely in this context that Foucault asserts that this subject 
was ‘already a certain type of subject who precisely enabled an art of government to be 
determined according to the principle of economy’ (Foucault, 2010.: 271).  
 
As such, every activity or personal ability comes into the process of the art of governance, be it 
economic or not, and determine the subject’s current or future investability; abilities or qualities 
thus become elements in the formation of human capital that produce both interest and income 
(either in the moment or due to future returns on investment).  We can understand then, displays 
of abilities or qualities to be calls for investment; we advertise our own enterprise-units as good 
returns on investments. Thus, virtuous actions, such as those performed seemingly in the service 
of climate disaster amelioration, are seen not as only ethically determined actions, but as part and 
parcel of our image as enterprise-units – we must be seen to be environmentally concerned; it is 
part of a feeling that articulates us as personally responsible for systemic crises. It is this visibility, 
conditioned by our own interest in personal investment that comes to build a picture of us as 
virtuous beings – it is important to indicate our virtue to other enterprise-units so they might 
invest their scarce resources in our enterprises – be this in time, money, love, attention or 
otherwise. As we shall discuss in chapter four, this display of virtue as self-marketization is a 
fundamental axiom of contemporary socio-cultural conditions. The very structure of neoliberal 
virtue then is bound to conditions of advertising – morality must be publicly performed if it is to 
be considered a “good investment”. As Chapter Four will discuss, we are not just people who 
recycle but “recycling-beings”, the ethical consumer performs their ethical nature as a mode of 
personal advertising. The concept of neoliberal virtue relies precisely on the construction of 
neoliberal subjectivity as one of self-entrepreneurship (Foucault), which in turn is conditioned by 
the economic ideologies inherited from the neoclassical school. As such, we must attend to the 
transmutation of neoclassical economics into neoliberalism. 
 
As Mirowski (2014(i)) asserts, the orthodoxy of neoclassical economics, while challenged in 
popular media in recent years, has continued, and indeed, strengthened its grip on economic 
thought since the crisis of 2007/2008. At a moment when the orthodox would seem to be 
failing, neoclassical economists doubled down on their belief in the correctness of their theories. 
For Mirowski (2014), this, as we can understand from Brown (2015), ratifies the Foucauldian 
conception of economisation where economic rationality impinges on everyday life. As the 
former suggests, ‘card-carrying neoclassical economists come convinced they possess a Theory 
of Everything at the End of History, and they apply their so-called economic approach to 
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everything great and small under the sun’ (Mirowski 2014 (i): 23). While neoclassical economics 
should be thought of separately to neoliberalism, Mirowski asserts some similarities. Certainly, 
neoclassical economics as a theory and a practice predates the emergence and instrumentation of 
the collection of ideas from the Mont Pelerin Society in the middle of the twentieth century. 
However, it is with neoliberalism that we could argue that the economic form found its most 
vital, if not purest expression. Specifically, how the logics of neoclassicism get taken up in the 
current conjuncture is important, and to understand this we must understand how liberalism 
shifted into its “neo-” variant.  
 
Andre Gorz (2011) understands the shift from liberalism to neoliberalism through a specific 
formulation. Precisely because, as he suggests, the limits of economic rationality are not naturally 
determined, but must be ‘imposed from the outside’ through ‘value judgements’, economic 
rationality is in truth an ideological formulation (Gorz, 2011: 127). As such, we must understand 
the ratification of economics into the construction of neoliberal logic as one of imposition by 
political will, enforced by institutional support and cultural power. Economic rationality is not 
necessary, but contingent on the value judgements and ethical decisions by a series of political and 
non-political actors over capitalism’s lifespan. Gorz’s formulation relies on two separate lines of 
argumentation; ‘an economic line of argument in favour of free play of “market forces”, and an 
ideological line of argument in favour of freedom of enterprise which is said to “mobilize the 
creative energies of individuals for society”’ (Gorz, 2011: 128). The first line of argumentation is, 
synthesising Hayek’s work on Adam Smith, the claim that economically liberal societies must 
allow all rational economic actors to determine their own actions free from social or moral 
concern for the collective. Politics thus, is abdicated by economics – the scenario described 
above in Foucault’s understanding of homo economicus under the conditions of liberalism. This is 
the nature of what Gorz terms “economic thought”. Distinct from this notion of economic 
thought, is the concept of “economic ideology”. In this argument, ‘entrepreneurs are creators of 
society and of culture’ (Gorz, 2011: 129), their activity is one of discovery and innovation – they 
mobilise themselves in service of society, precisely so as to form society, axiomatically, in their 
own image. As Gorz suggests, ‘one should no longer seek to integrate the economy into society 
but, on the contrary, to “develop policies which integrate society into the economy”, that is […] 
to make society conform to the requirements of economic rationality’ (ibid.). We can recall the 
work of both Polanyi and Foucault in this formulation, and Gorz is keen to situate his analysis in 
relation to the latter, who’s work allows him to understand how political intervention has 
superseded laissez faire policies to provide the best possible grounds for capitalism to proceed 
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successfully. Without using the name, Gorz is describing the conditions of neoliberalism, 
whereby economic activity is promoted by state intervention, even, as he suggests forms of 
welfarism, or ethical supports, that seek to create ‘enclaves in the heart of economic rationality’ 
guaranteeing the good running of capitalism (ibid.: 131). 
 
The transmutation of neoclassical economic rationality into neoliberal ideology is, to use Gorz’s 
analysis, the ratification of economic rationality at the level governmentality. Precisely to reform 
the latter in line with the demands of the former (and subsequently use the latter to enforce the 
former). So, if we take seriously the Foucauldian analysis that Brown reiterates, and the 
understanding of transformation that Gorz’s work allows us to think, then the expansion of the 
economic into previously non-economic domains can be understood through the concept of the 
axiomatic as a mode of expansion of axiomatics, not just the extension of logics. Which is to say, it 
reformulates everything in its own image, economic rationality thus becomes the law by which 
we ought to live. The foundational axiom of the economic is normative in this sense, it applies to 
the system and the individual. This should be fully understood as a procedure that conforms to 
the logics of the axiomatic as described in the introduction; expansion of economic rationalities 
into the position of hegemonic ideology is precisely a product of axiomatic forcing.20  
 
According to Brown (2005 and 2015), neoliberalism does not assume that the economisation of 
life occurs naturally (in counter distinction from classical liberals who assumed that laissez faire 
policies would produce the best possible situation for society if individuals and firms were left 
alone), instead, institutions are implicated in the production of normative and constructivist 
policies that provide rewards for enacting the vision and punitive measures for refusing to 
(Brown, 2005: 40). Political intervention and orchestration is required to invent conditions for 
the optimum environment for economic rationality to thrive. These interventional strategies are 
not restricted to the realm of politics, of course, but are found in many institutions – schools, 
universities, law, healthcare, and so on, not to mention the firms and organisations that make up 
global capitalism.  The state becomes ‘animated by market rationality’ Brown asserts, 
 
not simply profitability but a generalized calculation of cost and benefit becomes the 
measure of all state practices. Political discourse on all matters is framed in 
 
20 For a detailed analysis of the concept of “forcing” see Badiou (2007), Fraser (2006) or Hallward (2003): 135-
39. As Hallward asserts’ ‘[t]he last major step or component of a truth procedure is the operation whereby a 
truth changes the situation in which it is included, so as to impose of “force” its recognition in a transformed 
version of that situation’ (Hallward, 2003: 135). 
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entrepreneurial terms; the state must not simply concern itself with the market but think and behave 
like a market actor across all of its functions, including law. 
(Brown, 2005: 42) 
 
As Brown asserts, the market becomes the regulative principle of the state and society in three 
ways: the state responds to the needs of the market through monetary or fiscal policy, 
immigration policy, treatment of criminals; the state must behave like a market actor, fostering 
entrepreneurial activity; and thirdly, the health and growth of the economy is the sole 
justification basis for state legitimacy and basis for action.  
 
In these scenarios political will to, for example counteract the critical exhaustion of the 
atmosphere, ecosystems and people, is subsumed under economic rubrics; the battle to take 
much needed measures against the oil industries will always be fought against those that demand 
increased energy return on investment (EROI). And to complicate matters, as we have seen, 
there is a coterminous and recursive relation between the petroleum industry and the growth of 
the mode of analysis that undergirds this specific formulation and political sequence. The 
economy itself, because of its assumed rational objectivity is deemed the most viable arbiter of 
value, however, because this assumption is based on a founding myth, economic analysis has 
failed to provide adequate care for what it deems as externalities. An assumption that has critical 
consequences, not least for the planetary biosphere. The neoliberal subject in turn both 
intersects with, and is culpable for, the creation of this conjuncture; this should be understood as 
a recursive relation whereby the emergence of one is dependent on the emergence of the other.21 
Attenuated through a logic of economisation both humans and biophysical resources are 
articulated as capital investment in various ways. And, importantly, the construction of political 
commitment is bound up with the problematic notions of ethical personhood and neoliberal 
virtue. Real political commitment is, of course, in evidence in, for example, the meeting of the 
Conference of Parties. However, we should be very wary of assuming that a growing admission 
by political elites that human activity, especially that of burning fuels for energy, is detrimental to 
the planetary environment will usher in a new age of environmentalism, and usher out the Age 
of Oil. We need to be attentive to the ways in which the logics described in this thesis work 
paradoxically to maintain power relations despite their surface level assertions to do otherwise.  
 
21 It is important to insist here that I do not assume that the individual subject itself is to blame for the situation 
they find themselves in, however, when we understand these ideas we do so through a specific frame, 
suggesting that power is articulated on and through subjects – that subjects engage in varying degrees of 
complicity with the modes of governance we find ourselves in. 
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The economisation of life, the increased relevance of markets, and the transmutation of 
neoclassical economic thought into neoliberal rationality is to be understood through the frame 
of the biophysical basis for these procedures. Which is to say, we must rethink the preceding 
analyses through the lens of the petropolitical; all economic activity relies precisely on its ability 
to withdraw value from land and labour, as Polanyi (2001) asserts, and to externalise the run off. 
But furthermore, we must understand the formation of economic rationality (as described by 
Brown), as a petroeconomic rationality. The theory of human capital, for example, as I shall 
explore further in Chapter Four, is to be interpreted as a question of EROI, whereby not only is 
economic and personal value withdrawn based on an expenditure of biophysical energy, but that 
the most predominant frame through which “goodness” is performed is in relation to the 
environment. Therefore, it is not enough to make only economic claims about the nature of life, 
but we must extend these claims backwards to the biophysical world from which value is 
withdrawn, and forwards to the biophysical world in which the outcomes of economic activity 
will be deposited. It is only through an understanding of this as a long chain of extraction, 





Today, world oil demand outstrips supply by several million barrels per day (Weszkalnys, 2013), 
prompting a frantic scramble for further extraction sites and expansion into unconventional 
methods such as oil sands and fracking, but also an increased pressure to explore alternative 
sources of energy. First presented in 1956, Hubbert Peak Theory (more commonly known as 
Peak Oil), named after American geophysicist M. King Hubbert, names this natural limit to 
economic growth based on oil production. As I discussed in the previous Chapter, similar claims 
around natural limits were ratified with the publication of the 1972 book Limits to Growth, a 
pessimistic calculation of the future prospects of a population reliant on the energy won from 
extractive technologies. Combined with the publication of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring in 1962, 
these concepts have come to shape aspects of an environmental movement that looks to limit 
economic exploitation of the planet. Critical race theorists, such as Vergès (in Johnson and 
Lubin, 2017), or eco-feminists, Mies and Shiva (2014) for example, saw these concerns 
intersectionally, understanding that the populations most likely to be heavily affected by the 
downstream externalities of the oil industry were going to be women, people of colour and those 
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on or below the poverty line. Recent events, too numerous to name here, but including natural 
disasters such as Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy, the decimation of natural habitats and fishing 
stocks by the Deepwater Horizon disaster in 2010 and the precarious Ganges Delta (a regular 
flash point of natural disasters as sea levels rise and tropical storms increase in frequency) 
confirm this analysis – the poorest populations are least protected, the last to receive aid and 
often live nearest to sites of disaster or precarious locations (or the very sites of extraction, 
transportation and processing – proper names that have appeared in our lexicon recently such as 
Flint, Alberta or Dakota index the sites where populations are directly affected by extractive 
activities). In Chapter Five I discuss how notions of humanness can attribute value to certain 
sites and populations but not to others, thus providing adequate legitimation for neo-colonial 
extractive operations along racial lines.  
 
While compound economic growth was radically brought into question in the 1960s and 70s, 
and recent events (the 2008 economic crisis for example) ratify claims made during this period, 
‘traditional economic theory suggests that the problem represented by the existence of 
biophysical constraints on the expansion of the global economy will be solved by the markets’ 
(Alcott, Polimeni, Giampietro and Mayumi, 2008: 2). Consequently, a “business as usual” model 
has held sway over our political imaginations the last forty years, relying on both technological 
magic bullets and market solutions to solve these issues. Despite the overwhelming evidence that 
fossil fuel use leads to ratcheting ecological degradation, the political impetus to find solutions to 
these problems has stalled. Precisely because the rewards are so high, because the payoff is so 
great, and the narratives are so strong, energy is still drawn from petrochemical compounds found 
deep below the surface of the earth. Bound to a form of petropolitical epistemology, the 
consequences are huge.  
 
However, the International Energy Agency reports that changes are being made to the make-up 
of the economies of resource extraction. With the necessity to supply a global network with 
constant (and increasing) energy, plastic and chemical goods, the global energy outlook will be 
radically transformed over the next few decades. According to the International Energy Agency, 
growth globally in the renewable sector has increased, with a greater political commitment, lead 
by China, to low carbon fuels (IEA). This growth will have an impact on demand for, and supply 
of, fossil fuels. However, with the US accounting for ‘80% of the increase in global oil supply to 
2025 and maintaining near-term downward pressure on prices’(IEA), the era of oil is far from over. 
Importantly, the majority of this oil will come from unconventional sources. The story of 
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contemporary American oil interests has a long heritage; recent presidencies have, in their own 
way, been committed to economic expansion in line with their predecessors, despite their 
acknowledgement or otherwise of COP agreements. The American ideology of personal liberty 
was not born with the discovery of oil, but the former certainly emerges in the latter.  
 
This section and the next will explore the growing influence petroleum has over the world 
political economy, understanding this as a transformation, ushering in an age unlike any other 
before it, but also a continuation of certain previous logics. What is unique about the Second 
Age of Oil is the nature of how this political economy emerged in response to ecocritical counter 
narratives. I shall claim that the transformation from oil into money is so productive, the 
narrative attached to it so pervasive, and the ideology so naturalised that counter narratives have 
been, so far, not only inadequate, but mobilised (in a counter-revolutionary manner) against their 
proponents’ own interests. While, confidence in the power of progress is ideologically 
intoxicating, preventing the pursuit of alternative economic models (Alcott, Polimeni, 
Giampietro and Mayumi, 2008: 2), and the belief in perpetual economic growth suits those with 
the most to gain from that growth, there has been a need to identify, undermine and indeed, 
exploit, critical narratives, dissenting voices and the production of alternatives. The way this 
occurs in the latter part of the twentieth century is important to the analysis of this period.  
 
Discussing the global economic crisis precipitated by the events of 2007, Shimshon Bichler and 
Jonathan Nitzan (2011) identify a fear that besets all capitalists, a fear of “losing their grip” when 
systemic crises threaten the existence of their profit base. This fear manifests in the well-founded 
belief that their power has increased to approach its asymptote – and, as capitalism is grounded 
in the future, they have ‘good reason to fear that, from now on, the most likely trajectory of this 
power will not be up, but down’ (Bichler and Nitzan, 2011: 21). Whilst not concerning the oil 
industry, this analysis could certainly be applied to it – oil extraction has either reached its limit, 
or in response to global political pressure a significant proportion of it must be “left in the 
ground” as stranded assets, thus oil industrialists’ profits have reached their asymptote. In 
response, capital looks to two courses of action; one, as Bichler and Nitzan put it ‘[capitalists] 
realize that the only way to further increase their distributional power is to apply an even greater 
dose of violence’ (ibid.: 48); or two, as I shall explore later in this thesis, through a strategy of 
marketing. It is interesting to note that the increased capitalisation of oil futures is concurrent with 
the approaching asymptote of oil supply; one could argue that this financialisation is a form of 
violence meted out against the future – tying us into an economic promise to provide and burn 
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more and more fuel to meet the inalienable demands of finance capital.22 As Suhail Malik asserts, 
‘the derivatives markets presents a systemic risk to national and world economies’ (Malik, 2014: 
629), as such, the exposure to risk that dominates the derivatives market puts not just financial 
transactions, but livelihoods in danger. The derivatives market is structured around trade not on 
commodities, as Mackenzie suggests, but on value derived from contracts between two parties 
that ‘derive their value from the level of the index and thus permits what might be called “virtual 
ownership” of large blocks of stocks’ (Mackenzie, 2006: 4).  According to Jameson, this stage of 
capitalist accumulation is a virus and its development an epidemic of epidemics. Financialisation 
occurs at the very point that productive capital gives out – when the value of a commodity is no 
longer reasonably extractable in conventional terms and capital must ‘jostl[e] for more intense 
profitability’ (Jameson, 1997: 251). As he suggests: 
 
During its cycles capital exhausts its returns in the new national and international 
capitalist zone and seeks to die and be reborn in some "higher" incarnation, a vaster and 
immeasurably more productive one, in which it is fated to live through again the three 
fundamental stages: its implantation, its productive development, and its financial or 
speculative final stage. 
(Jameson, 1997: 251) 
 
So, the financialisation of the oil sector, first occurring in any meaningful way during the 1970s 
and 80s, is a result of the necessity to capitalise on a market that is losing its capacity for value 
extraction in the face of growing public animosity towards the industry and the realisation that 
assets won’t be so easily realised in the future – the end of cheap nature (Moore, 2015). As 
Smith-Nonini suggests, ‘the 1970-1 peak and subsequent decline of petroleum production in the 
United States should be seen as a prime cause of the rise of deficit financing in the neoliberal era’ 
(2016: 57). Her assertion is that the rise and spread of global finance is best understood in 
relation to the geopolitics of oil. Specifically, the extension of debt financing is seen as a 
response to the loss of US global power and legitimacy in the wake of the 1970s oil shocks. 
Restoring profitability to multinational corporations, ‘leveraged deregulation, privatisation and 
outsourcing of heavy industry to low-wage countries’ (ibid.: 58), became the preferred strategy of 
neoliberal restructuring. These geopolitical measures allowed the US to maintain a strong 
 
22 For an extended discussion of the violent nature of finance see Marazzi (2011), for an analysis of the relation 
between financialisation and time see Esposito (2011) who understands finance capital as a process of binding 
the future in the trading of risk. 
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currency and political influence over the global south, despite losing its domestic oil advantage. 
Precisely because global oil prices surged after the 1973 crisis, resource constraints were being 
reached and the US had lost global dominance in oil production, there was a necessity to find 
ways to resist the downward profitability of the sector. Declining energy return on investment 
(EROI) required countermeasures. These came in multiple forms, not least the growth of the 
financial sector. As suggested above, this is characterised as a violence directed towards the 
future. As Jason W. Moore (2015) indicates, financialisation on oil commodities has increased 
over the last few decades in line with rising exploration and production costs; due to rising 
marginal costs, the production of a barrel of oil rose tenfold between 1991 and 2007 (Moore, 
2015: 148). The rising attractiveness of financial speculation over investment in the “real” 
economy resulted in ‘protracted “underinvestment” in the extractive apparatus proper’ (ibid.). 
Global oil markets responded to the increased financialisation of the oil industry by increased 
price and market volatility. As Moore suggests, ‘financial activities are more profitable than 
investing in exploration and extraction, [they render] the latter insufficiently profitable, an effect 
homologous to (and reinforcing) the rising costs of production stemming from depletion’ (ibid.: 
149). The logic of financialisation moreover, demands varieties of cost cutting – many of which 
have left the drilling and production apparatus dangerously under-maintained. Financialisation, 
therefore, marks not only the moment of the attempt to reverse the declining productivity of the 
industry – “delaying the crisis”, as Streeck (2014) suggests when discussing debt financing – but 
the increased production of risk. As a countermeasure to declining profits, it inscribes a form of 
violence unequally on proceeding generations whose planetary ecosystem suffers. 
 
The second countermeasure took the form of the production of a narrative to resist the idea of 
loss of EROI. Precisely because financial markets rely on confidence, equally necessary to 
counteract this exhaustion of profitability is the need to build a narrative that “defangs” the 
burgeoning ecocritique and asserts the continued productivity of the global petroleum industry. 
The practice of marketing is precisely this narrative production. 
 
Proximate to the controversially proposed start of the geological era of the Anthropocene, the 
story of The Second Age of Oil began in the latter part of the twentieth century.23 Tied to 
explosive, fossil fuel driven economic expansion on the one hand and a counter movement 
exemplified by the green or environmental agenda on the other, this age is marked by the 
 
23 For an in-depth discussion about the “Golden Spike” of the Anthropocene see Bonneuil and Fressoz 2017, 
Northcott 2013,  
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necessity to occlude the deleterious effects of economic activity via techniques of marketing and 
campaigning. The necessity of this occlusion has increased in recent years as publics have 
become more aware of the impact of releasing carbon into the atmosphere, however, this 
technique of governance finds its roots in the tradition of Western liberalism. Explored in more 
detail in Chapter Four, this strategy is a change by degree rather than one of kind, what is 
significantly different from before is not the necessity to paper over the downstream 
externalities, but the methods by which this is performed. The economic pressure to resist the 
downward trajectory of the rate of profit has never been so prominent than with the 
hydrocarbon industries. The loss of legitimacy for fossil fuel extraction heralded by an increased 
public acceptance of green narratives – ironically, written, in part, by oil industrialists of the 
1970s in response to the growing nuclear power industries (Engdahl, 2004) – combined with the 
increased scarcity of supply, is a threat to the very profitability of the sector. A profitability, that 
in previous decades was more easily given an alibi by a social contract with the public that 
included increased abundance and personal freedoms; a profitability won on the back of a 
blindness to exploitation and extraction, and significantly a blindness to the limits of the capacity 
to expand. As that abundance and freedom has been funnelled upwards, to be held in the hands 
of a smaller and smaller population, and the blindness is somewhat clearing, the social contract is 
dissolving. In a later work, it may be useful to explore how the unbinding of this contract might 
have lead, in part, to the various political crises of the early 21st Century. But for now, I will 
explore the making (and subsequent re-making) of this contract as it is written by oil, and 
precisely how the narrative of economic expansion, expansion underwritten by the hydrocarbon 
industries, both constructs a particular form of global geopolitics and creates a socio-cultural 
necessity for exploitation and extraction. Indeed, as Christophe Bonneuil and Jean-Baptiste 
Fressoz suggest, an understanding of the Earth as a system, where economic and ecological 
concerns are entwined, is key to any contemporary analysis (2017: 20). To the extent that these 
two fields are entwined, we should think of the current cycle of financialised capitalism as 
intrinsically, even necessarily, tied to the extraction and burning of fossil fuels. And further, the 
exorbitant, accelerated burning of non-renewable energy drawn from deep below the surface of the 
Earth as only possible, or probable, because of the fact of the economic school of thought 
known as neo-classicism and the concurrent arrangement of ideas and cultural tropes that arise 
in the West in the last forty years; neoliberalism. To this end, we could say that the emergence of 
something like neoliberalism is only likely because of a combination of Anglo-American global 
interests and the state of the global oil industries and markets in the 1970s. And, concurrently 
the modes of analysis that arose with the emergence of the economy calculates the Earth as 
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commodity not just for exploitation through extraction and burning, but as part of an asset class 
from which financial value can be derived on a speculative stock market. As such, this ties future 
extraction into the very running of the economy itself to the extent that reducing trade has 
disastrous knock on effects at a civilizational level (Di Muzio, 2015). It is precisely this condition 
that determines the era – the global financial markets’ reliance on oil as a commodity only occurs 
after the Nixon shock of 1971 that cancelled the direct translatability of dollar to gold – thus 
allowing dollar convertability to be tied to oil reserves. And, as Engdahl, Mitchell and Smith-
Nonini assert, it is the oil crisis of 1973 and the subsequent vast expansion of the Anglo-
American money markets, that ushered in a new age of financialisation. If we are to follow the 
analysis presented in the introduction, the oil industry does not just intrude into every element of 
our lives, but reforms them axiomatically. Which is to say inscribes into the logics of our current 
socio-political realm its own sets of conditions, norms and cultural articulations. Oil here comes 
to form and reform the models of realisation that provide the ground for the possible, 
structuring what is realisable within a particular domain. As we shall see in the next section, the 
fact of entanglement between the social, economic, political and biophysical domains restricts what 
political options are available to us – we cannot, for example, just delink our current economic 
system from the burning of fossil fuels by fiat. This is how axiomatics operate, as regulative 
statements about the functioning proper of the system.  
 
 
2.5 Oil and Civilisation 
 
Like so many studies in recent years that deal with the relation between the extraction and trade 
of fossil fuels and politics (Argyrou, 2005; Bridge and Le Billon, 2013; Collier, 2010; Hall and 
Klitgaard, 2012; Klein; 2015; Stern, 2015), Tim Di Muzio’s Carbon Capitalism begins with a 
warning. In both 2005 and 2007, former high-ranking government officials in Washington 
modelled the global reaction to a hypothetical 4% reduction of the world oil market; the 
resulting modelled crisis saw an increase from $58 per barrel to $161. The “Oil Shockwave” war 
game predicted massive socio-economic turmoil as a result of this drastic spike, scenarios such as 
the reintroduction of the draft, increased unemployment and petrol rationing were countenanced 
as possible outcomes alongside ratcheting war in the Middle East (Di Muzio, 2015: 1). The 
lesson from this? The global oil trade and the economy are so intrinsically interwoven that any 
change in the former has massive implications in the latter, but furthermore, because our very 
way of life is entangled in the economy, the knock-on effects of oil price changes have serious 
 86 
socio-political and security implications. This is at the heart of Di Muzio’s study; the scale and 
scope of the crisis would be so significant as to affect us at a “civilisational” level. Entire 
populations rely so heavily on fossil fuels that price increases, such as those seen in the 1970s, 
bring into sharp focus the geophysical basis of our global economy (and the economic basis of 
our social world). This three-part relation between the social, the economic and the geophysical 
realms is broadly ignored in neo-classical and neoliberal economic literature.  
 
As we have seen, other writers have addressed this deficit in the literature. Moore (2015) 
describes the dualism inherent in this form of irrationality – the dualism between Nature and 
Culture, whereby each exists as an independent realm – as inherently wrongheaded. For Moore 
‘capitalism is not an economic system; it is not a social system; it is a way of organising nature’ 
(Moore, 2015: 2, italics in original). Capitalism exists not as an independent realm on the surface 
of a biophysical world, that withdraws value from that world, but as an intrinsic world making 
activity – economics and ecology are intertwined so significantly they cannot be disentangled. 
The perceptual lie neoclassical economics tells us is that capital accumulation can exist separately 
from the ecological resources that wealth is accumulated from. Hall and Klitgaard (2012) address 
a similar issue, suggesting that a question that rarely gets asked in economics is about the relation 
between energy and economic activity. Their answer to this question is a thoroughgoing redesign 
of the field of economics to include, as they call it, a biophysical-based paradigm.  
 
Di Muzio conceptually articulates the source of global economic power as fossil fuels; his signal 
difference with Moore’s, Hall and Klitgaard’s and Mitchell’s work is his reliance on the “Capital 
as Power” thesis proposed by Bichler and Nitzan (2009). The central claim in Bichler and Nitzan 
is that capitalism should be conceived not as a narrow economic entity or a mode of production, 
but as a symbolic quantification of power. Capital is thought of as commodified differential 
power, where accumulation becomes the accumulation of differential wealth (and thus power). 
In this way investors and capitalists gain relative power over others through differential market 
capitalisation. As Di Muzio notes, the oil and gas industries are the largest in the world in terms 
of capitalisation, thus also of relative power. Since wealth is a matter of creative potential to alter 
social reality through the exercise of differential power, the extractive industries are 
conceptualised as the dominant organisational power. This marks Di Muzio’s original 
contribution to the field, a new account of globalisation from the perspective of the Capital as 
Power thesis; what he calls the energy-capitalisation-social reproduction nexus. In this study, the 
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production and reproduction of social reality is linked, via market capitalisation, to the capacity 
to draw value from the earth.  
 
This new theory of globalisation attempts to explain the rise and fall of carbon capitalism and a 
civilisation based on the petro-market, making a series of arguments that place the importance of 
energy at the forefront of global economic power. This is a “counter-history” to the dominant 
narratives that think of the rise of capitalism as ‘unproblematic, autogenerated and, on balance, 
of benefit to most of humanity – all the while ignoring the biospheric consequences of human 
activities’ (Di Muzio, 2015: 8). This attempt to construct an economic theory that accounts for 
the marginal social costs of its activity rests on seven interconnected arguments:  
 
- Civilisation is unequally and transitionally based on fossil fuel extraction and consumption, 
which means that current forms of social reproduction are both historically unique and, crucially, 
non-sustainable. Because our civilisation is so heavily reliant on (predominantly) oil there will 
come a point where civilisation won’t be able to reproduce itself in its current form. As such, 
there is a limit to civilisation as it exists now. 
 
- Without the discovery and use of fossil fuels the extent of capitalisation would have remained 
severely limited. Because we live in a period of high-energy consumption, what Di Muzio calls 
the carbonisation of everyday life, the hierarchical forms of world order are the result of 
exploiting and consuming fossil fuels. This pursuit of politics through the economic function of 
resource exploitation is an imposition from above, and precisely one that oppresses the lower 
classes through differential accumulation.  
 
- The next two claims are epistemological; we need an expanded understanding of both the way 
energy has been monetised (and precisely how money is created) and how energy is a key factor 
in the emergence of power. Here modern money must be understood as capitalist credit money 
– debt – whereby banks capitalise on borrower’s capacity (or not) to repay loans with interest, 
this capacity relies on their ability to increase their own income through activity that relies on 
high energy usage. Because this is both socially unjust and dangerous on a finite planet, Di 
Muzio suggests that any significant post-carbon economics must include monetary reform in its 
agenda. The argument about power runs as follows: a political space that tries to safeguard its 
public is in contradiction to the accumulation of capital, systemic chaos and war are almost 
inevitable results of this contradiction, and from this, new hegemons are prone to emerge.  
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- The final three arguments rest on the power of petro-markets to create the world order and 
what challenges face us in their declining years. Whilst this, in another author’s hands, may be 
seen as a hopeful moment – a world beyond petro-capitalism – Di Muzio is here right to remain 
alert to the looming crises of social reproduction. Militarised conflict, which accounts for a large 
proportion of the petro-market, is bound to increase, and as such so is demand for oil – holding 
short of doom-laden predictions, the ratcheting nature of this vicious cycle is at the forefront of 
the argument.  
 
The bulk of the study is structured around an explication of these main arguments, taking a 
detour through meticulously researched histories of English and American contexts (slavery, war 
for independence, industrialisation) to make the significant claim that powerful logics have 
worked to construct carbon capitalism rather than it obtaining necessarily. Things could have 
been otherwise; the rich and powerful applied, and continue to apply, downward pressure on 
populations to increase their differential wealth through uneven capitalisation on natural 
resources, through taxation, economic policies and austerity. These activities can no longer 
continue at the same rate as before if we wish to live in a broadly agreeable biophysical world. If 
economic activity continues to capitalise on the earth in such energy-intensive modes, the 
irrevocable alteration of our world will result in crises of social reproduction. 
 
Di Muzio understands the world order as reflexively produced by its entangled relation with the 
petro-market, hierarchical because of radically unequal access to fossil fuels, and centuries of 
domination by the West. Petro-market civilisation is ‘an historical and contradictory pattern of 
civilizational order whose social reproduction is founded upon non-renewable fossil fuels, 
mediated by the price mechanism of the market and dominated by the logic of differential 
accumulation’ (Di Muzio, 2015: 5). While the relation between civilisation and the petro-market 
is given significant attention, the idea of civilisation itself remains under theorised. As such we 
are left with a broad argument, attributed to Jared Diamond, of how elites perform their wealth 
accumulating activities in direct opposition to the broader interests of the rest of society (ibid.: 
170). Despite being an interesting mode of analysis, this still leaves open the question of how Di 
Muzio understands “civilisation” as such. In other studies carbonisation is linked variously to 
democracy, capitalism, industrialisation, economic growth, modernisation, but a link to 
civilisation as such is peculiar to Di Muzio. Furthermore, this link threatens to undermine the 
specificity of his argument, as the civilisationary order is not usually directly attached to market 
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capitalisation. Instead, we have to make an historical distinction between civilisation as such, as 
an historical condition, and the growth of the petro-market in the late 1800s.  
 
An argument that draws a continuity between the petroleum age and the previous age (what Di 
Muzio distinguishes as the “age of efflorescence”), is put forward by Nigel Clark and Kathryn 
Yusoff in their essay for the Energy & Society Special Issue of TCS (2014). In this essay, the 
human use of fire is given prominent position in the history of human activity, as such 
pyrotechnology is seen as the unifying condition of historical growth within a broader economy. 
Theirs is a combustion centred analysis, and one that understands the petroleum age as part of a 
longer process of the shaping of energy flows. Channelling Bataille, Clarke and Yusoff, 
understand the movement of energy as the site of connection between human social life and the 
rest of the solar system (Clarke and Yusoff, 2014: 205). Fire itself is the linkage between the 
human and the cosmos, between the intimate and the monstrous. It is part of the long history of 
human activity that shaped our lives, and continues to do so today through the exploitation of 
fossil fuels.  
 
One could theorise the condition of civilisation through Roland Robertson’s essay Civilization 
(2006), where he attenuates a reading of Norbert Elias’ work through both Freud’s Civilization 
and its Discontents and Huntington’s The Clash of Civilization. Here, Robertson makes a clear 
distinction between civilisation as a sociocultural complex on the one hand, and as a process on 
the other. Not only did civilisation become a standard of behaviour – to be more or less civilised 
– but as project of civilising other races (where “barbarian” becomes an antonym for civilised). 
Robertson suggests that civilisation has been considered ‘as an aspect of Western imperialist 
gaze, relating to the subjectivizing [sic] project of “mission civilisatrice”’ ( Robertson, 2006: 422), 
and is intrinsically linked to the theme of imperialism. While his analysis of the pursuit of 
political power via economic means, precisely capitalisation on petro-markets, understands in 
some detail the complex, hierarchical nature of the global order, if Di Muzio were able to 
understand his petro-market civilisation through Robertson’s frame, he could theorise the 
complex processual nature of the petro-market as a dominating Western force continuous with 
other such imperial projects. As is, the term civilisation without the hyphenated “petro” modifier 
doesn’t appear in this study and receives less attention than it should. 
 
What a culture does with its energy is an important question when discussing the socio-cultural 
implications of energy production. Elizabeth Shove and Gordon Walker (2014) ask the question 
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of energy utilisation, suggesting that studies often take the societal “need” for energy for granted 
(Shove and Walker, 2014: 41). Instead, their work seeks to understand the linkage between 
energy supply and demand as part of social practice. What drives the exploration for and 
extraction of fossil fuels, especially when the task is so expensive, and often so dangerous? Di 
Muzio would conclude it is the drive for differential accumulation and therefore power by a 
small number of capitalists, whereas Shove and Walker urge us to think more broadly about 
energy demand at the level of the socio-cultural. Whether the economy drives the energy system 
or vice versa, the authors contend that importantly it is social practice that defines an emergent 
society. What this means then, is energy is seen as an ingredient of the complex make up of 
societies, driven by the practice of the social at the level of material and normative commonality 
(ibid.: 46). To the authors, energy cannot be regarded as a privileged driver of practice, but that 
the practice instead produces demand for energy. Without certain social practices, there would 
be no need for energy (ibid.: 49). However, for Di Muzio, petro-market capitalisation exists 
primarily as a motor for the increase in private profit rather than as a result of demands from 
social practice. While they do intersect, while the socio-cultural conditions of our globalised 
world are preconditioned to run off fossil fuel and inherently reflexively engage with the 
exploitation of the “natural” world, at root market capitalisation is a matter of increasing market 
share, and as such is a matter of supply rather than demand. At root, Di Muzio’s study seeks to 
correct those analyses that would place blame at the level of the social, instead, focusing his 
attention on the powerful actors and their desire to increase differential accumulation. It is for 
this reason his analysis is, in my view, most adequate here. 
 
Di Muzio asks whether technology could keep humanity on the course of increased 
consumption and economic growth, or whether our desires for lifestyles commensurate with 
those we’ve grown accustomed to are inherently antithetical to the climate stability of our 
biosphere. Here it seems important to stress that while increased standards of living and mass 
democratisation historically occurred in correlation to a mass carbonisation, the linkage between 
growth and carbon could be unbound. The world beyond carbon capitalism looks very different 
from the one we live in currently, and the transition will see rapid and exponentially increasing 
socio-political traumas as a result of both the climate emergency and the economic effects of the 
changes in the costs of oil extraction. What this study makes very clear is that the accumulation 
of relative wealth will allow the rich to insulate themselves from the worst effects of their 
actions, providing them with the motivation to continue to damage the planet and the most 
vulnerable populations precisely because it increases their differential power. As such, we must 
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be alive to the classed, raced and gendered power differentials inherent in oil-based 
capitalisation; fundamentally, this form of accumulation exploits both land and people 
throughout its chain – both at the level of the construction of differential social relations due to 
class power gained by capital accumulation and at the level of the differential effects of the 
downstream externalities felt predominantly by non-white populations of the Global South.  
 
It is precisely the differential aspect of global hydrocarbon production that must be understood 
here – certain actors have not only historically been able to produce and reproduce their unequal 
market capitalisation through historically high levels of EROI, but they are then able to insulate 
themselves against the worst climatic results of the burning of these fossil fuels. As discussed 
later, this differential power rests on the conceptual articulation of a certain mythos that exists 
across our cultural and social worlds. This double bind of unequal distribution and unequal 
insulating capacity is axiomatically bound to the conditions of neoliberalism at, as Di Muzio 
asserts, a civilizational level – to tamper with it would result in significant punitive responses. As 
such, the global capital chain of accumulation that includes oil production and debt financing 
commits us through the threat of violence to acquiesce to this system. Any attacks at a systemic 
level are met with force (for example, see the response to the Dakota Access Pipeline Protests, 
also known as #NODAPL). This happens at the level of the social contract but also at the level 
of subjectivity; we are, as Foucault suggests, produced and reproduced by the environments 
around us. These environments are intrinsically tied into the petroleum industries and their 
global political, not to mention their geophysical effects. It is important, then, for us working in 
and on culture, to understand precisely how cultural tropes feed into and feed from the 
axiomatic logics at play within these conditions. This is not to suggest only that cultural 
phenomena (artworks, for example) themselves partake in the cycle of global finance capital, 
although of course we know they do, nor to assert that somehow culture is bound into the 
processes of oil industrialisation, which would be a stretch, but to understand how certain 
political rationalities that have gained prominence in recent years are coterminous with those 


















Restraint on trade, or on production for purposes of trade, are indeed 
restraints; and all restraints quâ restraint is evil 





3.1 There Will be Blood 
 
In the final scene of Paul Thomas Anderson’s 2007 film There Will Be Blood, the fictitious oil 
tycoon Daniel Plainview, played by Daniel Day-Lewis, kills Paul Dano’s Pastor Eli Sunday with a 
bowling pin. As he is chasing the religious man around his bowling alley, Plainview menacingly 
tells Sunday that he “drinks his milkshake” invoking the action of an oil well as it sucks its 
precious crude from the earth, draining it dry. Sunday, who has come desperate to Plainview’s 
mansion years after the main action of the film to beg the rich man to buy up his land, is out of 
luck. Years before they had battled to win the hearts of the local townsfolk, religion on the one 
hand, capitalism as exemplified by the new oil industry on the other. Plainview triumphed, 
leaving the pastor with neither a flock of parishioners nor profitable land.  
 
In this final, fatal, scene, Plainview tells Sunday that he had bought up his small patch of land 
from his brother years ago and had sucked it dry, bellowing “drainage” at him. As a prescient 
image of predatory capitalism, the “long straw” of Plainview’s character that sucks the oil from 
the ground of Eli Sunday is instructive. A certain imaginary of freedom is invoked with 
Plainview – the freedom to exploit others – that has been integrated into the conditions of the 
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neoliberal conjuncture as “individual freedom”.  What the sucking dry represents is not so much 
greed, or the plain fact of accumulation, but, as Bichler and Nitzan’s Capital as Power thesis has it, 
as discussed earlier, the accumulation of differential wealth and therefore differential power. 
Freedom (individual, not universal freedom), under these conditions is the expression of 
inequality.  
 
Two intertwined claims; freedom, in this political imaginary, is the reproduction of exploitation 
and that, in as much as this creates it, freedom is contingently linked to inequality. As an expression 
of unequal market capitalisation, then, petropolitics maintains a normative association between 
freedom and the further exacerbation of both wealth and power disparity. Any task that takes 
seriously the promise of universal freedom must understand this linkage and seek to delegitimise 
it.  
 
Through the image of the Plainview character, it seems possible to understand how this figure 
exemplifies a certain early 20th century idea of freedom – an image tied up with the robber 
baron/frontier capitalism of the industrial era. In Mody C. Boatright’s Folklore of the Oil Industry 
(1963), the author has researched a number of significant figures involved in the oil industry in 
this era. As this book was written as an historical study of the industry in its “golden era”, it has 
some limitations, it doesn’t, for example, account for the significant shifts in the industry after 
the 1973 energy crisis, nor the economic accelerations and contiguous expansions into new oil 
rich nations of the latter part of the last century. It does however, describe a certain subjectivity 
that we can utilise in this argument. Most pertinent is the figure of The Driller: 
  
“The traditional image of the driller – an image that appeared early and persisted late – 
was that of a footloose and fancy free wanderer, physically tough and indifferent to 
danger, competent, and in the knowledge of his competence proud and independent, 
often to the point of arrogance, yet a man of few words” 
(Boatright, 1963: 118) 
 
A spirit that runs through much contemporary insistence on the “freedom of 
the individual” narrative finds its corollary here. Both at one and the same time 
dandyish in his abandon and macho in his outlook, this self-image, this form of subjectivity, is 
articulated as a solo male, independent from both the reliance on others within a community and 
the natural world. In Anderson’s film, Daniel Plainview is actively aggressive towards both – his 
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rejection of the Christian church, which mirrors the secular trajectory of twentieth century 
capitalism, and his rapacious approach to land acquisition indicate a man motivated by personal 
profit alone. Accordingly, Plainview exemplifies a paradigmatic spirit of capitalism that emerges 
during this period and determines what is legitimate today; the capacity of the individual to 
exorbitantly exploit what is previously held in common for their own benefit. It is only possible 
now, I would argue, to understand the ideology of neoliberalism as underwritten by the oil 
industry’s socio-political imaginary. Oil, extracted, burnt, and as globe warming effluent, must be 
understood as a power relation; not only does it work to construct and legitimate the world we 
live in, but it delimits what is articulable.  
 
The frontierism exemplified by Plainview is a complex entanglement of the two types of 
freedom identified by Isaiah Berlin (1959). Berlin’s analysis rests on a distinction between 
negative and positive liberty (he uses liberty and freedom interchangeably), indeed, he 
purposively restricts himself to only discussing it in these terms, acknowledging the array of 
literature that already deals with the sense of the term. Negative liberty is broadly described as a 
form of freedom from coercion or interference – if I am coerced into or restricted from doing 
something, I am thought to be unfree. The condition of being without these impediments is one 
of negative liberty. Coercion is seen as the deliberate interference by another person impeding 
my ability to act, whereas being incapable due to external pressures, such as limited financial 
resources, is only considered coercion when it is deliberate – these limitations are considered an 
aspect of negative liberty. Individualistic accounts of the restriction of freedom would only 
consider deliberate intervention by another person as the occasion of coercion, and not by the 
material conditions within which we find ourselves. Berlin acknowledges the material conditions 
inherent in the limitation of freedom, however his discussion rests predominantly on the way 
one person restricts or interferes with another. He takes account of the ways that the liberty of 
one, often ‘depends on the misery of other human beings’ and that ‘the system which promotes 
this is unjust and immoral’ (Berlin, 1959: 5), however, negative liberty, as described by Berlin, is 
articulated as the absence of deliberate restrictions, and not as absence of the “accidental” 
preconditions for living a productive and full life.24 
 
 
24 As will be discussed later in this chapter, Nancy Hirschmann (2003) provides a far more complex, systematic 
understanding of how the freedom of one does not guarantee the freedom of others, and Domenico Losurdo 
(2014) unpacks the liberal assumptions around freedom and its relation to slavery, taking into account 
particular occasions of liberalism in action. 
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As noted by Rob Larson (2018), negative liberty is the only type of freedom theory considered 
by the neoliberal thinkers of the twentieth century. Precisely because they have no account of 
power, the freedom from coercion that neoliberals see as the aim of any political project, cannot 
give meaning to Berlin’s second term, positive liberty. We will call this the paradox of negative 
liberty; the concept of negative liberty is incapable of accounting for the ways unfreedoms are 
produced, moreover, it becomes a myth that occludes its own structural failings. If, as Milton 
Friedman asserts, economic freedom is an end in and of itself, but also an ‘indispensable means 
toward the achievement of political freedom’ (Friedman, 2002: 8), then the negative liberty that 
is foregrounded in his political project, allied to economic theory, is the mask for the inequities 
produced by capital accumulation on a free market.25As Jodi Dean suggests: 
 
In neoliberal ideology, the fantasy of free trade covers over persistent market failure, 
structural inequalities, the prominence of monopolies, the privilege of no-bid contracts, 
the violence of privatization, and the redistribution of wealth to the “have mores’. Free 
trade thus sustains at the level of fantasy what it seeks to avoid at the level of reality – 
namely, actually free trade among equal players, that is, equal participants with equal 
opportunities to establish the rules of the game, access information, distribution, and 
financial networks, and so forth. Paradoxically free trade is invoked as a mantra in order 
to close down possibilities for the actualisation of free trade and equality. 
(Dean, 2009: 56) 
 
This paradox is central to the ideology of neoliberalism.  
 
Positive liberty is what Berlin understands as the capacity to be one own’s master; it is broadly 
associated with the term autonomy.  
 
I wish my life and decisions to depend on myself, not on external forces of whatever 
kind. I wish to be the instrument of my own, not of other men's, acts of will. I wish to be 
a subject, not an object; to be moved by reasons, by conscious purposes, which are my 
own, not by causes which affect me, as it were, from outside. I wish to be somebody, not 
nobody; a doer - deciding, not being decided for, self-directed and not acted upon by 
external nature or by other men as if I were a thing, or an animal, or a slave incapable of 
 
25 For a cogent analysis of the way “free” market capitalism produces inequality see Piketty (2013), Hickel (2017) 
or Larson (2018). 
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playing a human role, that is, of conceiving goals and policies of my own and realising 
them. 
(Berlin, 1959: 8) 
 
The danger that Berlin identifies with respect to the concept of positive liberty is one of 
despotism; if powerful individuals can associate positive liberty with the condition of rational 
behaviour, all behaviour perceived to be irrational is seen to be expressive of a lack of personal 
freedom. If we are slaves to our “base desires”, then they assume justification in intervening to 
create the conditions more conducive to “rational” behaviour (such as the types of market 
intervention seen in neoliberalism). As such, desire to create certain behaviours coherent with an 
autonomous individual, as discussed in the previous chapter, can act as the legitimation for 
interventionist policies at home or abroad. Thus, the concept of positive liberty is used as an alibi 
for “civilising projects”. We will call this the paradox of positive freedom; freedom used as a 
cover for restructuring, intervention and expansion. Furthermore, the notions of positive and 
negative liberty intertwine on both their actually existing and mythic levels. Positive liberty is 
clearly reliant on a certain amount of negative liberty; as a subject of freedom we must be free 
from the limitations on our actions in order to be able to perform them, to realise our potential. 
Equally, a mythos of negative liberty so often employed by neoliberalism to declare the freedom 
of the markets occludes not only, as we have seen, the factual inequality produced by markets, 
not only the lack of freedom, in the form of state intervention (as seen in the shift from classical 
liberalism to neoliberalism) of these markets, but also, importantly, acts, alongside positive 
liberty, as the legitimating narrative for the interventionist strategies inherent in structural 
readjustment projects of the last century. 
 
In Hayek (2006) and Friedman (2002) (who draws significantly from Hayek), the concept of 
liberty is restricted to the conditions of non-coercion – or as Berlin would understand it, negative 
freedom. The task of a policy of freedom, as Hayek sees it, is to ‘minimize coercion or its 
harmful effects’ (Hayek, 2006: 12). For him, freedom is not power, or capacity – something that 
may be associated with positive conceptions of freedom, but simply, the ‘relation of men to 
other men, and the only infringement on it is coercion by men’ (ibid.). As is evident in Nancy 
Hirschmann’s (2003) work, this analysis relies on an understanding of restriction or coercion as 
coming solely from active human subjects, rather than from systemic conditions that prevent 
action – as such, Hayek’s understanding of freedom and coercion is non-systemic, purely 
individualistic (I will return to a discussion of this later in this chapter). For Hayek, to conceive 
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of liberty as the absence of obstacles, rather than the condition of non-coercion by an active 
subject, is ‘equivalent to interpreting it as an effective power to do whatever we want’ (Hayek, 
2006: 16). Liberty ‘describes the absence of a particular obstacle – coercion by other men’ 
(Hayek, 2006:18) and by coercion ‘we mean such control of the environment or circumstances 
of a person by another […] to serve the ends of another’ (Hayek, 2006: 19). In this sense, Hayek 
guards against the danger outlined above of using freedom (in its positive formulation) as an alibi 
for oppression. For him, positive liberty is only what we do with freedom once we already have 
it. It is this understanding that allows Hayek to make the problematic assertion that the 
‘penniless vagabond who lives precariously by constant improvisation is indeed freer than the 
conscripted solider with all his security and relative comfort’ (Hayek, 2006: 17), eschewing any 
claim that liberty relies on a certain level of stability or support. Not only an intellectual 
justification for the declination of the welfare state (Thatcherism is famously based on the ideas 
of Hayek), this conception of freedom is severely limited. As many commentators have noted, 
the denial that freedom can be limited by systemic conditions, that freedom could also mean 
something other than non-coercion and that someone without economic resources can be most 
free leads to an understanding of society that resists supporting its weakest members, suggesting 
instead that their position in society is their own fault. Thus, the free-from-coercion-vagabond is 
guilty of making bad usage of his freedom (bad choices), what he does is his sole responsibility, 
and not conditioned by the context within which he finds himself. As David Chandler (Chandler 
and Reid, 2016) has analysed, Hayek’s understanding of private, individualised free subjects 
creates the conditions where 
 
Problems themselves, from conflict to underdevelopment or environmental degradation 
and global warming, are constructed from the bottom-up; as problems of the subject’s 
inability to govern itself on the basis of its choices and actions. 
(Chandler and Reid, 2016: 28) 
 
This, Chandler suggests, inscribes governance into life itself, reducing it to ‘the generic or 
“everyday” problems of individual behaviour and practices’ (Chandler and Reid, 2016: 29). This 
privatisation of responsibility reduces human collectivities to a collection of individuals that are 
seen to only be responsible for their own actions and not the way they impact on others. As 
Chandler suggests,  
  
 98 
Nothing exists outside our actions and consequently our actions are everything. If there 
is a problem to be addressed the only sphere of engagement can be with the sphere of 
human action, understood as decisional choices of individuals. 
(Chandler and Reid, 2016: 41) 
 
As individuals capable of making choices, our transforming capabilities are reduced to an internal 
world, the external world has been closed off to our intervention – the autonomy of the 
individual has granted us as masters of our own destinies, demanding self-help and self-
construction. Chandler, channelling Anthony Giddens, understands this as a retreat into the 
internal world whereby the only transformation possible is that of the individual’s inner world.26  
 
Charles Sanders Pierce’s rejection of nominalist philosophy could be seen as a critique of 
Hayekianism avant le lettre. I will return to Pierce’s work in Chapter Five, but for now let us 
consider the following question: 
 
The question of whether the genus homo has any existence except as individuals is the 
question of whether there is anything of anymore dignity, worth, and importance than 
individual happiness, individual aspirations, and individual life. Whether men really have 
anything in common, so that the community is to be considered as an end in itself, and if 
so, what the relative value of the two factors is, is the most fundamental practical 
question in regard to every public institution the constitution of which we have it in our 
power to influence 
(Peirce cf. Forster 2011: 3) 
 
Understanding freedom through the narrow framework of liberal individualism, whereby we do 
not consider our own actions and desires as intertwined with something like a community, 
disavows the ethical or political commitments inherent in projects such as socialism. Inherent in 
Peirce’s logic is an understanding of how the individual relates to society; rather than thinking 
this relation as one of freedom from each other, he entreats us to understand it as a form of 
commonality. I will return to this later.  
 
In this chapter I want to understand how the conditions of individual freedom have come to 
shape the way we understand, on the one hand, the complex cultural formations emergent in the 
 
26 I will return to the question of transformative potential in Chapter Five. 
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last forty years, and on the other, how narratives of freedom have been used to justify the 
differential accumulation through exploitation inherent in the oil industry – precisely at an 
historical moment when the capacity for and legitimacy of that exploitation has been challenged. 
The second age of oil is marked by an axiomatic adherence to a mythos of personal freedom that 
paradoxically reinscribes a declination of general freedoms – the way contemporary art 
participates in, or critiques this project is central to any study of the interrelatedness of these 
inferential spheres.  
 
 
3.2 Freedom to Extract 
 
Together, the paradoxes of negative and positive liberty, and their intertwined mythos, form a 
key ideological component of neoliberalism. It is my contention that this double paradox 
emerges within the context of and through the relation our economic systems have to the 
extraction and burning of petrochemicals and their effects. This double paradox is what marks a 
key difference between the first and second ages of oil – under classical liberalism, coterminous 
with the first age, broadly speaking, while there may not have been a greater coherence between 
the mythos and the fact, under Neoliberalism, and thus the second age, the growing difference 
between these two is exemplified by the promise neoliberalism makes to us to have resolved this 
distance. Instead, the insistence on negative liberty, the deracination of the individual from the 
community, that is seen in neoliberalism as a form of rationality, is indeed utterly irrational.  
 
Both one and the same time positive and negative freedom, the desire for deregulated access to 
natural resources, what Heidegger identified as “standing reserves”, is both a freedom from 
restriction and a freedom to exploit nature (Heidegger, 2013). This complexity must be 
understood; it is not as simple as suggesting that the type of freedom expressed in the Second 
Age of Oil is purely freedom from regulation; oil drilling and the industrial scale exploitation of 
the earth is a promethean project of world building. Equally, neoliberalism has been a 
constructive and enframing project that builds worlds as much as it’s central proponents desire 
freedom from state regulation. Indeed, neoliberalism required a shift from the laissez faire 
politics of classical liberalism, to one of large-scale state intervention (however, importantly, this 
shift is occluded from view by the insistence on the concept of the free market, which prioritises 
the concept of negative liberty). The shift from the conditions in Plainview’s era, the “golden 
age” of capitalism, to today requires an understanding of a complexity of entangled concepts of 
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freedom. Plainview strived in the conditions of classic liberalism, with its hands-off approach to 
his extractive activity, however, a different type of industrial oil extraction exists today – at home 
with a variety of government intervention that both occasionally limits its activities, but 
importantly, and more often, provides the conditions for them through incentives, regulations 
and deregulations. Thus, petropolitical freedom today, is formed of an array of regulations and 
deregulations, tax incentives and tax cuts, free market competition and government 
interventions. It is this complexity that creates the conditions for the paradoxes outlined above. 
The mythic component of freedom, and its uses as a narrative to cover over neoliberal inequality 
(how governments intervene to create the conditions for increased market dominance by 
monopolistic corporations), underwrites the conditions of the Second Age of Oil. Freedom, as 
Dean (2009) suggests, under these conditions is a myth, or a façade that occludes the truth of its 
production.  
 
As journalist Thomas L. Friedman (2009) asserts, there is a negative correlation between the 
price of oil and the quantifiable freedoms enjoyed by citizens – freedom of the press, free 
speech, free and fair elections, rule of law, independent judiciary, independent political parties – 
suggesting that when oil price rises (and firms increase their market capitalisation), these 
freedoms are eroded. He calls this the First Law of Petropolitics (Friedman 2009). Thus, whilst 
petropolitics might claim to express certain freedoms, such as the freedom to pursue one’s own 
economic activity free from governmental interference, in practice, the increased market 
capitalisation on oil results in the degradation of citizen’s freedoms. Furthermore, as we are 
aware, the extraction and burning of fossil fuels has resulted in a huge increase in pollution and a 
warming climate in the form of negative downstream externalities, or marginal social cost. The 
extractive industries produce enormous externalities that have to be dealt with socially, that is by 
us; degradation to our water supplies and air quality, decimation of environments and the 
warming of the planet all point to limitations on our freedoms. Thus, the freedom to profit from 
the oil industry is won off the back of the contractions of universal freedoms – we have to pay 
for the economic freedom industry enjoys through the damage to our world, and the taxation 
that is needed to ameliorate that damage. 
 
Discussing the deep-rooted associations between liberal ideals of individualism and private 
property rights, David Harvey (2009) links commercial and military interventionist strategies 
with the invocation of personal freedom and democracy. Wars and extractionist colonialism 
share, for Harvey, the Wilsonian idealism of freedom of expansion, where the ‘“doors of nations 
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must be battered down”’ (Wilson cf. Harvey, 2009: 4). Colonialist tendencies in American history 
provide us with a frame to understand this interlinking of conceptions of freedom and free trade. 
As described by Harvey, the successive liberalisation of trade that occurred in the latter part of 
the twentieth century is just a continuation of forms of commercial expansion that expropriates 
value from the Global South that emerged with early settler colonialism. Neoliberalism 
exacerbates rather than curtails this colonial project, but this time under the banner of 
expansions of personal freedoms. As explored in Chapter Two, the alibi for intervention was so 
often the spread of democracy underwritten by the ideals of self-determination. The belief in 
military supported capitalist expansion has been carried forward into contemporary politics. The 
use of core American ideologies, freedom, liberty and democracy, in current political speech are 
a cover for global dominance, especially in the name of geological procurement. As Harvey 
suggests, George W. Bush's ‘willingness to violate “the sovereignty of unwilling nations” and the 
enunciation of a “preemptive strike” military strategy whenever U.S. interests (commercial as 
well as military) are threatened, sits firmly in this Wilsonian tradition, as do his frequent 
associations of personal freedom and democracy with free markets and free trade’ (Harvey, 2009: 
4). The utopianism of personal freedom has, as Harvey suggests, worked as a ‘system of 
justification and legitimation’ for the colonial project (Harvey, 2005: 19).  
 
It is this use of the ideal of freedom as justification and legitimation I want to hold on to. It is a 
core liberal tenet and, I would argue, central to any understanding of contemporary art. Art 
“frees” us to think differently, artistic expression should be “free” from constraints, art allows a 
“free” play of ideas to emerge. These ideas are inherent in discourse about art’s relation to 
freedom inherited, as Brian Holmes suggests, from the avant garde (Holmes in Sholette and 
Ressler, 2013). And, they act, as I will show later, as a cover for structural inequities that emerge 
in the name of art.  
 
The artist of the last fifty years has been as footloose as the driller in Boatright’s narrative, a 
freedom-oriented agent focused on the differential extraction of value from existing resources. I 
understand contemporary art’s axiological theory of autonomy precisely through this frame. 
Under the conditions of petropolitical contemporaneity artworks seek to uphold conceptions of 
autonomy that privilege certain positionalities that have the capacity to extract value in specific 
ways. Precisely, I claim, it is due to the self-understanding of artists as free, autonomous agents (a 
conception that draws from, but misunderstands Adornian autonomy), that contemporary art 
axiomatically reproduces normative statements and behaviour that reiterate the idea of freedom 
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as differential rather than universal. Here it is important to remember that these claims do not 
suggest that all contemporary artworks operate in this way. It is perfectly reasonable, to head off 
some of the potential criticism of this position, to claim that some artworks operate in one way, 
while others do not. What I want to assert is not that this condition is universal, but that it is 
universalising – which is to say it is part of an axiomatics that seeks to be the universal condition of 
all artworks. It seeks to be hegemonic. 
 
 
3.3 Missuses of Autonomy 
 
Autonomy is a concept that is often applied interchangeably with freedom, in this chapter I will 
not conflate them but understand them as entwined concepts – indeed it is the way they are 
entwined, and so often conflated, that I am interested in. Contemporary art website e-flux, for 
example, lists numerous exhibitions that cite “freedom” or “autonomy” as content. One of these 
is an exhibition listing from 2009, Radical Autonomy at The Grand Café in Saint Nazare, France, 
where the concept of autonomy is framed as one where ‘art could be a sanctuary for futility, 
obscurity, insight, ambivalence, joy and unease’ (Radical Autonomy). Or the write up for an 
exhibition, Exercises in Autonomy, at Muzeum Sztuki in Lodz, 2016, which, as the curator explains, 
explores practices that ‘could potentially become helpful in the process of acquiring autonomy 
from technocratic state organizations and an economy based on uneven capital accumulation 
and predatory exploitation of natural resources’ (Exercises in Autonomy)  
 
These conceptions are not outliers, the colloquial understandings that are produced within 
contemporary art discourse of autonomy think it generally as an exercise in escape or creation of 
sanctuary. The popularity of ideas such as Hakim Bey’s Temporary Autonomous Zone has 
seeped into art’s understandings of autonomy. The Adornian dialectic (that I explore later in this 
chapter) is all but lost here – autonomy is not seen as inherently dialectically related to society, 
but a mode of disassociation from it. This understanding of autonomy is common, I would 
argue, in contemporary art discourse at multiple levels, where art is seen as constructive of 
“spaces” of distance from anything that the interlocutor doesn’t happen to like about society. 
What does it mean, for example, to create autonomy from ‘predatory exploitation of natural 
resources’, as the curator of Exercises in Autonomy suggests art can? Here, art isn’t even afforded a 
critical role, merely the capacity to assert its difference from extractive techno-ideologies. The 
suggestion that art’s role has been reduced to an escapism, or at best a site of imagination, is 
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deeply problematic. Articulated as such, art then becomes a refuge away from the problems of 
the world, not a site from which to challenge, critique, or rationally analyse that world. This is 
dangerous inasmuch as it conditions us to think of art conservatively as the ratification of 
capitalist realist relations. But furthermore, autonomy becomes a privileged site that promotes 
disinterested rather than the interested engagement of people whose lives are affected by the 
conditions they find themselves in. Thus, we see art being a refuge for a lack of diversity as 
privileged subjects are assumed to be more capable of speaking, precisely because of their 
autonomy from the conditions that they speak about. Autonomy in this form promotes a form 
of left-paternalism in art that is suspicious, not only because it privileges the voices of those who 
are already powerful over those who are without power, occluding those less privileged, but 
because it occludes the structural conditions that make this possible. Autonomy is given as the 
alibi for left-paternalistic accounts of struggle without affording those within that struggle the 
means to prevail over it, or claim ownership of the narrative. 
 
Precisely, the claim of objectivity rests on the presupposition of freedom from conditions that 
would be seen to compromise that objectivity. Hence, why, for example, white mediators narrate 
the struggles of people of colour – their supposed disassociation affords them a superior 
position. In Renzo Martens’ 2008 documentary/art film Episode Three: Enjoy Poverty, the Dutch 
artist works with Congolese photographers in an emancipation project that attempts to exploit 
the photographers’ close relationship to their own and their neighbours’ poverty. At the 
beginning of the film it is revealed that images of poverty are the Democratic Republic of 
Congo’s most profitable export, Martens’ intervention is to encourage these photographers, 
whose main line of work previously had been photographing weddings and parties, to setup a 
profitable business by photographing war and famine. However, when they sit down with a high-
ranking official in Medicine Sans Frontier, their hopes are dashed. His response is straight out of 
the liberal playbook; these photographers are not allowed to exploit their own position, the only 
photographers allowed to sell their work are European/American. This distinction is drawn 
precisely because the (non-native) professional photographers are seen to have a disinterested, 
neutral and objective position in contrast to the interested, Congolese photographers. The 
assumption of neutrality, that links to whiteness, maleness, Europeaness is a direct consequence 
of the assumption of autonomy inherited from Adorno’s reading of Kant.27 
 
27 It is worth noting that there is a significant body of research, often from a black radical and/or feminist 
perspective, that takes a critical position on this idea of neutrality – I will explore this later in this chapter and in 
the final chapter. 
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Furthermore, autonomy is figured as an escape or respite from the prevailing conditions, rather 
than a critical reformulation of those conditions. As Brian Holmes suggests, ‘(t)he crucial insight 
of what were formerly called the “avant-gardes” is that an image of emancipation provides only a 
contemplative respite from exploitation, hierarchy and conflict. The energies devoted to the 
creation of a privileged object could be better spent on reshaping the everyday environment’ 
(Holmes in Sholette and Ressler, 2013: 166). Art, as only an image of freedom, is seen as 
allowing a privileged access to escape, access that is foreclosed to other less privileged subjects.  
Of course, we must also acknowledge that these privileged objects have shaped our environment, 
just in ways that assert the primacy of differential not universal freedoms through the production 
of spaces away from the prevailing conditions only afforded to certain subjects. Without a 
principle of universality, freedom will accrue differentially, and furthermore, will offer only a 
temporal escape not a tool with which to leverage systemic change. 
 
The aim here is not to suggest that we need to find an art that does not operate in this way, or to 
try and mobilise, promote or engage only with practices that are anti-/non-/post-autonomous, in 
fact these practices already exist. Expanding our engagement with art and artists outside of the 
conditions of contemporary art, while worthwhile in its own right wrongly assumes two things; 
one, that it is possible to escape contemporary art’s axiomatic conditions by fiat, and two, that by 
doing so we are able to produce critical change at the level of the system of art itself. Neither of 
these assumptions are accurate. In fact, as I will show in these chapters, the very process of 
attempting to produce change with these working assumptions counterintuitively returns the 
critical intention back on itself. First, however, the concept of autonomy needs fleshing out.  
 
When we consider, for example, the work that appeared in the 2016 Berlin Biennale, where the 
infra-thin difference between art and commodity was nominally absent, it seems that art has 
entirely assimilated to the commodity form, to the point where not only does the work look like 
a commodity, but operates as one as well. Indeed, as Mohammad Salemy asserts, DIS, the 
lifestyle magazine/artworld outsider curators of the biennale, seek to ‘blur, if not all together 
remove, the distinctions between art, theory, advertising, fashion and start-up commerce’ 
(Salemy 2016). The difference between artwork and commodity has been removed; The Present in 
Drag is the latest example, or perhaps apogee, of this process of absorption that has been 
ongoing for the most part of the twentieth century. What is interesting to note here is the 
divergence of two tendencies in contemporary art. On the one hand (as exemplified by the 
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curatorial statements discussed above), there is the tendency to claim art as a mode of autonomy 
from the commodity form, and on the other, the tendency to eradicate that very autonomy. The 
totalisation of either of these positions is theoretically inadequate, and it is in this inadequacy that 
we find the central problem with claims to autonomy; there exists neither a totally autonomous 
art, nor a totally heteronomous art, it is not possible to either eradicate nor absolutise the gap 
between the artwork and the commodity form, society or prevailing political economy; artwork 
and its other are coterminous, but not entirely so. This is the central antinomy within art – the 
paradoxical centre.  What I am keen to discuss here is the way contemporary iterations of 
autonomy (in either the autonomy as escape or DIS inspired eradication models) seem to 
misunderstand that very formulation.  
 
In his letter to Walter Benjamin from 1936, Theodor Adorno attempts to defend autonomous 
art from the claim that it is, as Benjamin had asserted, “counter-revolutionary” (Adorno, 2007: 
121). In his response to Benjamin and his later work, Adorno suggests that the autonomous side 
of the artwork is inherently dialectical, an assertion he repeats in Aesthetic Theory when he 
determines artworks to have an intrinsic processual quality, they, as he suggests, ‘go over into 
their other’ (Adorno, 1997: 232). The autonomy of art, for Adorno, works through the dialectical 
relation it has with society, not, as he notes, an existence purely separate or divorced from the 
commodity form or society. It is this dialectical, or processual, nature of the artwork that allows 
it to be at one and the same time apart from and a part of the society from which it arises. 
Furthermore, this capacity to stand apart from society (whilst also being a part of it), is, 
according to Adorno, what facilitates its negative or critical role in relation to that society. In the 
two examples above, the negative role is eclipsed by the totalising principles – either escape or 
absorption. 
 
In a recent essay in the Marxist journal Mediations, Jackson Petsche lays out a defence of 
Adornian autonomy, suggesting that with the advent of post-modernity, the individual subject 
has lost the ability to differentiate the form of art from the commodity form, justification in 
Petsche’s mind to rehabilitate Adornian conceptions of autonomy (Petsche: 2013). Modernity’s 
capacity to produce the artwork as “other” to the commodity has disappeared, and aesthetic 
production today has been integrated into commodity production more generally – as per the 
example of DIS. Drawing on Jameson, Petsche argues that with the dominance of culture in 




“[The] ‘self-autonomy’ of the cultural sphere […] has been destroyed by the logic of late 
capitalism […] the dissolution of an autonomous sphere of culture is […] to be imagined 
in terms of an explosion: a prodigious expansion of culture throughout the social realm, 
to the point at which everything in our social life - from economic value and state power 
to practices and to the very structure of the psyche itself - can be said to have become 
‘cultural’” 
(Jameson, 1991: 48) 
 
Autonomy is understood as the opposite of the commodity form, but an opposition that appears 
almost identical to it precisely because the cultural has been integrated into the social. Indeed, 
Adorno suggests (following Kant), the functionlessness of art is its social function – thereby 
understanding functionlessness as precisely, the mode by which art distinguishes itself from a 
society that instrumentalises and calculates everything. Within Adorno’s work, this appears as an 
ongoing dialectical relation. Coterminous with the dialectic between economics, politics, society 
and other spheres, is that of the limits of what might have been previously considered “culture” 
proper and its outside. According to Adorno, art can never be truly autonomous, but it must 
adopt this status in order to criticise society; precisely because art is at one and the same time the 
thing and its opposite, and this demand is placed on it by the necessity to be critical, it is the 
critical tendency in art that has been the motor for this dialectic. Jameson’s amendment to this 
theory is to suggest that the autonomous realm, or the capacity for art to be dialectically opposite 
the commodity form, no longer exists. The dialectic has collapsed. In both an ontological and 
epistemological sense, the collapse of the difference between culture and commodity is the 
modality of Jameson’s postmodernity par excellence. Jameson’s idea of this dissolution 
axiologically constructs contemporary art, whereby there is no longer any distance between it and 
the commodity form – the DIS type exhibition emerges from this logic. Equally, the logic that 
produces exhibitions where autonomy is seen as un-dialectical escape also emerges from the 
same conditions. No longer capable of having a negative or critical dialectical relation to the 
commodity form, autonomy gets refigured as mere escape. How artworks operate critically 
today, then, must be understood as a reformulation of the concept of autonomy.  
 
As the oppositional or alienating effects of the avant garde have become commodified and 
marketized, Petsche’s (Petsche: 2013) question then, is can art still oppose society by merely 
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existing? Is art still capable of being autonomous? Does, in fact, there still exist this antinomy 
between art and the commodity? Or has it been dissolved by the two opposing tendencies? 
 
According to Petsche, where art, or the aesthetic experience, can no longer be differentiated 
from the commodity form, there is no space of contemplation within which to form a coherent 
critical distance from society. He draws on Marcuse to understand the power of art to create 
political or critical change, but, importantly, this occurs through a change in consciousness not 
social relations. Art’s negation of established reality would establish an almost intangible shift in 
consciousness that would be inherently socially productive. Thus, political transformation is 
linked, through the sensuous aesthetic experience, to the internal world created in subjective 
experience, something that Marcuse sees as an antagonist force in capitalist society. Subjective, 
inner experience becomes not just a liberation for Marcuse, but the site from which the political 
must embark – the ability to step outside capitalist social relations, to differentiate the 
commodity form from the aesthetic form, and to escape the grip of capital. According to 
Marcuse, ‘this escape from reality led to an experience which could (and did) become a powerful 
force invalidating the actual prevailing bourgeois values, namely by shifting the locus of the 
individual’s realization from the domain of the performance principle and the profit motive to 
that of the inner resources of the human being: passion, imagination, conscience’ (Marcuse cf. 
Petsche, 2013: 152). In this sense, autonomy becomes the production of an individualised space 
away from the prevailing conditions, a space to retreat into, rather than an operation dedicated to 
the dialectical practice of the negative. Freedom, as understood by this logic, appears not in the 
positive sense – freedom as capacity – but in the negative sense – freedom from coercion. When 
the critical force of art is subsumed by the commodity form, the conception of freedom appears 
only as escape and not as the capacity to produce change.  
       
 
3.4 Thunderlike Freedom 
 
Contemporary conceptions of freedom seem to be rooted in at one and the same time free 
floating, deracinated, individualism, and colonial instantiations of differential power. This 
formulation is complicated by various, non-contemporary, non-Western histories of art, histories 
that find their genesis outside of the liberal tradition. However, it is important to account for the 
conditions of the genre of contemporary art as it appears in its European/Western formation 
precisely because of its internal drive for universality, and how it recursively co-constitutes the 
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normative dimensions of contemporary liberal society. I will link a review of the literature 
around contemporary art with an analysis of contemporary conceptions of freedom within 
neoliberal societies to understand how the nature of freedom instantiated by contemporary art is 
ideologically linked to freedom as understood within the liberal tradition as it transmutates into 
its neoliberal and more current variants.28 A petropolitical analysis binds these forms of freedom 
to the ideological and socio-political formations emerging out of the Second Age of Oil. These 
concatenated inferential systems share tropological axiomatics,29 (in this case around the ways 
freedom is articulated) that are correlated, but not causally linked, to the petropolitical. Which is 
to say, inferential systems share tropes, logics, and in some cases axioms in co-constitutive ways. 
Cultural phenomena both draw from and feed into these tropes, logics and axioms. It is, of 
course, the claim of this thesis that the cultural, political, economic and ecological co-constitute 
axiological founding statements, thus, the way a concept, such as freedom, appears in one sphere 
tracks across to the other spheres rather than remaining isolated. 
 
The nature of freedom within art – how artworks, exhibitions and the condition of 
contemporary art as such articulate their relation, modelling and instantiation of freedom – has 
its historical genesis in the middle of the twentieth century. Within the tradition of art history 
this story generally mobilises a series of artworks, exhibitions and art events that float free of 
their surrounding social, political, economic and ecological contexts. The story usually begins 
with Duchamp and Warhol, reading, in the case of Thierry De Duve (1996), Kant through the 
conditions created by the readymade, or in the case of Arthur Danto (1997), the project of 
contemporary art through the Brillo Box. This thesis is neither a history of contemporary art nor 
a corrective to its limited narratives. Instead, what I attempt here is a speculative approach that 
holds together particular ideological components to produce a heuristic formulation. 
Contemporary art is not the art most suited to this particular historical political conjuncture 
because it responds to or extends its parameters, but because it reflexively feeds into the 
ideological formations that underwrite them – artistic tropes operate at the level of the 
 
28 During the writing of this thesis a number of significant political shifts occurred, not least the EU referendum, 
or “Brexit” vote and the election of Donald Trump to the position of 45th President of the United States. These 
seismic events have made us aware of the growing discontent with liberalism from the perspective of a growing 
far right, ethnonationalist faction. The “current variant” of liberalism we are now experiencing must be seen in 
this context. While I will expand on some notions of this later in this chapter, it is beyond the scope of this thesis 
to articulate in full these conditions, however, we should keep in mind the fast changing nature of the political 
conjuncture.  
29 While the term “tropological” has its origins in biblical exegesis, I use it here to indicate the logics of tropes; 
how a trope might reappear in different inferential systems without there being a direct causal relation is an 
important mode by which we can understand the nature of the contemporary moment.  
 109 
axiological. And this is nowhere clearer than in the concept of freedom. Cultural logics 
determine how this concept is articulated, not just that it has become a central concept in our 
lexicon. 
 
Within the discourse, art is often seen as a mode of escape. The nature of autonomy for E. E. 
Sleinis, for example, is non-dialectical; in a text entirely untroubled by a reading of Adorno, 
Sleinis tells us that the ‘art enterprise inherently promotes freedom’ (Sleinis, 2003: 2), and that art 
‘frees us from the commonplace and the merely instrumental […] frees us from habitual and 
routine modes of perceiving, thinking, feeling, and acting that arise from activities needed to 
sustain life’ (ibid.: 5). He continues, ‘freeing entails overcoming resistance or inertia or loosening 
fixed patterns […] [the] function of art is to overcome such resistance’. In his understanding art, 
then, is a project of negative freedom – “freedom from” – that foregrounds the experience of 
viewing art as one of transformation; we become freer when we view art – ‘the freeing creates a 
new self’ (ibid.: 13). But how precisely is this process to be understood if not dialectically? What 
of the “old self’ is maintained, what is sublated? If we are to think this process without a 
synthetic conception of the person one becomes after viewing art, how can we properly 
understand it? Furthermore, without the dialectic at play in the art encounter, where we see 
“freeing” as an entirely linear, quantitative process – a process of calculation inherent in the 
economisation of society – whereby freedom is measured by how much of it accrues to a 
particular subject via their experience of an artwork, we can only understand freedom in its 
negative sense, we can only understand liberation as a project of escape from restrictions applied 
by others or nature. Thus, the “habitual” or “routine” stands in for laws and norms that 
imprison us, and the best way to overcome them is to escape them. Judged as such, freedom can 
only be a project of individual emancipation – one that seeks to free us one by one from the 
shackles without an attempt at systemic change. As discussed later in this chapter, this non-
systemic thinking is coherent with a neoliberal logic that is comfortable with the production of 
differential freedoms – and has its roots in the Hayekian formulations discussed earlier. Further 
still, as I shall focus on more explicitly in the next chapter, this account of freedom is perfectly 
coherent with a market ontology that requires moral legitimation for the extraction of value, 
whereby freedom is deemed both legitimation and the conference of value. Insofar as an artwork 
is seen to be a progenitor of freedom, it has symbolic value that adds to market value, and it 
covers over this operation with the nominal expression of personal freedom as a moral “good”.  
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The concept of freedom as an escape from norms is central to the project of contemporary art; 
as De Duve, quoting Robert Musil, tells us, art is ‘something which simply is, and which doesn’t 
need to conform to laws in order to exist’ (De Duve, 1996: 3). The very logic of art revolves 
around this central locus of non-conformation (to laws or norms), as De Duve shows us it acts 
as an invariant logic of contemporary art that has the status of ‘family resemblance’ (De Duve: 
12): 
 
[T]hat all attempts to define art must end in either a solipsism or a tautology; that the 
concept of art is undecideable; that the openness and indeterminacy of the concept are 
pertinent to any definition of the concept; or, finally, either by recourse to a theory of 
performative speech acts, or through the detour of institutional theory, that the 
circularity of empirical definition “art is everything that is called art” far from being a 
solipsism, constitutes the ontological specificity of works of art 
(De Duve, 1996: 12) 
 
Here we have three positive claims; art is undecideable, open and indeterminate; art is everything 
that is called art; and these claims for art determine the ontological specificity of art as such. And 
I would add, these conditions work at the level of the particular and the generic – each particular 
work of art and the genre of art as such comply with these invariants. So, here we have a paradox; 
art is art only if it resists laws, yet it is itself conditioned by the invariant laws thus stated. A law 
of art is that art escapes law.  
 
The Duchampian readymade, for De Duve, exemplifies this invariant; the naming of a urinal as a 
work of art articulates an indeterminacy of the concept of art, where previous paradigmatic limits 
of art no longer obtain, and the work of art is only art because of the proper name given to it. 
The performativity in naming an object art manifests, as he suggests, the ‘magic power of the 
word “art”’ (ibid.: 13), freeing the work from a history of style. Art’s autonomy exists precisely 
because of the capacity to nominate anything as a work of art. Autonomy is thus a condition of 
aesthetic nominalism – the capacity to confer the “value” of art on an object previously not 
thought of as such. This expansion of the axiom of art into otherwise non-art areas is 
emblematic of post-Duchampian modalities of art making, whereby the word art acts as a sign 
that at one and the same time designates an object as such and expands the notion of what art 
can be. This signifying practice exists only for an audience. Indeed, as Adorno asserts, the 
‘experience of artworks is adequate only as living experience’ (Adorno, 1997: 232), the work of 
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art is animated by the gaze, contemplative immersion is required for the processual quality of the 
work to be ‘set free’ (ibid.). Or as Suhail Malik suggests, the fundamental constitutive logic of 
contemporary art is the experience of it (Malik in Hlavajova and Sheikh, 2016: 129). As such, when 
the term art acts as a signifier it does so precisely to constitute an audience rather than solely an 
object. Thus, the nomination of an art object is coterminous with the nomination of an audience. 
The Duchampian readymade has precisely this co-constitutive logic. One that has as its 
completed experience the refining, as Duchamp puts it, of sugar from molasses (Duchamp 
1957), by the spectator, whereby an artwork’s openness is temporally filled by the production of 
meaning in the process of experience. The nature of this production of meaning, however, is 
importantly non-conclusive as it will be repeated by every subsequent spectator. This 
‘contingently determined multiplicity’ (Malik in Hlavajova and Sheikh, 2016: 129) is the central 
component of contemporary art’s concept of freedom, whereby meaning is unfixed, free floating 
and determined only contingently through a co-constitutive relation with the audience (which 
repeats at every instance of being viewed). 
 
This unfixity of meaning is guaranteed by an aesthetic nominalism that no longer grants the 
universal through genre. As Adorno determines, the aesthetic particularity of contemporary art 
frees it from the genres, determining contemporary art as the generic itself whereby the principle 
of individuation encourages particularisation (Adorno, 1997: 264). What Danto terms the “post-
historical” period is characterised by an end to the master narratives of art, whereby work 
articulates a pluralistic approach. In this period, which Danto dates from roughly 1964, there are 
no ‘stylistic or philosophical constraints’ (Danto, 1997: 47), instead everything is possible. Here: 
 
It is one of the many things which characterize the contemporary moment of art - or 
what I term the post-historical moment - that there is no longer a pale of history. 
Nothing is closed off, the way Clement Greenberg supposed that surrealist art was no 
part of modernism as he understood it. Ours is a moment of, at least (and perhaps only) 
in art, of deep pluralism and total tolerance. Nothing is ruled out. 
(Danto, 1997: xiii – xiv) 
 
The rise of aesthetic nominalism explodes the generic limits that the modern artwork worked 
within and against, transcendence of limits is no longer a viable mode of art making, as every 
available style, form or philosophy, is tolerated. Instead, contemporary art emerges as a genre in 
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and of itself, devoid of dialectical relation between the particular and the universal that would 
have been granted through the working against the genre limit.  
 
What Georg Lukács named “subjective idealism” emerges as a modality of experience, whereby 
subjectively differentiated “worlds” are conjured – aesthetic reflection is thus a matter of making 
meaning independently of a universal (Lukács in Cazeaux, 2000: 221). These independent worlds 
constitute multifarious viewpoints on the same aesthetic experience insofar as aesthetic reflection 
is nominalistically determined. Which is to say, the dialectical movement between the particular 
and the universal that would have been mediated by genre is foreclosed by the total tolerance 
given by aesthetic nominalism. Artworks no longer allow a dialectical transition into the universal 
and this is transferred to experience in as much as an experience of a work of art must 
understand that work of art to be just another iteration of an equally tolerated, free expression 
amongst many others. The condition of the contemporary is thus a condition of simultaneity 
whereby freedom is encountered as total tolerance within the same time and place – spatio-
temporal simultaneity.  
 
Peter Osborne has linked aesthetic nominalism to an increasing individualisation within society, 
whereby neoliberalism is seen as the most recent articulation of individuation (Osborne, 2013: 
107). For Osborne, following Adorno, total individuation would result in a total destruction of 
meaning. Insofar as individuation is not total, artworks still require mediation via interpretative 
categories, however, as Osborne notes, the appropriation of aesthetic forms by the culture 
industry has led to ‘declining artistic significance of objective aesthetic norms’ (ibid.).30 
Channelling Lucy Lippard, Osborne understands the work of the latter part of the twentieth 
century to be uncategorisable. Eschewing objective norms, contemporary art as it emerged in 
this period, became the aesthetic experience most coherent with the emerging socio-political 
conjuncture. Insofar as the ideological components of neoliberalism rest on a particular 
conception of freedom, contemporary art’s resistance to genre, total formal and philosophical 
tolerance, increasing individuation, and the production of multiple, incoherent “worlds”, is 
 
30 We might read this against the claims made for the 2016 Berlin Biennale in the last section; wherein 
contemporary art has destroyed the infrathin difference between art and non-art (the logical conclusion of the 
readymade gesture), aesthetic experience is no longer viable – the autonomy of art from the commodity form is 
what guarantees the reflection process, without it, works of art are merely things. Because I hold that autonomy 
articulated only as “freedom from” is purely quantitative, which is to say accords in varying quantities to various 
works of art, this understanding is incapable of managing the decline of artistic meaning. It is only when 
autonomy gets articulated as a process of self-legitimation that we can understand it in a dialectical relation to 
society as such. I will expand on this concept in the latter section of this chapter. 
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expressive of that conception. Which is to say, freedom thus understood as lawlessness legislates 
for the paradoxical production of generic norms in line with that idea of lawlessness. As I will 
discuss in the next section, this paradox is coherent with the emerging political variant of 
neoliberalism we are experiencing today. Thus, contemporary art imagines freedom in the last 
instance as a form of negative freedom – freedom from laws and norms. In this scene, the 
absent law represents genre limitations that would have determined the field as such, without 
these, art appears as fully pluralistic, or, as Cuathemoc Medina suggests: 
 
the ‘arts’ have merged into a single multifarious and nomadic kind of practice that 
forbids any attempt at specification beyond the micro-narratives that each artist or 
cultural movement produces along the way. If ‘contemporary art’ refers to the 
confluence of a general field of activities, actions, tactics, and interventions falling under 
the umbrella of a single poetic matrix and within a single temporality, it is because they 
occupy the ruins of the ‘visual arts’ 
(Medina in Aranda, Wood and Vidolke, 2010: 19) 
 
As Castoriadis (1991) makes explicit, thinking freedom as thunderlike and the subject as a free-
floating entity, delinked from every tie (be that a law, norm, tradition, or history), is not adequate 
to understand the nuanced, dialectical nature of this concept. As Erich Fromm (2001) has 
argued, the project of increasing personal freedom – the continual process of individuation that 
he sees as historical as well as individual – is one that removes the security and orientation 
provided by community and tradition. As such, the history of negative freedom is haunted by the 
increased isolation of individuals – a phenomenon that Fromm traces through history to the 
escape from the bounds of nature. In the face of an overwhelming nature, the human is required 
to escape its bounds, this escape is then accompanied by a mastery of that nature with the use of 
tools and technology. As Fromm understands it, the negative freedom of escape is accompanied 
by the positive freedom of mastery through technology. Thus, the concept of positive freedom 








3.5 The Concept of Freedom as Norm Production  
 
In many narratives, the accrual of freedom is assumed to be a moral good, quite often without a 
nuanced understanding of the multiple ways that freedom is constructed. With the increased 
individualisation of freedom, the pursuit of differential freedoms, the understanding of freedom 
as escape from norms, the concept of freedom is understood quantitatively, as a matter of 
accounting. The project of freedom is thus seen as a zero sum game; there is only so much of it 
to be distributed.  
 
It is clear that the demand for freedom – from regulation – to exploit the earth’s natural 
resources that comes from the oil industry rests on the exploitation, thus unfreedoms, of the rest 
of the population. What is less clear is how, when the concept of personal freedom so often 
comes to rest on the idea of non-coercion, we are bound to a normative construction of liberty 
as purely negative, as such, this norm of freedom as non-coercion comes to shape our very 
institutions and behaviours.  
 
As a constructive conceptual articulation, when freedom is only understood through this specific 
frame, the social and institutional are reproduced in accordance; which is to say, social 
institutions, individual behaviours and normative practices are all constructed as though freedom 
means only freedom from coercion. It is the aim of this section to understand how the 
articulation of freedom within this narrow conceptualisation produces and reproduces particular 
norms, paradoxically when proponents of this formulation assume this idea of freedom to be 
free from norms as such. This argument corelates to the De Duvian argument above, whereby 
the law of art was one of lawlessness.  
 
To understand this conception of freedom as proceeding from, and constitutive of, social norms 
will help us analyse it better and understand the modalities through which we can challenge or 
expand these notions of freedom. Precisely, my claim is that to understand conceptions of 
freedom as an escape from normativity, as proponents of negative freedom do, disavows the 
very action of norm production that occurs with this mode of articulation. When we understand 
all discursive articulation as participating in a regime of norm production and proliferation, we 
can see how even a conception of freedom as freedom from coercion (by norms) operates to 
reiterate and establish normative behaviours. Moreover, I think it is possible, through this 
analysis, to recover conceptions of freedom that link it to emancipation and democracy, in order 
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to wrest it from the hands of people who use it as means to undemocratic ends. We can do this 
precisely through the way we understand bundles of concepts to coalesce around constructions 
of norms and to produce causal significance. To begin with I want to understand how social 
structures have causal power (an idea that will reappear in Chapter Six), this will be followed with 
a critique of free speech advocacy and a discussion of how an adequate theory of normativity will 
allow us to reconceptualise freedom away from the restricted view of freedom as freedom from 
coercion.  
 
To articulate how causal significance proceeds from the interaction between norms and social 
forces, rather than from either the transformative power of individuals or the monolith of 
society itself, Dave Elder-Vass (2010) understands the emergent powers of social forces through 
the concept of norm circles.31 Specific groups of people have social powers, as they intersect and 
overlap, possessing causal power to influence individuals and institutions. The concept of the 
norm circle understands how structural and agential forces participate in the construction, 
ratification and proliferation of norms and how this produces change at a social level. For Elder-
Vass, the power to produce change emerges from within a grouping of individuals (not society as 
such nor from isolated individuals) – precisely, these groupings, norm circles, have emergent 
properties, which is to say have powers greater than their individual members.  A norm circle 
possesses potential for causal power exceeding that held by individuals alone. As we shall 
explore, this concept of emergence allows Elder-Vass to understand the norm circle as 
productive of social causality where individuals would be incapable.  
 
Society is comprised of a hierarchical strata, or as Elder-Vass terms it, lamination of individuals, 
groups and social institutions (where behaviour sediments into norms and rules). We should 
understand the interrelation between each lamination as causal insofar as normativity intersects, 
and produces change within, each lamination. As Elder-Vass explains, ‘the social power that 
tends to encourage us to conform to any given social norm is in fact an emergent causal power 
of a specific social entity, a specific group of people: a normative circle’ (Elder-Vass, 2010: 7). 
While not enough weight is given to the concept of power in this theory, where differential 
capacity for discursive control or domination within each norm circle is not fully articulated, it is 
 
31 Cass Sunstein (1995) describes in some detail how social norms come to produce and police social action and 
behaviour.   
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still useful to understand how causality is produced as an emergent property of norm circles, not 
handed down from dominant figures.32 
 
Action within a norm circle, interestingly for Elder-Vass, is not externally determined, but 
emerges from the commitment to ‘endorse and enforce’ practices within the circles themselves 
(ibid.: 123). As such, members of a circle act in ways they wouldn’t were they not members. 
There is a shared obligation to act and reproduce behaviour deemed acceptable or punish 
behaviour that falls outside the norm. Accordingly, concepts and actions get more readily 
concretised and ratified when reinforced by norm circles – in fact, within a circle there is a 
tendency to increase conformity to a norm. This tendency means that even seemingly small 
groups might have emergent powers beyond what could be imagined.  
 
When understood in this way, the concept of freedom as non-coercion must be understood not 
as an escape from norms, but precisely as a central conceptual axiom around which norms are 
produced and reproduced. 
 
The current tendency in popular political discourse to assume that freedom is constituted by the 
fact of being uncoerced – only when we are not being interfered with – assumes that life be free 
from coercion, limits, or regulation. It models freedom as a negative formulation whereby our 
freedom is normatively judged to be based on how unlimited we assume ourselves to be when 
making statements, performing actions or going about our business. If we feel coerced – by 
institutions, other people or social norms – we assume our freedom to have been compromised. 
As Wendy Brown (2017) has analysed, current strands of neo-fascist thought have been allowed 
to develop under the conditions of neoliberalism precisely because of the way freedom in 
neoliberalism has been formulated. The neoliberal variant of freedom has, according to Brown, 
been reduced to its restricted form of freedom from coercion, uncoerced action becomes freedom’s 
only meaning ‘[a]ll other meanings—freedom as emancipation from powers of domination, 
freedom as capacity, and freedom as participation in popular sovereignty—are simply nonsense 
from [a neoliberal’s] point of view’ (Brown 2017). As she suggests, this concept is ratified by, if 
not emergent from, the writing of Milton Friedman and Frederich Hayek. These two “architects 
of neoliberalism” understood economic freedom (freedom on and of the market, freedom to 
choose, freedom from regulation) to be not only the guarantor of personal and political 
 
32 A further study of this could attenuate a reading of normativity through Foucauldian notions of power, or 
even through the work of Bichler and Nitzan who fully articulate the concept of differential power.  
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freedoms, but an end in and of itself. However, as Rob Larson (2018) has shown, the 
Hayekian/Friedmanite conception of freedom occludes the structural effects of power dispersal 
– differential wealth being the foundation of the production of differential power, thus 
differential freedoms. Neither Friedman nor Hayek have an adequate analysis of the structural 
problems of the concentration of wealth.  
 
The predominance of these discourses in public life, to the extent that Larrry Summers can 
proclaim to the Democratic party that ‘“we are all Friedmanites now”’ (Summers in Larson, 
2018: 111), has led to a rather restricted view. Thus, when we invoke freedom, we are 
normatively invested in concepts of freedom as freedom from coercion and nothing more. In 
other words, because of how public discourse has repeatedly linked the two while occluding 
other, more nuanced concepts of freedom, there is a normative dimension to the very language 
we use to engage in political discussion. As such, the demand by advocates of freedom to be 
uncoerced by norms results in the expansion of only negative forms of freedom and, 
paradoxically, as I shall explore now, in the reiteration of normativity within their own discourse. 
Non-coercion in this formulation comes to act as a norm that is enacted within the norm circles 
that adhere to this conception insofar as participants’ behaviour is endorsed or punished 
dependent on their adherence to the norm of no-coercion. We see this endorsement or 
punishing occurring most obviously in online behaviour where critical challenges to a person’s 
beliefs come to be understood as a restriction on their freedom of speech, no matter how 
abhorrent those beliefs may be. Freedom of speech in these environments trumps all other 
forms of freedom not by fiat, but by the fact we have a narrow understanding of freedom only 
as freedom from coercion.   
 
This conception of freedom as “non-coercion” assumes, or desires, that social good, or society 
as such, neither exists nor makes heteronomous demands on us as individuals. That all that 
matters are individual choices, expressions and action – this is the view of methodological 
individualism. As Wendy Brown suggests, in this analysis ‘freedom is not just an unlimited right, 
but one exercised without any concern for social context or consequences, without restraint, 
civility, or care for society as a whole or individuals within it’ (Brown, 2017). Insofar as freedom 
is thought of as freedom from constraints on action and expression, it becomes the ground from 
which political battles are fought, and the basis for demands of personal rights as asserted with 
no care for the social impact of those actions. Personal expressions, no matter their 
consequence, are seen as sacrosanct precisely because the limitation of them is seen as a 
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limitation on freedoms and thus allied with whichever oppressive regimes you chose to name – 
thus, to oppose freedoms of speech is seen as consistent with logics of fascism and so on – the 
naming of one’s opponent as such can be seen as a form of discursive punishment for not 
adhering to a norm. The convoluted, illogical nature of this is troubling. We see claims to 
freedom of speech most often by self-styled libertarians who want to defend their ability to say 
“controversial” things in the public realm.  
 
However, this formulation rests on the problematic assumption that freedom from constraint is 
a natural condition and engagement with institutions, people or norms problematically limits that 
natural state of freedom. As Zygmunt Bauman (1988) articulates, the long history of the study of 
the concept in sociology has focused on the conditions of “unfreedom”. It assumes, as he says, 
that freedom was ‘a fact of nature, [and unfreedom was] an artificial creation, a product of 
certain social arrangements’ (Bauman, 1988: 4). This history, that concentrated on restriction, 
limitation, social constraints – all concepts that assume an external (as constraints) or internal (as 
conscience) pressure – became a ‘self-evident, axiomatic assumption’ (ibid.: 5). However, as 
Bauman is keen to assert, the free human individual is far from a natural or universal figure, but 
an historical and social creation.  
 
Individual freedom cannot and should not be taken for granted, as it appears (and 
perhaps disappears) together with a particular kind of society. 
(Bauman 1988: 7) 
 
Individual freedom is thus a contingent social construct that emerges out of the conditions of a 
particular society – in his analysis this society is capitalist. And we should of course be conscious 
here that capitalism is the accumulative mode by which differential power is gained by 
differential accumulation. Because as Bauman suggests, freedom only exists as a social relation – 
relying on the differentiation between one party and another – one person’s freedom comes at 
the expense of another’s, freedom accrues in accordance with already existing lines of power. As 
he suggests, ‘freedom was born as a privilege [it] divides and separates. It sets apart the best from 
the rest. It draws its attraction from difference: its presence or absence reflects, marks and 
grounds the contrast between high and low, good and bad, coveted and repugnant’ (ibid.: 9). The 
form of freedom practiced by free speech advocates and neoliberals alike pretends that having 
resources in which to perform one’s capacity is unnecessary. Freedom as conceived of as lack of 
restrictions, for Bauman, is not an adequate expression of what it means to be able to do things 
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– we need resources, we need capacity. Importantly, not conceptualising having resources as a 
problem for freedom emerges from a position of never having to have worried about having 
resources or not. Only thinking of freedom as noncoercion is thus a sign of already occupying a 
privileged, or differentially powerful position in relation to other parties.  
 
Freedom can only be differentially attainable. As Domenico Losurdo reminds us in his historical 
overview of liberalism, the contradictory dark heart of liberalism is the illiberalism of slavery 
(Losurdo 2014). The socio-economic conditions that provide some members of a global 
community with their much-prized freedom comes at the expense of the lack of freedom of 
others. How do we align an economic system geared towards, in the first instance, the 
differential accumulation of value with the expansion of freedom into realms that rely on a lack 
of freedom in order to draw value from them? How do we align freedom with slavery? This 
dilemma of liberalism is the key question for scholars of freedom to deal with. The differential 
conception of the attribution of freedom is what structures society – as Bauman suggests, ‘if it is 
true that “men make society”, it is also true that some men make the kind of society in which 
other men must live and act. Some people set norms, some other people follow them’ (Bauman, 
1988: 23).  
 
The capacity to create social norms freely is the ground for power, precisely because those 
norms determine the action of others; freedom appears, in Bauman’s analysis, as the capacity to 
rule. Under this logic, freedom becomes the precondition for oppression. Demand for freedom 
becomes demand for power over others.  
 
 Freedom is power, in so far as there are others who are bound 
 (Bauman 1988: 23) 
 
Articulated in this way, it is coherent to analyse the demand for personal freedom of expression 
as a demand for power. Predominantly these demands come from parties who see themselves as 
injured by restrictions on their freedoms of expression, but whom have been able to either forget 
or occlude the suppression of freedoms of others precisely because they do not understand 
freedom in terms other than noncoercion – to only understand freedom as non-coercion means 
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any occasion of coercion must be resisted and any reparative activity that seeks to rebalance 
power differentials are seen as forms of coercion.33 
 
Advocates of freedom as non-coercion, then, argue that no one must care about each other 
when making statements, that, the ability to make statements trumps the harm done by those 
statements and in fact, because we are all individuals, the making of statements has little or no 
effect on those parties who might otherwise be harmed – harm is thus just rendered as “taking 
offense”. However, contra to this view, their actions and statements create, proliferate and 
reinforce norms. As such, their actions have a performative nature – they create the world they 
want to live in as a normative function. Freedom as noncoercion comes to act as a regulating, 
axiomatic principle whereby all critical statements must be allowed. Freedom of speech must be 
an inalienable right. But of course, this formulation of freedom as noncoercion as universal 
axiom, problematically rearticulates the fundamental liberal dilemma of freedom. Insofar as 
freedom accumulates differentially, some parties will always enjoy more of it than others. To 
unreflexively assume that this is not the case, or to act as though freedom accrues equally, is to 
occlude the structural dimension – that some parties will always be restricted or punished more 
than others, that freedom to speak or to act without coercion just is not realised universally. 
Some parties have freedom while others do not. As such, this demand for freedom is one that 
ratifies and increases already existing power, rather than increases universal freedom. If we are to 
care, as I think we should, about universal, not individual freedom, then we must attend to how 
these statements operate to restrict the freedoms of others and how they not just articulate but 
normatively reproduce the liberal dilemma of illiberalism. Equally, we must recover the concept 
of freedom from those that would seek to restrict it to only noncoercion, we must rearticulate its 
other, complex meanings – as self-determination, as freedom as capacity, as emancipation from 
oppression, as a positive project of autonomy that understands its relation to the community. As 
Judith Butler asks, 
 
If I am struggling for autonomy, do I not need to be struggling for something else as 
well, a conception of myself as invariably in community, impressed upon by others, 
impinging upon them as well, and in ways that are not fully in my control or clearly 
predictable? 
 
33 This type of thought is most prominent in recent debates around racial and gender justice, whereby 
historically oppressed communities attempt to seek reparative justice only to be criticised by those members of 
society who have historically enjoyed most social power for attempting to limit their own freedoms and thus to 
be acting like fascists. 
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(Butler, 2006: 27) 
 
Are we then, to take seriously the case made for total freedom from coercion? Surely this is 
neither possible nor desirable. Not possible because the project itself has a normative claim that 
constructs society in a certain image – which it does so precisely because we are relational beings 
– and not desirable because dependency, community, respect, an understanding of relationality, 
of the way our voices and actions impact others and of the ways our freedoms are won at the 
expense of others is necessary for the construction of social norms, behaviours and institutions 
that produce maximum justice.  
 
 
3.6 The Concept of Freedom as Occlusion 
 
If we do wish to live lives free from social and cultural norms, apart from societies that are seen 
to restrict us, away from the structures that bind us to tradition, community and other humans, 
then we have to account for how these desires inculcate and institute certain socio-political 
formations. Insofar as the concept of individual freedom articulates a declination of traditional 
ties, as Fromm (2001) asserts, it is conceived as a form of structurelessness. This attitude 
corelates across political and artistic discourses – the genre limits that modernity questioned, 
deconstructed and worked on that have now dissolved are seen as a structuring condition of art 
are seen by contemporary art as though they were normative constraints. Without those limits, 
contemporary artworks float free in a structureless world.  
 
Equally, at the petropolitical level, individualist, liberal conceptions of freedom, as exemplified 
by Hayek, Friedman and others, find their apogee in the differential market capitalisation of the 
oil industrial complex. An industry that specifically relies on the privatisation and 
individualisation of forms of knowledge, access and profit seeking while conterminously 
producing downstream externalities that are increasingly responsible for the destruction of 
planetary existence. Within this industry, environmental regulations are downward pressures on 
market capitalisation – the socio-cultural norms emerging from the environmental movement, 
that question the legitimacy of these industries and tend towards greater regulation, are limits on 
the freedom of the market that characterises the ideology of neoliberalism. The general tendency 
towards less regulation in all spheres is noticeable. 
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Yet, as is evident in relation to norms, this tendency, while it holds the value of freedom from 
structure as a central tenet, paradoxically reproduces structure in other ways. This paradox is well 
articulated by Jo Freeman in her essay “The Tyranny of Structurelessness”. Writing in the 
context of feminist organising, she asserts, structure is unavoidable, no group that coalesces can 
do so without the creation of structure. Structure returns to groups that presuppose their own 
lack of structure.  
 
A “laissez-faire” group is about as realistic as a “laissez- faire” society; the idea becomes a 
smokescreen for the strong or the lucky to establish unquestioned hegemony over 
others. This hegemony can easily be established because the idea of ‘structurelessness’ 
does not prevent the formation of informal structures, but only formal ones 
(Freeman, 1996: 1) 
 
By many proponents of forms of liberal and neoliberal governance, explicit, formal structures are 
seen as a restriction on our freedoms, however, as Freeman understands, the presupposition of 
structurelessness in fact ‘becomes a way of masking power […] most strongly advocated for by 
those who are the most powerful’ (ibid.). Power can be exerted even when the subject is unaware 
of its existence, for example, in Freeman’s case study, access to childcare can allow some women 
more capacity to participate in organisations. Not having the same level of access, time, energy, 
thus prevents an equal distribution of power within groups. In contradistinction from the liberal 
assumption about structure, formalised structures seek to make evident those inequalities, 
whereas the declaration of structurelessness merely returns informal structures while 
concomitantly denying their existence. This occlusion of structure – that comes to enforce 
already existing power differentials and thus proliferate unfreedoms – is done in the name of 
freedom. Yet again, the assertion freedom is allied with the restrictions of freedom of others. Is 
it impossible, then, to think of freedom as a universal concept? Will the expression of freedom in 
one place necessitate the reduction of freedoms in others?  
 
Nancy Hirschmann (2003) has analysed the differential distribution of freedom, specifically in 
the way it effects women in society (while her analysis has a feminist focus, this description could 
equally be applied to other areas – race, class, disability etc). Here she understands how the 
subject of discourses of freedom and liberty has traditionally been a “neutral”, white, man – the 
unthought structure that returns to reduce freedoms is here nature itself; “natural” gender 
distinctions are seen to determine the access women have to, for example, education. As 
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Hirschmann tells us, the Western liberal tradition is constituted by a principle of patriarchy even 
when proclaiming itself to be attached to freedom. By focusing on women’s experiences, she 
reconsiders the dominant understanding of freedom, that is seen as severely lacking in 
complexity, to incorporate particularity into what is (mistakenly) seen as a universal category. If, 
as she suggests, freedom theory has focused too exclusively on the semantic debates over the 
meaning of the word, instead of taking into consideration who the subject of that freedom is, then 
the theory lacks a substantial concept of power. Hirschmann’s critique reinscribes theories of 
freedom with politics, including the particular experiences of women to articulate a concept of 
freedom that resists falsely universalising a masculine subject. Hirschmann: 
 
If context sets the terms for understanding claims of freedom, and if women’s choices, 
opportunities, desires, and options exist within a context of patriarchy or sexism, there is 
good reason to believe that sexism itself can be a barrier to freedom. That is, not just 
individual sexist acts perpetrated by particular individuals, but the entire cultural 
construct that assigns greater value to men than to women, that provides more options 
to men and supports men’s pursuit of choice more than women’s – in short what many 
feminists alternately call male privilege or patriarchy – can restrict women’s freedom 
(Hirschmann, 2003: 23) 
 
The context of masculinity thus defines precisely how the expression of the concept of freedom 
is applied. A partial account of freedom, as Losurdo has also reminded us, leads to a situation 
whereby one portion of the population is afforded freedoms that are denied to others, to 
counteract that, we must work with understandings like Hirschmann’s that inscribe particularities 
back into the universal concepts we want to use. Far from accepting what appears as natural or 
necessary, Hirschmann, along with many other theorists of social emancipation, seek to 
delegitimise claims to necessity and reveal how, in fact, the social order is plastic, malleable and 
constructed.34 
 
Hirschmann utilises this mode of analysis, social constructivism, to understand how gender 
differentials come to structure the concept of freedom, identifying the unaccounted unfreedoms 
at the heart of the pursuit of freedom. In agreement with Bauman’s analysis, as described above, 
 
34 As Erik Olin Wright suggests, ‘a central proposition of all theories of social emancipation is that the structures 
and institutions that generate the forms of oppression and social harms identified in the diagnosis and critique 
of society do not continue to exist simply out of some law of social inertia; they require active mechanisms of 
social reproduction’ (Olin Wright, 2010: 26).  
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‘sociohistorical configuration’ is seen as productive of our social worlds, structures, institutions 
and relationships (ibid.: 75). Liberalism here is conceived as only one possible response to the 
contemporary historical and political conditions, rather than the only response, she sees it as ‘no 
longer inevitable or natural, but contingent and historically specific’ (ibid.). Thus, when we 
discuss concepts such as freedom, we must understand them both in their timeless, universality 
and in their specific instantiations within the conditions provided by the contingent socio-
political contexts. This weaving of local occasions and universal concepts is a key methodological 
tool that I will return to in Chapter Six.  
 
 
3.7 The Concept of Freedom as Commitment  
 
In Martin Hägglund’s (2019) work, the concept of freedom appears as a matter of what he calls 
secular faith. In this understanding, faith is described as the commitment to a set of procedures 
that reiterate and reproduce responsibility- it is only through the commitment to the object of 
our commitment that we recognise as finite that secular faith has any meaning. The recognition 
of our finitude – both that we will die and that we are necessarily reliant on others to support our 
existence – invokes in us a sense of responsibility to others as ends in themselves, not as means 
to an end. As opposed to religious faith, that Hägglund argues is tied to ideas of the infinite in 
the notion of life after death and thus cannot adequately value life because it does not view it as 
either precarious or precious (because of that precarity). It is this ethical commitment that I want 
to borrow from Hägglund to understand how freedom is explicable by the ideas of responsibility 
rather than through the notion of escape. Let us look more closely at Hägglund’s work to 
understand this.  
 
In response to the appropriation of the concept of freedom by the political right, where freedom 
‘serves to defend “the free market” and is largely reduced to a formal conception of individual 
liberty’ (Hägglund 2019: 31), Hägglund argues that many thinkers on the left have retreated from 
or rejected the idea of freedom. This, he suggests is a mistake, declaring the necessity to include 
concepts of freedom in emancipatory politics. In his understanding of a renewed conception of 
freedom for the left, this important political concept emerges not through ideas of individual or 
personal liberty, but as a social project whereby we must acknowledge the necessity to rely on 
others for our own survival. The acceptance of our own finitude becomes here the basis of the 
expression of our freedom, insofar as freedom becomes a commitment rather than a release 
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from responsibilities – precisely, it is the acceptance of and commitment to responsibilities that 
mark us as social beings. For Hägglund secular faith; 
 
recognizes that the defining purposes of our lives depend on our commitments. The 
authority of our norms cannot be established by divine revelation or natural properties 
but must be instituted, upheld and justified by our practices.  
(Hägglund 2019: 16) 
 
It is only through an ongoing process of engagement with practical attention to the difficult tasks 
we have in our lives that we can be free – a dedication to our projects – rather than the liberal 
understanding of freedom as non-coercion, Hägglund, paraphrasing Marx, suggests that freedom 
‘does not consist in a liberation from labor and necessity’ (ibid.: 323). The idea of freedom as 
limitless supply of free time away from anything that is put at stake, that matters, that has value, 
that we need to struggle for, is anathema to Hägglund. It is precisely in the struggle that the value 
of what we commit to emerges. 
 
The role of instituting is important to Hägglund; he identifies the necessity of the institution of 
social norms as opposed to the expectation that these norms will obtain naturally or through an 
act of divine revelation. Without adequate social institutions, the capacity to sustain our 
commitments is reduced. As I shall explore later in this thesis, this understanding of the 
importance of institutions is key to my theorisation of a socialism by which we can expand our 
epistemological understandings of and commitments to justice. Hägglund’s work is coherent 
with this theorisation insofar as he identifies the role commitment plays in the struggle for 
freedom. He identifies commitment to a project as ‘any form of purposive activity with which 
you identify and to which you are freely committed’ (ibid.: 214), expanding that these projects 
could be anything that you ‘treat as an end in itself’ (ibid.). This is not merely the avowal of a 
belief, but the active commitment to something that makes a demand on me – caring for a loved 
one, building a house, indeed, writing a thesis – thus, freedom can only be expressed through the 
acknowledgement that the value of something only emerges when that thing is at finite. It is the 
finitude of the object of our commitments that makes us value it; Hägglund suggests that ‘by 
virtue of my commitment, I cannot be indifferent but must be responsive to the fate of what I 
value’ (ibid.: 220). Thus, the commitment to pursuing our projects is only possible because of the 
value inferred on those projects by the knowledge of them as finite – the fragility of the 
environment, for example, provides us with motivation to commit to its protection (or one 
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hopes). It is precisely in this way, we could say, that artistic practice constitutes a commitment to 
freedom – the pursuit of a project as an end in itself – yet this cannot, however, be said of the 
reception of the artwork itself (which is my main concern here). The moment of apprehension 
of the artwork, in contradistinction to the sustained commitment that a practice entails, appears 
as a revelatory moment isolated from the practice itself. In this sense, the apprehension of a 
work of art cannot clearly be said to encompass the same conception of freedom as artistic 
practice. 
 
In the work of Cornelius Castoriadis, the idea of autonomy links directly to the Greek origins of 
the word – auto nomos, meaning self-law. Autonomy then, specifically means the creation or 
institution of one’s own laws; to be free, we have to make our own nomos, autonomy is a 
movement of self-legitimation (Castoriadis, 1991: 162). However, autonomous societies – ones 
entirely governed by their own laws and norms – rarely exist; according to Castoriadis ‘almost 
always, almost everywhere societies have lived in a state of instituted hetereonomy. An essential 
constituent of this state is the instituted representation of the extrasocial source of the nomos’ 
(ibid.) Which is to say, society is almost always constituted by laws and norms that are 
adjudicated from sites relatively external to it. While he doesn’t discuss autonomy in art, there are 
formations that can be mapped across to art here. As Andy Hamilton asserts, following Adorno, 
‘autonomy is normally taken to mean that art is governed by its own rules and laws, and that 
artistic value makes no reference to social or political value’ (Hamilton: 251). This concept of 
autonomy as self-legislation, rather than escape, is coherent with Castoriadis’ work. For him, 
autonomy is not the absence of laws or norms – not the escape from them into a lawless realm – 
but the creative act of institution that ‘ushers in a new type of society and a new type of 
individuals’ (Castoriadis, 1991: 163).  
 
Autonomy does not consist in acting according to a law discovered in an immutable 
Reason and given once and for all. It is the unlimited self-questioning about the law and 
its foundations as well as the capacity, in light of this interrogation, to make, to do and to 
institute (therefore also, to say). Autonomy is the reflective activity of a reason creating 
itself in an endless movement, both as individual and social reason  
(Castoriadis, 1991: 164) 
 
This continual movement of self-creation at a social and individual level articulates just what is at 
stake here. Instead of understanding autonomy as the retreat into a privileged zone, safe guarded 
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from the laws and norms of society, or free from the struggles of that society, we can re-imagine 
it as a dialectically creative passage between registers and scales that works to institute laws and 
norms. This also points up the failure of contemporary understandings of art’s autonomy – if art 
thinks the passage into autonomy purely as an exercise in escape then it disavows the dialectical 
potential to co-constitute society in another image.  
 
Despite Petsche’s insistence that Adorno held radical negativity as the safeguard against art’s 
potential escapist tendencies, art today has reneged on that Adornian promise. Not only because, 
as Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello (2007) suggest, negativity and critique have been 
reincorporated, but because the characterisation of autonomy as escape has precluded the 
capacity art might have had to act as an engine for socio-political change. However, when 
autonomy is considered as a process of self-legislative construction, as Castoriadis asserts, then 
‘politics is a project of autonomy […] politics is the reflective and lucid collective activity that 
aims at the overall institution of society’ (Castoriadis, 1991: 169).  Autonomy, thus understood, is 
a deliberate, political activity that works towards common ends through common means, not 
through the privileging of one particular subject, instead it is a collective instituting of laws and 
norms. Art, then, can partake in this continual movement of collective instituting once it re-
understands the political project of autonomy in this Castoriadian frame.  
 
This formulation, as Castoriadis suggests, seems unusual ‘only to those who believe in 
thunderlike freedom and in the free-floating, being-for-itself disconnected from everything, 
including its own history’ (ibid.: 173). Castoriadis ridicules those who would believe that freedom 
is a release from all boundaries, regulation or limits and that a desirable state is one of 
structureless flux. The way this form of freedom infects the project of autonomy is important, as 
societies reflexively self-create their own boundaries, the desire to break with those boundaries 
continually emerges. This dialectical procedure of forming and then breaking with the law is 
fundamental to any functioning democratic society – however, what Castoriadis’ work warns us 
against is the idea that there could be any final resting place for this society – thunderlike 
freedom as a telos is not desirable nor achievable – instead, autonomy is not a transcendence of 
the law, but a continual reformulation of it. 
 
This challenge to the conception of freedom that asserts a delinked methodological 
individualism (a thunderlike freedom from all rules and laws), also proposes a strong counter to 
the contemporary insistence on individualised, subjectivised aesthetic experience.  Where art 
 128 
thinks autonomy as a paratactical, atelic escapism – which is to say the creation of spatially and 
temporally delimited zones somehow outside, or alongside, the prevalent conditions, that adhere 
to the non-strategic production of local horizons – it fails in the task of instituting radical 
counter hegemonic socio-political realities. We must rethink autonomy as the creation of 
reflexive, synthetic complex counter hegemonies that are capable of instituting common, or 
collective freedoms rather than the dive into the myopia of, on the one hand, particularism or, 
on the other, false universality. 
 
What is apparent, then, is the necessity to rethink concepts of freedom within art in line with a 
renewed engagement with Adorno’s work through the lens of more recent understandings of the 
way power intersects with appeals to freedom. Instead of allowing neoliberal articulations to 
dominate, articulations that can only attribute freedom the value of being free from norms, laws 
and heteronomous control, we can hope to think of art as a form of constructive autonomy. 
Whereby it returns to the institutional role of interceding in the production of axioms. This, 
however, is not an easy task. As Chapter Five will discuss, we cannot hope to jump over the void 
separating individual works of art and the capacity they might have to autonomously institute 
socially transformative norms and laws. We do need to begin, however, by thinking of the 
capacity of art to constitute laws as a useful starting point for this project. If we only imagine 
autonomy in terms of negative freedom, we cannot imagine how autonomous art can produce 
political change. But equally, we must reject the differential freedoms that exemplify the 
conditions of the Second Age of Oil – the insistence on freedom as escape from norms, laws 
and regulation reinscribes the power differentials that characterise the massive inequalities 
inherent in this time period. The mythic nature of freedom in this era, that it only accrues to 
people who already have power yet is assumed to be a natural feature of the market/life, 
occludes the huge differentials at play. If art can only see freedom in an individualistic sense, it 

















Cultural capitalism [treats] official culture as an economic activity driving innovation, 
thereby justifying its support on economic grounds. As in other areas of government 
investment, such as defence, commercial culture looks to official culture to fund the 
training, research and risks that commerce can exploit 





In the summer of 2000, after a series of acquisitions, British Petroleum spent a reported total of 
$211 million to rebrand as Beyond Petroleum, employing advertising giants Landor to redesign 
their logo as a green and yellow flower/sun to indicate their new commitment to green energy 
and a reduction in emissions (Most expensive logo). The rebrand drew the ridicule of a number of 
commentators, not least Greenpeace who mocked the oil company for attempting to paper over 
their extractive practices with canny marketing. In the wake of the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil 
spill on the BP operated Macando Prospect oil rig, Greenpeace launched an attack campaign that 
asked the public to redesign the infamous “Helios” logo in line with the company’s record. The 
ad Greenpeace took out read: 
 
It is clear that BP's bright green logo has never matched the reality of the company. Since 
taking over in 2007, Tony Hayward has taken BP back to petroleum, chasing the last 
drops of oil from unconventional sources like the Canadian tar sands and deep-water 
drilling in the Gulf of Mexico. 
(Brownswell 2010) 
 
Drawing attention to the hugely disproportionate amount spent on acquiring ARCO to expand 
its oil drilling portfolio over the amount spent on the much smaller solar energy company 
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Solarex ($26.5 billion against $45 million), Greenpeace accused BP of greenwashing. 
Foregrounding their environmental credentials whilst continuing their extractive and polluting 
practices, including investing in the controversial Alberta tar sands extraction, was a marketing 
trick that sought to resist the downward pressure of the falling rate of profit. BP had read the 
public mood – environmentalism was becoming popular – and had responded with a campaign 
aimed at repositioning themselves as an environmentally responsible oil company. However, 
with an increased investment in controversial extraction projects, the expansion of their oil 
drilling portfolio and a swath of environmental disasters to their name, nothing could be further 
from the truth.  
 
Colloquially this marketing practice is known as greenwashing, it is common enough, but for the 
purposes of this thesis, I want to understand it through the frame provided by Christopher 
Wright and Daniel Nyberg (2015). Responding to the necessity to protect their reputational 
capital, firms would often, as analysed by Wright and Nyberg, employ tactics of corporate 
environmentalism. These tactics they name as “exemplification”. Drawing on the work of 
Boltanski, Chiapello and Thevenot, this analysis understands corporate environmentalism as a 
process of incorporating critique. My claim is that this practice is not just limited to the corporate 
world. Contemporary art is not only uniquely positioned as a tool in the practice of 
exemplification (BP’s sponsorship of the Tate points to this) but is also governed by a similar 
logic. Within the context of the reputational economy, contemporary art works to increase 
reputational capital through the expression of moral goodness (a quality that has been employed 
in the now common practice known as “artwashing”), while conterminously blindly reproducing, 
or not adequately addressing, differential power and systemic oppression. The axiomatics of 
contemporary art revolve around an image of goodness/virtue whereby it appears to be 
committed to an ethico-political project of either guilt assuagement, amelioration or social 
restoration where, in fact, its continuation of systemic inequality is tied to its role in the 
valorisation of capital, the entrenchment of class power, and the reinscription of notions of 
freedom as deregulation. Art problematically structures its performative assuagement of inequity 
around the liberal notion of access rather than the radical project of redistribution, thus 
furthering the logic of neoliberalisation. This chapter is focused on an analysis of this 
phenomena, understanding the desire for an increase in perceived moral goodness to stem from 
the necessity to increase one’s own human capital, tying this reading to the forms of 
exemplification theorised by Wright and Nyberg. Nancy Fraser (2019) describes this condition, 
and one she analyses as at play within society at large, as a form of “progressive neoliberalism”. 
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For Fraser, progressive neoliberalism is an alliance of two tendencies; ‘on the one hand, 
mainstream liberal currents of the new social movements (feminism, antiracism, 
multiculturalism, environmentalism, and LGBTQ+ rights); on the other hand, the most 
dynamic, high-end, “symbolic”, and financial sectors pf the US economy (Wall Street, Silicon 
Valley, and Hollywood)’ (Fraser, 2019: 11). This hegemonic bloc, as she describes it, foregrounds 
it’s “progressive” credentials, whilst continuing the economic trajectory of much of the latter 
part of the twentieth century. As Fraser suggests, ‘[t]he progressive-neoliberal bloc combined an 
expropriative, plutocratic economic program with a liberal-meritocratic politics of recognition’ 
(ibid.: 11-12). The concept of exemplification emerges directly from this hegemonic alliance, it 
acts as the fundamental motor of this politics. As discussed below, the politics of recognition 
that emerged from the 1960s counter cultural movements provided the legitimacy for capitalist 
accumulation and the “lean-in” varieties of feminism emerging in the context of neoliberalism. 
 
 
4.2 Greenwashing  
 
The systemic fear analysed by Bichler and Nitzan (2011) discussed earlier (Chapter Two), 
provides an internal driver for capitalists. In response to increased critique, declining market 
share and profitability, capitalists are concerned with losing control. The presumed impending 
crisis is systemic, general rather than localised, and is generally assumed to have three specific 
features that Bichler and Nitzan outline as; crises of the relation between politics and economy, 
as a mismatch between “real” and “nominal” aspects of the economy and as rooted in our past 
sins. However, the authors want to suggest these foundational assumptions are wrong. They 
claim that if we were to think of capital as a form of power, then these assumptions would 
become unsound, instead; 
  
The bifurcation of “economics” and “politics” would become untenable, thereby 
rendering the notion of economic crisis meaningless. The separation of the “real” and 
the “nominal” would become unworkable, thereby leaving finance with nothing to match 
or mismatch. And the backward-looking orientation of the analysis would have to give 
way to a forward-looking stance, rooting the crisis not in the sins of the past but in the 
misgivings of the future. 
 (Bichler and Nitzan, 2011: 3) 
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Thought of as a form of power, capital then becomes entangled in the struggle for domination, 
whereby future accumulation is tied into present power. A normal crisis of capital might indicate 
a decrease in power, but one that will be resolved eventually, whereas a systemic crisis indicates a 
precipitous drop in power. As Bichler and Nitzan claim, this systemic risk increases, as does the 
potential for the precipitous decline in power, precisely when this power reaches its asymptote – 
a ceiling that is never quite reached. An asymptotic ceiling not only indicates the limit of capital, 
but the need for greater and greater force to keep capital accumulation on track; 
 
Capitalist power rarely if ever reaches its upper limit. The reason can be explained in 
reference to the following dialectical interplay: the closer power gets to this limit, the 
greater the resistance it elicits; the greater the resistance, the more difficult it is for those 
who hold power to increase it further; the more difficult it is to increase power, the 
greater the need for force and sabotage; and the more force and sabotage, the higher the 
likelihood of a serious backlash, followed by a decline or even disintegration of power 
 (Bichler and Nitzan, 2011: 4) 
 
As is evident in the last forty years, petropower has been approaching, if not has reached, its 
asymptote. The declining viability of traditional extraction methods, the loss of legitimacy due to 
environmental critique and the clear indicators of the limits to CO2 emissions all point to a 
serious systemic crisis. These “backlashes” must be met with a response by petrocapital if it 
wishes to maintain its market dominance and thus power. In Chapter Two I analysed the violent 
response through the means of financial capital – to place on to the future by means of the 
derivative, the responsibility to not only return value, but expunge the deleterious effects of 
pollution. The current chapter is focused on the second means that capital seeks to increase its 
distributional accumulation – marketing. In the context of the oil industries this marketing takes 
the form of greenwashing. 
 
The organisational and individual drivers behind greenwashing emerge in the context of 
increasing regulation, delegitimating loss of public support for the oil industry and the downward 
pressure of loss of profit due to the increased difficulty of extraction as petropower reaches its 
asymptote. The oil industry is exemplary in the position it holds – at one and the same time 
committed to its internal logic of capital accumulation in the face of internal downward pressure 
and, as a form of marketing, committed to the appearance of environmentalism. Despite 
overwhelming evidence to suggest the existential threat posed by the industry, oil extraction has 
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not abated, instead moving towards unconventional, and often much dirtier, methods. These 
firms then seek to legitimise their behaviour through the offsetting of their moral conscience in 
the form of virtue marketing. 
 
So widespread is this practice (not only within the energy sector), that the consumer markets for 
green products has grown exponentially in the last two decades. As Magali A. Delmas and 
Vanessa Cuerel Burbano have analysed: 
 
The consumer market for green products and services was estimated at $230 billion in 
2009 and predicted to grow to $845 billion by 2015. At the start of 2010, professionally 
managed assets utilizing socially responsible investing strategies, of which environmental 
performance is a major component, were valued at $3.07 trillion in the U.S., an increase 
of more than 380 percent from $639 billion in 1995. More companies are now 
communicating about the greenness of their products and practices in order to reap the 
benefits of these expanding green markets. 
(Delmas and Burbano 2011: 64)  
 
As consumer knowledge about environmental risk has grown, to be seen to be “green” is 
profitable. While some firms have sought to reduce waste, limit their CO2 emissions or “go 
green”, many have also opted for the practice of greenwashing, or ‘misleading consumers about 
firm environmental performance or the environmental benefits of a product or service’ (ibid.). 
While it is indeed virtuous to incorporate green policies, the detrimental effect of greenwashing 
is significant. As Delmas and Burbano suggest, the rise in greenwashing has a profound negative 
effect on consumer confidence, eroding trust in green products and services. The backlash 
against firms that seek to reimagine themselves as green is not limited to the BP example above. 
Just witness the media storm surrounding the recent revelation that Volkswagen were fixing their 
emissions figures.35  
 
Delmas and Burbano define greenwashing as the ‘intersection of two firm behaviours: poor 
environmental performance and positive communication about environmental performance’ 
(ibid.: 65). The disparity between performance and the communication of that performance is 
accounted for by the regulatory context – punitive measures against greenwashing, especially in 
the US, where this study is carried out, are limited. Firms face little incentive to avoid 
 
35 Brignall (2015), for example 
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greenwashing but high rewards. The analysis emphasises the importance of ‘regulatory, 
normative and cognitive factors’ (ibid.: 68) in determining firms’ tendencies towards 
greenwashing. There are seen to be a number of driving factors, some internal and some external 
– these can be further broken down into market external demands (consumer/investor demand 
and competitive pressure), non-market external drivers (lax regulation, activist/NGO/media 
monitoring), individual psychological drivers (optimistic bias, narrow decision framing, 
hyperbolic intemporal discounting) and internal organisational drivers (firm characteristics, 
incentive structure and culture, effectiveness of intrafirm communication, organisational inertia). 
These factors all determine the tendency of a firm to greenwash. They all point to an 
environment in which firms have the freedom to utilise whatever mean necessary to increase 
shareholder value, where legitimacy is being eroded due to normative behaviour, and where 
short termism is prominent. 
 
Toby Miller (2018) has analysed how culture is implicated in the project of greenwashing. This 
complicity, he argues, operates in two ways; through the externalities it produces in the form of 
energy consumption and the failure to deal with that consumption. This complicity is then, as in 
the case of corporate greenwashing explored above, covered over by the self-promotion as good 
environmental citizens. There are multiple examples. The irony of the international biennale that 
insists thousands of visitors a year fly many thousands of miles to look at works of art – often 
that express distress at social ills like environmental degradation. Institutions that accept 
sponsorship from oil and gas companies, whilst showcasing artworks that challenge the 
legitimacy of those very same industries. The independent curator that reproduces bad 
employment practices by not adequately paying their artists while making an exhibition about the 
conditions of labour. Miller asserts culture as a way for polluters to seek social license to 
continue their activity, understanding culture through multiple lenses – among others, as a means 
of spiritual uplift, as a project of critique, through the Marxist understanding of culture industry 
as the creation of false consciousness or in Gramscian terms as a legitimation for the hegemonic 
political economy. As Miller suggests, culture ‘offers important resources to markets and nations’ 
(Miller, 2018: 33). Because culture reflects and manifests each epoch’s consciousness of itself, 
suggests Miller drawing on Althuser (ibid.: 34), it is seen as a resource in and of itself.  
 
This understanding of greenwashing sees culture as a way to provide “symbolic cover” for the 
institutions’ own polluting tendencies. Contemporary art is a tool in the task of greenwashing. 
But, as I will claim later in this chapter, contemporary art is not only an adequate tool in this 
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project, but adheres to the same set of axiological conditions – insofar as art operates to occlude 
its own structural effects through a foregrounding of virtue, it is bound to a project of marketing 
that get realised in what I called in Chapter Three, “neoliberal virtue”.  
 
 
4.3 The Expediency of Contemporary Art 
 
In a 2013 speech addressed to arts executives in the British Museum, then Conservative 
Secretary for Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport, Maria Miller spoke about the 
necessity of art’s economic contribution. Her intervention into the debate around art’s function 
was to assert the dominance of economics. Maintaining and furthering “British values” at home 
and abroad is the express aim of her position, utilising the soft power of culture to assert British 
dominance, to, some critics might suggest, continue colonialism by other means. One way of 
doing this is through the spread of cultural values, a role that successive British Culture Ministers 
have been fully aware of, the other is through economic growth; art must be seen in this context 
to have this double function. At one and the same time an ideological function, linked to the 
nebulous concept of Britishness and the historically problematic concept of civilisation, and an 
economic function whereby culture is understood as a tool in the toolbox of political economy. 
 
Her assertion of culture’s economic value came in the context of vast swaths of austerity 
measures by the Conservative/Lib Dem coalition, many of them hitting the arts hard. As a 
declaration of intent, the speech was clearly designed to foreground firstly, the necessity of belt 
and braces austerity and secondly, the importance of culture in that project. As she suggests: 
 
[S]ome simply want money and silence from Government, but in an age of austerity, 
when times are tough and money is tight, our focus must be on culture’s economic 
impact. 
(Miller 2013)  
 
Subsuming culture to George Osborne’s economic wishes, Miller asserted the necessity of it as 
an instrument of growth over and above its other, intrinsic qualities. While many saw this as a 
deep betrayal (National Theatre director Nicholas Hytner for one was critical36), I am convinced 
that Miller’s statement, while not declaring a desirable normative position, was ontologically 
 
36 See https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/entertainment-arts-22267625  
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coherent. British culture, and especially contemporary art, does, despite its performative 
resistance to the idea, have a significant economic function in line with the Conservative 
Chancellor’s designs.  
 
As George Yúdice suggests, the concept of culture as an expedient of governance or economic 
development has ‘displaced or absorbed some of the other understandings’ (Yúdice, 2003: 1). 
Yúdice sees culture as a resource much like nature, something to be fostered and cared for, for 
the sake of future generations. This, he suggests entails understanding these resources as part of 
the process of accumulation. He continues, 
 
Culture-as-resource is much more than a commodity; it is the lynchpin of a new epistemic 
framework in which ideology and much of what Foucault called disciplinary society (i.e., 
the inculcation of norms in such institutions as education, medicine, and psychiatry) are 
absorbed into an economic or ecological rationality, such that management, 
conservation, access, distribution, and investment – in “culture” and the outcomes 
thereof – take priority. 
(Yúdice, 2003: 1). 
 
Insofar as artworks seek to provide resources for critical engagement, foster social bonds or 
develop communities, Yúdice suggests that it is impossible to think these practices outside of the 
frame of the resource. Whereas they assume to be providing the grounds for progressive political 
struggle against capital or power, artists become managers of expropriative schemes in the name 
of social good – ‘community-based art projects […] ultimately enhance the value of real estate, 
foster investment and so on’ (Yúdice, 2003: 35). Cultural capital provides the legitimacy and 
value that attracts investment, provides ethical cover and reinscribes civilisation into 
“uncivilised” areas. Regularly, art institutions, biennales, public art works and so on are 
introduced to economically “deprived” areas to drive urban regeneration and revive economies. 
As Robert Hewison (2014), drawing on Pierre Bourdieu, has analysed, this form of cultural 
capital draws value from artistic endeavours but returns it in economic form to the state or, more 
often, private investors. Hewison: 
 
Cultural capitalism seeks to privatize this shared wealth, absorbing it into the circulation 
of commodities, and putting it to instrumental use. 
(Hewison, 2014: 7) 
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In spite of, or even because of, the assertion of the art’s autonomy, social ills would be magically 
transformed with the correct dose of culture.37 In fact, artwork would not even necessarily have 
to directly perform social good (in the case of socially engaged art) or have political or social 
good as its content; the mere existence of art as such, even, or especially, art critical of its own 
condition as bankable commodity, is enough to draw value to the site of investment in both 
Hewison and Yúdice’s analyses. It is art’s power to confer ideological value on a site, to hold 
economic value as a resource and to provide legitimation that I am analysing here – art with a 
critical valence performs this process just as well as art without. As Hito Steyerl has suggested, 
contemporary art suits the environment of the hyper-capitalist oligarch precisely because of the 
cultural value it infers on him (it is always a “him”), and the critical capacity of a work of art is so 
intrinsic to that value – autonomy is used against itself as a form of valorisation. She asks; 
 
Why and for whom is contemporary art so attractive? One guess: the production of art 
presents a mirror image of post-democratic forms of hypercapitalism that look set to 
become the dominant political post-Cold War paradigm. It seems unpredictable, 
unaccountable, brilliant, mercurial, moody, guided by inspiration and genius. Just as any 
oligarch aspiring to dictatorship might want to see himself. The traditional conception of 
the artist’s role corresponds all too well with the self-image of wannabe autocrats, who 
see government potentially—and dangerously—as an art form. Post-democratic 
government is very much related to this erratic type of male-genius-artist behavior. It is 
opaque, corrupt, and completely unaccountable. Both models operate within male 
bonding structures that are as democratic as your local mafia chapter. Rule of law? Why 
don’t we just leave it to taste? Checks and balances? Cheques and balances! Good 
governance? Bad curating! You see why the contemporary oligarch loves contemporary 
art: it’s just what works for him! 
(Steyerl 2010) 
 
In this essay Steyerl insists that we consider not what the work of art is about, but what it does. It 
is this imperative that drives my analysis here. If anything, my work is to understand how we can 
apply this form of pragmatic critique to contemporary art. Drawing on Charles Sanders Peirce’s 
famous maxim of pragmatism, that understands the necessity of looking to the practical effects 
 
37 For a comprehensive overview of the history of art’s social impact see Belfiore and Bennett (2010)  
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of an object, I read contemporary art against itself, understanding the function of it as an object 
in the world to be as important as what it is ostensibly about. Here is the maxim in full: 
 
It appears, then, that the rule for attaining the third grade of clearness of apprehension is 
as follows: Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we 
conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is 
the whole of our conception of the object. 
(Peirce, cf. Thayer ed. 1982: 88) 
 
I will return to this pragmatic approach later in the thesis. For now, it is enough to note that 
Steyerl’s immanent critique shares a lineage with this tradition, and, further, that any 
consideration of a theory of contemporary art must understand its function outside its 
ideological commitments or content. It is this mode of analysis that Dean Kenning and 
Margareta Kern (2013) take up, where they understand the function of art to be related to 
increased economisation. Linking artworks to their role on the financial markets, they suggest 
that art provides ‘opportunities to store, accumulate and exhibit extreme personal wealth and to 
promote corporate and class power via sponsorship deals and philanthropic relations’ (Kenning 
and Kern 2013). They continue; 
 
The cultural prestige attached to contemporary art can also be used to reproduce 
hierarchies and exclusive networks, instil a neoliberal culture of competitive individual 
advantage, exploit unpaid or poorly paid labour, and contribute to landholder profits 
through culture-led gentrification. 
(Kenning and Kern 2013) 
 
Insofar as art valorises contemporary capitalist exploitation at the level of its function (which is 
to say, not at the level of its form or content), it provides a foil for increased accumulation. 
Acting as part of the asset class (as analysed by Erica Coslor and Olav Velthuis (2013)), artworks 
provide the perfect vehicle for transporting and storing huge quantities of wealth, often tax free. 
In the context of financialisation, global hegemonic power thus utilises art as part of the process 
of valorisation, accumulation and transfer of wealth amongst the richest percentage of the 
population. Somewhat like oil commodities, art’s economic value is sometimes projected into the 
future though its role on the derivatives market. Thus, individual artworks are temporally coded 
for economic growth apart from their value at the auction house – they exist as part of an asset 
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class for investment incommensurate with their value in the art world as such. But let’s examine 
this a little more closely. Despite the reticence of some dealers (Coslor and Velthuis, 2013), the 
financialisation of art has increased in the last thirty years (in line with generalised financialisation 
of the economy), however, as Coslor and Velthuis insist, the art market has not been entirely 
financialised precisely due to artworks’ illiquid nature. As they suggest, ‘[t]he lack of liquidity and 
costliness of information means that works of art cannot be bought and sold easily; it is difficult 
to locate and match supply and demand, which in turn results in high transaction costs’ (Coslor 
and Velthuis, 2013: 482). Artworks’ value fluctuations at the whim of taste make the projected 
value uncertain – ‘the potential rewards are high, but so is the risk’ (ibid.: 481). The unregulated 
nature of the artworld makes it less attractive for professional financial investment. There have 
been occurrences of artworks bought and sold in securitised form, it is just not the success story 
that some might have thought, or hoped for. Liquidity needs to be constructed; the unregulated 
nature of the artworld is more akin, then, to the laisse faire nature of liberal markets, rather than 
the highly interventionist strategies employed in the neoliberal era. Thus, the art market 
somewhat resists total financialisation because it is unregulated, which is to say, unmeasured, not 
scientific, lacking in calculation. It is, as Steyerl suggests above, mercurial, dynamic, unpredictable 
– much like the figure of the modern artist that so attracts hyper capitalist investment. Precisely 
because of this nature, the art market, instead of a site for professional investment, can be 
exploited as a site for corruption – forgery, arbitrage, and insider trading – making it a risky 
environment for financial investment that relies on clarity of data and an ability to predict future 
trends. The art market, and whatever is meant by the term “the art world”, thus models itself on 
the very nature of contemporary art, free floating, limitless, without regulation.  
 
Despite the resistance the art market has to total financialisaton, art itself must be analysed as 
complicit in aspects of global capital power. The power relations, logics and human values 
reproduced by neoliberal financialised capitalism are not distinct from current cultural 
formations, practices and institutions, as Kenning and Kern assert, ‘capitalism is not something 
at a categorical distance from art to be either opposed from an autonomous critical sphere or 
else submitted to in an act of betrayal to that critical autonomy’ (Kenning and Kern 2013) The 
concept of complicity itself needs to be analysed here; to assume that artworks are complicit in 
power presupposes an a priori “pure art” that is distinct from, but then becomes corrupted by 
the machinations of power. What I hope to achieve here is an understanding of art that sees its 
relation to power as intrinsic but not necessary. Which is to say there is not a prelapsarian form 
of contemporary art that exists in its pure form prior to recuperation into the current political 
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conjuncture. Contemporary art emerged as part of the conditions of the political economy of the 
twentieth century, and recursively feeds into them – art here does not exist as an expression of 
political economy, but a sphere within which political and economic logics manifest, emerge and 
have traction. But, importantly, it could otherwise be so.38 In other words, art is coterminous 
with the constructions and maintenance of global power, not divorced from it, nor an empty 
container within which power finds its representation or cheerleader – yet, and this is an 
important distinction, art is not seen here as a project that is necessarily tied to the particular 
direction of travel of these political logics, it is only bound to neoliberalism insofar as it is 
considered part of the genre of contemporary art. This is not to say that non-contemporary art, or 
art prior to the contemporary period, existed in some autonomous realm away from political and 
social conditions, but that, precisely, contemporary art conditions and is conditioned by, the 
neoliberal variant of political economy. Even, especially, insofar as artworks appear to be critical 
or to escape from those conditions.  
 
Whereas artworks and practices might seek to disrupt, resist or challenge the neoliberal 
hegemony, even perhaps the petropolitical conditions of that hegemony in the case of many 
recent works of art and exhibitions, these artworks and practices do not escape their paradoxical 
relation to those conditions. On the one hand, as Kenning and Kern suggest, ‘capitalism and 
elite power are immanent to art’ continuing, ‘art is one of the forms of its manifestation and 
operation, a mechanism elites use to consolidate and extend that power’ (Kenning and Kern, 
2013). Yet on the other, artworks continually resist, at the level of content, this complicity. Or 
some, further still, admit this complicity as a form of immanent critique. What is coherent to 
suggest here, is that contemporary art, as it exists under the current socio-political conditions, 
performs at a functional or structural level services that it opposes at a conceptual or ideological 
level. Kenning and Kern suggest that; 
 
In recent years art has appeared to manifest forms that challenge neoliberal dominance, 
with exhibitions, artworks, projects and talks in galleries concerned to question, criticise 
and oppose the systems of global financial capital, and to propose alternatives to it. 
However, so long as these events and discourses do not address directly the specific 
material and symbolic conditions that frame them, criticality can be dissipated, rendered 
 
38 As I will analyse in the next chapter, we cannot hope to remove contemporary art from this context by fiat, 
instead, what is needed is a thoroughgoing, continual remaking of art and culture and of political economy. As I 
will suggest, art is to be seen as part of this process of remaking. 
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ineffective or, worse, act as a radical smokescreen for both individual works and 
institutional set-ups keen to maintain avant-gardist credentials while embodying 
neoliberal values 
(Kenning and Kern, 2013) 
 
 
My claim is that this radical smokescreen concept goes right to the heart of the logic of 
contemporary art. Art is not just a tool in the concealing of the truth of a political conjuncture, 
but has that concealing aspect as an axiom. Even when art seeks to reveal the truth of the 
conditions of its making, it does so, as I will show, as part of an expression of virtue that confers 
value on the person, institution or neighbourhood it is being associated with, it uses virtue to 
occlude the processes by which it reinforces inequity and reinscribes hierarchy, and virtue comes 
to be seen as the predominant criteria for quality despite its complicity in oppressive techniques. 
Indeed, as Andrea Philips suggests, Contemporary Art participates in a project of colonising 
value through the expression of righteousness: 
 
Since its postwar governmentalization in Europe, culture has only had one real value to 
economize socially, and that is its general value. The demand to economize value is met 
with outrage in most quarters of the art world. Yet value is at the core of art’s self-belief 
– it is why the MACBA feels entitled to incorporate anti-capitalist activists into its 
program. In this sense the arts colonize value: this colonization is performed through the 
perpetuation of righteous belief systems at local and international scales. The value of art 
is its export. Its general European liberal value regime is exported across the world, 
masking human rights atrocities to local labor debates. What is this general value? Care, 
community, neighbourliness, sustainability, etc. These values are shared by the directors 
of major museums and their boards as well as by activists; they are shared by small-scale, 
large-scale, mircro-political, and macro-institutional players.  
(Philips in Amundson and Mørland 2015: 39) 
 
It is coherent, then to suggest that art utilises its vainglorious belief in its virtuous nature as a 
mode of colonialism – whereby the spread of the concept of contemporary art is useful to 
powerful interests despite, or indeed because of its progressive value. A significant mode by 
which art operates to ratify already existing power relations is through the mode of inclusion and 
disinclusion – whereby the cost of access is extremely high, but also, true to type, indeterminate; 
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it is expressly not articulated what requirements someone must meet to be included or excluded 
It is this contradiction that forms a central axiom of contemporary art.  
 
 
4.4 The Paradoxical Doing of Contemporary Art 
 
In the well-known essay The Logic of Equal Aesthetic Rights (2008), Boris Groys is keen to 
reassert the autonomy of art as a mode of resistance against external pressure. If art is to have 
any power, he suggests, it cannot be purely a means of aestheticising or decorating politics. 
However, Groys suggests, the art system itself, cannot be purely autonomous, but must reflect 
certain ‘dominant social conventions and power structures’ (Groys, 2008: 12). The art system, in 
his rendering of it, is defined by a multitude of external value judgements, criteria and rules, 
which leads, he suggests, to an abandonment by many artists and critics (he never names which 
ones he means) of the concept of autonomy; ‘the autonomy of art was – and still is – thought of 
as dependent on the autonomy of the aesthetic value judgement’ (ibid.). In other words, if the 
decision about what enters the art system – what becomes art – is not autonomous, art-immanent, 
then the artwork itself is seen as non-autonomous, and thus rendered merely decoration. 
However, against this tendency, Groys asserts that it is precisely this condition of absence of 
immanent value judgement that guarantees the autonomy of art. He suggests ‘[t]he territory of 
art is organized around the lack or, rather, the rejection of any aesthetic judgement’ (ibid.). I 
made a similar argument around the dissolution of genre in the previous chapter, but here, 
Groys brings in the concept of judgement to understand how artworks enter into the regime of 
art. And this entry is precisely conditioned by an absence of judgement, which is to say, the 
condition of entry is not guaranteed by a hierarchy of taste, but by the assertion of equal 
aesthetic rights. As Groys suggests; 
 
[T]he autonomy of art implies not an autonomous hierarchy of taste – but abolishing 
every such hierarchy and establishing the regime of equal aesthetic rights for all artworks. 
The art world should be seen as the socially codified manifestation of the fundamental 
equality between all visual forms, objects and media. 
(Groys, 2008: 13) 
 
In this passage Groys understands art world limits to be modified by the condition of equality, 
the artworld is thus an expression of that equality, distributed not around a hierarchy of value 
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judgements, but a flat plane of equal rights. It is only under these conditions, he suggests, that 
every judgement can be seen as a ‘heteronomous intrusion into the autonomous sphere of art’ 
(ibid.). As such, art works resist intrusion (and confirm their autonomy) by an assertion of their 
equality. This assertion, Groys suggests, links art to politics through a claim to the recognition of 
equal rights. The avant garde is thus rendered a political project of equality that demands every 
artwork, and thus person, be thought of as fundamentally equal. In the name of fundamental 
equality, the field of art is extended to all objects and images, forms that previously existed 
outside of its remit. The name of art is given over to ‘all possible pictorial forms’ (ibid.), to allow 
their entry into the regime of art under the condition of equality. Art has become a site open to 
all, the ‘kind of recognition that once used to be granted only to the historically privileged artistic 
masterpieces’ (ibid.). Recall Osborne’s (2013) concept of transcategoriality, or Medina’s (2010) 
conceptualisation of contemporary art as a multifarious and nomadic field, or further still the 
understanding of aesthetic nominalism in the writing of De Duve (1996). Groys’ claims exist in 
the same universe as these theorists’. Art has opened out, become radically tolerant of difference, 
and as such has become a model of liberalism, recognising as legitimate ‘forms and artistic 
procedures that were not previously considered legitimate’ (ibid.).  
 
For Groys, this becomes a politics of inclusion directed against the politics of exclusion of 
minorities. Contemporary art’s total tolerance becomes adequate to a tolerant political regime, 
that resists the imposition from the outside of inequalities. As such, contemporary art’s power 
comes from its ability to declare the equality of all images and signs in its system, an inferential 
system that acts as though everything is equal. The normative condition of contemporary art is one of 
total inclusion insofar as works of art index their own acquiescence to this equalisation – “good” 
art is art that speaks of equality. Some artists transplant images from regional context into a mass 
media and some do the reverse and insert mass media images into a regional context. The ability 
of art to not just transcend regional boundaries, but to act as though they don’t exist is central to 
this logic. Contemporary art, I would argue, thus becomes rather than an index of political 
equality, indexical of the global citizen, capable of crossing borders at will, with minimal 
resistance. This conception of citizenship is problematic in the sense that it denies the actually 
existing inequalities that do exist, holding equality and tolerance as an epitome of what it means 
to be civilised, thus centring a narrative of politics around a falsely universalised subject – the 
privileged passport holder. Divorcing the universal from the particular in ways that deny the 
particular circumstances of subjects without privileged access to the freedom to transcend 
boundaries, Groys’ celebration of equality uses the concept of equality as a smokescreen to 
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occlude actually existing inequalities in much the same way as theorists of freedom, as analysed 
by Hirschman (2003), wrongly presuppose their subject to be universal. What Groys’ conception 
of art does, is derive its universal principle from the particular conditions of western 
manifestations of art without recourse to the privileged conditions that made those particularities 
possible. Any assertion of equal aesthetic rights thus occludes the structural conditions that 
allowed those artworks or subjects their free movement whilst denying others the same privilege.  
 
Groys’ understanding lacks a theory of power. Nowhere is the concept of equality attenuated 
through a lens of differential access to the means to gain that equal position – artworks merely 
severe their relationships to any particularity. This critique, of course, finds its genealogy in the 
post-structuralist and feminist critiques of universalism that, as Judith Butler asserts, ‘have noted 
the use of the doctrine of universality in the service of colonialism and imperialism’ (Butler in 
Butler, Laclau and Žižek, 2000: 15). The association between universal claims and colonialism 
could be made here in regard to Groys’ work, but it is perhaps more interesting to re-evaluate 
the role of universality within artistic and political discourses. Raising to the level of abstraction 
the concept of equality allows Groys to sidestep theorisations of power differentials and the way 
that power manifests and is made through and in social life. As Butler suggests, ‘[p]ower is not 
stable or static, but is remade at various junctures within everyday life; it constitutes our tenuous 
sense of common sense, and is ensconced as the prevailing epistemes of a culture’ (ibid: 14). To 
read Groys in Butlerian terms, equality thus becomes a formal claim, one that seeks to assert 
itself as an abstract law or universal, that sediments in the current episteme the concept of 
equality as silo’d off from the power relations that provide certain subjects the access to it. 
Equality as an assertion, not as a struggle, comes to form our common sense. This is a claim that 
relies on an abstraction away from the particular in order to produce universal claims – 
formalism is, as Butler suggests, the ‘product of abstraction’ (ibid: 19). She continues, ‘this 
abstraction requires its separation from the concrete, one that leaves the trace or remainder of 
this very separation in the very working of the abstraction. In other words, abstraction cannot 
remain rigorously abstract without exhibiting something of what it must exclude in order to 
constitute itself as abstraction’ (ibid.). Formalising claims for equality thus exclude the work that 
goes against that equality of images, work that adheres to hierarchical systems, work that binds to 
the parochial. As such, this work is seen as outside the conditions of contemporaneity; a 
contemporaneity that assumes total equality. As such, there is a paradox at the heart of the claim 
Groys makes when he suggests that 
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[T]his struggle for inclusion is possible only if the forms in which the desires of the 
excluded minorities manifest themselves are not rejected and suppressed from the 
beginning by any kind of aesthetical censorship operating in the name of higher 
aesthetical values 
(Groys, 2008: 15) 
 
These aesthetic values are thus replaced by ethical values that assert the claim that only work that 
adheres to the ethical demand for equal aesthetic rights be tolerated in the system of art – as 
such becoming identical to liberal civilising notions of community and citizenship. The violence 
this performs is, as we have seen, occluded by the assertion of ethical “good” inherent in the 
notion of equality. Groys’ idea of art as focused on the concept of goodness as derived from the 
declaration of equality and total tolerance is identical in form to a type of neoliberal virtue 
analysed by Sara Faris (2017). Tolerance as a form of ethical goodness as opposed to the 
perceived intolerance of the Islamic faith is a narrative that plays out across Europe today. As 
shown by Farris, in her use of the term femonationalism, multiple actors in the contemporary 
political context invoke women’s rights to forward their own Islamaphobic agendas. As she 
suggests; 
 
Short for “feminist and femocratic nationalism”, femonationalism refers both to the 
exploitation of feminist themes by nationalists and neoliberals in anti-Islam campaigns 
and to the participation of certain feminists and femocrats in the stigmatization of 
Muslim men under the banner of gender equality. 
(Farris, 2017: 4) 
 
In her analysis, concepts of gender equality are invoked in order to produce anti-Islam narratives 
about oppressive male violence within the faith, which in turn stirs up feminist critiques of 
Islam. Central to contemporary Western democracies are doctrines of gender equality, even if 
their realisations are inadequate, that can be utilised to counter perceived oppression or lack of 
tolerance within what are seen as “less civilised” populations and nations. The use of equality 
here mirrors that foregrounded by Groys. While in Farris’ work femonationalism indexes the 
advance of ‘xenophobic and racist politics through the touting of gender equality’ (ibid.), 
pursuing these politics in the name of equality and tolerance, which inscribes into Islam the 
“common sense” notion of intolerance and the idea that Muslim women need to be “saved”. In 
Groys’ work, the concept of equal aesthetic rights rides roughshod over aesthetic forms that 
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appear to be outside the conditions he ascribes, assuming them to be “bad” art. Thus, the 
concept of equality reinscribes an inside and outside, a disavowed hierarchy that markets itself as 
a horizontality. Within this frame, exclusions occur that delimit work that does not perform in 
the way Groys suggests it should, which is to say work that is perceived to be “intolerant” of all 
other images. Without wanting to find a place for intolerance within the conditions of 
contemporary art – my claim is not that Groys’ work is wrong to exclude intolerance, it is that 
his assumptions about inclusion paradoxically reinscribe a form of exclusion that he cannot 
vouch for – I would want to understand how limits to contemporary art are avowed rather than 
problematically disavowed in a move that prescribes a universality which occludes the conditions 
that created it. As we discovered in Chapter One, Chantal Mouffe (2005) identifies this occlusion 
of politics in her analysis of third-wayism. As she suggests, this political conjuncture foregrounds 
consensus politics, occluding the very real agonistic elements of discourse. As becomes evident, 
the critique of Groys above identifies the axiological relation between contemporary art and 
Mouffe’s analysis of neoliberalism. Thus, it is coherent to suggest that Groys’ concept of 
universality does not account for the socio-political constructionist nature of the limits of 
contemporary art.  
 
As Hirschman (2003) suggests, a theory of social construction is important to help us understand 
the way claims to universality miss out on their true properties – that the universal is, at least in 
part, socially constructed. This social construction necessarily concretises around concepts that 
form the guiding principles of a movement, period or nation. In the case of contemporary art, 
the concept of equality of aesthetic forms has come to stand in for that concrete centre just as 
much as freedom from coercion has. But this central claim around which the genre of 
contemporary art concretises misses what it excludes. What eludes the claims precisely is what, 
according to Butler, ‘return[s] to haunt the polities predicated upon their absence’ (Butler in 
Butler, Laclau and Žižek, 2000: 11). Groys’ assertion of equality acts as a false universalism that 
occludes the structural inequalities that proceed from the act of declaring something as art and 
that this disavowed structuring procedure is what returns to undermine his claims. This 
exclamation of goodness vis-à-vis disavowal is one way contemporary art “greenwashes” its 






4.5 In the Background 
 
In her address to a Former West panel (2014) Andrea Phillips discusses the way public 
institutions, especially arts institutions, mobilise critical content. Her claims revolve around an 
analysis of what she calls, following management studies language, the back end and front end of 
neoliberalised institutions. Asking how the front end and the back end of the institution operate 
together, how claims made in the public facing part of the institution manage the internal 
workings, Phillips makes the claim that, in the Anglo-Saxon model, these two sides do not meet 
at all. At the front end, what is displayed to the public, is an ethos of, or call to, a progressive, left 
political demand or critique. At the level of content, the institution, as Phillips suggests, is often 
bound to a project of political radicality, whereas at the back end, the way the institution is 
organised, managed and run reproduces inequities that are coherent with those in the neoliberal 
order that the content is critiquing – exploitational employment practices, outsourcing of labour, 
unpaid internships, entrenched hierarchical structures etc. Writing elsewhere, in the context of 
private ownership of ostensibly public institutions, Phillips suggests the following: 
 
So often arts institutions commission artworks that call for radical forms of collaboration 
and communing, but fund these through private patronage and promote them through 
and as an individuated core. This raises acute political issues concerning the ontological 
foundation of the artwork as privatised property in its contradictory modality of 
presumptive sharing. Here the content of the work – that might propose alternative and 
decapitalised forms working together – sits in parenthetical relation to its property state, 
a state which consistently coalesces around the artwork despite the artist or curator 
making a non-privatising demand (this is of course related to much broader 
infrastructural concerns regarding the art world, including those of education and esteem, 
value and production). 
(Phillips, Invest in What: 7) 
 
Phillips suggest this contradiction appears within the context of increased entrepreneurialism in 
the arts sector, whereby ‘cultural workers are left with little option but to perform this 
contradiction on a daily basis’ (Phillips, in Amundson and Mørland, 2015: 34). The competition 
between cultural workers, institutions and so on necessitates this type of contradictory behaviour 
– precisely the requirement to act as economic actors, according to the principles of homo 
economicus. For Phillips this emerges from a crisis of legitimacy, whereby, the difference between 
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the front end of the institution and the back end conceals the way these institutions have 
incorporated the methodologies of the culture industries. It is the use of “virtuous” or 
“progressive” artistic practice as marketing that has allowed these institutions to maintain their 
foothold on the competitive market. 
 
This contradiction between the front end of the institution, I would suggest, is not limited to art 
– in fact the examples given at the beginning of this chapter point to an identical logic within the 
energy industries – but is endemic to the condition of neoliberalism itself. What is peculiar to art, 
however, is the way art’s double status as both a commodity and not, the dialectical nature of its 
autonomy, is productive of this contradiction. The condition of the autonomy of the artwork 
organises the way art institutions operate – which is to say, extending Phillips’ argument, art itself 
is not an innocent, or pure object that sits within the “front end back end” model of the 
institution, but itself is exemplary and productive of that very model. Contemporary art’s logic 
here is identified as a problem for the reconciliation of the contradiction, rather than a curative 
measure. In fact, as we see in many examples, art is so comfortable with this contradiction, that it 
is the perfect tool for the papering over of the “badness” of business operations with the 
“goodness” of artistic content. In Phillips’ work she is committed to finding ways to transform 
institutions into centres for the experimentation and practice of equality, not only at the level of 
content, but the way the institutions themselves operate. This commitment is instructive insofar 
as it points to the necessity to account for activity that art criticism rarely considers – what art 
does outside of its content and form. I consider this to be a pragmatic approach to art theory; 
understanding the full operations that an artwork performs as part of its analysis. This pragmatic 
approach should be attenuated through a structural understanding of how goodness operates to 
occlude an analysis of the secret truth of the artwork.  
 
In Brian Holmes (2008), we find a similar immanent critique. Discussing the representation of 
politics in the art gallery Holmes portrays a situation where the institutional frame requires 
politics, often radical politics, as a legitimating argument for its existence. The representation of 
anti-global politics, for example, has become a ‘hot topic […] popular in a museum (Homes, 
2008: 82). For multinational corporations, who often sponsor art events, (Holmes lists a number 
of significant sponsorship deals from the early 2000s, and we could equally think of Deutsche 
Bank’s ongoing support of Frieze Art Fair, BP’s involvement until recently with the Tate, or any 
number of lesser known sponsorship deals that prop up the international art market and its 
attendant biennales, talks, events or exhibitions), the image of ‘excluded people’s politics is worth 
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a lot to the included’ (Holmes, 2008: 83). To those parts of society who “count”, the 
representation of those who are excluded, often by the former’s economic activities, are seen not 
only as a form of entertainment, but a way to legitimate their activities. Thus, we see the double 
violence of representational politics in the art world. The violence of exclusion accompanied by 
the violence of exploitation. Art is the perfect vehicle of this double violence precisely because it 
performs this move itself. Which is to say, as analysed above, art has a set of socio-economic 
functions that increase inequality, reduce the reach of democratic politics and presuppose 
equality where it doesn’t exist whilst simultaneously presenting the politics of the excluded as 
content to be celebrated as entertainment and act as a form of “washing” of the consciences of 
the global elite who make up the artworld.  
 
 
4.6 Exemplification and Justification 
 
Wright and Nyberg (2015) identify the way corporations engage with civil society as a form of 
marketing aimed at increasing their legitimacy in the eyes of their consumers. They name this 
marketing process “exemplifying”. Businesses exemplify in order to claim legitimacy by being 
seen to act in the best interest of society or the environment. They ‘present themselves as role 
models that embody many of the ideal practices and innovative capabilities required to ensure 
the well-being of present and future generations’ (Wright and Nyberg, 2015: 85). This process is 
often, as shown by their analysis, accompanied by veiled action counter to the marketing agenda. 
Despite presenting themselves as green, or worthy, behind the scenes corporations continue to 
lobby for more lenient regulatory environments and invest in polluting technologies. Coherent 
with the concept of greenwashing, Wright and Nyberg’s concept of exemplification extends this 
analysis to include a Gramscian notion of hegemony and the concept of justification as explored 
by Boltanksi and Chiapello and Boltanski and Thevenot. I will pursue this route to offer an 
extended reading of notions of exemplification and justification, linking them to an analysis of 
artistic critique in Boltanski and Chiapello (2007).  
 
Participation in corporate citizenship schemes is now widespread; many major companies engage 
in activities that intervene within public sector and state lead areas of governance. However, as 
Wright and Nyberg suggest, this extension of corporate influence ‘is driven by narrow business 
interests’ (Wright and Nyberg, 2015: 75), and has the potential to undermine democracy. By 
aligning their interests with public interests, such as the reduction of CO2 emissions, 
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corporations are seen to act as authorities in the fight against the climate emergency despite their 
lack of expertise and their often paradoxical desires to reduce their own accountability to 
environmental regulation. This tendency is most prevalent amongst green modernists and 
corporate environmentalists who are committed to the belief that environmental stewardship can 
go hand in hand with economic growth and that market mechanisms are the most reliable 
solution to environmental problems – such as Nicholas Stern.39  
 
The final acquiescence to the demands of climate science, albeit within the parameters of the free 
market model (that, as we have seen, is anything but free), recalls the assumption that the market 
works in the best interests of society. Despite the thoroughgoing critique of this position from 
multiple angles, some of which I have introduced above, many groups with seemingly green 
credentials act against the interests of society by acceding to the corporate world’s mechanisms. 
The act of exemplification, in the final analysis, seeks to blind critique of these mechanisms with 
the veneer of social good. Within the sphere of arts and culture – a sphere within which the act 
of exemplification has found a fruitful home – institutions, businesses and corporations often 
utilise the sheen provided by art as this veneer.  
 
As an example, the Design Museum’s 2018 exhibition Hope to Nope is not unusual, except, 
perhaps in the response by some of its exhibiting artists to what they saw as a practice of 
exemplification too far. In the summer of this year, when it was revealed that the Design 
Museum had hosted a luxury reception for arms dealers at the same time as displaying an 
exhibition of art and design born from, or dedicated to, social movements for peace and justice, 
many of the exhibiting artists removed their work in protest. Much of the work in the exhibition 
was within the scope of progressive or left political art-activism that protested against injustices 
meted out by corporate interests, be that in the military or oil industrial context. Fighting against 
racism, sexism and gentrification and for fair pay and working conditions, these artists couldn’t 
countenance an engagement with an institution that would receive corporate sponsorship from 
the villains of their battles. While it is not within the remit of this thesis to discuss the ethical 
dimensions of corporate sponsorship, this action of protest does draw our attention to the ways 
 
39 Sterns’ (2015) analysis that climate change is merely a market failure sees the potential market successes that 
could emerge in the wake of this climate catastrophe. This idea that capitalists could either solve or benefit 
from the emerging markets underwrites not only corporate environmentalist’s greenwashing, but the attempts 
by capital to create markets for “responsible” citizens.   
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institutions, even ones seemingly dedicated to a political project such as the Design Museum, are 
content to take money from highly unethical industries.40 
 
Subsequently, the protesting artists set up an offsite exhibition in Brixton Recreation Centre in 
September 2018. This exhibition, From Nope to Hope, organised by the group themselves to draw 
attention to the practices of the Design Museum and the ways institutions often use art to cover 
over the business practices of their donors, the exhibition was a somewhat ad hoc affair, set in 
the context of a space the antithesis of a white walled gallery; the large green floored, redbrick 
and concrete space is part of a gym and recreation centre. The usual recreation centre sounds 
echoed out over the work, most of it clipped to Harris fencing.  
 
Work by Shephard Fairy and Jeremy Deller appeared amongst work by lesser known artists and 
activists, much of it with an anti-war, anti-oil agenda. Some work made explicit a critique of the 
contradictory practice of exemplification; one piece in particular, Bus Stop Posters (2015-16), by 
Brandalism/Barnbrook Design consisting of three posters that take aim at BP, Total and 
Volkswagen, pointed out the contradictions inherent in the industries. The anti-Volkswagen 
poster, for example, reads ‘Drive cleaner. Or just pretend to.’ (Brandalism/Barnbrook Design, 
2015-16).  
 
However, one piece seemed to turn its critical attention on itself and the work around it. A large 
text work by Oddly Head (2017) read (in a nice typeface) ‘Slogans in nice typefaces won’t save 
the human races’. This self-critical approach seemingly makes the claim that even the 
surrounding artworks dedicated to both good design and social causes won’t do anything to 
counter the inequities they fight against, neither will this work itself. As one of the first works 
seen as you enter the exhibition, it greeted the audience with a seemingly cynical acquiescence to 
the status quo – there is no alternative, and certainly posters that want to demand one have no 
hope of achieving it. However, I would argue that this work was not the most cynical in the 
 
40 In this context it would be wrong not to point out one of London’s key examples of this practice; the 
Zabludowicz Collection. As many will be aware, Anita Zabludowicz, wife of Poju Zabludowicz, runs a highly 
successful commercial art gallery and collection that presents itself as something of a confluence of 
entrepreneurial project space, a Kunsthalle following the German model and a public institution. In reality, 176, 
the space dedicated to the Zabludowicz Collection, has acted like all of these things, but the central aspect of 
their practice that is relevant here is that Poju’s business interests include arms dealing. Critique of Anita’s arts 
endeavours often centre around the fact they act as a way to wash the image of her husband’s businesses – a 
call to boycott Zabludowicz projects and events, much in the same vein as BDS, has been written and 
distributed, giving special attention to the close relationship Goldsmiths has to Zabludowicz through its curating 
MFA. See here - https://boycottzabludowicz.wordpress.com/  
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exhibition but the most intelligent. Instead of pointing to failure it points to the need for a 
revised methodology. Sat amongst posters that proclaim the power of art to ‘make us better’, or 
seeks to provide hope in dark times, Head’s work speaks to the necessity to do more than just 
plaster posters or hold placards. It is a work that critiques the work around it, suggesting, as I do, 
that work of this sort is limited in its political potential precisely because it is, as we shall see in 
the following section, involved in a project of exemplification itself.  
 
Within the context of Brixton, a part of London that has seen significant gentrification in recent 
years, From Nope to Hope asserted a resistance to the prevailing conditions, but did so in the 
language of the street. Either in the tropes of activism of the OWS variety or the sleek design 
popularised by Adbusters these works are all seen as somewhat temporary, fast in their response 
and not entirely without their amateur nature. As part of a wider project to reject corporate 
sponsorship, to collectivise artistic resistance to inequities in the art world and the making public 
the “back end” of art institutions this exhibition is successful. Many of the artists here are 
involved in wider struggles, or act in solidarity with those struggles in ways that genuinely 
support them. They provide nodal points in the shifting of public opinion and sediment political 
activity into useful phrases and images with which to mobilise opposition. The work doesn’t 
appear to be contemporary art in many ways – it doesn’t conform, for example, to the Groysian 
demand for equal aesthetic rights. This work very much asserts a demand to be read in only one 
way, it resists the freedom of interpretation presumed by contemporary art. However, I have no 
misconceptions that this work can escape the conditions of the contemporary by fiat. As I will 
show in the next section, the valence held by critical work participates, whether it likes it or not, 
in the conditions of exemplification. And this is the crux of this argument. Critical work still 
adds value in the form of cultural capital to the institutions it represents. In the Design Museum 
example, the artists’ work was used, inadvertently, to valorise the business of arms dealing. But 
what, we must ask, is being valorised in the Brixton Recreation Centre context? What does the 
work here add cultural capital to? I would argue that cultural capital is accrued not necessarily 
only to the contexts in which the work is shown, but to the notion of art as such. As I shall 
explore in chapter six, the system of art exists not as a series of isolated instances of art, but as 
what I will call a metabolic system. Valorisation spreads across the whole system where critique 
offers legitimacy to the whole system. It is not true that there is an inside and outside to the 
institution, that work appearing within the museum context is compromised and work appearing 
in other institutional contexts is politically or ethically pure. Work appearing in any context 
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legitimates that context, but also, this legitimacy is granted across what might be seen as borders 
to that context and into others.  
 
 
4.7 Legitimation and Virtue 
 
In the context of civil society, how does an organisation, corporation, individual or institution 
gain legitimacy? What provides justification? For many theorists already encountered in this 
chapter, art acts as a tool for justification. It legitimates action precisely because it is deemed to 
be good, worthy or of value. Art’s intrinsic value outside of monetary value is seen as a benefit to 
the institution, corporation etc displaying it. This analysis juxtaposes the market value of a work 
to another order of value that it holds, but does not see them as entirely separate. Art’s non-
monetary value often operates to provide a return on investment to shareholders, private 
individuals or corporations through processes such as gentrification, cultural capital exploitation, 
or financial transactions. Helping us understand the way art participates in the accrual of cultural 
capital through the notion of virtue, Boltanski and Thévenot’s (2006) work is instructive. 
 
In Boltanski and Thévenot (2006), the question of worth emerges through a reading of works of 
political philosophy. For them, judgements based on the order of worth are bound by their 
relation to trust in reputation. How can we decide to trust someone’s reputation or challenge it 
without recourse to a higher order, or charismatic authority? How does a society seek 
justification when free from the bonds of dependence on social orders and hierarchies? When 
not governed by market principles how do we assess value? Boltanski and Thévenot theorise that 
within the context of liberalism – the freedom of men from bondage (to paraphrase their reading 
of Rousseau) – ‘detached from hierarchical relations, men can still fall under the sway of public 
opinion’ (Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006: 109). Thus, opinion and public esteem come to stand in 
for legitimation.  
  
Liberated in this way from relations of personal dependence, men are nevertheless still 
not free, for they remain slaves to opinion, which is based not on reality but on power 
relations among factions and coteries, and conflicts of interest that pit men against one 
another in temporary groupings formed for selfish ends. 




Reading Rousseau, Boltanski and Thévenot theorise that legitimate political relations rely upon a 
third, mediating party, suggesting that any attempts to negotiate at the level of concrete 
interactions between equal people will result in relations of force – ‘[i]f just relations are to be 
established among persons, human interactions have to be mediated by a relationship to a 
totality situated at a second level’ (ibid.). This is where The Social Contract leads, to the 
construction of a mediating second level order that appears from the natural antagonistic 
relations between people.  
 
If relations of force emerge from non-mediated negotiations, Boltanski and Thévenot suggest 
that virtue operates as a balancing principle of the body politic. Worthiness is not gained through 
talent, but through virtue. As they suggest: 
 
Unlike distinctions of rank, which are marked by titles, or the benefits of distinction that 
are accrued through fame, that is through recognition by others, distinctions that are 
acquired through civic merit are associated with persons to the extent that these persons 
serve causes that transcend them. Interpersonal relations are meritorious when they 
occur in settings arranged in such a way as to desingularize them. 
(Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006: 111) 
 
In this context, this means that the construction of the general will, through the conditions of an 
arithmetical sum of individuals in the form of voting, must be accomplished through the 
freedom of all participants. An absence of coercion is thus a central component of the 
construction of a second order mediator, however, as we have noted, this freedom is not 
untroubled by relations of power. Belief in someone’s reputation is reliant on opinion; to assert 
the absence of influence through the mechanism of opinion within the context of a nominally 
free and open society is meaningless. Insofar as the status accorded to virtue is significant, 
personal reputation is based on the assumed validity of virtuous actions, thus action seen to be 
without virtue counteracts the construction of reputation. 
 
Michel Feher (2009) has argued that a defining feature of neoliberalism has been the growth of 
human capital as a dominant subjective form. Rather than the “commodification” of the liberal 
subject, the idea of human capital has emerged as a prominent concept in the current era. In 
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order to understand how cultural capital is accrued by art I will link it to Feher’s notion of 
human capital. According to Feher,  
 
[M]y human capital is me, as a set of skills and capabilities that is modified by all that 
affects me and all that I effect. Accordingly, the return on human capital no longer 
manifests itself solely in calculations about whether to work or to receive more training. 
It now refers to all that is produced by the skill set that defines me. Such that everything 
I earn – be it salary, returns on investments, booty, or favors I may have incurred – can 
be understood as the return on the human capital that constitutes me. 
(Feher, 2009: 26) 
 
Not all return on investment in human capital appears as earnings, it could equally be accrued as 
forms of well-being not associated with financial income – health, happiness, relationships, 
pleasure and so on. This appreciation of human capital, according to Foucault (2008: 226), and 
of course, Feher, whose work extends Foucault’s, appears as the subject’s “satisfaction”. 
Drawing comparisons to the neoliberal model of corporate governance, Feher highlights the 
preoccupation with ‘capital growth or appreciation rather than income, stock value rather than 
commercial profit’ (Feher, 2009: 27). As such, an investor in their own human capital, it appears, 
is concerned less with a ROI but with the appreciation of the “stock value” of that capital. Thus, 
in the context of the reputation economy, the investor in human capital is concerned with 
utilising the expression of virtue as a mode of appreciation. We see this in the example of 
greenwashing outlined at the beginning of this chapter, and, of course in the ways corporations 
use virtuous art as a practice of exemplification. This practice not only draws ethically minded 
customers to use their products, increasing profit, but increases their capital value. An 
association with virtue thus appreciates the value, and valorising potential of a corporation, 
individual, or as I suggest, an artwork. And this is key, as an enterprise unit (to use Foucault’s 
terminology) increases their value, so too does their ability to bestow value on other units 
increase. Reputation within the system allows enterprise units to act in accordance with other 
units to confer the appreciation of capital value. Thus, artworks can accumulate cultural capital 
through association with other artworks, institutions, and so on, just as institutions accrue value 
through their association with virtuous artworks. What is considered virtuous is, of course, 
different depending on the context and the conditions of the time. 
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As Feher’s analysis shows, neoliberal subjects are predominantly concerned with the appreciation 
of their capital value through the ‘impact of their conducts’ (Feher, 2009: 27). They seek 
“bankability”, “employability” or “marketability” as a measurement of their human capital. In the 
context of the art exhibition that valorises and legitimates corporate businesses, the impact 
appears as an association of virtue – not here delineated by the content of the work as such, but 
through the association with the system of art precisely because art is seen to be virtuous in and of 
itself, and the bankability, employability or marketability of a work of art is how cultural capital is 
measured. As such, critical appreciation of a work of art is not an end in itself, but part of a 
process whereby value is accorded to that work through the attention drawn to it through the 
process of critique.  
 
As I shall explore in the next section, virtue is accorded to art precisely because it has a history of 
critique and fighting against oppression. To accord value to a work of art each occasion of art 
does not in itself need to be virtuous. Instead, the value of art is given in accordance with the 
system of art, whereby capital is spread across that system (in an uneven fashion).  
 
 
4.8 Critique as Justification  
 
Art washing only works if we trust that art is intrinsically good. With the recent rise in critical 
approaches to art, a re-emergence of institutional critique (Phillips, Malik, Yudice, Hewison, 
Holmes, Steyerl, Kenning and Kern as just some of the most prominent examples) this trust 
must surely be eroding. Just as trust in corporations erodes when it is revealed they are partaking 
in greenwashing. The growth in counter-cultural, anti-corporate movements within the arts such 
as Platform or Art Not Oil points to an increase in consciousness surrounding the issue of art 
sponsorship and its relation to the oil industry. As analysed by Polanyi (2001), this tendency in 
radical political resistance is known as the counter-movement, and it exists alongside the 
movement of history as a form of corrective or challenge to power. It is this critical tendency, 
exemplified by the proponents of “anti-” type movements in art or business, and for the sake of 
this thesis, the oil industry, that make up the counter-movement. My argument here is that it is 
precisely the immanent critique of art, the counter-movement, that returns to provide legitimacy 
of it. Without its internal corrective procedure in operation, art would merely be decoration for 
power or a form of propaganda, but the critical project that art – autonomous art – participates 
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in is exactly what legitimates it as “serious” and “good”, thus providing the much needed cultural 
capital required for the act of exemplification. 
 
Boltanski and Chiapello (2007) describe a situation in the 1980s and 90s whereby contemporary 
variants of capitalism recuperated the demands for liberation by the previous decade’s anti-
capitalist movements, what they call the artistic critique, in order to increase accumulation. They 
specifically focus on how the demand for liberation of desire came to structure the neoliberal 
model of accumulation, creating the conditions for the increase in flexibility, precarity and 
casualisation. In this sense, the critiques of capital from the 1960s and 70s were incorporated 
into a model that lead to, in many cases, an increase in oppression in the form of precarious 
labour and systemic dependency. Thus, they show how, under the conditions of capitalism, 
critique becomes a motor for systemic change, yet allied not with the people, but against them 
and with the forces of accumulation. Demands for authenticity, liberation and flexibility – 
themselves cogent critiques in the face of an immovable, inflexible, hierarchical structures such 
as those appearing in the context of early to mid-twentieth century capitalism – became the 
guiding principles of the late twentieth and early twenty first centuries. As they suggest, ‘the 
commodification of the authentic made it possible to revive the process of transformation of 
non-capital into capital, which is one of the principle motors of capitalism, on new bases and, 
consequently, to meet the threat of a crisis of mass consumption that loomed in the 1970s’ 
(Boltanski and Chiapello, 2007: 443). In order for this transformation into capital to occur, new 
territories must be revealed, and it is precisely the act of critique that reveals these new 
territories. The case of eco-products provides a good example of this. As Boltanski and 
Chiapello suggest, environmental critique often incorporates critiques of capitalism and 
consumer society, whereby nature is seen to be desirably “authentic”. As capitalism responds by 
offering new forms of consumerism based on the desires of its consumers to be “green”, the 
territory of what is capitalised grows. Authenticity is a driver for the growth of capital 
accumulation.  
 
This internalisation of critique finds another perspicuous example in the history of second wave 
feminism as explained by Nancy Fraser (2013). Fraser describes the significance of second wave 
feminism on the cultural and socio-political landscape of the late twentieth century. She 
constructs an historical description of the uses of feminist critique by the burgeoning ideology of 
neoliberalism. Fraser takes up the well-known view that the feminist movement's relative success 
in the transformation of culture has not intrinsically led to institutional change. As she suggests, 
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‘on the one hand, feminist ideals of gender equality, so contentious in the preceding decades, 
now sit squarely in the mainstream; on the other hand, they have yet to be realized in practice’ 
(Fraser, 2013: 210). Without the structural or institutional changes that were demanded, second 
wave feminism's promises were unfulfilled, and importantly, the cultural revolution that 
occurred, the vast change in subjectivities, occluded or obscured the lack of institutional change. 
That is to say, the shift in the cultural landscape (at least in the West), the broad acceptance of 
the critique at a cultural or discursive level, prevents us from thinking the somewhat more 
important lack of institutional transformation. Culture, then, can counter-intuitively obscure the 
failings of the movement, instead performing the obverse move of its general “message”; on the 
one hand, it is furthering the feminist cause discursively through awareness raising, but on the 
other it is denying the possible transformative potential of that awareness as it occludes the work 
still to be done at a structural level. 
 
As Fraser asserts, through a reading of Boltanski and Chiapello, feminist critique could harbour a 
more disturbing possibility: ‘the cultural changes jump-started by the second wave, salutary in 
themselves, have served to legitimate a structural transformation of capitalist society that runs 
directly counter to feminist visions of a just society’ (Fraser, 20130: 211). As the feminist critique 
was recuperated into neoliberal ideology the social currents felt during the period were 
conscripted into the legitimisation of a ‘new form of capitalism: post-Fordist, transnational, 
neoliberal’ (Fraser, 2013: 211). Many of neoliberal capitalism's central ideological claims 
overlapped in significant ways with the aims of second wave feminism, allowing the latter to 
thrive under the conditions of the former. Feminism founded its anti-authoritarian and anti-
systemic critiques in the context of state-organised capitalism, however, it was only under the 
“tolerant” conditions of neoliberalism, an ideology that argued for similar aims, that feminism 
became a broad social movement; finding its way into ‘every nook and cranny of social life and 
transform[ing] the self-understandings of all whom [it] touched (ibid.: 218). Fraser asks whether 
it was more than mere coincidence that feminism and neoliberalism found success together, 
suggesting perhaps, there was some logical affinity between them; ‘with welfare and 
developmental states under attack from free-marketers, feminist critiques of economism, 
androcentrism, étatism, and Westphaliansim took on a new valance’ (ibid.: 218). What started as 
a corrective to both economic subjugation of women and lack of cultural recognition, splintered 
into the one-sided culturalism, thus occluding redistribution in favour of recognition. In Fraser's 
telling of it, the culturalisation of feminist demands coincided precisely with the rise of a 
neoliberalism and its desire to suppress the memory of social egalitarianism. She understands 
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how capitalism resignifies the critiques against it to legitimate emergent forms, thus recuperating 
counter-hegemonic claims to produce the ‘higher, moral significance needed to motivate new 
generations to shoulder the inherently meaningless work of endless accumulation’ (ibid.: 219). 
The flexible, neoliberal capitalism that we are living through today (the “new spirit” Boltanski 
and Chiapello describe) was in part born from the critiques against the older, more authoritarian 
regimes. Fraser suggests that disturbingly, second wave feminism has contributed a moral 
legitimation and a set of logics for this new spirit.  
 
As a discourse of recognition, the role of culture in this formulation is interesting. Unwittingly, it 
embarks on a two-fold movement; the domination and subsequent concealment of the discourse of 
redistribution. Thus, feminism's economic critique gets subjugated and occluded by the relative 
successes of its demands for cultural recognition. Rather than adopting a multilayered paradigm, 
encompassing both the economic and cultural registers of the critique, neoliberalism has 
succeeded in curtailing the demands for redistribution, and foregrounding the demands for 
recognition as a form of identity politics that has been mobilised against forms of statist, 
communal, egalitarianism. Fraser calls this, in her earlier work, the “cunning of history”, and, as 
it emerges later in her thought, “progressive neoliberalism”. The cultural demands of feminism, 
and similar egalitarian critiques, have been recuperated and turned against themselves. As Fraser 
(2019) suggests, this alliance between liberation movements and capitalism has created a 
hegemonic alliance that provides legitimacy for ongoing appropriation. Coherent with logics of 
capitalist accumulation and exploitation, liberatory vectors have been co-opted into the 
prominent politics of recognition that have emerged in the late twentieth and early twenty first 
centuries. Seducing the ‘major currents of progressive social movements into the new hegemonic 
bloc’ (Fraser, 2019: 14), progressive neoliberalism has a normative dimension that engineers us 
as human subjects. We are thus, homo economicus, governed by a logic of economisation, and at the 
same time, homo virtuous, bound to the logics of exemplification, that hides the raw economistic 
mode of operation. The elision between social movements and capitalist accumulation makes us 
in its own image. Additionally, the display of virtue, thus, has no need of a thoroughgoing critical 
relation to the underlying capital endeavours it occludes.  
 
So too with contemporary art. An axiom thereby emerges in this context that provides ground 
for the exemplifying practices of an artwork, mobilising the critical valences of art in general 
which in turn provides a legitimation for all done in its name. Artistic critique, or the critical 
potential of art, is recuperated into the inferential system of capitalism, allowing valorisation to 
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occur within the context of previously non-capitalised territories. Critique is the motor of this 
expansion of valorisation. In the context of the artwork or exhibition or practice that seeks to 
disrupt, resist or emancipate, the content of this work, while being salutary, still has the potential 
to privatise capital or provide legitimation for the valorisation of capital in the various forms 
explored above. That is why it is not adequate to analyse art practices with such limited 
conceptions as form or content, we must be expansive in our analysis and understand how, in 
line with the Peircian approach discussed previously, artworks work in their broader sense 







































The law-event duality is at the heart of the conflicts, which run through the history of 
ideas in the Western world, starting with the pre-Socratic speculations and continuing 
right up to our own time through quantum mechanics and relativity. Laws were 
associated to a continuous unfolding, to intelligibility, to deterministic predictions and 
ultimately the very negation of time. Events imply an element of arbitrariness as they 
involve discontinuities, probabilities and irreversible evolution. 




5.1 Political Transformation  
 
It is my contention that the petrocultural is characterised by a limited understanding of the ways 
in which art can have meaningful political impact. As Gabriel Rockhill (2014) suggests, the 
inferential fields of art and politics have often been theorised as either ‘completely autonomous 
spheres, divided by an insurmountable barrier, or they constitute domains that do indeed 
influence each other through privileged points of interaction’ (Rockhill 2014: 1). As I suggest in 
this chapter, this question is underwritten by a Liberal framing that determines art’s interaction 
with politics along very specific lines. As Rockhill asserts, there is no natural, or pre-given field 
of art and politics, they are both historically constructed and conditioned fields. What is proper 
to Contemporary Art, then, is linked not just to the history of art, but to the social and political 
fields as they have emerged throughout history. If we are to assert that art can have traction 
within the socio-political fields (an assumption that is far from given), then we must understand 
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the relation between those two fields. In this chapter, my aim is to point towards a route into 
that project, and suggest that the common understandings of this relation are myopic – that is to 
suggest, limited in their perception of that relation, either because they assume to readily the 
capacity for art to have the traction they desire or that art and politics are insurmountably 
divided fields. As such, these two views occupy extreme versions of Rockhill’s central antinomy; 
art is unrelated to politics in an undialectical autonomous fashion or it is so directly related to 
politics that action within the field of art has direct effect in the political realm. The failure of 
some theorists to make claims around how art has political impact rests on this problematic 
antinomy. These failures, I argue, are not just limited to art theory, but infuse much political 
discourse, whereby acts of resistance, activism, political organising etc are too often thwarted by 
their own inability to understand the systemic conditions within which they operate. In this 
chapter I focus on a number of occasions of myopia to those conditions, for example the case of 
Extinction Rebellion’s inability to adequately negotiate their own colonialist blind spots or the 
way in which Olufar Eliason’s work makes an assumption about the nature of political change 
that limits its impact. While it is important not to suggest that artworks are “failures” because of 
their inability to produce political change, we do need to understand how the conditions 
provided by contemporary art hamstrings any political ambitions from the start. This chapter 
also foregrounds an understanding of the role of spontaneity in the work of Rosa Luxembourg, 
Vladimir Lenin and Marks Fisher’s recent attenuation of these themes in his own works. I 
attempt to understand how the problems of political myopia play out in terms of a society in 
which individuals in that society see their capacity to effectuate political change as limited, it 
draws on the work of Roberto Unger and Emile Durkheim to understand these issues, and seeks 
to counter this socio-political tendency through a reading of Charles Sanders Peirce. However, to 
begin with this chapter utilises a reading of the relation of the universal to the particular in the 
work of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. 
 
The question of how artworks produce political transformation has been central to art 
theoretical discourse for many years. Foremost in these debates is the question of the relation 
between the artwork and the field of politics, between the human agent and the state, or between 
the individual and the universal. While each of these separate terms should not be elided, we can 
understand some relations between, for example, the field of politics in general and the concept 
of the universal – it is through Laclau and Mouffe’s ideas of subjectivation, hegemony and 
universality that I understand this “knot”. For Laclau, the universal is an empty place; it is 
through the hegemonic operation, whereby subjects take up temporary hegemonic positions in a 
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movement of politics, that the empty place is temporarily filled in. In order for politics to exist as 
such, the universal must be understood as the horizon for any political claim – as he suggests, 
the universal: 
 
is absolutely essential for any kind of political interaction, for if the latter took place 
without universal reference, there would be no political interaction at all: we would only 
have either a complementarity of differences which would be totally non-antagonistic, or 
a totally antagonistic one, one where differences lack any commensurability, and whose 
only possible resolution is the mutual destruction of the adversaries. 
(Laclau 2007: 61) 
 
Political thought is thus the movement between the particular and universal insofar as the latter 
is seen to be temporarily filled in with the former – without this hegemonic operation, particulars 
would exist as mere differences. When I refer to the concept of the relation between the human 
agent and the political, I am conceiving this as a hegemonic relation that understands the horizon 
of universality as the rhetorical foundations through which it must operate. While there is a 
highly fruitful discussion to be had in this area of political philosophy, it is beyond the scope of 
the current thesis to construct it in its entirety here.41  
 
It is precisely the nature of the relation between the individual and the universal that concerns us. 
Understanding this relation gives us a theory of both the human subject and the social world that 
it is part of, and a theory of political change. Change should be understood through the way 
particularities gain dominance in discursive fields through a hegemonic operation, as described 
by Laclau and Mouffe (2001). Insofar as the social world is conditioned by all sorts of material 
and ideological forces, the description of the human that emerges within the next chapters does 
so in relation to these forces. It is my contention that the forms of Liberalism that emerged in 
the latter part of the twentieth century underwritten by the oil industry, have a very particular 
view of these relations – for Liberalism, the human subject has no relationship to other subjects, 
no relationship to the transcendental realm of politics, and exists in a dominant position in 
relation to nature. These characteristics, as identified by Roberto Unger (1975), are central to 
classical liberalism, however, attenuated through the ratcheting inequalities, extractions and 
exploitations precipitated in large part by the petrochemical industries, they take on a hyperbolic 
 
41 For more on this see Laclau (2005), (2007) and (2014), Laclau and Mouffe (2001) and Crtichley and Marchart 
(2004). 
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character.42 Central to this chapter is an understanding of how political theory formulates the 
relation between the individual and the state; these theories map on to the way art assumes its 
relation to the field of the political precisely because contemporary art exists within, what Unger 
calls, the family of ideas of Liberalism (Unger, 1975). In the context of the failures of the liberal 
order in light of the petropolitical, we need to reengineer that very order. As Mann and 
Wainwright argue; ‘[c]limate change requires a fundamental shift in our understanding of the 
political’ (Mann and Wainwright, 2018: 79).  
 
Fundamental to a discussion of the way the individual relates to the universal are the dialectical 
concepts of continuity-discontinuity, invariants-variants, law-event. As identified by Prigogine, 
above, these conceptual dyads have determined the history of Western thought. When discussing 
the role art has to play in making changes to, for example, socio-political norms and laws, we are 
focusing specifically on the way the contingent object of art has traction at the level of the 
universal. How artworks create change at higher levels, how political change occurs, is a matter of 
asking how something discontinuous creates change within fields of law, norms and tradition 
that continue and persist over time. This is, as understood by Laclau, a hegemonic operation.  
 
I claim that how art, as a form of discontinuities, auto-institutes at the level of universality, 
requires a dialectical operation, whereby contingency (tychism in Peircian terms) ramifies 
commitments to transformation at higher strata. This dialectical relation I call continuity. If we 
think that the universal is merely a collection of individuals not dialectically related to it (a feature 
of Liberalism that Unger identifies) and that to reach the universal requires the addition of more 
individuals, as opposed to a synthetic, multiplication and transformation across levels, then we 
give credence to the view that the world is limitless, that difference is all that exists, and that 
individuals are unrelated. The concept of continuity in contrast, then, emerges as an expression 
not of more and more individuals, but as the way those individuals relate through the concept of 
universality. Unger’s understanding of Liberalism relies on the idea that individuals do not see 
themselves as related to each other through a universal – the place that God or tradition used to 
hold – instead, individuals are silo’d off from each other. Here, I am suggesting the concept of 
continuity works as a corrective to the Liberal tendency to think the capacity for change as an 
operation that requires just an addition of more individuals – more on this in Chapter Six.  
 
42 Hyperbolic in both senses – exaggerated or amplified, but also in its rhetorical sense as embellishment; the 
neoliberal tendency towards marketisation relies precisely on, as we saw above in Chapter Four, a façade of 
liberal values to cover over its underlying operations.  
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As suggested by Laclau, the universal is required precisely for political action to take place, but 
for him the universal has a very specific character. Instead of being absolute or timeless, the 
universal must be thought of as an undecidable place holder that can be replaced and overturned 
though an operation of hegemony. This process is never finally realised nor fixed interminably, 
but opens out on to new conflicts and new struggles – this precisely is the understanding Laclau 
gives to “the political” as such. As Linda Zerilli suggests: 
 
Hegemony means that the relation between the universal and particular entails not the 
realization of a shared essence or the final overcoming of all differences but an ongoing 
and conflict-ridden process of mediation through which antagonistic struggles articulate 
common social objectives and political strategies. The very fact that commonalities must 
be articulated through the interplay of diverse political struggles – rather than discovered 
and then merely followed, as one follows a rule – means, first, that no group or social 
actor can claim to represent the totality and, second, that there can be no fixing of the 
final meaning of universality. 
(Zerilli in Critchley and Marchart 2004: 96) 
 
As Zerilli suggests, democracy is articulated as the interplay between the particular and the 
universal, suggesting that neither exclude the other, but rather, they exist in relation to each 
other. It is democratic politics that asserts this relation as a reinscription of the particular into the 
universal through the hegemonic struggle. Difference is articulated not as absolute, but as a 
manifestation of the ways in which particulars relate to each other in reference to the universal. 
As she suggests, ‘multicultural groups which cling too closely to a fantasy of pure difference risk 
at once ghettoization by, and complicity with, the dominant community’ (ibid.: 94). As such, 
politics is the work not of articulating contiguous differences that could be used by the dominant 
community to exclude and arbitrate between us,  but the articulation of these differences in 
order to approach the universal through a struggle. 
 
There can never be a final decision, but only contingent processes which lead to more struggles, 
the community is never finally realised, but must be able to be reformed through a hegemonic 
operation whereby the universal is replaced by new particulars. This conception of universality, 
at its heart, denies the monolithic nature of power, understanding instead, the necessary struggle 
and Gramscian “war of position” that must occur for power to be realised and ratified. This 
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gives us hope – no particularity can ever claim final hold over universality; the universal is always 
rearticulable.  
 
While I will argue in Chapter Six for a specific conception of the forms of socio-political 
organisation, and a description of the human in line with this socio-political condition, this 
chapter will look at the way a number of theorists, artists and writers have conceptualised the 
capacity art, or culture, has for producing political change. I will focus specifically on what I 
consider to be a failure in these theorisations to understand the operation required to transition 
from particular claims around productions of subjectivity towards broader modalities that have 
traction in the task of systemic transformation – the hegemonic operation as described above. I 
will argue that not only is systemic transformation desirable, but necessary to move from regimes 
of violence that I have outlined in previous chapters, but also that contemporary art, so 
theorised, is incapable of having that traction. However, I will not argue that contemporary art 
should be charged with that role, in fact, I make no prescriptive generalisations in the name of art, 
but only analyse how art that has political ambitions is thwarted in its task. Equally, I will not 
suggest that artwork has no broader efficacy or role in society, or that the modalities that I 
identify aren’t in some way interesting or useful, merely that contemporary art, so conceived, 
maintains the liberal separation between the particular and universal that appears in the way the 
individual is theorised as non-relational.  
 
This is the third axiom of petroculture – the inability for art to adequately understand the 
capacity artwork has for political change. Expanding on Robin MacKay’s (Mackay in Mackay ed. 
2015) notion of myopia, this chapter explores how the relation between art and politics is 
curtailed by an inability to theorise the transition between the individual and the universal. I also 
draw on Negarestani’s (Negarestani in Mackay ed. 2015) concept of triviality, to understand how 
art’s capacity for systemic transformation can be limited by the way the relation between the 
individual and the universal is conceived.  
 
How do we measure art’s political efficacy? While some theorists have attempted to elide the two 
regimes, suggesting that art just is political or that politics has an aesthetics, I will maintain the 
separation, arguing that, firstly, to perceive the logics of art separate from the logics of politics is 
necessary in order to understand how the former has traction within the latter, and secondly, that 
in order for art to be understood as anything other than the aesthetic handmaiden to politics, as 
propaganda for example, it must have autonomy from that regime. However, as discussed in 
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Chapter Three, this autonomy must be understood in a specific way, not as a retreat from 
exogenous forces, but a productive relational engagement with those forces in order to construct 
new rules, norms and modalities. It is thus precisely this mode of self-legitimisation that 
autonomy brings to the discourse around art and politics that I want to maintain here. Insofar as 
I identify this distinction between the two regimes, as I will elucidate in the next chapter, this 
distinction is not absolute, in fact, what I am mostly interested in is the fuzzy, mediation between 
these regimes, what Charles Sanders Peirce called “thirdness”.  
 
According to Peirce, the philosophical tradition of nominalism, that he identified with a wide 
range of thinkers including, as Forster (2011) suggests, Descartes, Hume, Locke, Leibniz, Kant, 
Hegel, and so on, is coherent with the inability to adequately understand the relation between the 
individual and the universal. Nominalism and liberalism share key characteristics. Insofar as 
nominalism, as critiqued by Peirce, believes that only individuals and not universals exist, it is a 
philosophical tradition that legitimates a reneging of responsibility to the social. Where 
nominalism assumes the universal to be made up of additions of individuals, liberalism, as I will 
examine later in this chapter, cannot but think the social in any way other than in an additive 
nature. My argument relies on an understanding of this move as a form of myopia.   
 
How can art navigate within the context of an entrenched econo-political rationality that 
overdetermines it as a myopic project? I argue that petropolitical logics underwrite this inability 
to orient political vectors that have traction on systemic change; our relation to the highly 
abstract threat of climate catastrophe on the one hand, and the entrenched violent regime of 
petrocapitalism on the other, is often either one of tragic resignation or trivial assumptions about 
our capacity to produce change. Through an examination of a number of practices within 
different contexts, I shall indicate how these two assumptions – I have no capacity or I have 
utmost capacity – are both limited responses to these crises. It is important to note here the debt 
this analysis has to Mark Fisher’s work on Capitalist Realism’s failure to imagine an alternative. 
As Fisher suggests: 
 
Capitalist realism as I understand it cannot be confined to arts or to the quasi-
propagandist way in which advertising functions. It is more like a pervasive atmosphere, 
conditioning not only production culture but also regulation of work and education, and 
acting as a kind of invisible barrier constraining thought and action.  
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If capitalism realism is so seamless, and if current forms of resistance was some hopeless 
and impotence, where can an effective challenge come from? A moral critique of 
capitalism, emphasising the ways in which it lead to suffering, only reinforces capitalist 
realism. Poverty, famine and war can be presented as an inevitable part of reality, while 
the hope that these forms of suffering could be eliminated easily painted as naïve 
utopianism. 
(Fisher 2009: 16) 
 
The suite of ideas, policies, laws and norms that have emerged in the period of the last forty 
years in line with the development of neoliberal capitalism contribute to this pervasive 
atmosphere of hopelessness – Capitalist Realism. Yes, we are entreated to work on ourselves 
(entrepreneurs of our selves), but the capacity to alter those laws and norms that make up the 
hegemon, are out of our grasp – and any attempt to do so seen as pure utopianism. This sense of 
realism rests precisely on the way the relation between the individual and the universal is 
conceptualised. In order to imagine political capacity, we must escape the frame of liberalism 





Both Robin Mackay and Reza Negarestani use the term “myopia” in their work to describe an 
operation that fails to orient the local towards the global. In Negarestani (in Mackay ed., 2015), 
this localist myopia appears as a function of conceptualisation that proceeds via a fixedness to a 
local site – without a function of deracination from that local site, and an orientation towards the 
global, conceptualisation risks being myopic. Which is to say, thought that is situated in 
subjective localisation without a relation to the universal reaffirms its isolation from broader 
strategies of thought.43 This myopia appears according to a site of utmost contingency, detached 
and spontaneous. As I shall discuss later in this chapter, the relation between the local site and 
the global environment is a fundamental operation of the political in art. Without an operation 
oriented dialectically towards the global, localisation risks limiting the capacity for 
 
43 Here, I am using the terms “global” and “universal” somewhat interchangeably – while they mean different 
things, I understand the work that the concept of the global does in Mackay’s and Negarestani’s work to be 
similar to that of the universal. Insofar as the global refers to a set of conditions that dominate all local 
operations, it refers also to notions of globalism and globality, but also to ideas around world creating or 
“worldviews”. As such, “the global” operates ideologically to create frames through which we act, think and 
imagine.  
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transformation. I take the concept of myopia to be one that operates as a restraint on knowing – 
a form of epistemological limitation – but also as a form of limitation on doing. The capacity to 
conceptualise and the capacity to act are closely linked here – yet, importantly they must be 
understood as different – to know, is not to do. It would be myopic to limit our human projects 
to just knowing. The expansion of our epistemologies must be combined with an expansion of 
our capacities to act. This is the basic premise of left accelerationism, our capacities, that have 
been hampered by neoliberal capitalism, ‘can and should be let loose’ (Srnicek and Williams in 
Mackay ed., 2014: 361).  
 
Negarestani’s work draws on CS Peirce’s analysis of continuity and contingency, or in Peircian 
language, synechism and tychism. Tychism, for Peirce is the local occurrence of absolute chance; 
‘tychism is responsible for the instantiation of particularities or local contexts […] it expresses 
the contingent instantiation or ramification of the universal into its own particular instances’ 
(Negarestani, in Mackay ed., 2015: 225). Whereas synechism is the doctrine that continuity is 
crucial to philosophy. Peirce suggests: 
 
Continuity is fluidity, the merging of part into part […] I draw a line. Now the points on 
that line form a continuous series. If I take any two points on that line, however close 
together, other points there are lying between them. If that were not so, the series of 
points would not be continuous. 
(Peirce, Collected Papers Volume 1, 1974: 68) 
 
A commitment to synechism allows us to understand the related nature of discreteness – instead 
of the siloing off of discrete objects, synechism posits a flow or connectedness between things, 
linked together in the continuum. It is this “anti-discreteness” that allows Negarestani to 
understand the relation between the local and the global site in terms of continuity. If we were 
not committed to synechism, we would assume an absolute contingency between local sites 
rather than a synechistic continuity. Negarestani’s understanding of universality as a ‘complex 
interweaving of continuity and contingency, synechism and tychism’ (Negarestani, in Mackay ed., 
2015: 225), allows us to understand how we might be able to investigate the ‘space of the 
universal through particular instances or local contexts’ (ibid.). In this formulation, Negarestani is 
describing the non-trivial relation between the particular and the universal, the local and the 
global. The environment of non-triviality is one of synthesis. It is only through the synthetic 
interweaving of local and global contexts – what, as we shall see later in this chapter, can be 
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understood as a neighbourhood logic – that we can understand how synechism describes 
collectivising or grouping not as a pluralistic, flat addition of multiple isolated individuals, but as 
the ‘interlinking multiplication between localities’ (ibid.: 226). He continues in another text: 
 
The local site of knowledge cannot be overextended to the universal landscape 
of logoi (dogmas – whether conceptual or metaphysical – are mostly expressions of 
inflating or over-extending the local to the global). Nor can different local sites or 
conceptual maps be stretched or simply added to one another in a pluralistic fashion (the 
risk of conceptual conflation, trivialization and anti-universality). Different strategies of 
navigation and integration of conceptual maps are required in order to maintain a 
universal orientation and non-trivially participate in the game of truths. 
(Negarestani in Rowan 2013: 4) 
 
As discussed later in this chapter, the notion of scale, which, as Anna Tsing (2012) suggests, can 
only think the relation between the local and the global as one of addition of local contexts, is 
incompatible with a synechistic account. This scalar approach is what Negarestani would call 
“trivial” – triviality here describes a relation between local and global that does not go through 
operations of synthesis. For Negarestani, “universality” is the name given to the ‘analytico-
synthetic passage from the local to the global, and through the lenses of synechism and tychism’ 
(Negarestani, in Mackay ed., 2015: 226). In other words, the notion of universality here is 
understood as one that incorporates the local contexts, not as a matter of addition, but as a 
synthetic interweaving and that interweaving occurs in the context of the continuum. Continuity 
is the name given to the interweaving in the space of the continuum (the space within which this 
interweaving occurs).  
 
Myopia, however, cannot think this synthetic construction of universality, instead, it thinks the 
universal as merely the addition of multiple individuals or contingent, local contexts – triviality.44 
It is in this sense that the challenge of the climate emergency is so often posed – if we can only 
get enough people to switch to green energy, to go vegan, or to stop flying, then we can avert the 
worst consequences of climate catastrophe. In a very real sense, of course, this is exactly what is 
needed (we do need a huge number of people to change their habits), but, as I hope to show in 
this and the final chapters, this trivial understanding, this myopic approach, misunderstands the 
 
44 This is coherent with the logic of Liberalism as described by Unger and the logic of absolute difference as 
described by Laclau. 
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complex interweavings of multiple contexts. It is an analysis devoid of the concept of power – 
and it is only through an analysis that includes a Peircian approach that we can fully understand 
power as a relation. Fundamentally, the worst culprits of climate catastrophe, those who have 
come to dominate our global system, are not accounted for in this myopic approach. As I 
discuss later in this chapter, the false universalisation of the notion of “we” in much climate 
activism, is a myopic understanding of the problems facing us. But this is also the way 
contemporary art tends to think its political operation. As discussed in relation to the example of 
Olafur Eliasson’s work Ice Watch, art assumes political change through the addition of individual 
audience members – if enough people see this work, then this will have a global effect. This 
myopic understanding appeals to the dominant views of the relation between universality and 
particularity, and, as Negarestani suggests, forms ‘a localism that insists on analysing the 
problems at the level of the local without any recourse to non-local possibilities’ (Negarestani, in 
Mackay ed., 2015: 226). 
 
This localism lacks future orientation, is short sighted and cannot understand the complex 
relation the local has to the global. One might accuse the petropolitical paradigm of this precisely 
because it favours short term profit over global deleterious effects. The petropolitical, appears as 
a form of localism that focuses on the local context of oil industrial profiteering (the 
accumulation of individual wealth), and avoids considering downstream externalities – which 
reappear in the form of complex, interweavings of the local and global as climate catastrophe, 
species decline, air quality and habitat degradation, racial discontinuities and other so called 
“natural” disasters. But, equally, climate change mitigation emerges in the liberal context as a 
localism that is myopic to the complex relationship it must have to global systems in order to 
have traction within the universal. The capitalistic distillation of energy from liquid hydrocarbons 
is a myopic abstraction that undermines the local through the misapprehension that individuals 
exist as discrete entities unrelated to each other, or a realm greater than themselves. A synechistic 
account of natural history would reintroduce the notion of continuity in order to institute non-
myopic modes of existing, behaving and thinking. What comes after this current petro-political 
paradigm must, therefore, take the work of Peirce seriously. As I show in this chapter, the socio-
cultural doctrines of contemporary art are yet to understand these lessons from Peirce, but 
furthermore, as a doctrine liberalism, given global legitimacy by the massive economic 
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5.3 The Universal, the Particular and the Individual 
 
If we are to understand how political claims made by a particular work of art have traction at a 
general, or global level, how it might transcend level, or how individual actions might have 
exigency within broader contexts, it is important to understand the complexities of the relation 
between the individual and the universal as it appears in art.46  
 
In the opening chapter to Kant After Duchamp Thierry De Duve (1996) invites us to imagine 
ourselves an ethnologist from outer space. Faced with the phenomenon of contemporary art, we 
have to make sense of how humans have grouped together these seemingly disparate objects into 
the category “art”. It appears that everything can be considered art, and as such, we are faced 
with the obverse truth, if everything is art, then nothing is art. The category art is an empty set or 
it is an infinite one (De Duve, 1996: 11). It appears to be the case that anything can be art, and to 
classify as art, there needs to be no appeal to a universal concept. As discussed above in Chapter 
Three, art’s autonomy rests on this conception of freedom from genre limitations – insofar as 
artworks need no appeal to categorical essences, their autonomy emerges as a form of negative 
freedom. In this context, then, it is coherent to suggest that art appears as a field of discursive 
multiplicity, determined not by some internal coherence, but by the name “art”. As De Duve 
suggests, ‘art is an autonomous business that is its own foundation, names itself, and finds its 
justification in itself (ibid.: 12). This, De Duve suggests, is art’s “nominalist ontology”, bound by 
faith to a belief system centred around the agreement that something is art precisely because we 
call it art. 
 
Unlike modernist painting which held purity or specificity as its regulation, De Duve insists that 
contemporary art has a form of agreement as its regulative idea. A consensus about what is 
legitimate forms around the ontological status of an art work. Instead of working to appeal to 
 
45 It is not within the scope of this study to explore the ways in which Negarestani’s work could productively be 
applied to Laclau’s much larger project, instead I hope to hold the two projects together in productive synthesis 
– perhaps this constellation can produce a useful starting point for further discussion.  
46 While a substantial historical study of these issues would be interesting, it is not within the scope of this thesis 
to present this. Instead, I will sketch an outline of these ideas here in order to make the main argument.  
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objective notions of truth or purity, as in his account of modernity, contemporary art thus 
appeals to a liberal sense of inclusivity – a supposed democratic decision centred on the 
presupposed consent of “the public”. Drawing on Kant, De Duve (2006) suggests that the 
nominalist pronouncement of a cultural object as art relies on the concept of sensus communis. Not 
quite translatable as “common sense”, sensus communis is closer to common sentiment, suggesting 
the capacity to feel in common. Thus, for De Duve, Kant’s signal contribution to aesthetic theory 
is the idea that the work of art grounds a community of feeling wherein the capacity to feel is 
formed around the singular work of art. This communal focal point relies on the idea that the 
singular work of art appeals to universality through its relation to the universal in the moment of 
apprehension. Insofar as the relation between the singular work of art and the universal is thus 
granted through the agreement on the categorical status of that art work, the community formed 
by the ontological agreement emerges in the moment of apprehension. This concept of 
community rests on the notion that to belong to it, one has to agree to the ontological status of 
the work of art. However, as is evident throughout this thesis, this liberal notion of inclusion 
rests on a deft sleight of hand; what art ratifies is not, in fact, a truly democratic construction of a 
public, but the superficial appearance of democracy that obscures our view of the entrenched 
hierarchies and emergent structures of the art world. “Everything is art” does not mean that 
everyone is included in the conversation about what is art, all it does is ratify art’s hierarchical 
structures whilst pronouncing its own assumed democratic mandate to speak for everyone.47 As 
such, the act of naming relies on the powerful position of gatekeepers in order to gain 
ontological status 
 
Lukács identifies the way in which artworks reflect on objective reality in a mode dissimilar to 
science. Whereas science focuses on individual occasions of reality – this chair, this table, this 
rock – in order to draw universal conclusions about the abstract concept of chair or table or 
stone, art, in Lukács’ account, gives a specific form to reality that holds in tension the individual 
and the universal. This category he calls the particular, and it is the particular that he places 
central to his aesthetics. The scientist merely passes through particularity either to abstract 
universals from individuals or to use universals to focus on new individuals. The artist, however, 
retains the tension between the sensuous individuality of an object and the universal concept; art 
would make no sense were it not to rest precisely in the dialectical interplay between the two 
poles. It is this space for play that Lukács is keen to assert. As he suggests, ‘these categories stand 
objectively in a constant dialectical interrelationship, that they constantly pass over into one 
 
47 Recall, for example, the discussion of democratic politics in Chapter One. 
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another, and further, subjectively, that the unbroken movement involved in the process of 
reflecting reality leads from one extreme to the other’ (Lukács in Cazeauz, 2000: 221).  
 
Artistic reflection focuses on this single, central mediating point between individuality and 
universality, around which there is a movement between the two poles. It reveals the truth of 
objective reality through the interplay between individuality and universality as they are sublated 
in the dialectical resting point of specific particularity. As such, this resting place is synthetic – a 
concretation of both the universal and the individual in sensuous form. Artworks, for Lukács are 
dialectical in this sense of operating in the category of synthetic concrescence – which always 
involves, instead of a loss, a certain preservation. The Hegelian process at play within the 
artwork, for Lukács, mediates what is both individual to the object/artwork itself, and signifies 
the typical – which is to say, articulates a typology. Artworks, thus, reveal typical notions and 
features that are held in common, whilst also retaining (through sublation) the specificities of the 
individual objects or forms they present. Form is a forming process of sublation whereby the 
individual and the universal are held up and preserved in the particular. Every individuality 
‘stands in relation to particularity and universality’ (Lukács in Cazeauz, 2000: 223). 
 
Lukács asserts that the most successful works of art are capable of holding this dialectical tension 
open indefinitely, it is, however, in periods of “decadence” that artworks are incapable of 
working through sublation to typical or common concerns whilst also retaining the complex 
relationship to individuality – ‘the richer determination of individuality is lost […] the theory and 
practice of decadence always emphasize the moment of individuality, which then gets fetishized 
as the absolutely unique, the unrepeatable, the ineliminable’ (Lukács in Cazeauz, 2000: 224). As 
will become clear later in this chapter, it is this fetishisation of the individual and the trivial, non-
dialectical relation to the universal that emerges in the current paradigm. I would argue, within 
the context of late stage neoliberal capitalism, the sphere of specific particularity is lost, and, it is 
my claim that Lukács, avant la lettre, points to this in his work. As I explore later in this chapter, 
the declination of social institutions that allow individuals to have traction at higher social levels, 
has had an effect on art – contemporary art in turn, is characterised by a similar tendency. The 
decline of artistic genres is key to understand this.  
 
Fundamental to Lukács’ account is the notion of genre. Necessary to a dialectical materialist 
notion of aesthetics, the mediating function of genre is the mode by which artworks relate to 
their material conditions, to humanity in general and to society. It is within the generic – which is 
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to say the expression of types, norms and modes – that specific particularity articulates the 
complex relation between the two poles of aesthetic categories. Without a theory of these 
generic modalities, contemporary artistic or political praxis is incapable of articulating a 
dialectical relation between the individual and the universal – the mode by which Marxist history 
proceeds. Instead it is bound to a flawed, or trivial, relation between these poles. Stripped of the 
mediating function of the generic, individuals are either assumed to be incapable of speaking to 
universal themes or they assume a direct relation to the universal. Lukács’ analysis turns on this 
point, the generic is precisely the mode by which a transition would occur, in other words, the 
generic is not so much a space between the individual and the universal, but the process by which 
the borders between the individual and universal are articulated and crossed – it is the 
commitment to the concept of genericity that would allow artworks to approach the universal 
whilst still maintaining the relation to the individual. Much in the same way that institutions in 
civil society allow individuals to have causal impact at higher levels – what is instituted in an 
institution is precisely the capacity it has to increase the social power of groups. 
 
Instead of systematising his thought in the same way as Lukács, Adornian dialectics run between 
the universal and the particular, with genre as the mode by which individual works of art 
approach the universality of authenticity. Adorno is concerned with the decline of aesthetic 
genres – or the advance of aesthetic nominalism – where the ‘universal is no longer granted art 
through types’ (Adorno, 1997:262). He recognises the ongoing advance of what he calls 
“principium individuationis” – the move towards greater and greater individuation which 
distances art from the universal. This is a directive rather than a given, which is to say, it is 
normative. The principle, thus acts as a regulative idea that asserts how art should function, rather 
than merely describing how it does. Insofar as artworks assert their ontological status as artworks 
through the articulation of that proper name Art (the concept of nominalism that De Duve 
identified) – the upshot of the Duchampian moment in the early twentieth century – they do so 
according to a principle of individuation whereby all artworks are individually afforded the 
condition of art not because they work within or on the limits of genre, but because they are 
nominated as art qua their status as individual works. 
 
The important contribution of Adorno’s work to this argument comes from his insistence on the 
mediating function of genre; genre acts to guarantee that art is bound dialectically to the 
universal. The history of art, especially within the context of late modernism, is a story about the 
dissolution of those genres, what John Roberts names a deflationary logic (Roberts 2010) whereby 
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artistic skill is reoriented away from typical techniques towards assemblage, collage and the 
readymade. This ‘seismic shift’ (Roberts 2010: 82) was responsible not just for destabilising 
genres and conventions but ‘demolishing the formal hierarchy in which [mediums of art are] 
positioned and embedded’ (ibid).  
 
By locating meaning in the aesthetically-chosen found object (that is, the object of artistic 
discrimination) the artist is no longer bound to the expressive demands of covering a 
given surface or modelling a given material, but, rather to the intellectual demands of re-
contextualising extant objects in order to change their sign-value. 
(Roberts 2010: 82) 
 
Insofar as genre, historically, operated as a mediator between the individual and universal (a role 
Lukács recognised occurring in relation to the specific particularity at the heart of the artwork), 
genre itself, and the attendant aesthetic norms and laws, have dissolved into a free play of 
individuals shorn from their complex relation to the universal via the mediating operation of 
genre. This is not to say that artworks have lost their sensuous particularity, nor that something 
like a role for art has been evacuated in the question of universality, but that artworks no longer 
emerge within the context of types or norms.48  
 
With this in mind, how can contemporary art speak to universals today? As I will analyse later in 
this chapter, the deracination of the relation between individual and universal is not limited to 
art. Contemporary political ennui emerges in the gulf between these two poles; the idea of 
individual capacity in the context of global politics appears useless precisely because of the 
dismantling of, and loss of confidence in, historical institutions that would serve to mediate 
between the two poles. This process appears as social, cultural and political power is siphoned 
towards fewer and fewer members of society and particular social classes. It is no coincidence 
then, that contemporary art emerged as the best vehicle of cultural capital for the extremely 
wealthy within the latter part of the twentieth and early part of the twenty first centuries. It is 
both the cultural image of neoliberal capital and a fundamental progenitor of it, which is to say, 
contemporary art, precisely because it’s relation to the universal is truncated, appears as an 
apolitical, non-ideological motor of the assumed non-ideological contemporary paradigm.  
 
48 Rosalind Kraus’ (1999) work here would be an interesting addition to this argument, her discussion around 
post-medium condition in particular points to notions of purity and ontology that could be useful for my 
argument.   
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There is an intrinsic link between the modalities by which liberalism, nominalism and 
contemporary art understands the relation between the particular and the universal that I wish to 
claim. Why this might be at stake when addressing issues of the petropolitical, however, is less 
obvious. My gambit is that these modalities were not only ratified during the eras concurrent 
with expanded oil sponsored economic growth, but that the petropolitical itself has had traction 
on developing these modalities. As explored in earlier chapters, oil’s logics have extended far 
beyond pipelines, drilling rigs and petrol stations, they reach into our very lives and create, or 
amplify certain social relations, and dampen or occlude others. When it comes to climate 
breakdown, our responses are equally shaped by that same set of logics. As is clear, the 
foundational logics of liberalism and those of the petropolitical are interwoven, almost, it would 
seem, inextricably.  
 
 
5.4 Spontaneity as Triviality  
 
How we conceive of the role art has to play in creating political change depends on a number of 
factors. Do we believe that art has a direct relationship to political change? That works of art 
have efficacy within the realm of the political? At what site do we expect art to effectuate 
change? When we say “the political”, what, or indeed, where do we mean? Is the political 
restricted to the realm of governmental politics, to activism, or to realms of subjectivity? The 
term “political” seems to operate across multiple registers, as such it is not always easy to 
ascertain what an artist or theorist means by political efficacy. Significant attention has been paid 
to this issue in recent years, however it is not the ambition of this chapter to parse the entirety of 
these discussions. Instead, I shall be focusing on what I see to be a tendency within 
contemporary art to think that the political power of art rests on a form of political voluntarism 
– the idea that all is needed is the will to change for change to occur – and the idea of 
spontaneity – that all action should come from below with no need to think the structures or 
institutions through which that action should be mediated. Spontaneity in this context is 
committed to a contingency that upholds a non-synechistic logic.   
 
The spontaneous order, a name given to the liberalism that emerged from non-planned, free 
markets – Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” and taken up in, among others, Friedrich Hayek’s 
work – identifies the order that emerges from the result of the voluntary action of individuals 
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rather than governmental intervention. As identified by Lenin (Lenin, 2009), spontaneity 
presupposes, one, the emergence of order from the unconscious working class masses, two, an 
immediacy of action that does not understand the worker’s objective position, and three, a flat 
field of operation, undisturbed by power relations or structural conditions. Spontaneity, then, 
relies on forms of individual freedom postulated by liberalism, specifically negative freedom, and, 
as Lenin suggests, confuses tactics for a plan (ibid.). Central to the disagreement between Lenin 
and Rosa Luxemburg on the issue of spontaneity is their understanding of personal freedom, 
Luxemburg insisting on the pure spontaneity of the working classes based around the Kantian 
notion of freedom (undetermined by outside forces), while Lenin’s understanding of the 
revolutionary potential of the proletariat was conditioned by an understanding of autonomy as 
self-determination – as expressed in the vanguardism of the party form (The Charnel House). 
 
Differentiating spontaneity from the notion of consciousness, Lenin identifies how, in the 
context of Russian protests and rebellions, spontaneity was, while the emergence of a nascent 
form of consciousness, not adequate to the latter. For him, socialist democratic consciousness 
emerged not from within the masses, but arose as the result of exogenous scientific knowledge 
(Lenin, 2009: 81). For him, ‘the spontaneous development of the labour movement leads to its 
becoming subordinated to bourgeois ideology […] [h]ence our task, the task of Social-
Democracy, is to combat spontaneity’ (ibid.: 82). It is the institution of the Party that operates to 
mediate between the individual workers and the structures of power they wish to alter. A focus 
solely on the horizontal, or spontaneous, then, is incapable of thinking non-trivially about the 
political challenge. Historically, however, the notion of spontaneity, along with its counterpart, 
voluntarism, has taken hold.  
 
Mark Fisher (Fisher in Gielen, 2013) identifies an ideological elision between the liberal notion 
of flexibility, spontaneity, networked horizontality and the Big Society of David Cameron; 
‘practically all mainstream political discourse is suspicious of, and sceptical towards, the State, 
planning, and the possibilities of organised political change’ (Fisher in Gielen 2013: 103). In 
Fisher’s telling of it, hierarchies have been superseded by networks, common sense is constituted 
by notions of fluidity, plurality, inclusivity and diversity – abolishing the idea there could be 
something like universal values. The ubiquitous nature of this form of “postmodernity” has 
rejected all notions of authority, and, according to Fisher has been disastrous for the left. In this 
telling, Luxemburg’s argument has taken hold, while Lenin’s vanguardism of the party has been 
rejected. While I think there has been a shift in recent years – the emergence of figures such as 
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Jeremy Corbyn in the British context or Bernie Sanders in the American seem to point to a 
renewal of ideas of the party acting in a vanguardist mode – these tendencies are still prevalent 
culturally today. Echoing Jo Freeman’s (Freeman, 1996) work on the way structureless 
organisations tend towards a reintroduction of tyrannical hierarchies through the back door, 
Fisher identifies the tendency within contemporary politics (and indeed in culture and the 
discourses around it) to render hegemonic struggle useless through the privileging of non-
hierarchised, spontaneous, face-to-face interactions. He suggests, instead of rejecting wholesale 
authority as such, we should be able to distinguish between authority and authoritarianism: 
  
The task now is to resist the false choice between obsolete authoritarianism and 
impotent anti-authoritarianism […] Authoritarianism is the abuse of authority; it is 
therefore to be opposed, not by a wholesale rejection of authority, but by the 
conceptualization and constitution of proper authority. 
(Fisher in Gielen, 2013: 105) 
 
What emerges in the latter part of the twentieth century, coterminous with a faith in 
horizontalism from both the left and the right – the anti-authoritarian activism post-‘68 and the 
hyper-capitalism of silicon valley – is an equal faith in the boundless creativity of individuals. 
This sense of generalised creativity was not, however, conjoined with a political ambition to 
produce transformations at a political level – or rather, as Fisher suggests, the retreat into 
individual creativity was in the face of emergent complexities at the level of the global. Faced 
with an incoherent and opaque globalised world, much political action assumed that change 
could only come at a local level – and often this meant very much at the level of the subject 
themselves. The rejection of authority, of hegemony, has thus resulted in the rejection of any 
ambition to reclaim power for the left, coherent with this is the idea that human creativity can be 
a site of political struggle, but only insofar as what is changing is oneself not the system. Srnicek 
and Williams identify this as “folk politics” – the politics of ‘localism, direct action, and relentless 
horizontalism [that] remains content with establishing small and temporary spaces of non-
capitalist social relations, eschewing the real problems entailed in facing foes which are 
intrinsically non-local, abstract, and rooted deep in our everyday infrastructure’ (Srnicek and 
Williams in Mackay, 2014: 354). 
 
In line with this analysis, Chantal Mouffe (Mouffe in Gielen 2013) has criticised tactics of 
“withdrawal” or the fetishization of autonomy that many artistic practices employ, identifying a 
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trend in current artistic practice that thinks that in order to resist the marketisation of art 
institutions and the instrumentalization of the artist, that we must operate outside the 
institutions. Asking whether ‘critical artistic practices [should] engage with the current 
institutions with the aim of transforming them, or should they desert them altogether’ (Mouffe 
in Gielen 2013: 64), Mouffe gets to the heart of a question fundamental to our project here; 
should art’s autonomy be confined to a form of negative freedom that seeks to withdraw at an 
individual level from the conditions and contexts it finds itself in? Her answer is a resounding 
no; artistic practices that retreat from a relation to the institutions that provide them with context 
deny the very possibility of a ‘counter-hegemonic struggle to disarticulate the constitutive 
elements of neoliberal hegemony, with the aim of establishing a new power configuration’ (ibid.: 
66). Understanding culture as a vital battleground in the war of position that is hegemony, 
Mouffe foregrounds a counter-hegemonic approach that integrates critical concerns into a 
constant revisionary practice that engages with institutions. As she suggests, ‘instead of 
celebrating the destruction of all institutions as a move toward liberation, the task for radical 
politics is to engage with them, developing their progressive potential and converting them into 
sites of opposition to the neoliberal market hegemony’ (ibid.: 71). Accounts of spontaneous or 
individualised withdrawals from the institutions of the art world (or institutions in general) 
presupposes the capacity to clearly delineate between the inside and outside, as I show in 
Chapter Six, this clear delineation is not possible. The rejection of hierarchies or authority, the 
rejection of that necessity to use institutions to increase our political capacities is expressed as a 
faith in a horizontality that prevents political transformation. Or, as Rodrigo Nunes (2014) 
suggests;  
 
The time has come to be openly polemical and say once and for all that networks are not 
and cannot be flat; that prefiguration cannot be a goal in itself; and that an idea like 
horizontality may have moved from a fresh critical antidote to outdated ways of 
organising, to becoming an epistemological obstacle 
 (Rodrigo Nunes 2014: 12) 
 
While this is a highly truncated telling of the story of spontaneity, my aim here is to lay some 
groundwork to understand a critique of the way that art comes to assume its action in terms of 
spontaneity, instead of through mediating institutions (in the context of Lenin’s Russia, this 
mediating institution is of course the party, for Mouffe those may be understood as institutions 
of civil society, Nunes’ focus is on grassroots political organisations). What can be understood 
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clearly from this account, is that the theories of spontaneity and horizontality do not allow for an 
organised body of conscious subjects to emerge. Instead, presupposing that change will emerge, 
as though natural, from the masses with no organisational structure in place, spontaneity and 
horizontality imagine that the gulf between the individual and the universal to be crossed in one 
leap. This is the same supposition, as noted in Chapter Two, made by liberal economists who 
assumed that, left alone, homo economicus would prefer the most prudent choices thus producing a 
spontaneous order best suited to distributing wealth successfully, and equitably. This is an 
individualism of the highest order. 
 
 
5.5 Artistic Spontaneity 
 
Seeing as the conditions assumed by political spontaneity, an equal starting point, are rarely 
afforded individuals, it is an inherently poor theory for a discussion of how individuals – or art – 
participates in the construction of a social order. Any theory of social ordering, thus, must start 
from a description of the subject as co-constituted by power relations and social structures. 
Thus, a theory of art’s political potential cannot rely on the idea that it emerges as though by fiat, 
it must account for the social and political structures that support it and make this emergence 
possible – it must contain a theory of power and a theory of institutions. 
 
So, when artworks assume that their relation to transformative politics is direct, which is to say, 
the content is magically identical to the action produced, we should be cautious – they think that 
transformation is contingent on the actions of the people viewing the work. Let’s examine this in 
the following example.  
 
Ice Watch (2018) is a work of public art by the Icelandic artist Olafur Eliasson that appeared in 
two sites in London in December 2018 – outside the Tate Modern and, as a smaller iteration, in 
front of the Bloomberg offices. The work outside the Tate consisted of 24 large blocks of ice 
arranged like an ancient stone circle on the banks of the Thames, that, over time, melted. The 
work has appeared twice previously, in Copenhagen in 2014 and Paris in 2015 – both times to 
coincide with a Conference of Parties meeting about climate change. The ice for this sculpture 
was harvested from the Nuup Kangerlua fjord in Greenland, where it had broken away from the 
ice sheet. In collaboration with the geologist Minik Rosing, these large chunks of ice were hauled 
in refrigerated ships to their resting place in London. During the lifespan of the work, the ice 
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melted, allowing visitors to see, hear and smell the popping and hissing of melting ice as it 
released its centuries old air into the London atmosphere. The air being released is, according to 
Rosing, ‘air that that was trapped before we started polluting the atmosphere. Those bubbles 
have almost half the CO2 content as the air outside the iceberg. It was trapped maybe 10,000 
years ago, maybe 100,000, so you can smell what air used to smell like before we polluted it’ 
(Rosing cf. Jonze 2018).  
 
Ice Watch was developed in response to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s stark 
warning that we only have twelve years to avert climate catastrophe. In the face of such a 
terrifying prognosis Eliasson suggests that art and culture have a vital role to play; rather than 
presenting audiences with difficult to understand statistics, abstract concepts or vast scales, we 
need to make them feel the experience of ice melting. It is only in this immediate way that the 
audience will be moved to action on climate change. He suggests we need ‘a positive narrative to 
make people change their behaviour’ (Eliasson cf ibid.). Ice Watch makes us witnesses to the 
melting of the ice caps, bringing the tragedy of climate change into the public consciousness in a 
visceral way. Eliasson invites us to: 
 
Put your hand on the ice, listen to it, smell it, look at it – and witness the ecological 
changes our world is undergoing. Feelings of distance and disconnect hold us back, make 
us grow numb and passive. I hope that Ice Watch arouses feelings of proximity, 
presence, and relevance, of narratives that you can identify with and that make us all 
engage. 
(Elisson cf. Ice Watch is heading for London) 
 
For Eliasson, the bodily experience outweighs the rational understanding of statistics – we will 
only respond to the immediate sensation of the melting of polar ice but not to knowledge that 
this is happening at a distance. Apparently, Eliasson has been reading behavioural psychology 
and has learnt that action can only be prompted by an immediate, proximate experience, not by 
abstract knowledge – as a species we shall be forever limited to our immediate, local 
surroundings. This assumption of rational limitation in his audience is conditioned by Eliasson’s 
understanding of the way art conceives its role in political change. Precisely, art here is the direct 
presentation to our senses of the tragedy of melting ice caps, instead of the mediation of that 
knowledge through scientific institutions and epistemologies, presumably because we can no 
longer trust them. Art thus stands in for our inability to trust authority, presenting us with 
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immediate experience that keeps our concerns local – we are moved not by the knowledge that 
the populations of island nations are losing their homes and livelihoods, that equatorial countries 
are experiencing record temperatures causing crops to fail not to mention taking the lives of 
many poor inhabitants, or by the very current crises of extreme weather conditions in the Global 
South, or the flooding, strong winds or wild fires happening in even developed countries. 
Instead, we are moved to action by the experience of ice melting in our home city, an experience 
that places front and centre the concerns of the inhabitants of that city. This threat to the local 
presupposes and thus determines the types of political responses that would emerge – insofar as 
the political here is both determined by and preordains responses according to a logic of 
spontaneity, Eliasson’s work will result in localist political voluntarism.  
 
The hope of Ice Watch is that enough people experience it in order to precipitate political change – 
however, adequate theorisation of how that occurs is not given. Instead of a logic of mediating 
contexts or intermediary institutions that might modify or enlarge that political intent, art here 
appears to have direct access to the sphere of political change – it must leap across the abyss 
separating the particular work of art and the universal realm within which the political claims 
gain traction. And it assumes to be able to do this through an accretion of subjects – plus plus 
plus. This logic assumes that change occurs through the addition of enough individuals whose 
personal motivations are sufficiently altered in order to make radical change possible.  
 
The concern here is not that the people will not know how to articulate their political will, but 
that spontaneous political action can only emerge from an immediate experience rather than an 
expanded epistemology that foregrounds rational or abstract understandings of the struggles that 
appear outside our direct experience – what Negarestani calls triviality. Furthermore, these 
accretions of subjectivities are not understood as synthetic multiplications whereby local contexts 
interweave with global, but as a question of numbers; if enough people see the work. As explored later 
in this chapter, this understanding of political change thinks groups as an accretion of 
individuals, in, what Peirce would call a nominalistic fashion, rather than a form of realism that 
understands the continuity of groups.  
 
Whereas Eliasson suggests it is not enough to know, one must feel in order to construct political 
subjects, I would argue that this feeling without knowing forecloses a political subjectivity that 
can account for the conditions of subjects who are not like us. Assuming that we respond more 
urgently to the smell of centuries old air and the cold touch of an ice block instead of testimonies 
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of those populations on the frontline of a tragically changing climate, or the wealth of scientific 
data predicting the catastrophe, assumes something very tragic about the human condition. In 
this narrative we are myopic subjects, incapable of parsing information about worlds outside our 
own. In place of international solidarity, self-interest and nationalism is foregrounded, our 
horizons limited to the localities in which we live, what matters is what is close.49 Furthermore, 
this work operates in a romantic anti-capitalist frame that prioritises authentic, direct, immediate 
experience, over what is considered abstract about contemporary capitalism – data, information, 
finance. Romantic anti-capitalism presupposes that human political agency should be directed 
towards escaping the trammels of capitalist society by creating an authentic relationship to the 
land, nature, or human “essence”.50 As if to prove this, note the title of Eliasson’s 2019 Tate 
show. 
 
Eliasson’s 2019 retrospective at the Tate Modern, In Real Life, contains work from his student 
days until now, tracing his playful engagement with nature, weather, and human interaction. The 
last room of the exhibition is a somewhat haphazard recreation of “Studio Eliasson”. Known as 
The Expanded Studio, it documents some of his projects, including Ice Watch and Little Sun, a 
small plastic light that seeks to provide solar powered lights to communities without electricity – 
but, in the final analysis one could argue creates a business opportunity out of poverty whilst at 
the same time maintaining the appearance of goodness.  
 
On one wall there is an array of notes, sketches and research arranged in an alphabetical order, 
offering a kind of glossary to the work itself. Amongst many other quotes, images, and notes, 
Eliasson has pinned a quote from Rebecca Solnit (source text unattributed), written in capital 
letters in red pen. It is a poem of sorts: 
 
 I want better metaphors. 
 I want better stories. 
 
49 Further to this it is worth noting that both Eliasson and Rosing describe this work in terms of beauty – it is 
beautifully pure water and air that is being released, the sound is beautiful, the blocks themselves – the beauty, 
of course, emerges precisely because it is pure, before the emergence of industrial activity, before pollution, 
before humanity. This prelapsarian idea of beauty is telling. Is the political project that the artist and geologist 
embarking on one of population reduction or control? Are we witnessing an example of neo-Malthusianism in 
artistic form?  
50 Iyko Day’s (2016) work on this is instructive.  
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 I want more openness. 
 I want better questions. 
 All these things feel like  
they give us tools that  
are a little more  
commensurate with the amazing possibilities  
and the terrible 
realities that we face. 
(Rebecca Solnit cf. Olafur Eliasson, 2019) 
 
The “poem” is likely taken out of context, so none of the following should reflect on Solnit, but 
the centrality of these sentiments to Eliasson’s practices resonate with an analysis of voluntarism. 
Progressive, ecological or left critical movements rarely lack metaphors, stories or programmes, 
what they have lacked is the power to enact these stories. If we continually assume that better 
stories will save us, whilst concurrently giving no credence to very real material constraints on 
the enaction of those stories, we will be destined to repeat the failures that have historically 
befallen us. What voluntarism, a central component of much art that supposes its role as 
modelling future solutions, assumes, then, is that all we need to do is create expanded 
epistemologies. Fundamental to a description of political myopia, then, is one of two ideas; the 
idea that power relations do not exist, or if they do, they can be easily bypassed by adequate 
imaginative narrations; or that intransigent power relations ultimately restrict our capacities to 
act, limiting our engagement with the question of political transformation to a performative 
imaginary. “All we need are better stories” is accompanied by the idea that faced with ratcheting 
crises, our capacities are ultimately lacking and the only arena we have left to act in is the 
imaginary. The left melancholia identified by Fisher in his description of capitalist realism, thus 
prevents us from doing the hard work of working on intermediary institutions, organisational or 
solidarity projects, and foregrounds artistic or creative projects within which capacity to imagine 
better futures is rewarded by the accrual of cultural capital and the self-satisfaction of “having 







5.6 The Racialised “We” of Extinction Rebellion 
 
It is this retreat into individual claims to having had “done something” that has beset much of 
the discourse around climate change amelioration. Granted, recent conversations in the popular 
discourse have included, at least in some sense, the idea that systemic change needs to occur; 
George Monbiot’s51 many introjections into the debate, for example, have focused on political 
and economic matters instead of personal or subjective ones, localism still pervades within the 
common sense. While I shall explore how market solutions to political problems are inadequate 
in Chapter Six, it is important to note that this localisation of political ambition and the retreat 
from hegemonic struggle, ideas straight out of the liberal playbook, are behind calls to recycle, 
buy local produce, use energy saving lightbulbs and even to go vegan. This personalisation of 
responsibility dangerously risks absolving the main culprit of climate disaster – the very 
economic system that determines and regulates our activities.   
 
Emerging in the latter months of 2018, the climate action group Extinction Rebellion have 
already become a global force, having organised marches in over 90 cities around the world, 
caught the attention of journalists, politicians, celebrities and the general public alike and staged 
many “successful” public demonstrations of varying form, including the general strike-like 
“International Rebellion” that, in London at least, managed to significantly disrupt transport and 
economic activity in multiple sites across the city for over a week. As a direct response to this 
and other similar marches by organisations such as The Wretched of the Earth and the Youth 
Climate Strikes, the British Labour Party called for a Climate Emergency in Parliament. By many 
metrics the wide-reaching campaign, that has taken many lessons from previous activist 
organisations, Occupy Wall Street, Black Lives Matter and so on, has been successful; the climate 
crisis is now listed as a major source of public anxiety by a YouGov poll (Carrington 2019), the 
2019 European Elections saw a Europe wide “green wave” as political parties with the climate as 
their number one priority won many seats, and many major political parties now list climate 
change amelioration as policy.52 Yet, in the final analysis there is something fundamentally 
limited about their tactics. While vocalising the truth of the global climate crisis, its nature as an 
 
51 For Monbiot see, for example 2019 (i) and 2019 (ii)  
52 Since then, however, we have seen, in the British context, that the main driver for voters turned out to be 
Brexit by any means necessary, climate be damned. So short lived was the environmental concerns of the 
general population that even while Australia’s bush burned, destroying lives and decimating  farmland, we voted 
in, by a significant majority, a politician wholly unconcerned with climate disaster.  
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emergency, and the need for governments to act, the counter-hegemonic move is not made, 
rather, it is withdrawn from.  
 
In the Principles and Values section of the Extinction Rebellion website, there are ten clear 
statements that allow us to understand the politics of this organisation. While a number of the 
statements clearly outline need for “systemic change”, the eighth Principle says this:  
  
We avoid blaming and shaming: We live in a toxic system, but no one individual is to 
blame. 
 (Extinction Rebellion) 
 
While it is admirable to name the system, the reticence to articulate which subjects (and which 
nations) work to maintain and reinforce that system lacks the teeth needed for a counter-
hegemonic operation. As I outlined above, in Chapter One, and will discuss later in this chapter, 
the nations that profited most from colonial settler extraction and plunder are those contributing 
most to carbon emissions. As James Trafford suggests, ‘[w]ealthy countries like Britain are built 
on, and sustained by, impoverishing the global south. This means they have the resources to 
weather the storm whilst others are consigned to fate’. (Trafford 2019) 
 
Failing to identify the largest emitters of carbon, and declaring that “we” are facing a climate 
emergency ‘we are facing an unprecedented global emergency. Life on Earth is in crisis: scientists 
agree we have entered a period of abrupt climate breakdown, and we are in the midst of a mass 
extinction of our own making’ (Extinction Rebellion), Extinction Rebellion frames the crisis as a 
moral, universal one, affecting us all equally. The refusal to name names takes the focus off 
specific actors – large corporations, governments refusing to sign in new environmental 
legislation etc – and, to the advantage of those corporations, turns it towards everyone. Indeed, 
as Kate Irvine (2018) asserts, ‘climate change is not the great equalizer’, she continues: 
 
Rather, its impacts filter through the complex and often highly unequal social, political, 
and economic structures that define human social systems globally. And not surprisingly, 
efforts to mitigate climate change and ameliorate its impacts are likewise channelled 
through those very same structures; indeed, climate change has emerged out of them. 
(Ervine, 2018: 29) 
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As I discussed in Chapter One, the use the term Anthropocene links responsibility with a 
universalised individual subject – the whole of the Anthropos. This is not as much a paradox as 
it seems; instead of relating the individual to the universal through synechistic weaving and 
multiplication, this assumption totalises the figure of the individual within the universal, 
assuming a direct correlation between the two. The universal “we” here operates as a totalitarian 
identification between the local human subject and the global crisis, imparting responsibility 
universally, and equally, across all subjects, despite the fact that that responsibility is not ours. 
Precisely, Extinction Rebellion’s argument ratifies a form of totalitarian thinking that 
presupposes individuals are identical to the state not that power is divided unequally amongst 
different actors and groups.  
 
As I shall discuss later in this chapter, this “we” occludes black and indigenous epistemologies, 
experiences, and subjectivities, flattening them, yet again, into the image of European universality 
– as a corrective to this it is worth noting the work of the climate activist group The Wretched of 
the Earth, who re-embed the racialised subject at the centre of a discourse around climate 
disaster. Their open letter to Extinction Rebellion (Wretched of the Earth 2019) does not shy 
away from the idea that ‘we did not get here by a sequence of small missteps, but were thrust 
here by powerful forces that drove the distribution of resources of the entire planet and the 
structure of our societies’ (WotE 2019). Suggesting that it is precisely the drive for profit that 
produced the colonial relations inherent in the economic systems that have driven us to this 
point, Wretched of the Earth (whose name comes from Frantz Fanon’s famous work) identify 
the failure of Extinction Rebellion to challenge these very economic systems. Their demands 
resonate with ideas around racial justice and accountability to communities in the Global South, 
much of what follows in this chapter owes a debt to the analysis WotE open up.  
 
How we construct the idea of who or what matters will determine our future politics and action. 
Challenging the idea of the universal “Anthropos” at the heart of the term Anthropocene, 
Kathryn Yusoff (2018) critically examines the way blackness has been (and still is being) 
constructed in relation to white universality, and how recent scientific evidence pointing to 
potential environmental harm has led to racial imaginaries and political action that repeats 
colonial relations.  
 
If the Anthropocene proclaims a sudden concern with the exposures of environmental 
harm to white liberal communities, it does so in the wake of histories in which these 
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harms have been knowingly exported to black and brown communities under the rubric 
of civilization, progress, modernization, and capitalism. 
(Yusoff, 2018: xiii) 
 
This sudden emergence of environmental violence that the white liberal communities around the 
world are experiencing, so often narrativised in terms of threat to our land, our children or our 
future, prevents us from seeing that the same violences have been occurring in sites distant from 
“us”. Yusoff calls this a wilful blindness that permeates our comfortable position – the privilege 
of not having to worry about climate catastrophe. The material geopolitics of race infuse and 
infect not only the colonial projects of extraction – extraction of value from land and people not 
deemed “human” – but the very ways in which we respond to these threats. As is well 
documented, liberal comfort is underwritten by violent actions, dispossessions and the racial 
organisation of space; insofar as this comfort must be maintained, we are entreated not to 
foreground the struggles of marginalised communities within our climate action (see, Trafford 
2019). However, as long as we construct our political actions in the liberal frame, colonialism will 
be repeated. As Yusoff asserts, local political struggles often centre around material 
infrastructure – pipelines, coal fields, water rights etc – yet these local scenarios are not 
constructed away from economies of power that are ‘preconfigured through a racialised 
geosocial matrix’ (ibid.: 13). Like Yusoff’s claims for the racialisation of geology, it is important 
to identify artistic practices as preconfigured by racialised matrices; in order to conduct ourselves 
in just ways, we must account for the racialised geopolitical materialities and imaginaries that 
construct our worldviews. Immediacy, then, in the form of spontaneous politics, as exemplified 
by artwork that foregrounds white comfort, will only ever repeat the racialised matrices it is 
predetermined by. Eliasson’s work can be read as deeply embedded in this expression of comfort 
– what the inhabitants of London are meant to feel is not actually the necessity to produce 
radical change that could repair damages caused by colonial relations, but the idea that change to 
our psyches is adequate to political change – as such, we come away from viewing this work 
better people. Far from having to engage in the struggle that characterises the lives of many migrant 
and indigenous populations of the world, we, white, liberal subjects, have our consciences 
massaged by the knowledge we can assuage our colonial guilt through “thinking virtuously”.  
 
The expression of environmental virtue, as identified in Chapter Four as a form of 
exemplification, that retains white comfort often foregrounds goodness without thinking 
through the material and structural conditions that allowed it to emerge and reproduce the 
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violence it is superficially concerned with. Gloria Wekker (2016), identifies this as “white 
innocence” – the idea that one can hold up examples of ethical, green or antiracist behaviour 
whilst also participating in and benefiting from systems that predominantly privilege whiteness, 
and relationally, marginalise and violate blackness, indigeneity and migrancy. The metabolisms of 
land, matter and bodies that afford us this innocent position, that insulate us from the worst 
effects of the climate disaster, are thus denied in this white innocence. Reducing racism to the 
subjective experience of prejudice, as Robin DeAngelo (2018) suggests, rather than 
understanding it as a structural condition, allows white progressives to overlook those very 
structural conditions – we can declare our innocence because we do not hold reprehensible 
views, yet we fail to address systems of oppression and violence – we can feel better about 
ourselves for having the “correct” views. This form of myopia, wilful or otherwise, underwrites 
Eliasson’s work, and I would argue, is fundamental to the condition of contemporary art as such. 
Because contemporary art foregrounds voluntarist action based around the individual subject, 
and understands this action within the context of a politics of spontaneity, it forecloses the 
continual and ongoing process of unlearning and challenging oppression that is required.  
 
As Yusoff, Ghassan Hage (2017), François Vergès (in Johnson and Lubin 2017), T.J. Demos 
(2016 and 2017) and others assert, the racial dimension of climate change is one of domination, 
extraction and exploitation. It is not one of innocence, but of agents and systems fundamentally 
responsible for causing, through racialised violence and settler colonialism, environmental 
disasters globally and locally. Racial domination relies, as Yusoff argues, on prefiguring blackness 
as not just inferior to whiteness, but of a different category. In order to exploit bodies, just as 
land and natural resources are exploited, whiteness has to imagine blackness as inhuman, thus 
more proximate to “nature”. As Yusoff suggests, ‘humanness becomes differentiated by the 
inhuman objectification of indigenous and black subjects’ (Yusoff, 2018: 35). This elision 
between exploitable bodies and exploitable nature allows the primitive accumulation of 
petrocapitalism to occur. Underwriting the white innocence and comfort of colonial power 
relations is the double extraction of value from blackness and from land – with oil, of course, 
being front and centre of this extraction. Rather than exploitation being a by-product of racial 
prejudice, the category of blackness, then, is created in order to exploit – thus, Vergès description 
of the racial capitalocene as a long history of capital domination. This history is only possible, as 
Yusoff suggests, because the description of universal “Man” appears as ‘the ontological 
signification of Whiteness’ (Yusoff, 2018: 34), whereby, whiteness signifies a fullness of 
humanity that lacks in blackness. Within the context of Eliasson’s work, the universal subject 
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appears as localised and nationally bound, neutral, unmarked – thus in the position of whiteness. 
How we construct a non-localised subject then, is of utmost importance when considering the 
capacity for art to produce just political change that accounts for the racialised, gendered and 
class relations at play within contemporary capitalism.  
 
 
5.7 Petro-political anomie 
 
Domination of one group or community by another, either through oppression, violence, 
systemic, carceral or political means, requires the construction of a system in which the 
oppressed group lack access or the capacity to make systemic changes. As we have seen, gradual 
consciousness raising exercises have made some ground in the counter-hegemonic project, yet 
have so often had their demands incorporated into those dominant systems in ways that do not 
provide justice for the oppressed – but in fact, create further oppressions. The incapacity to have 
demands for systemic change heard, much less acted on, bests many activist or political projects. 
One way of understanding this incapacity is through the concept of myopia. However, 
sometimes lacking the means necessary to construct struggles for universality is not the failure of 
those movements or people themselves, but the way in which society is constructed in ways that 
make that task impossible. The climate emergency and the ways in which the oil industry has 
built global financial and political dominance are real, material conditions that truncate political 
ambitions raised against that power. There is no natural domination, every form of power is 
constructed in order to capitalise on that differential level of power, as such, politics is the 
proper name for the struggle for and against domination. Petropolitical domination is no 
different – climate collapse is a form of power differential.  
 
The political is not an arena in which dominant groups impose their interests and 
subaltern groups resist; it is, rather, the ground on which the relation between the 
dominant and dominated is worked out. In other words, there is no nonpolitical or 
apolitical domination. Thus, the fundamental adaptation that climate change demands of 
humanity is political in this sense. It is the only way in which the dominant can continue 
to dominate – and the only way in which that domination can be undone. 
(Mann and Wainwright, 2018: 80) 
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In order for the petropolitical domination of individuals, society and nature to be undone, the 
political system must be rethought in terms of the justice for these parties. How we apportion 
that justice, how we work out what is valuable to us as a species as opposed to us as individuals, 
or a community as opposed to corporate interests, is determined by how we view those 
relationships. Within the frame of, for example, Liberalism, those relationships are 
characteristically different to other paradigms, say socialism. Petropolitics grounds those 
relations in terms of a specific notion of valuation. When land, labour and people become 
valuable as resource, rather than as ends in and of themselves, the economic logics of 
extractivism is applicable to them. Liberalism views those resources as determined not by a 
communal value, but by an individual one – whereby a resource is only valuable insofar as it 
increases the capital wealth of an individual (whether that is economic or cultural capital). As 
Unger suggests; 
 
Ends are viewed by liberal theory as individual in the sense that they are always the 
objectives of particular individuals. By contrast, values are called communal when they 
are understood as the aims of groups […] the political doctrine of liberalism does not 
acknowledge communal values. To recognize their existence, it would be necessary to 
begin with a vision of the basic circumstances of social life that took groups rather than 
individuals as the intelligible and primary units of social life. The individuality of values is 
the very basis of personal identity in liberal thought, a basis the communal conception of 
value destroys (sic). 
(Unger, 1975: 76) 
 
Democracy acts then, as the fundamental mediator between the individual and the group. 
However, within neoliberalism, democracy has, as Streeck (2014) suggests, withered, and with it 
the institutions tasked with ensuring its operation. Coterminous with the emergence of this 
regime is the decline of institutions, either through defunding, neglect or the erosion of public 
trust. What Emilie Durkheim (1960) called anomie – the degradation of the relation between 
individuals and the social norms and values of the given society – results in, or is a product of, a 
type of limitlessness. A derangement, as he calls it, whereby social values are no longer being 
marshalled by society; instead social norms no longer apply. He characterises forms of anomie 
with the experience of infinity; individuals have become ever more free from the social bonds 
that used to guide them, this desire without limit leads to an ever greater intensification. It is 
certainly coherent to argue that petropolitics imagines no limit; a world with natural, or inherent, 
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limits is one in which future economic value cannot be withdrawn.53 As such, the petropolitical 
tries to impose the false experience of limitlessness on society – the freedom of the market – in 
order to maintain its market capitalisation.  
 
This social anomie results, as Durkheim suggests, from the breakdown of institutions that 
mediate between the social body and the state. In order for anomie to be staved off, individuals 
need to have adequate relation to the processes by which political decision is made. Durkheim: 
 
A society composed of an infinite number of unorganized individuals, that a 
hypertrophied State is forced to oppress and contain, constitutes a veritable sociological 
monstrosity. For collective activity is always too complex to be able to be expressed 
through the single and unique organ of the State. Moreover, the State is too remote from 
individuals its relations with them too external and intermittent to penetrate deeply into 
individual consciences and socialize them within. Where the State is the only 
environment in which men can live communal lives, they inevitably lose contact, become 
detached, and thus society disintegrates. A nation can be maintained only if between the 
State and the individual, there is intercalated whole series of secondary groups near 
enough to the individuals to attract them strongly in their sphere of action and drag 
them, in this way, into the general torrent of social life. 
(Durkheim, 1960: 28) 
 
If democracy is incapable of mediating successfully between individual and communal needs, or 
restricting the capacity individuals have to make changes in society, then anomie emerges. This is 
true even if the balance is in favour of assumed communal needs, whereby societal norms are 
oppressive, and the individual has little to no traction in changing them. Polanyi’s (2001) work 
on the economic history of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries points to a historical 
precedent for this type of social degradation. According to him, the collapse of nineteenth-
century civilisation was not due to any exogenous pressures, but to the failure of the societies to 
adopt measures to protect successfully against the changing market systems. Fast paced 
industrialisation and the “modernisation” of the economy based on the concept of homo 
economicus imposed, as discussed in Chapter Two above, market conditions on the organisation of 
society. In this context, the description of the human follows the concept of economic 
rationality, yet, as Polanyi has shown, economic rationality is not the natural condition of human 
 
53 See Chapter Three 
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subjects and must be invented by state intervention. In such societies, whereby capital growth is 
privileged over other markers of a healthy society, human capacities are kept in line with the 
economic desires of the country, in order to maintain this arrangement, individuals must be 
restricted from having a close relation to the institutions and mechanisms by which power can 
be altered – it is out of this restriction that anomie emerges.  
 
Insofar as current industrial activity is precipitating ecosystem collapse, and our capacities are 
being suppressed by entwined economic and political systems intent on continuing down that 
destructive path, our relationship to those systems is deeply malignant. The lack of traction 
between our desires and those systems, a degradation of democracy itself, will, as Polanyi’s 
historical account shows, result in social collapse. Coterminous with, what I would consider to 
be the signal failure of liberalism, global ecosystem collapse, these anomic conditions presage a 
global systemic crisis. Further to this analysis it is important to understand how financialisation, 
as explored in Chapter Two, has returned us to the paradigm of accumulation by dispossession. 
Exploring the case of Monsanto, Kari Polanyi Levitt (2013),54 suggests we have returned to a 
regime of violent serfdom, whereby farmers are in bondage to the global corporations who own 
the patents on the crops they grow. As she suggests, ‘[t]transnational companies have 
increasingly secured monopolistic control over markets on a global scale […] more powerful 
than governments’ (Polanyi Levitt, 2013: 185). Financialisation binds us to a specified future, its 
temporal horizon one of greater and greater accumulation by dispossession as the limits must be 
crossed, all the while binding its human subjects to violent contractual arrangements. 
Furthermore, corporate interests, so divorced from the interests of the community and 
individuals, come to supersede the latter to such an extent that corporations occupy the site of 
power in society.  
 
The failure of the current socio-political regime to avoid this crisis, I argue, is due to the 
deracination between the individual and the political. This crisis of legitimacy will not be solved 
only by the spontaneous rising up of groups of individuals nor by the top down imposition of 
limits. Instead, I suggest, following Negarestani, we need a properly dialectical understanding of 
the relation between the individual and the universal that understands the crossings of the void 




54 Karl Polanyi’s daughter. 
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5.8 The Failure of Liberalism 
 
While I think it is important to note Patrick Deneen’s conservatism, there is something 
important in his critique of liberalism. While social conservatism and forms of localism seem to 
be the end point of Deneen’s analysis (something this thesis will not abide), his work on the 
failure of liberalism (Deneen, 2018), is instructive. Not least because it links social maladies to 
liberalism’s first principles in much the same way Losurdo (2014) does – understanding the role 
of liberal society to be one of exclusion and ratcheting inequality – but because it brings the 
analysis up to date. Losurdo calls liberalism a form of “master-race democracy”, that subjugates 
servile labour and land to decimation and destruction (Losurdo, 2014: 229), while Deneen 
attenuates a reading of this analysis through the idea that neo-liberalism, far from being a break 
with the liberalism before it, was its logical conclusion, whereby liberalism became more itself 
(Deneen, 2018: 3). As we’ve seen in previous chapters, its logic is bound to the concept of self-
marketing – ‘it pretends to neutrality, claiming no preference and denying any intention of 
shaping souls under its rule. It ingratiates by invitation to the easy liberties, diversions, and 
attractions of freedom, pleasure, and wealth.’ (ibid.: 5). This pretence allows it to shape societies 
unnoticed. As Deneen notes (in the context of higher education), liberal governments, far from 
renouncing control over their subject’s lives as the advertising line would have it, have expanded 
their domination: 
 
The liberties that liberalism was brought into being to protect – individual rights of 
conscience, religion, association, speech, and self-governance – are extensively 
compromised by the expansion of the government activity into every area of life. Yet this 
expansion continues, largely as a response to pupils felt loss of power over trajectory of 
their lives in so many distinct spheres – economic and otherwise – leading to demands 
for further intervention by the one entity even nominally under their control. 
(Deneen, 2018: 7-8) 
 
As such, the intrusion of liberal governance into life has expanded. More power accrues 
upwards, into corporate hands, removing power from intermediary institutions that would 
otherwise act as our representatives. As Deneen suggest, ‘[s]uch a keenly felt distance and lack of 
control is not a condition to be solved by a better and more perfect liberalism – rather, this crisis 
of governance is the culmination of the liberal order’ (my italics) (ibid.: 8). In the face of countless 
environmental catastrophes, deaths, species extinction and ecosystems collapse, our feeling of 
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helplessness has intensified by a significant degree. Petropolitics is a liberalism, the privatisation 
of our lifeworld.  
 
Deneen’s subject of critique is the expansion of personal freedoms associated with liberalism; 
because his conservatism prevents him from understanding this historical tendency as a dialectic 
of personal and collective freedom, he cannot think this sufficiently. Instead, personal freedom 
just is the evacuation of communities, laws, norms and culture. While I certainly find this 
argument persuasive, and have in part relied upon it, I would be very keen to assert the necessity 
to think beyond what it seems Deneen is calling for; a return to a prelapsarian state where social 
and cultural norms had a significant impact on personal lives. There is no return to repressive 
normativity; communal freedom must be dialectically linked to the expansion of personal 
freedoms. However, it is important to follow the historical narrative of how the escape from 
norms has, in part, tended towards a declination of social and cultural values and the attendant 
institutions that would uphold them, at least in order to understand how we might reconstruct 
these institutions with an expanded (and non-liberal) notion of freedom in mind.  
 
Deneen argues that the liberalisation of society is shaped by a freedom from positive law, the 
sense that natural limits should not bind us, instead, we should (and it’s a normative claim) 
transcend any limit where it appears. Ironically, however, the expansion of personal liberties in 
the form of escape from social and cultural institutions such as family, religion, associations and 
so on, requires an increased ‘regulative behaviour through the imposition of positive law’ 
(Deneen, 2018: 38).  
 
Liberalism thus culminates into ontological points: deliberated individual and the 
controlling state [..] the state consists of autonomous individuals, and these individuals 
are “contained” by the state.  
(Deneen, 2018: 39) 
 
Deneen’s work should be taken with some caution, while his historical account is seemingly 
accurate, indeed it tallies with others given by, for example Erich Fromm (2001), I would argue 
that the positive content he accords these institutions disallows him from thinking a future that 
is not, in some way, a return to the past.  
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The story of the twentieth century, as told by Fromm, is one of escape from social bonds and 
norms.  
 
Once the primary bonds which gave security to the individual are severed, once the 
individual faces the world outside himself as a completely separate entity, two courses are 
open […the second] open to him is to fall back, to give up his freedom, and try to 
overcome his aloneness by eliminating the gap that has arisen between his individual self 
and the world. This second course never reunites him with the world in the way he was 
related to it before he emerged as an “individual”, the fact of his separatedness cannot be 
reversed; it is an escape from an unbearable situation which would make life impossible 
if it were prolonged.  The course of escape, therefore, is characterised by its compulsive 
character, like every escape from threatening panic; it is also characterised by the more or 
less complete surrender of individuality and integrity of the self. 
(Fromm, 2001: 121) 
 
 
As human societies escape and transcend their limits, either socially, culturally, ecologically or 
economically (with the use of the derivatives market), the relation between the individual and the 
world is widened.55 This deracination emerges in societies in which communal values are 
suspended in favour of the individual desires of those in power; insofar as the petropolitical is a 
regime dedicated to the apportioning of value to natural resources in order to further increase 
individual wealth, it is one that cannot acknowledge the existence of objective communal or 
social values. Value only exists as exchange value – a mediating function between individuals 
represented by the pricing mechanism – not as something objective outside of individual desire 
or intervention. What this means, as Unger (1975) shows us, is that objective value (abhorrent to 
the political theory of liberalism), is superseded by naming conventions. Insofar as an object 
 
55 It is important to note that this deracination or alienation from the “natural” world should not be seen as a 
loss or lack of essence. Insofar as humans have always coexisted with nature through some kind of lack, 
whereby we have never not been “fallen”, there does not exist some past to which we can escape nor some 
idealised relation to nature that we must retreat. In many cases, alienation from nature is desirable, it is the 
figure of the alien in fact, that allows us to think otherwise, a productive imaginary that foregrounds the 
deracination from nature as a positive step. Romantic anti-capitalist or small “c” conservative critical 
approaches to this very same question would see us attempt to close the gap between culture and nature, 
assuming them to be two distinct spheres in the first place. The type of democratic socialism that I am 
advocating for here, rather, understands the necessity to produce institutions through which justice will be 
upheld – it is only through the very actions of alienated human actors to utilise rationality to produce these 
institutions that we shall find the understanding that neither culture nor nature exist as separate entities but 
are always already entwined.  
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belongs to a category of similar objects, it does so according to the name given to it. Is this not 
exactly the condition described by De Duve above? Artworks no longer appear to have some 
relationship to formal or conceptual essences that bind them together as works of art, instead, as 
De Duve suggests, they appear within the regime of art precisely because they are called art.  
 
How then, we understand the relation between individuals and universals is central to political 
theory precisely because the condition of relating is one of valuation. It is through the idea of 
universal value that individuals relate to one another within groups. Within the context of 
liberalism, groups are only collections of individuals, they do not have an internal essence or value 
that binds them together. As Unger asserts, liberalism affirms that the group is a ‘sum of its 
parts’ (Unger, 1975: 81). Insofar as the group is ‘simply a collection of individuals’ (ibid.), the 
relation between the individual and the group is one of non-transcendence. Unger calls this the 
principle of individualism.56 For him, the principle assumes that society is artificial, value is 
individual and subjective, the group is merely the association of individuals and what is true of 
those individuals is true of the group. One can ascertain all that is needed to know about groups 
from the summation of what we know about individuals. Under these conditions the transition 
between the localised individual and the global or universal – between the individual and the 
group – is fundamentally truncated. How we navigate this transition is vital for political theory, 
but equally, as shown above, for art theory.  
 
As Jameson (1990) acknowledges, the spatial discontinuities of political modelling so they might 
be generalisable are limiting to political action – the problem appears as one of scale. Jameson 
names the strategic capacity to expand models at more general levels “cognitive mapping”, as he 
suggests ‘the incapacity to map socially is as crippling to political experience as the analogous 
incapacity to map spatially is for urban experience’ (Jameson, 1990: 350). In this concept, the 
inability to overcome discontinuities between the local and the global are analogous to the 
inability to navigate the space of a city. Without the requisite mapping institutions, way-markers 
and structural conventions, we are lost, much like Foucault’s prisoner of the passage57 – this is 
what I call myopia.  
 
 
56 Recall here Adorno’s similar formulation. 
57 Deleuze’s (2016) telling of the Foucauldian idea of freedom is interesting here. In Deleuze’s work Foucault 
imagines freedom as man aboard a rowing boat in a vast flat ocean, unable to make a rational decision of which 
way to navigate, the boat’s passenger is in fact a prisoner. 
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This myopia appears because of spatial discontinuities – scalar disparities – particulars struggle to 
gain traction at general levels. This incapacity to generalise particulars is sometimes understood 
as a problem of scale, however, as Anna Tsing (2012) argues, this is the wrong approach. 
Scalability approaches the world as discrete but identical components that can be adequately 
scaled up without change in type or nature of the components. As Tsing suggests, it is the central 
notion in supply chain capitalism – she gives the example of how production lines scale up. 
Tsing tells us ‘to scale well is to develop the quality called scalability, that is, the ability to 
expand—and expand, and expand—without rethinking basic elements’ (Tsing, 2012: 505). She 
describes scalability as a triumph of world making and the conquest of nature, yet it does so at 
the expense of the heterogeneity of the world. Instead she proposes we think of the world as 
non-scalable. Nonscalability theory acknowledges that as things expand, they take on new forms 
and meanings. Whereas economic growth only understands the world in terms of its capacity to 
be scaled up – operations of accumulation that can be mapped into other scenarios (models) – 
we have to think nonscalar modes that do not approach the world through the frame of 
economic growth. Transformative relationships emerge when you scale - these are the basis for 
the inclusion of diversity, without the acknowledgement of the transformative nature of 
increasing and expanding scalability will always exclude diversity as it seeks to increase the size of 
the same. Scalability is what allows labour and nature to be commodified as separate units of 
value. As she suggests, 
 
Projects that could expand through scalability were the poster children of modernization 
and development. Agribusiness expanded. Biological populations expanded. Scalable 
approaches to knowledge expanded. We learned to know the modern by its ability to 
scale up. Scalable expansion reduced a once surrounding ocean of diversity into a few 
remaining puddles. Project advocates thought that they had grasped the world. But they 
have been confronted with two problems: first, expandability has gotten out of control. 
Second, scalability has left ruins in its wake. Nonscalable effects that once could be swept 
under the rug have come to haunt us all. 
(Tsing, 2012: 523) 
 
Scalability presupposes direct relation between the small and the large. This ruinous mythos has 
allowed capital to exploit the local in the name of the global, a plantation logic that determines all 
nature (and indigenous peoples, seen as close to nature) as available for exploitation. Thus, when 
we think the cognitive mapping project required for transitioning local, particular claims to 
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universal positions, we must think in nonscalar terms. It is the capacity to understand the 
heterogenous nature of the world, that relationships are transformative, and that as one 
transitions political claims upwards, the process necessarily alters and distorts those claims. 
Tsing’s work on the nature of scale is vital for us to understand how political theory must 
approach the processes involved in this transition.  
 
This is also an aesthetic problem. For Jameson, the act of representing the global within the 
local, in the form of a cognitive map, draws on aesthetic concepts of representation. These 
representational operations are an integral part of any socialist political project, but operations 
that have been eroded by, as Jameson suggests, a declination of the role of class consciousness in 
contemporary societies. The ability for an individual to represent to themselves the relation she 
has to a class, and thus to society, is precisely the operation that has been foreclosed. For CS 
Peirce, this foreclosure emerges in the context of what he calls nominalism, it is through an 
analysis of nominalism that we might hope to understand the decline of the nontrivial relation 
between individual and the general. While Unger doesn’t explicitly name Peirce in his earlier 
work (1975), his later work, specifically The Self Awakened: Pragmatism Unbound (2007) draws 





If, as Unger suggests, value is ascribed only subjectively or individualistically, it is given to objects 
only by human intention and cognition. Insofar as objects then appear only for human cognition, 
only of value because they have been ascribed it by thought, and do not possess any value 
intrinsically, it is coherent to suggest that it is human intervention that completes the object. Within 
this context, the meaning of material objects is given through the perception by mind. As such, 
dead matter takes on value only by being used for human projects – such that nature becomes a 
resource. Liquid hydrocarbon, oil, thus emerges as valuable only insofar as it is useable and 
exchangeable. Thus, as Yusoff describes above, civilisation is able to exploit land, labour and 
bodies precisely because nature (without culture) is seen as free from human thought and thus 
not complete. It is this relation that underwrites all colonialism – extraction and exploitation just 
is, for liberalism, the fair use of “blank nature”. While there is significant scholarship within a 
number of traditions that critiques this post-Kantian position (eco-Feminism, indigenous 
thought, Speculative Realism and New Materialism being only a few examples), I want to focus 
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on Peirce, not least because I think his work has been somewhat overlooked when it comes to 
these discussions and it offers us a useful perspective, but also, because I think the description 
given to nominalism is axiomatic to the construction of liberal political theory.  
 
Peircian pragmatism poses itself against nominalist philosophy, calling the latter ‘the most 
inadequate, and perhaps the most superficial […] the silliest possible’ (Peirce cf. Forster, 2011: 
2). For Peirce, nominalism represents an anti-scientific, anti-realist object to progress, a 
worldview with disastrous consequences. Nominalism is the assertion that universals or abstract 
objects do not exist, and are merely the products of the mind. Only individuals exist, shorn from 
their relation to each other through the universal. Such that two objects that share the same 
colour, say green, cannot share the universal greenness because, for a nominalist the universal 
“green” does not exist except (in some variation of nominalism) as a predicate to nominate 
something green. Nominalists, as opposed to realists, would assert that because only individuals 
or particulars exist, there can be no such thing as laws or norms; general concepts exist, then, 
only in as much as they are products of the mind. For Peirce this is something that must be 
defeated. Not only because it is logically fallacious, but because it has seeped into the ‘average 
modern mind’ (ibid.: 3). It is in this way that Peirce can be seen as a critic of neoliberalism before 
the fact. He says this: 
 
The question of whether the genus homo has any existence except as individuals is the 
question of whether there is anything of anymore dignity, worth, and importance than 
individual happiness, individual aspirations, and individual life. Whether men really have 
anything in common, so that the community is to be considered as an end in itself, and if 
so, what the relative value of the two factors is, is the most fundamental practical 
question in regard to every public institution the constitution of which we have it in our 
power to influence. 
(Peirce cf. Forster, 2011: 3) 
 
Nominalists would argue, Peirce suggests, as humans we have nothing in common, just 
particular occasions of individual existence – the mind organises a chaotic rush of independent 
data into a coherent whole, but there are no laws or universal qualities that hold across those 
individuals. Individuals are not in a part-whole relation to the categories they exist within, but are 
foremost singular and divorced from those categories. As Paul Forster explains ‘[n]ominalists 
hold, then, that the choice of conceptual scheme is determined by knowers’ interests rather than 
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by objective features of the world’ (Forster 2011: 5). For a nominalist, desire is a subjective 
expression of individuality, but, and this is important, value is not determinant of desire, merely 
conferred on an object by desire. This means that value is set by the individual’s desire of it, not 
by any inherent quality of the object.  
 
The nominalist is committed to the idea that because reality is constituted by individuated, 
discrete fragments, something like infinity only exists insofar as it is a collection of multiple 
particulars. For our purposes, then, it is possible to understand how Peircian pragmatism infers a 
critique of liberal political thought. If a nominalist cannot understand how collections of 
individuals can share properties outside of themselves, how there can be something like 
generality, then it describes a situation in which the communal does not exist. The communal 
aspects of social bonds make no sense to nominalism insofar as they can only understand the 
communal as a sum of its parts. Liberalism, in this very real sense, is a nominalist philosophy.  
 
Contra to this form of individualism, Peirce is committed to a project that upholds the 
conceptual category of continuity. The continuum, he asserts, exists against the notion that 
knowledge claims can be exhausted by individuals, instead it is a special type of generality that is 
not contingent on particularity but on universal adherence to an Idea.  The continuum is not a 
collection of individuals, but transcends individuality through the synthetic weaving of local 
contexts into generality. In this way, it is not additive, but synthetic. One cannot reach continuity 
by the addition of more individuals, but by the assertion that there exists commonality between 
individuals, the continuum requires multiplication not addition. For Fernando Zalamea (2012), 
reading Peirce: 
 
‘Peirce’s continuum – generic and supermultitudineous, reflexive and inextensible, modal 
and plastic – is the global conceptual milieu where, in a natural way, we can construct 
hierarchies to bound possible evolutions and local concretion of arbitrary flow notions’ 
(Zalamea 2012: 23, italics in original) 
 
The continuum is that which binds individuals to each other, the reflexive generic quality of 
thirdness, or mediation. Peirce links this to the rational ability to reason about the world in an 
abstract way, rather than an acceptance of immediacy or actuality. The direct or trivial collection 
of particularities that obtains under nominalism, then, is not a description of continuity. The 
continuum is the name given to the site in which both abstract and concrete, particular and 
 203 
universal are woven together in plastic ways. Because, as Atkin (2016) suggests, Peirce has 
‘committed himself to the view that possibilities, generalities, laws, are real, not merely modes of 
expression’ (Atkin 2016: 55), he rejects the radical individualism inherent in the liberal model. As 
such, the logic of continuity exists as a description of the ways in which laws, norms and cultures 
emerge and are ratified, not as an eventual rupture, nor as a dogmatic adherence to immutable 
laws, but as a reflexive, synthetic relation between the individual and the universal. As such, it 
challenges assumptions about political transformation that hold that those transformations come 
from heroic individuals and, instead, foregrounds the reflexive space of thirdness that appears as 
a mediating function between individual and universal. Community, or the social, as such, then 
not only exists as a thing in and of itself but emerges through the synthetic multiplication of 
relations, not as a collection of discontinuous individuals. This is an important intervention. 
Insofar as Peirce allows us to articulate a mode by which individuals can have traction at a 
universal level, the logic of continuity emerges as a guiding principle of any articulation of 































By cartographic gesture I mean accounting for the regimes of power and subjectivation 
one is embedded in, and pursuing an alternative vision of one’s own embodied, critical 
situatedness – a situatedness that is never one’s own. This involves a cartographic 
apparatus of cutting loose from the universalist humanist paradigm that has anchored 
colonial Euromodernity, and of generating a living map toward intersectional, decentred, 
transversal, anticolonial, non-linear, and non-unitary imaginaries and practices of figuring 
otherwise, despite and beyond the dehumanizing geopolitical hierarchies of our present.  





6.1 Conceptions of the Human-Society Nexus 
 
Art speaks of and to a human subject, it produces and addresses that subject, determining it in its 
address, producing its own demos in each instantiation of address. Through this address it also 
produces a world. What type of world it produces is determined by the logics that it articulates 
and adheres to. Within the context of contemporary art, as I understand it, that world is linked 
to the figure of the human according to an individuated project, coherent with a differentiation 
between, and mastery of, culture over nature – thus, one that is coterminous historically and 
ideologically with the petropolitical project of exploitation, extraction and expulsion. The 
axiologics of contemporary art produce an individual, isolated, monad, separated from the world 
through the logic of liberal humanism. As liberalism is the philosophical defender of capitalism, 
it is also only feasible as a world view within the context of capitalism – in the context of late 
stage, neoliberalism (the paradigmatic twin of the second age of oil) that world view is inculcated 
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by the idea of homo economicus. As shown in chapter two, that image of the human should be 
attenuated through the logic of petropolitics – the logic of extractivism and exceptionalism that 
underwrites the latter part of the twentieth century and the early stages of the twenty first.  
 
Within the context of post-petropoliticality (a politics committed to a post-petroleum world), a 
new description of both society and the human figure within that society will emerge. However, 
it is not quite correct here to say “within”; the description of the human is recursively related to 
the description of society that I will sketch. It is only through a dialectical, synechistic relation 
that it is possible to understand how societies and individuals relate to each other. The 
emergence of these recursive descriptions relies on a foregrounding of certain modalities, values 
and practices. In this chapter I will hold the work of Sylvia Wynter in constellation with that of 
Reza Negarestani; these two thinkers provide us with necessary tools to understand the labour 
and the orientation required to move beyond paradigms committed to exploitation and 
extraction. Wynter’s deconstructive work, as I shall explore, is complemented by Negarestani’s 
project of construction. Wynter’s discussion of the image of the human, and the concept of 
worth is central to this chapter. As the chapter progresses, there is a focus on how colonial logics 
come to shape the current world and how, if political transformation is possible, it needs to be a 
task of reengineering these logics. I draw on the work of George E Lewis, who’s critique of 
European avant garde music is a useful tool to understand the ways in which freedom should be 
reimagined in the axiological task of reengineering. This leads on to a discussion of complex 
systems theory where the work of Elena Esposito, Brian Massumi and Niklas Luhmann is held 
together with an analysis of William Stanley Jevons’ work on fossil fuel use and economics in 
order to understand how a systemic analysis can draw on the idea of the metabolic to provide a 
more adequate description of the world from which to work. This chapter closes out with a 
discussion of the concept of normativity and how this could be a useful lever (to use Massumi’s 
term) in a pragmatic project of reengineering.  
 
As described above, in Chapters One and Two, the Second Age of Oil has been determined by a 
certain conception of what it means to be human. Economisation underwritten by the oil 
industry, combined with a theory of human capital and a notion of value only as resource 
determines in large part this image of the human. If we are serious about understanding the 
recursive role culture has to play in the interpellation of us as humans, then this descriptive 
statement of humanity is important. Petroculture, then, is the mode by which human expression 
emerges within the context of the Second Age of Oil; Contemporary Art is the paradigmatic 
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example of petroculture. As we have seen, the narrative of the Second Age of Oil combines 
these extractive economic descriptions with a liberal idea of individual freedom, the self-
legitimating display of virtue and a myopic conception of the relation between the individual and 
universal.  
 
Sylvia Wynter’s work draws specific attention to the ways in which hegemonic epistemologies 
present a certain genre of the human that concretises ideas of humanness in line with Western 
origin stories. The narrativisation of what it means to be human, Wynter asserts, revolves around 
a biological mechanism tied to an economic script. In the name of economic freedom, this origin 
story normalises accumulation as a mode of economic freedom. As shown above, in Chapters 
Two and Three, this valorisation of freedom as the accumulation of capital forms a fundamental 
axiom of our cultural-social-political-economic nexus. As Wynter suggests, freedom vis-à-vis 
accumulation, comes to determine the generic description of human per se, attenuating any and 
every descriptive statement through an ideologically capitalist framework. This mythic script 
writes into the very notion of humanness the idea of capital accumulation, rewarding those 
subjects that “play by the script” and punishing those that do not. As she suggests: 
 
[T]he genre-specific preprescribed “truth” of economics must itself analogically elaborate 
an ethno-class descriptive statement mode of material provisioning that can, law-likely, be only 
that of homo oeconomicus’s single absolute model of free-market capitalism. This model’s 
imperative supraordinate telos of increasing capital accumulation thereby predefines it as 
the only means of production indispensable to the enacting of the economic system of 
free-trade-market capitalism’s unceasing processes of techno-industrial economic growth. 
(Wynter in McKittrick ed. 2015: 22) 
 
The ethno-class distinctions that free-market capitalism makes, what/who is, in Wynter’s terms, 
selected and “dysselected”, those who are able to participate in and enjoy the processes, systems 
and rewards of capitalist accumulation and those who are not, those included and those 
dispossessed (Butler and Athanasiou, 2013) or expelled (Sassen 2014), marks humanness along 
colour and class lines. Thus, black and brown, or lower-class subjects are not merely not 
represented in political life, but radically, and violently, disincluded in what it means to be human. 
It is, as analysed by Vergés (Vergés in Johnson and Lubin ed. 2017), race that was the single 
most important factor determining where toxic waste facilities were sited in the United States – 
these intentional strategies on the behalf of authorities have, as Vergés explains, lead many to 
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assert the colour line at the heart of the Anthropocene.  In this context then, “whiteness” as 
such comes to represent inclusion along capitalist lines – with punitive repercussions for those 
excluded. This universal “referent-we” of whiteness maps directly on to humanness, whereby 
blackness is seen as outside of the idea of the human. The descriptive statement of humanness, 
the ‘West’s liberal monohumanist’ (Wynter in ed. McKittrick 2015: 23) bourgeois model, thus 
articulates not only what is normal, but what is normative; prescribing into all relations modes of 
acceptableness, reasonableness and rationality. Thus, on the one hand, behaviour outside of the 
frame of homo econonomicus is seen as irrational and on the other, actions by racialised subjects are 
apriori also seen as irrational. However, as Polanyi has asserted (see Chapter Two), human action 
is anything but economically rational, so any system that selects only for what it sees as 
“rational” behaviour will “dysselect” significant proportions of human activity and subjects. 
Homogenisation of human behaviour thus appears as a mode of calculation; what is calculable 
becomes of value insofar as it exists for economic exploitation, only what is calculable is thus of 
value, and the normative statement enacted by this mode of calculation homogenises 
humanness. This descriptive statement of humanness, as analysed by Wynter, thus becomes 
normative, delimiting acceptable modes of being in accordance to calculation, conceptualising 
human singularity as only for exploitation, giving credence to the Freidmanite claim that economics 
is a science divorced from ethics and interpellating humans as actors in economic dramaturgies. 
Humanity appears in accordance with a script ‘whose macro-origin story calcifies the hero figure of 
homo oeconomicus who practices, indeed normalizes, accumulation in the name of economic 
freedom’ (McKittrick in McKittrick 2015: 10).  
 
6.2 Worth Beyond Calculus  
 
This world narrative identified by Wynter, gives legitimacy to the idea that humans (and of 
course nature) are viable only insofar as their worth is calculable – humanity is thus subsumed to 
economically rational axiomatics. But furthermore, the racial lines along which this calculability is 
drawn are highly pronounced. While whiteness (and middle classness) affords a certain ability to 
achieve singularity (being recognised fully as an individual), blackness is identified as a general 
category (whereby black people are marked by their generic signifier “black”) valuable only for 
exploitation – thus, only for whiteness. Blackness emerges here as a category that exists in the 
wake of servitude to whiteness.58 Here, we can draw parallels to Yusoff’s work on blackness and 
 
58 Christina Sharpe’s In the Wake: On Blackness and Being (2016) illustrates how black lives today are swept up 
in the aftermath of slavery. Sharpe shows how to be ‘in the wake is to occupy and to be occupied by the 
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inhumanness; the figure of blackness and the crude resource of oil is surprisingly similarly 
conceived. Oil is not seen as of intrinsic value as part of the ecosystemic conditions for planetary 
continuation (insofar as it’s extraction and combustion appears as an auto-destructive activity), 
but only valuable as a resource for human exploitation. Blackness like oil is considered not an end in 
itself, but a means to an end – the capitalist exploitation of enslaved populations being only one 
pertinent example. Concomitant with that form of slavery, is the capitalist exploitation of the 
earth – something that will bind us all to its climate catastrophic eventuality. The ‘fossil fuel-
driven, thereby climate-destabilizing free-market capitalist economic system’ (Wynter, in ed. 
McKittrick 2015: 22) determines our life-threatening relation to natural scarcity, a bond that, as 
Wynter suggests, is seen as only escapable through ‘unceasing mastery of natural scarcity by 
means of ever-increasing economic growth!’ (ibid.: 26). Unable to think outside the axiom of 
freedom as accumulation, capitalist determined humanity will attempt to escape the ever more 
destructive climate catastrophes through more and more accumulation, but, perversely, will be 
returned to the bonds of a climate-disrupted world ecosystem as it approaches inhospitality. The 
freedom expressed by petrocapitalist activity exists within a liberal framework incapable of 
articulating or comprehending the externalities of fossil fuel dependence, a dependence that will, 
due to the exhaustion of natural resources, eventually kill its master. 
 
The concept of the human instituted by this logic was, as Wynter asserts, not naturally occurring, 
but emerged from and through origin stories; stories we have to keep retelling ourselves in order 
to reproduce and recalcify the system by our commitment to it. Thus, as Wynter’s work allows 
us to think, these capitalist socio-cultural axioms require continual reinvestment in order to 
maintain their hegemony, and this reinvestment is precisely part of the system of accumulation. 
Insofar as the system itself requires and necessitates continual ideological reinvestment, Wynter 
understands it, following Humberto Maturana, as an autopoietic system that self-generates. 
Recursively defined, then, the human, as part of the autopoietic socio-economic system, emerges 
through and within the systemic narratives that obtain in that paradigm. Following Fanon, 
Wynter’s understanding of the human includes this narrativization – whereby the descriptive 
statement of the human includes Fanon’s concept of “sociogency”. As Wynter suggests, ‘the 
human is, meta-Darwinianly, a hybrid being, both bios and logos (or, as I have recently come to 
 
continuous and changing present of slavery’s as yet unresolved unfolding […] rather than seeking a resolution to 
blackness’s ongoing and irresolvable abjection, one might approach Black being in the wake as a form of 
consciousness’ (Sharpe 2016: 13-14). Sharpe’s argument is to understand blackness as a form of consciousness 
that must acknowledge the history of slavery, rather than erase it. I find this approach useful precisely because 
the erasure of these histories, perhaps something that might occur in a Western perspective (see my discussion 
of George E Lewis’ work on jazz music later in this chapter), only serves the interests of whiteness. 
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redefine it, bios and mythoi). Or, as Fanon says, phylogeny, ontogeny, and sociogeny, together, define 
what it is to be human’ (Wynter in ed. McKittrick 2015: 16). To understand, then, the concept of 
race in these terms is to understand that, as Walter Mignolo suggests, ‘race is not in the body but 
rather built in the social imaginary grounded on colonial differences [and] becoming black is 
bound up with being perceived as black for a white person’ (Mignolo in ed. McKittrick 2015: 
116). 
 
In order, then, to continually reproduce the system and the human according to that system, we 
require a narrative function, or the continual retelling of the conceptual or ideological 
frameworks that sustain those systems – in Wynter’s terms, mythoi. So as to reinforce the 
distinctions and hierarchies in place, the re-narrativisation of that mythoi must reinforce the 
selection/dysselection of human bodies based on their biologically defined traits. Insofar as 
blackness, then, appears as a relation, one that relies on the systematic re-articulation of 
selection/dysselection based on bios, it emerges as a result not in fact, of a purely biocentric 
description, but hybridly in accordance to mythoi as well as bios. As Wynter suggests, ‘[i]f humans 
are conceptualized as hybrid beings, you can no longer classify human individuals, as well as 
human groups, as naturally selected (i.e., eugenic) and naturally dysselected (i.e., dysgenic) beings’ 
(Wynter in ed. McKittrick 2015: 17). Thus, the universal description of the human, in accordance 
to whiteness, sustains an imperial relation that presupposes dominance and exploitation – the 
slave relation. In order to produce a true to the human principle, we must understand the 
historical contingency of this relation. These characteristics are not, as shown by Wynter, 
naturally occurring, but features of an origin story that legitimises and produces the conditions 
for capital accumulation, and thus for the exploitative behaviour necessary for the extractivism 
inherent in the Age of Oil. Wynter: 
 
The logic of environmental disasters is one itself, which, correlatedly and empirically, also 
enacts the descriptive statement of homo oeconomicus-on-the-model-of-a-natural-organism, its 
codes of a non-biologically determined principle of causality. Hence, the fact that the 
ever-increasing ratios of fossil fuel-driven capital accumulation, are themselves also law-
likely equated with ever increasing ratios of global warming, climate change, and 
environmental instability. 
(Wynter in ed. McKittrick 2015: 65) 
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The circularly reinforcing human-capital system, according to the logic of accumulation as 
freedom, thus determines and is determined by a logic of ever increasing ratios (eternal growth) 
that demands exponential valorisation as a form of human liberty (the axiomatics of liberalism), 
on the one hand, underwritten by extractive labour and, on the other, legitimised by the image of 
virtue according to human liberty. All the while, this liberty is won on the back of a relation that 
presupposes but occludes dominance and exploitation. These are the axioms at the heart of 
capitalist accumulation, and, when Wynter asks what it means to be human, she is challenging 
the assumed naturalness of these contingent historical processes. In order to address this 
question, then, new axioms must be produced, and adhered to accordingly, that can delink us 
from the mythoi of capitalist accumulation that determines the selection/dysselection axis.  
 
Because culture is the registering of the calcification of values and norms within the context of 
societies, Wynter’s thought, that foregrounds the sociogenic narrative functions at the heart of 
the descriptive statement, allows us to understand how cultural expression reiterates and ratifies 
the selected/dysselected distinctions that capitalism valorises. As Wynter suggests: 
 
Cultural conceptions, encoded in language and other signifying systems, shape the 
development of political structures and are also shaped by them. The cultural aspects of 
power are as original as the structural aspects; each serves as a code for the other’s 
development. It is from these elementary cultural conceptions that complex legitimating discourses are 
constructed. (italics in original) 
(Wynter cf. Mignolo in McKittrick 2015: 113) 
 
 
Culture becomes the site within which economic and political power continues to exert its 
dominance, but it also, importantly, exists as the site from which challenges to that power could 
be forged. Generational battles over cultural norms, then, emerge as radical contingencies that 
devalorise and revalorise existing and new norms. This ongoing renewal of norms, however, 
should be understood within the context of neoliberal capitalism as the axiomatic expansion of 
the space of capital accumulation. We must, for example, be alert to Fraser’s analysis (see 
Chapter Three) that identifies how the culturalisation of liberatory politics in the latter part of 
the twentieth century denuded the redistributive potential of those politics in favour of a focus 
on a politics of recognition. In which sense, new stories are fundamentally not enough to create 
social and political transformation. Only a materially concerned, counter-hegemonic project to, 
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at one and the same time expand cultural and social norms, while protecting that expansion from 
co-option by capital valorisation as celebratory intellectual ballast, can have a hope to re-engineer 
society in the image of an epistemologically and narratively just descriptive/normative statement, 
a project therefore, that relies on the institutionally guaranteed vertical counter hegemonic 
project. While in the next section of this chapter I will complicate that reading through the 
notion of metabolism, it is worth noting here that what is emerging is a project of 
revalorising/revaluation and not a project of the creative expression of novelty. Without a radical 
reappraisal of collective value, determined democratically, restrictive or oppressive norms return 
through the back door – in the liberal retreat from normativity and the neoliberal assertion of 
negative freedom the collective agreement on value is avoided, but as Massumi suggests: 
  
In the absence of a strong alternative conception of value, it is all too easy for normative 
gestures to slip back in. Priorities are still weighed, orientations favored, direction 
followed. Without a concept of value, by what standards are these choices made? Usually 
none that are enunciated. Standards of judgement are simply allowed to operate 
implicitly. Normativity is not avoided. It becomes a sneak. This can prove to be just as 
oppressive. 
(Massumi 2018: 3) 
 
What is required then is not an avoidance of value and valuation – insofar as neoliberalism 
reduces all value to economic value it cancels deliberation around value – but a discursive 
engagement with collective construction that refuses to calcify around a one off consensus, but 
leaves open the radical possibility space of further political contingencies. Massumi’s assertion is 
to recognise value for what it is, ‘irreducibly qualitative’ (ibid.: 4). In this sense he wants to rescue 
value from quantification/calculation – value then, should be not a matter of arithmetical 
addition, but of multiplication. Recall here the description of the continuum explored in Chapter 
Five above; the continuum, according to Peirce, is not the addition of individual parts, but 
something qualitatively different from its parts. Value then, it must be asserted, emerges from 
the continuum, agreed upon collectively it underwrites all norms and laws and is not just an 
assertion of numerical democratic summation, but a properly synthetic multiplication. To 
reassert the Mouffian insistence on agonism explored in Chapter One, there is no final 
agreement that should bracket out the political from ongoing intervention in the construction of 
the future, instead, this descriptive statement must be thought of as being open to constant 
renewal and reconstruction. This goes too for her collaborator, Laclau; as suggested, for him the 
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universal is not fixed, but a matter of continual hegemomic struggle, it is forever in a process of 
articulation. 
 
How our normative statements reproduce, ratify and delimit value is thus key; the future 
oriented derivative market, for example, valorises ongoing and temporally displaced 
capitalisation in order to achieve best ROI. If oil futures cannot be realised, the whole notion of 
value is disrupted and must be reimagined. Any post-petrocapitalist world must reintegrate 
notions of value that capitalism has disregarded/occluded/devalued – thus, a world such as this 
obtains precisely, and only, when value-for-capital axiomatics are replaced by value-in-and-of-
itself axiomatics. This is why I reject carbon tax initiatives that use price mechanisms to offset 
carbon emissions, thus reincorporating value-for-capital into the system intended to offset the 
damage done by that very logic.59 
 
If the preprescribed descriptive statement of Wynter’s work – that ossifies us as supposed 
rational economic actors and predetermines hierarchies that exploit labour, land and bodies – 
needs updating, we can look to Negarestani’s (Negarestani in Mackay 2014) work in order to 
discover modalities of thought capable of producing new descriptions of what it means to be 
human. Committed to an updated project of enlightenment rationality, Negarestani’s 
“inhumanism” is a conceptual gambit that understands the description of the human as written 
in sand. In order to rethink the limits of the human, inhumanism understands the task as one of 
continual revision. This revision should be thought of in the context of continua and 
contingency, whereby certain invariances of the human must remain while others should be seen 
as protean. Contra any description of all human limits as permanent (or epistemologies as 
necessary and ahistorical), then, Negarestani’s work reimagines these limits as open to revision 
by us. As such, it is of use in a counterhegemonic operation aimed at re-describing the human 
and society – holding Wynter’s and Negarestani’s work together in this context might prove 
fruitful. Wynter’s “undoing” of the preprescribed descriptive statement becomes complimented 
by Negarestani’s revision. 
 
As a challenge to the liberal humanist tradition Negarestani’s work seeks to posit real freedom in 
the radical capacity to reimagine what human means; 
 
59 Equally, elections and national referenda have an inadequate understanding of democracy insofar as they see 
democratic engagement only as a matter of one time arithmetical calculation not as a discursive practice that 
upholds disagreement. Calculation always risks a dangerous marginalisation of sectors of society, and when 
referenda are making decisions for the ignored sector the legitimacy is always weak.  
 213 
 
[T]he net surfeit of false alternatives supplied under the rubric of liberal freedom causes a 
terminal deficit of real alternatives, establishing for thought and action the axiom that 
there is indeed no alternative. The contention of this essay is that universality and 
collectivism cannot be thought, let alone attained, through consensus or dissensus 
between cultural tropes, but only by intercepting and rooting out what gives rise to the 
economy of false choices and by activating and fully elaborating what real human 
significance consists of. For it is, as will be argued, the truth of human significance—not 
in the sense of an original meaning or a birthright, but in the sense of a labor that 
consists of the extended elaboration of what it means to be human through a series of 
upgradable special performances—that is rigorously inhuman.  
(Negarestani in Mackay 2014: 428) 
 
This labour, or commitment to rational elaborations of what is possible, is, for Negarestani a 
navigational struggle of reengineering the notion of human through ‘the space of reasons’ (ibid.: 
438). To be human is to struggle, human freedom emerges not as a bolt from the blue, but as a 
process of labouring. As Negarestani asserts: 
 
This is why it is the figure of the engineer, as the agent of revision and construction, who 
is public enemy number one of the foundation as that which limits the scope of change 
and impedes the prospects of a cumulative escape. It is not the advocate of transgression 
or the militant communitarian who is bent on subtracting himself from the system or 
flattening the system to a state of horizontality. More importantly, this is also why 
freedom is not an overnight delivery, whether in the name of spontaneity or the will of 
people, or in the name of exporting democracy. Liberation is a project, not an idea or a 
commodity. Its effect is not the irruption of novelty, but rather the continuity of a 
designated form of labor.  
(Negarestani in Mackay 2014: 464) 
 
This perspective is coherent with Gabriel Catren’s analysis. In a critical appraisal of the 
typologies that support a relation between, what he names, ‘terrestrial finitude and the heavenly 
infinite’ (Catren in Bryant, Harman and Srnicek 2011: 342), Catren asserts the existence of three 
different approaches to this transcendental relation – through grace, prayer or ecstasy. If the 
relation between finitude and the infinite, or between the individual and universal, is one 
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constituting the process of effectuating transformation (of one’s self, the concept of the human 
or the system), Catren’s argument helps us resist haphazard ecstasy – the miraculous irruption of 
the transcendental noumenal in the phenonomenal world. The miracle relies not on the arduous 
labour of either negative or constitutive politics, but the capacity to leap across the void 
separating the two poles of individual and universal (the sites of political endeavour). As Catren 
writes: 
 
The infinite process of theoretical knowledge does not advance by attempting to grasp 
an ‘uncorrelated absolute’ through a philosophical ‘ruse’ capable of discontinuously 
leaping over the subject’s shadow, but instead through a continual deepening of scientific 
labour seeking to locally absolve it from its conjunctural transcendental limitations, 
expand its categorical, critical, and methodological tools, and progressively subsume its 
unreflected conditions and presuppositions. Far from any ‘humanist’ or ‘idealist’ 
reduction of scientific rationality, this reflection upon the transcendental localization of 
the subject of science should allow the latter to radicalize the inhuman scope of 
knowledge by producing a differential surplus value of un-conditionality and universality. 
In other words, such a reflexive torsion should permit the subject of science to 
continuously go through the transcendental glass and force its progressive escape from 
the transcendental anthropocentrism of pre-critical science: it is necessary to think the 
particular—empirical and transcendental—localization of the subject of science within 
the real in order for theoretical reason not to be too human. 
(Catren in Bryant, Harman and Srnicek 2011: 342) 
 
 
Catren’s assertion does significant work in articulating the claims here. The desire to escape or 
change political conditions, to produce new axioms, or revalorise previous norms and laws must 
be understood not as a leap across the void (between the individual and universal, an ahistorical 
rendering of the past as forgettable and the future as all there is), but as a labouring process 
whereby human agents increase their capacities through a dialectical synthesis, precisely resting 
on achievements of the past and righting the injustices from history. This can most easily be seen 
in the way institutions such as the judiciary multiply individual’s power through the use of 
precedent and tradition. Here, it is an institutional lever that increases capacity. Art too, is bound 
by these requirements, we cannot expect artworks to miraculously produce the political 
outcomes we want them to. Recall Rockhill’s critique of the assumption so often made in art 
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theoretical writing of the talisman like powers of artistic artefacts to create direct political 
consequences (Rockhill 2014: 6).  
 
Labour, then, is central to any project to increase our powers, to change our conditions or 
produce counter-hegemonies. Thinking beyond the constraints of the human, and 
conterminously the constraints of the system, requires not a leap, or magical thinking, but the 
ongoing project of revolutionary revision – a goal-oriented process of revising boundaries rather 
than a discontinuous leap into the void. Working contiguously together in order to construct a 
descriptive statement that delivers justice, the labour required is a “step-wise” project that utilises 
functional hierarchies in order to transition between local and global sites. For Negarestani, it is 
the space of reason that ‘harbors the functional kernel of a genuine collectivity, a collaborative 
project of practical freedom referred to as “we” whose boundaries are not only negotiable but 
also constructible and synthetic’ (Negarestani in Mackay 2014: 434). The space of reason is 
constituted by discursive practices. Discursive practices, the act of giving and asking for reasons, 
understand reason not as the apriori access to norms, suggests Negarestani, but as a landscape of 
navigation that can operationally update descriptive and normative statements in line with a 
project of increasing freedom. To do this, it is necessary to understand the system and how to 
navigate through it. Note here I did not say “around” or “outside” it; any political project must 
understand that one cannot escape the systemic conditions by fiat. Heuristic approaches to 
navigation rely on an expanded epistemology of a system determined by nested hierarchies, not 
clearly delineated insides or outsides – there will be no radical break from the descriptive 
statements, but a reworking process that adapts to, and adjusts, the conditions of complex 
systems. The engineering required for such a task must work through multiple nested 
hierarchies, transitioning between functional and systemic levels in order to rewrite the 
constitutive and institutional conditions for just futures.  
 
 
6.3 Alienation and Exnomination  
 
Any project that foregrounds reason, or any specific mode of being/thinking, will, however, run 
the risk of privileging certain types of humans. Who has access to the capacity to reason, to work 
on the project of reconstructing the image of the human, is never explicitly named by 
Negarestani (although he does make the case for his project of inhumanism as an unlearning of 
racism), but there is a risk, just as there is a risk in all projects like this, that reasonableness is 
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narrowly defined around capacities but occludes the privileges inherent in the possession of 
those capacities – the occlusion would, of course, be a case of exnomination (the phenomenon 
of hiding one’s own name in order to naturalise one’s ideology – this process occurs most in 
discourse that presupposes a “natural” state from which other behaviours are seen as deviant). In 
order to engage multiplicities in the discursive practice that would adequately meet Wynter’s 
challenge to undo the racialised conception of human and not re-concretise conceptions around 
other narrow criteria, we can look to the work of the Xenofeminist collective Laboria Cuboniks. 
Central to their work is the concept of alienation; this appears here as a positive force for 
reconstructing the concept of the human away from narrowly defined natural boundaries and 
biological norms. 
 
It is through, and not despite, our alienated condition that we can free ourselves from the 
muck of immediacy. Freedom is not a given—and it’s certainly not given by anything 
‘natural’. The construction of freedom involves not less but more alienation; alienation is 
the labour of freedom’s construction. Nothing should be accepted as fixed, permanent, 
or ‘given’—neither material conditions nor social forms. XF mutates, navigates and 
probes every horizon. Anyone who’s been deemed ‘unnatural’ in the face of reigning 
biological norms, anyone who’s experienced injustices wrought in the name of natural 
order, will realize that the glorification of ‘nature’ has nothing to offer us—the queer and 
trans among us, the differently-abled, as well as those who have suffered discrimination 
due to pregnancy or duties connected to child-rearing. XF is vehemently anti-naturalist. 
Essentialist naturalism reeks of theology—the sooner it is exorcised, the better. 
(Laboria Cuboniks: 1) 
 
For them, the work needed must be considered as an open and experimental practice that 
eradicates the “natural” restrictions on human freedom. But instead of foregrounding 
embodiment type theorisation that some critical post-Enlightenment thinkers have, 
Xenofeminism instead posits rationalism as the vector through which this work can proceed. As 
we see in the quote below, the focus on rationalism is one that opens up the space of reason 
rather than closes it down. For example, reason itself is not seen as naturally dominated by 
masculinity but contingently so: 
 
Xenofeminism is a rationalism. To claim that reason or rationality is “by nature” a 
patriarchal enterprise is to concede defeat. It is true that the canonical “history of 
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thought” is dominated by men, and it is male hands we see throttling existing institutions 
of science and technology. But this is precisely why feminism must be a rationalism—
because of this miserable imbalance, and not despite it. There is no “feminine” 
rationality, nor is there a “masculine” one. Science is not an expression but a suspension 
of gender. If today it is dominated by masculine egos, then it is at odds with itself— and 
this contradiction can be leveraged. Reason, like information, wants to be free, and 
patriarchy cannot give it freedom. Rationalism must itself be a feminism. XF marks the 
point where these claims intersect in a two-way dependency. It names reason as an 
engine of feminist emancipation, and declares the right of everyone to speak as no one in 
particular. 
(Laboria Cuboniks: 2) 
 
 
This sense of the historical contingency of reason’s association with masculinity is fundamental 
to the XF project. In order to not be guilty of exnomination, we must alienate our positions 
from a natural assumption about rights, norms and laws. The question of who gets to create 
those rights, norms and laws – semi-invariant components of a society – reaches deep into a 
conceptualisation of a project of decolonialisation – and out of this, a radical project of 
democracy. A radically democratic practice then, should not be seen in arithmetical terms – 
merely a matter of accounting – but in terms of a just reworking of the conceptions of the 
demos itself in light of historical injustices.60 We must not then, be tempted, to redefine access to 
political justice based on biological facts, nor on social norms, but on the very concept of 
alienation of those norms – with the notion in mind that norms are, necessarily, revisable 
features of society – to be alienated. 
 
A commitment to humanity, Negarestani tells us in coherence with a Xenofeminist perspective, 
is one that asks what else human can be, it is committed to this question rather than the 
acceptance of the given. Wynter’s work, then, emerges in this context; a commitment to the 
expansion, or heuristic reworking, of the description of the human. To unsettle or undo the 
conception of humanness inherent in the preprescribed conditions, in accordance with Wynter’s 
work, requires a continual struggle that understands how the systemic conditions in place are 
 
60 This cashes out in the idea that merely including more minorities in the system is not enough, what is needed 
is a radical reformulation of that system around lines that support justice. The former method, just including 
more minorities, is clearly within the liberal playbook.  
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more or less conducive to certain actions. In the context of The Second Age of Oil, for example, 
to cut global oil trade without adequate developmental or resilience measures in place would, as 
described above in Chapter Two, have such enormous global systemic consequences to be 
undesirable. The description of the human is so intrinsically entwined with the systemic 
conditions of our current paradigm that the two must be thought together. Thus, transformations 
made at one level recursively impact at others, but, as Negarestani tells us, not by fiat, but 
through a complex leveraging of functional, institutional and structural hierarchies. Equally, as I 
will discuss in the next section, changes made at one level are not reliably causal at other levels – 
due to the complexity of our systemic conditions, attempts to “make right” injustices can lead to 
further entrenching of those injustices, or consequences unseen by the agents themselves due to 
their own limited horizons (myopia). Thus, projects to reimagine the human without the 
necessary epistemological descriptions will fail to have traction on those descriptions. 
Individualised actions that seek to produce political transformation, when silo’d off from the 
contexts from which they emerge, lack the capacity to transform those contexts. There is no 
“human out there”, no individual that exists outside of context; systemic conditions thus, must 
be functionally taken into account in any political project. As such, in order to transition from 
the extractive, neoliberal, colonial-capitalist system that is our context, we cannot, on the one 
hand, attempt to live as though that system does not exist, nor on the other, can we attempt to 
produce transformation through individual actions that we assume accrue arithmetically in 
desired outcomes.   
 
 
6.4 Binding Oneself to History  
 
Writing about improvised music in the latter half of the twentieth century, George E Lewis 
(1996), distinguishes between Eurological and Afrological perspectives – historically and 
culturally emergent rather than ethnically essential categories. The former, exemplified by John 
Cage, is characterised by a number of features coherent with the European avant-garde; specific 
notions of freedom, chance, spontaneity (that excludes history), temporal immediacy and the 
valorisation of novelty. Distinct from the Eurological perspective, Lewis identifies the 
Afrological perspective, exemplified by bebop and jazz (styles emerging earlier than Cage’s avant 
garde compositions), most particularly, but not limited to, Charlie “Bird” Parker. This form of 
improvisation is characterised by relations to rules, tradition, discipline and experimentation on 
and with the pre-existing formal “heads” (the name given to precomposed melodic material). 
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The differences between these two forms of improvisation is pertinent; while Cage, no fan of 
jazz music due to its perceived “childishness”, would foreground the aleatory and ideas of 
freedom as a complete rupture with the past (in the context of European avant-gardism this 
rupture, or “blank slate”, approach was clearly in evidence across many art forms – one only has 
to think of Malevich’s Black Square to see this), Parker, and improvised jazz music in general, 
tended towards freedom as understood as a reworking of the past, rather than a rupture with it. 
From Lewis’ perspective, the Afrological challenges assumptions about avant garde 
improvisational music precisely because it exposes, on the one hand, Cage’s pseudo-universalism 
– the assumed objectivity of whiteness that constitutes itself as universal – and, on the other, the 
privilege of Eurological approaches that are only able to think freedom through individualistic 
frameworks that delink themselves from their historical emergence (manifesting an a-historicality 
that refuses to think inheritance, nor the value of political struggle), and an American frontier 
spirit where ‘that which lies before us must take precedent over “the past”’ (Lewis, 1996: 109). 
African-American composers, in contrast, viewed sonic symbolism as a social project to address 
racial justice through ‘black social expression and economic advancement’ (ibid.: 94), and 
understood composition as an historical project that drew on tradition and norms – for African-
Americans, the erasure of the history of slavery and oppression would be unconscionable. The 
value, then, of the Afrological perspective to the project here is that it understands how political 
transformation emerges through social vitality, through a working on and labouring with pre-
existing conditions rather than a radical break from the past that is only available to those 
subjectivities privileged enough, and a exposure of how whiteness seeks universalisation (the 
erasure of lineage and rewriting of history associated with settler colonialism and slavery).  
 
Lewis’ Afrological perspective, then, becomes valuable in rethinking the descriptive statement 
insofar as it foregrounds labour and struggle as a mode of freedom rather than the thunder-like 
freedom of the Eurological perspective – a dominant mode of transformative politics in the 
twentieth century (and one that still conditions our thinking) that operates through the liberal 
model of methodological individualism. Any project of transformation then needs to pursue an 
approach, such as the Afrological improvisational music of Lewis’ work, that refuses to think 
transformation as a radical, ahistorical break, instead understands the historical and cultural 




Lewis’ understanding of freedom through labour is coherent with the argument made by Martin 
Hägglund that appears earlier in this thesis. Hägglund’s argument revolves around the idea that 
freedom is not constituted by the escape from responsibility, but through the adherence and 
commitment to projects that we set ourselves. As he suggests: 
 
The exercise of freedom requires a practical identity that cannot be invented out of 
nothing by an individual, but is formed by social institutions. To be free is not to be free 
from normative constraints, but be free to negotiate, transform and challenge the 
constraints of the practical identities in light of which we lead our lives. 
(Hägglund 2019: 274) 
 
The project Hägglund is proposing, Democratic Socialism, which, coherent with Unger’s work 
on this, sees the democratic control of the institutions themselves as an aim, understands the 
necessity for its success not to be tied to individuals gaining thunderlike freedom by fiat, but 




6.5 Complex Systems 
 
In order to think the project of political transformation as a common project of labour, we need an 
adequate theory of the complex environmental systems that we exist within. In this section, I will 
point towards an analysis that combines complex systems theory with questions of ecology; 
while it is beyond the scope of this thesis to develop this fully (or review an adequate quantity of 
literature related to complex systems theory), I hope to indicate the direction of travel needed for 
this kind of work. It is important to think this through an artistic frame insofar as the question of 
culture should always be asked in accordance with the problem of the environment. According 
to Wynter, to think globally is to understand that what we have is not an energy problem or a 
pollution problem and so on, but a ‘poverty-hunger-habitat-energy-trade-population-
atmosphere-waste-resource problem’ (Wynter in McKittrick 2015: 44), and that this interactive 
problematic has to be understood in relation to dimensions of power and culture. In order to 
grasp the enormity of this emergent phenomenon, Wynter entreats us to think according to a 
logic that includes the narrative dimension of the construction of power; the sociogenic theory 
she adapts from Fanon allows us to see that power emerges within a cultural model that 
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symbolises values within a normative frame. Insofar as power exists within and through culture, 
it is pertinent to understand the entwined systemic problematic as enforced and reproduced 
through cultural narratives. But, furthermore, that culture itself produces (not just reproduces) its 
own structural and normative functions that impact on the system itself.  
 
The proliferation of conjoined problems in our global interactive systemic problematic, relies on 
an understanding of a “general ecology”. Insofar as this general ecology describes the way 
individuals relate to each other (or the way individual fields/inferential systems relate), it shall be 
understood as a complex system – a complex system, according to Melanie Mitchell, is that ‘that 
exhibits nontrivial emergent and self-organising behaviours’ (Mitchell 2009: 13). This theory of 
complex systems posits that environmental concerns exist in conjunction with concerns of the 
individual/system within that environment – the environment never exists in and of itself, but 
always already in contextual relation to the individual/system within it (we must note here that 
this is not to make a counter realist claim that the world exits only insofar as it exists for us, but 
that the term “environment” describes something that is not independent of the individual that it 
is the environment of). How we understand the individual/system then, must pass through an 
understanding of the environment and vice versa – as such, we need a conceptual schema that 
adequately tackles the problem of environments in accordance with nontrivial emergent and self-
organising behaviours.  
 
Drawing on Gregory Bateson, Elena Esposito (Esposito in Hörl ed. 2017) posits cybernetics as 
the solution to this problem. Exploring two questions of an ecological approach – borders and 
control – Esposito identifies the way the individual/system and the environment interrelate 
through exchanges of information, materials and energy between the inside and outside. Insofar 
as the border between an inside and outside exists, it will be crossed, but not destroyed – as 
such, boundaries between systems and individuals are not eradicated, but are maintained and 
regulated. The science of cybernetics emerged historically to make sense of this control or 
regulation across borders and boundaries, giving credence to questions of how the inside can 
influence the outside and vice versa. The concept of feedback is the key discovery of early 
cybernetics; as Esposito suggests, ‘[t]he ingenuity of feedback is that the boundary is assumed in 
order to be neutralized – the separation serves to indicate the forms in which the operations of 
the system make it fluid and allow for a constant, reciprocal influence between inside and 
outside. But the separation must exist, otherwise there could be no influence and everything 
would get lost in indeterminacy’ (ibid.: 286).  
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What emerged later, Esposito recalls, was a more complex notion of feedback, one that relied 
upon the notion of a double feedback loop. As she suggests, ‘the classic loop of feedback circuits 
becomes a double loop – and as such, much more complex and difficult to deal with. The 
observer observes a system facing its environment, and discovers himself to be involved in the 
object he observes […] the observation of feedback between the environment and the system 
produces a second feedback circuit between the observer and his object’ (ibid.: 287-8). This 
complexification of the above argument leads Esposito towards an interesting conclusion that I 
will reconstruct here. Instead of relying on notions of hybridity (drawn from Latour), whereby 
two poles (nature and society for example), are understood as apriori blurred, or hybrid, Esposito 
proposes the opposite; ‘[o]nly if you are able to indicate clearly what’s in and what’s out, what 
belongs to the system and what is part of the environment, will you also be able to study the 
complex forms produced when the inside reflects the outside and vice versa’ (ibid.: 289). Thus, 
the distinctions between systems must be foregrounded in an understanding of cybernetics in 
order for us to be able to make claims about their interrelations.  
 
Brian Massumi (2018) makes a somewhat similar but subtly different claim. Insofar as he sees the 
relation between capitalist systems and their immanent outside as constitutively open, whereby 
the exchange across boundaries rests on the concept of excess and affect, Massumi understands 
the relation between inside and outside as conditioned by potential. This passage from Massumi is 
enlightening:  
 
The movement of double becoming is a processual coupling between two systems. The 
processual coupling belongs to neither system per se, but enters as formative force into 
the becoming of both. It constitutes their immanent outside. Process is the immanent 
outside of the in-betweens of system. Since it is unbounded by any given system or set of 
systems, that immanent outside overspills systematicity as such. Considered in itself, this 
in between is a wide-open. It is the expanded field of where systems’ becoming may go, 
beyond where and what they are now. It is the fielding of potential. Process is by nature 
in excess over the system. This means that every system a constitutively open system 
[sic]. This distinction between internal/external (systems environment) and immanent 
outside (processual ecology) becomes extremely important for understanding complexity 
and resistance under capitalism. 
 (Massumi 2018: 10) 
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The constitutive openness of the system as it approaches its immanent outside is, however, 
conditioned by its operative closure – the operations any system performs have identity with the 
inside but a non-identity with the outside. It is only through this open/closed dialectic that we 
can understand the system. Both art and capitalism work on the limits of their systems to 
reconstitute the outside as the inside – capitalism does this through extractive or exploitative 
modes and art does this through the continual introduction of creative novelty. “The New” is 
thus of value to both insofar as it constitutes the field into which each system expands. Thus, the 
systems are only constituted by their relation to the immanent outside as a force of axiomatic 
expansion that relies on “potential” – capitalism’s relation to nature then, is one that relies on 
potentialising that nature as a resource for capitalist expansion. And art potentializes the 
particularities of local sites into global circuits of distribution, exhibition and discourse via the 
dialectical relation between art and non-art, or centre periphery, that occurs, for example, in the 
biennale circuit.61 Ever expanding biennalisation processes seek to include peripheral sites into 
the logic of the centre – instead of just being seen as the incorporation of these sites into a 
circuit of display, the very axioms of contemporary art are expanded into these sites. In order for 
this operation to make sense, we have to have something we understand as art and something we 
understand as not-art, that is, society. 
  
These conclusions echo Niklas Luhmann’s (2000) descriptions of art as a social system. 
Luhmann understands art’s relation to society as one of operative closure, insofar as there is a 
relation, then, it operates across a boundary. As Luhmann suggests: 
 
Art participates in society by differentiating itself as a system, which subjects art to a 
logic of operative closure – just like any other function system […] Modern art is 
autonomous in an operative sense. No one else does what it does […] The societal 
nature of modern art consists in its operative closure and autonomy, provided that 
society imposes this form on all functional systems, one of which is art. 
(Luhmann 2000: 134-5) 
 
61 Whereby local sites are subject to the demands of the global market; the accumulation of cultural capital that 
becomes of interest to ‘collectors, private donors, and real estate investors’ (Arsanios in O’Neill, Sheikh, Steeds 
and Wilson eds. 2019), precisely, the exploitation of land and labour by the global art world in previously 
“empty” sites. Or, as Nkule Mabaso writes in the context of institutions in Cape Town, South Africa, where ‘the 
institution is not only outward facing, but also reproduces methodologies inward the further marginalize local 
knowledges and knowledge systems in favour of “universal knowledge”’ (Mabaso in ibid.: 99).  The associations 
with settler colonialism are here hard to ignore.  
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As we know from discussions above (Chapter Three), the autonomy of art rests on this 
differentiation between systems, something that contemporary art has sought to reduce. Indeed, 
in the system/environment dyad (whereby environment might be understood as capitalism as 
such, or a capitalist society), contemporary art has taken one of two paths – a liberal 
individualistic escape from that society that denies the dialectical relation or, the pessimistic 
inverse, an absolute coherence with it, which also denies the dialectic. It is only, thus, through an 
approach proposed by Esposito, whereby the distinction or boundary is upheld, and not through 
a Latourian insistence on hybridity, that we can proceed dialectically to understand adequately 
the double circularity of this relation. It is also through this approach that we can understand the 
non-identity between the human and the world narrative  – precisely that, as Wynter asserts, the 
human must tell a story of itself in the environment as a mode of double circularity – the 
observer observing themselves in the image of the world – and not as a form of either direct 
identification with or total divorce from that world. In other words, Wynter’s work demands an 
updated idea of cybernetic reflexivity, in line with Esposito’s findings, that sees human narrative 
as a contingent cultural expression of power not as a necessary expression of “truth” as such. 
Contemporary art, then, to have political traction, has to think in a similar mode. While being an 
operatively closed system, the reflexive relation between it and society, across inferential spheres, 
must be understood as one whereby it sees a nontrivial relation that accounts for systemic 
transformation through complex differentiations and laminar functionality, not as a hybridisation 
of art-society that sees their relation to be apriori conjoined. The capacity to understand art as a 
project of laminar traversing then, must be coherent with a theory of cybernetic reflexivity.  
 
 
6.6 Metabolic Systems 
 
This double circularity of feedback relationships is evidenced in numerous systems theory 
contexts, not least in the discourse around pollution, or negative downstream externalities. Why 
it is important to build a descriptive statement that accounts for the concept of cybernetic 
feedback between systems/individuals/environments should become clear; precisely, 
neoclassical economics, that sees itself as a pure science, delinked from the world, is incapable of 
understanding how the externalities of economic activity feedback into the world-capitalist 
system itself. This failure, as reported in the scientific literature around climate change, is exactly 
what the neoliberal theoretical frame prevents us from seeing. With its focus on individual 
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behaviour, a theoretical inheritance from classical liberalism, neoliberalism fundamentally 
misunderstands the complex relationships that exist in our global interactive system model – this 
is a central contradiction at the heart of the Second Age of Oil. In order to produce an adequate 
description, I will develop briefly a concept I call metabolic systems theory.  
 
To understand the metabolic, I will turn to an essay on the grandfather of neoclassical economic 
thought, William Stanley Jevons. In a work about Jevons’ Paradox  – the claim that increased 
energy efficiency counter intuitively often leads to a rebound effect where more energy is 
eventually consumed – Mario Giampietro and Kozo Mayumi (Polimeni, Mayumi, Giampietro 
and Alcott eds. 2008) discuss in some detail complex adaptive systems.  Concerned with the 
organisation of living systems over hierarchical levels and multiple scales, they make the claim 
for a more complex epistemology capable of understanding the complexity of evolving adaptive 
systems. In line with this they underscore the concept of the metabolic system with the concepts 
of holons and holarchies. The chapter asks how we orient ourselves for the best course of 
action, making the claim that it is impossible to use efficiency to do this. As they suggest: 
 
when representing and analysing evolving metabolic systems organized in nested 
hierarchies, innovative theoretical frameworks are needed that can properly take care of 
the analysis of circular […] and multiple scales. This requires going beyond the paradigm 
of reductionism. 
(Mayumi and Giampetro in Polimeni, Mayumi, Giampietro and Alcott eds. 2008: 81). 
 
What this theoretical development speaks to is the capacity to understand the complex 
relationship between the micro and the macro scales, when a particular event or occurrence at a 
micro level has macro level effects. As we shall see, this has significant implications on the 
conceptual apparatus required to think the individual as separate and non-relational. Precisely, it 
collapses. Thus, it is increasingly impossible to speak of a non-dialectical inside or an outside – 
feedback exists between them. Where neoclassical economic science seeks to purify and 
particularise, to understand economic activity as separate from its ground in nature or its effects 
in society, a metabolic theory demands that we think any division between the inside and outside 
as contingent, temporary and revisable – and, importantly, circularly feeding back across that 
boundary (as Esposito suggests). Under these terms, then, the conceptual buttress of competitive 
individualism, the ontological claim that we are all alone and make our own lives for ourselves 
without help from anyone, loses traction. 
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Society, the economy, culture and nature are all metabolic systems; they are in a constant state of 
autopoetic flux, not in thermodynamic equilibrium, they constantly exchange matter and energy 
from the environment around them and between each other, and are organized in a nested 
hierarchy based on the concept of the “holon” (Giampietro and Mayumi in Polimeni, Mayumi, 
Giampietro and Alcott eds. 2008). A holon is something that is simultaneously a part and a 
whole, autonomous from the environment, but connected to it via a mereological relation (a 
mereological system is one in which parts and wholes are in relation to each other through 
nested hierarchies). As Giampetro and Mayumi tell us, the holon, developed by Arthur Koestler 
in his book The Ghost in the Machine, is a combination of the Greek “holos”, meaning whole and 
relating to the macroscopic and the suffix “on”, meaning particle or part, relating to the 
microscopic. Thus, a holon is a part-whole that combines constraints of both the macro and the 
micro. Individual humans, their societies, and cultures are all organised as holoarchic systems – 
as nested hierarchies, not as distinct systems apart from each other. Every autonomous example 
of economic activity, an individual action or cultural phenomenon is in a part-whole relation to 
the epistemological system of society as such. Which itself is nested within broader spheres such 
as nature to the extent that the actions and effects are indiscernibly located. Instances of 
economic activity for example have macro-political effects. Thus, when we analyse the systemic 
nature of society, we must be aware of the modalities of relations between the individual parts 
and the whole, as such we cannot express axiomatic statements about individuals divorced from 
their relation to the whole system in which they find themselves. Nor can we make similar 
statements about wholes that are derived from experience of individuals. Such as, individual (x) 
in category (a) is blue therefore all of the individuals in category (a) are blue.  
 
As Giampietro and Mayumi suggest:  
 
The phenomena of emergence, […] points at the obvious, but often neglected, fact that a 
metabolic system must be necessarily a ‘becoming system’ and therefore requires a 
continuous update of the selection of attributes together with proxy variables and their 
relationships – the formal identity assigned to the observed system – used to describe its 
behaviour […] Therefore, once the attributes selected for the formal identity of the 
observed system become no longer relevant for predicting behaviours of the system, the 
proxy variables and their analytical relations must be automatically discarded. Then a new 
set of attributes with a new set of proxy variables and relations should be introduced. 
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After these selections are made, both a new formal identity (a given and finite set of 
relevant attributes which can be represented using a given and finite set of proxy 
variables) and a new inferential system (a finite set of axioms, rules and algorithms) must 
be introduced 
(Giampietro and Mayumi in Polimeni, Mayumi, Giampietro and Alcott eds. 2008: 92) 
 
A metabolic system thus requires constant updating of its variables and epistemic boundaries, 
none of which appear as historically necessary, nor independent from revision. These occur as a 
continuous emergence of proxy variables that reach a tipping point to create a phase change. 
Systemic change is thus achieved by the constant revision of boundaries and formal qualities to 
create new forms of framing that allow the introduction of new inferential systems. Therefore, 
systemic change cannot occur by fiat, nor as an evental or revolutionary eruption, but through 
the constant updating of variables to create the conditions of systemic change. Unger (2007) 
describes a form of thought against an institutional dogmatism that denies ‘the truth that the 
promises of democracy can be kept only by the ceaseless experimental renewing of their 
institutional vehicles’, suggesting this form of necessitarian thinking ‘nails our interests, ideals, 
and collective self-understandings to the cross of contingent, time-bound institutions’ (Unger 
2007: 23). Unger’s claims revolve around a reappraisal of the pragmatist claims to the revisablity 
of democratic limits, suggesting that neoliberal ideology that seeks to occlude its own historically 
contingent nature, or indeed to naturalise its existence, is precisely engaged in a rhetorical 
production of what he calls false necessity - exnomination. Against this we must assert the 
capacity for systemic political change through continual revisability and not through catastrophe 
or crisis. 
 
Granted, revolutionary or evental iterations do have impact within inferential systems, often 
significant impacts, but what the work on Jevons’ paradox shows us is that these impacts are 
often unreliable due to cybernetic effects – precisely the way positive and negative feedback 
produces unintended outcomes within and outside of systems. In order to explore this further, it 
is necessary to expand on the description of Jevon’s fundamental paradox and also understand 






6.7 Rebounds and Dark Matter  
 
In the foreword to The Jevons Paradox (Giampietro and Mayumi in Polimeni, Mayumi, Giampietro 
and Alcott eds. 2008), Joseph Tainter examines the well-known paradox that gives the book its 
name. Identified by William Stanley Jevons in his work The Coal Question (1866), the paradox 
concerns the usage of coal in industry, but can be equally applied to all energy sources. The 
assertion is, that whenever a resource saving is made, through increased technical efficiency for 
example, that saving is put to use increasing the output of the company, country or individual 
who has made that saving. As Tainter suggests; ‘as technological improvements increase the 
efficiency with which a resource is used, total consumption of that resource may increase rather 
than decrease’ (Tainter in Giampietro and Mayumi in Polimeni, Mayumi, Giampietro and Alcott 
eds. 2008: x). Insofar as resource use might in fact increase rather than decrease as a result of the 
initial saving, an effect known as rebound, the suggestion that climate disaster can be “solved” by 
increased efficiency runs into trouble. In the current system, individuals will compensate for any 
efficiency gains by higher levels of consumption – this should not be seen as some form of 
psychological failing on the behalf of human individuals, more a reaction at multiple levels to the 
foundational principles of economic theory that reduced use impacts cost of consumption. 
Because the paradox ‘cannot be circumvented through voluntary restraint or any other laissez-faire 
approach’ (Tainter in Polimeni, Mayumi, Giampietro and Alcott eds. 2008: xv), one cannot think 
of efficiency savings through either individuals’ voluntaristic approaches or market mechanisms. 
Both these solutions to the problem tragically result in the potential for increased use of the 
resource as the logical reduction in cost of the resource that the market imposes will result in 
higher levels of use. Thus, state intervention is a required step to prevent the inevitable price 
decrease. 
 
In the current discourse around climate catastrophe amelioration the responses are often centred 
around increased efficiency of individuals, companies and nation states – as though the 
accumulative effect of a reduction in resource use will passively result in overall reduction in 
environmental harm. This approach proposes using market mechanisms to produce desirable 
outcomes. However, because the central axiomatics of supply and demand determine the 
behaviour of the market, this approach will result in Jevons’ paradox. Indeed, as the authors of 
this study show, an increase in efficiency often leads to not just a rebound, where the 
consumption of a resource returns to previous levels, but a backfire, where consumption exceeds 
it. This paradox is evident elsewhere – often increased efficiency, seen as the display of moral 
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virtues (something explored in more detail in Chapter Four above), can give us social license for 
other activities that may cause a backfire effect. If we think of politically transformative 
approaches that rely on individual actors “doing good”, the potential for paradoxical backfire is 
significant. Politically transformative artistic practice, for example, often provide a license for 
local or national governments to renege on their social contract. Resulting in decreased public 
funding or support for important institutions, socially engaged art excuses cash strapped councils 
from their duty to the public. In the context of neoliberal capitalism, then, art, when thought of 
within a “market” formation, works counterproductively to “backfire” on the very communities 
it wished to help. How we understand the notion of legitimation within and outside the 
inferential system of art, then, is important. 
 
In Dark Matter (2011) Gregory Sholette explores the concept of the eponymous “dark matter” in 
astrophysics as it relates, metaphorically, to the contemporary art world. Shollette understands 
the small scale, unseen, amateur, “creative dark matter” as a necessary but invisible component 
of the system that props up and provides symbolic ballast to the famous, successful artist. As he 
suggests, ‘[a]ll these forms of dark matter play an essential role in the symbolic economy of art’ 
(Sholette 2011: 3). The invisible elements of the system provide a stable and reliable economic 
function in the whole system (the non-famous artists buy the books, go to galleries, work in arts 
administration, teach art and so on) – without them the system would collapse, but furthermore 
Sholette asks; 
 
How would the art world manage its system of aesthetic valorization if the seemingly 
superfluous majority—those excluded as non-professionals as much as those destined to 
“fail”—simply gave up on its system of legitimation?  
(Sholette 2011: 3) 
 
The symbolic legitimation aspect of Sholette’s analysis is important. If works of art not seen to 
be valuable as such can provide symbolic legitimacy for the system as a whole, can act as 
buttresses for valuation/valorisation, it is coherent to suggest, following Sholette, that legitimacy 
is conferred upon all aspects of the system by any and every work of art, or practice within that 
system. As such, we can make the claim that works of art that seek to delegitimise, critique or 
move away from the commodity form, the marketisation of the art world, or indeed any aspect 
of the contemporary paradigm, paradoxically work to accrue symbolic legitimacy for those very 
things they attempt to critique. In this sense, when understood as a system of legitimation, the 
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art world hoovers up cultural capital to the centre from even the most critical work at the 
margins. It is therefore coherent to suggest that critical art acts in a self-canabalising fashion to 
undermine its very authority, unintentionally returning value via symbolic valorisation to the 
aspects of the system it deems unacceptable. Thus, artworks that seek political transformation 
are limited if they act independently. A liberal model of isolated individuals is inadequate here, 
we must imagine a project that conjoins and mobilises multiple ecologies of artworks, 
institutions and subjects within the inferential system of the artworld and beyond. A 
commitment to structural change must operate at, and across, multiple levels, acknowledging the 
necessary transformations and distortions that occur as levels are crossed. It is not the case that 
artworks can propose themselves as small scale models that can be directly scaled up – no, the 
scalar approach is inadequate.  
 
Both Jevons’ paradox and Sholette’s concept of creative dark matter, or my attenuation of it, 
allow us to understand the complex system processes involved in the project of political 
transformation as it relates to art practices. Critical or political work in one area, while salient and 
thought provoking, often has a rebound or backfire effect elsewhere in the system, giving 
credence to the analysis above that understands the metabolic nature of the system. While this 
analysis might lead some to a political quietism, to give up on any political action in the 
assumption that all action is compromised or useless, this is not my aim. I argue instead, that it is 
only through an understanding of these complexities that political action can be directed in such 






How individuals and social structures have causal power has been described in some depth by 
Dave Elder-Vass (2010). In this section I wish to understand the concept of normativity as 
described by Elder-Vass in relation to Zalamea’s (2012) work on Peirce. This relation could 
generate a PhD study in and of itself and as this thesis is nearing its end the rehearsal of this 
narrative will be necessarily limited. Describing his own work as recognising ‘the contributions of 
both social structure and human agency to [explain] social events’ (Elder-Vass 2012: 8) Elder-
Vass is keen to offer an emergentist solution to the question of causal power, suggesting that it 
emerges from the interactions between individuals and social structures rather than being 
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ontologically attached to one or the other. Distinct from both methodological individualist and 
methodological collectivist positions, and, what he calls “central conflationist” positions 
(exemplified by Anthony Giddens) that ‘seek to bridge these other two positions by treating 
structure and agency as ontologically inseparable’ (ibid.), Elder-Vass’ emergentist approach could 
be seen as being conditioned by a complex synthetic interweaving of the individual and the 
structure. Central to this emergentist approach is Elder-Vass’ concept of “normative social 
institutions”; these types of institutions are created by interactions between members of social 
groups called “norm circles”. As he suggests, ‘[n]ormative social institutions […] are an emergent 
causal power of norm circles’ (ibid.: 115). As discussed in Chapter Three, individuals and social 
structures engage recursively in the production of norm circles, from which normative social 
institutions emerge. It is worth expanding on this theory here in order to understand how norms 
operate as a form of semi-invariant – a set of revisable descriptions that we must intercede in if 
we are keen to reassert different values for our society. Norms, then, as I hope to make clear, are 
a fundamental lever in the project of social causality. They are not, however, of the same order as 
axioms – norms proceed from axioms and not the other way round. However, my contention is, 
norms are utilisable in the project of developing new axioms – if we understand the causal power 
of norm circles, as expressed by Elder-Vass, I argue that we can exploit them to intervene in the 
creation of axiomatics. 
 
A norm circle is a collection of individuals that cohere around the agreement upon, and 
commitment to, a set of shared norms, for Elder-Vass, the norm circle has causal powers (not 
the individual or society as such, but the norm circle which is seen as an iterative function of 
individuals relations to each other). As he suggests: 
  
Although institutions depend on the members of the norm circle sharing a similar 
understanding of the norm concerned, emergent or collective properties cannot be 
produced by such formal similarities [...] It is the commitment that they have to endorse 
and enforce the practice with each other that makes an norm circle more effective than the 
sum of its members would be if they were not part of it. The members of the norm circle 
are aware that its other members share that commitment, they may feel an obligation to 
them to endorse the norm concerned and have an expectation that the others will 
support them and they do so. In other words, the members of the norm circle share a 
collective intention to support the norm, and as a result they each tend to support it more 
actively they would if they did not share that collective intention. 
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(Elder-Vass 2012: 123) 
 
The emergent or generative qualities of norm circles rests on this collective commitment to 
maintain or reinforce norms. The existence of norm circles results in the increased likelihood of 
conformity to norms as members of the circle pressure others to adhere to those norms. Thus, 
invariance is registered across social groups in accordance with commitment to norms. This 
commitment to norms is not necessarily bad – all social groups conform to this logic whether 
they have oppressive or liberatory politics, despite protestations in the popular discourse that 
freedom from norms is the central tenet of liberation – norms are a fact of social engagement 
and have neither positive nor negative valence.  
 
This model is usefully applied to descriptions of all social collectives, insofar as society is 
composed not of a collection of unrelated individuals, but of norm reinforcing subjects that 
exacerbate the strength of those norms through their explicit, public commitment to them, the 
relation between individuals emerges as one of commitment and conformity. As such, in the case 
of oppressive social norms, the collective endorsement of them can induce fear in individuals 
who deviate as the power of those norms exceeds that held by individuals – insofar as social 
pressure is also backed up by institutional or state power in the form of (often violent) penalties 
for transgression, these norms have the weight of more than just norm circles behind them. 
Social norms have emergent causal power, often, but not always, ratified, by state or institutional 
power. 
 
Far from endorsing the reintroduction from above of repressive social norms – no matter how 
“progressive” those norms might appear – this theory can help us understand on the one hand, 
how social causal power emerges from groupings, and how radically democratic engagement in 
norm construction is possible. If we, following Negarestani, agree that social norms are revisable 
by individuals, then Elder-Vass’ emergentist conception of normativity is useful. Social norms, in 
his conception are seen neither as properties of social systems nor as belonging to individuals, 
but as emerging from the relation between the two. As I pointed out in Chapter Three, however, 
this theory does not have an adequate theory of power that would understand how some 
individuals and social groupings have privileged access to the production and ratification of 
norms. In fact, a similar criticism could be levelled at Negarestani’s work – the subject of 
revision is exnominated, and thus seen as potentially neutral. The danger of that neutrality is 
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clearly evident in the work of Wynter, Fanon, Yusoff, Hirschmann, Butler and other black 
radical or feminist thinkers. Neutrality is so often coded for whiteness, maleness, ablebodiedness.  
 
That being said, the formal logic at work in Elder-Vass’ work is fundamental to an approach that 
could be fruitful. His work understands the causal power of groups, how agency operates across 
social laminations, and how intervention in the production of social norms is possible, and, 
importantly, how collections of individuals are ampliative not additive. As he suggests: 
 
it is one of the strengths of the emergentist perspective that it accepts that entities at 
many levels of a laminated whole can simultaneously have causal powers and that these 
powers may interact to produce actual events [...] it is not only true that individual beliefs 
themselves are causally effective but also that they are a crucial part of the mechanism 
underpinning the causal power of the larger group. 
(Elder-Vass 2012: 124) 
 
This multi-laminar approach underwrites the theorisation here. It is only through the capacity of 
socially constituted groups – norm circles – that can intervene at many levels in order to have 
emergent and amplifying causal powers, that we can hope to have traction at higher levels. The 
emergentist perspective allows us to understand how collectives of individuals can have causal 
power whereas isolated individuals cannot. However, while not everything is a norm, and 
certainly we would likely think about our political actions in multiple different ways, the function 
of norms described above is a coherent strategic tool to understand how commitments can be 
ramified and enlarged in radically decolonial ways; if norm circles have emergent powers, then, in 
order to orient them against colonial projects of extraction and exploitation we can mobilise 
multiple subjects in amplificatory roles. To live according to principles decided collectively, then, 
valorisation of notions of goodness need to be tied to multi-laminar analyses of the effects of 
actions and statements.  
 
 It is to this multi-laminar approach that I now turn.  
 
Zalamea’s intervention in Peirce scholarship is important here. Specifically, the way he discusses 
the logics of continuity in Peirce can help us understand the multilaminar approach discussed 
above. Understanding the continuum as a form of genericity, Zalamea, drawing on Peirce, 




The continuum is thus a general, where all the potentialities can fall – overcoming all 
determinations– and where certain modes of connection between the parts and the 
whole (local and global) become homogenized and regularized – overcoming and melting 
together all individual distinctions. The generic character of Peirce’s continuum (thirdness) 
is thus closely weaved with the overcoming of determinacy and actuality (secondness). In 
this process the threads of indetermination and chance (firstness) become essential, 
freeing the existent from its particular qualities in order to reach the generality of 
possibilia. 
(Zalamea 2012: 12) 
 
Zalamea’s engagement with Peirce’s continuum derives from the understanding that the 
continuum cannot be constructed out of a collection of particular individuals, rather, it is the 
generalness or vagueness associated with transfinite supermultitudinous collections. Insofar as 
the supermultitudinous nature of Peirce’s continuum refers to a genericity, it should not be 
thought of as merely the addition of many separate parts, but as amplificatory and undetermined 
– whereby it reveals the true universal. Existents or individuals are then seen as a rupture from 
the continuum, rather than as components that accrue to construct it. Individuals are a form of 
discontinuity, that weave into and through the continuity of the transfinite universal continuum. 
This discontinuous mark, Peirce names Secondness, and refers to the actual, discrete or the 
existent. As Zalamea tells us: 
 
A generic continuum is always present in the universe, reflected in multiple layers (single 
continuum of qualitative possibilities – line in the blackboard) and “meta-layers” (double 
continuum of qualitative possibilities – blackboard). Through acts of “brute force” are 
then produced breaks on the continuum which allow to “mark” differences: secondness, 
existence, discreteness, emerge all as ruptures of the real, the third, the continuous. 
Vagueness, indetermination, amalgamation, present in a “primitive” continuum (the 
Parmenidean “One”), evolve towards a logic of identity, more and more determined, 
capable of recording differences by means of successive breaks, ruptures, discontinuities. 
(Zalamea 2012: 29) 
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Between secondness and thirdness, then, emerges a protean weaving and possibility space that 
extends in a three-dimensional spiral. The discrete and the continuous are recursively bound in 
this spiral that entwines firstness (immediacy, spontaneity, sensation), secondness (facts, alterity, 
resistance) and thirdness (law, continuity, knowledge, generality). This is the continuum, within 
which the relationships between individuals and the universal are played out. It is in this context 
that laminar traversal takes place. The interweaving between laminations goes in a back and forth 
motion that places local sites in global contexts and conditions global contexts by those global 
sites – this description allows us to understand how discrete practices (of art or politics) entwine 
with their contexts, ramifying global conditions in local sites. This logic intertwines with Peirce’s 
pragmatic maxim, that affirms, as Zalamea suggests: 
  
we can only attain knowledge after conceiving a wide range of representability 
possibilities for signs (firstness), after perusing active-reactive contrasts between sub-
determinations of those signs (secondness), and after weaving recursive information 
between the observed semeiosis (thirdness). The maxim acts as a sheaf with a double 
support function for the categories: a contrasting function (secondness) to obtain local 
distinctive hierarchies, a mediating function (thirdness) to unify globally the different 
perspectives. 
(Zalamea 2012: 58) 
 
The boundary crossings and mediating functions inherent in the continuum glue information, 
energy and material from one site to another, allowing, as Zalamea tells us, ‘the “transit” of 
modalities, the “fusion” of individualities, the “overlapping” of neighbourhoods’ (Zalamea 2012: 
22). Vital, then, in a theory of counter-hegemonic organisation that would seek to revise the 
descriptive statement, or the limits of the human, Zalamea’s Peircianism allows us to understand 
how values, norms and laws can interact with individuals. Far from retreating into an 
methodological individualist approach that prioritises individuals over the universal, or a 
methodological collectivist approach that subsumes individuals into the universal, or indeed a 
conflation of the two that seeks a centre ground, determined by a trivial relation between 
individual and universal, this approach understands the complexity involved in the relationship. 
Instead of understanding the transition between local site and global context as a leap across the 
void, we can now see how local concerns can increase their capacities, bootstrapping their way to 
hegemonic positions. Any theory of political transformation requires a theory of how those 
transformations manifest, combining Zalamea’s theorisation of Peirce’s continuum with Elder-
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Vass’ concept of norm circles allows us to understand how amplification across laminations can 
occur. This is true not just of norms – statements, concerns or values can be mobilised in the 
same way. In fact, it is through the process of ramification that a transformation of values into 
norms occurs. And it is equally through this amplificatory process that we can hope to intervene 
on the construction and reconstruction of axioms.  
 
Returning to Chantal Mouffe’s analysis, the counter-hegemonic struggle she proposes engages 
with the conditions and contexts provided by institutions, rather than withdrawing from them 
altogether. Assuming a puritanical relation to inside and outside, the withdrawal approach 
misunderstands the metabolic nature of the system described above. Mouffe’s approach, 
however, is more in line with my analysis. Instead of assuming that political change can occur by 
fiat as a leap across the void, this work proposes utilising the hierarchies and modalities of 
institutions in order to produce counter-hegemonic operations. These operations, instead of 
prefiguring a horizontal, or spontaneous order, then, must understand how multilaminar 
approaches will utilise the amplificatory nature of norm circles to institute differently a just 
descriptive statement. Mouffe’s model rests on the capacity for institutions to stage agonistic 
positions in order to imagine a new order that could emerge to challenge neoliberalism. 
However, this is inadequate – staging or imaging alternatives is only a portion of the project, 
hegemonic operations require a theory of action that understands the steps necessary to utilise 
these imaginaries in a project of increasing capacity of individuals. Mouffe’s work stops short of 
proposing an organisational model capable of doing this, favouring the narrative functions of 
culture over the norm reinforcing function. Without a theory of how norms operate to 
reproduce, reinforce and amplify values across multiple sites, imaginaries remain in their local 
site and thus foreground individual subjectivities over institutional models.  
 
The privileging of individual subjectivity in the liberal order and the reliance on catastrophic 
revolutionary practice lacks the necessary stepwise practices, as Roberto Unger suggests; 
 
The history of modern social ideas has misled us into associating piecemeal change with 
disbelief in institutional reconstruction, and a commitment to such reconstruction with 
faith in sudden and systemic change. The most important expression of this prejudice is 
the supposedly all-inclusive contrast between two styles of politics. One style is 
revolutionary: it seeks the wholesale substitution of one institutional order by another, 
under the guidance of confrontational leaders supported by energised majorities, in 
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circumstances of national crisis. The other style is reformist: its concerns are marginal 
redistribution, or concessions to moral and religious anxieties, negotiated by professional 
politicians among organized interests, in times of business as usual.  
We must now jumble these categories up, associating fragmentary and gradual but 
nevertheless cumulative change with transformative ambition. To jumble them up in 
practice must first jumble them up in thought. The foremost expression of this jumbling 
up is a style politics defying the contrast between revolution and reform and therefore 
exemplifying the practice of revolutionary reform. Such a politics practices structural 
change in the only way such change generally can be practised: piece by piece and step by 
step. It combines negotiation among organized midnight minorities with mobilization of 
disorganised majorities. And it dispenses with calamity as the enabling condition of 
change. 
(Roberto Unger 2005: 31-2)  
 
Far from being a conciliation to power or a reneging of revolutionary ideals, this stepwise 
approach necessarily includes not just multilaminar operations but multiple subjects – as such, 
the procedure of capacity increase is radically democratic. Thunderlike or revolutionary 
transformation that relies on catastrophe is only available to certain subjects, often those who 
already possess the most power in any situation, and often does not result in predictable ways. In 
order for multiple subjectivities to have access to the means by which change occurs, there needs 
to be a reshaping of the methodologies of organisation and transformation in line with a 
stepwise logic that increases commitments to universal rather than personal freedoms, that 
mobilises normativity rather than imagines the possibility to escape from it and a commitment to 
the complex, intertwined relation between local and global, discontinuity and continuity, discrete 
individual and general context, that can glue together individuals through the mediating function 




















To be sure, a set of principles does not by itself entail an effective transformation of our 
society. Given the power relations of capitalism under which we live, the achievements 
of democratic socialism can only be the result of a sustained and difficult political 
struggle. 




The axiological conditions of contemporary art emerge in conjunction with those of 
neoliberalism, which in turn is underwritten by the politics of the oil industry – what I call the 
petropolitical paradigm, or The Second Age of Oil. As discussed in this thesis, there is a 
recursive relation between these inferential fields. Thinking about contemporary art without, for 
example, a theory of how it relates to the modes of extraction and exploitation inherent in 
petropolitics, misunderstands important ontologies. This is not to say that contemporary art and 
petropolitics are somehow necessarily bound together, in fact I would be keen to assert the 
opposite, that the petropolitical and the cultural are only contingently bound. The capacity to wrest 
culture away from the political paradigm it appears within – the task of autonomy – must be 
renewed, but only if it can be reimagined as a Castoriadian-Hägglundian project of self-
legitimation; freedom as a commitment to the projects we hold dear in the face of finitude, and 
the production of, not escape from, norms. What I hope to show through this thesis is that there 
exists a coherence or similitude between the logics of contemporary art and that of petropolitics. 
I call these the axioms of petroculture, and they rest on three points – freedom, exemplification 
and myopia. Under the heading of freedom I explored how the concept of autonomy has been 
transformed in recent years; the roots of current forms of autonomy as escape (or the tragic 
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acceptance of the impossibility of autonomy) are to be found in Adorno, but the transformation 
is so great as to have shaped contemporary conceptions of autonomy in the image of neoliberal 
logics of freedom. I understand this logic as a combination of Isiah Berlin’s ideas of negative 
liberty and the idea of differential freedom, as drawn from Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan 
Nitzan’s work on differential accumulation. Freedom has, on the one hand, been, as Wendy 
Brown suggests, reduced to the limited view of freedom from coercion – causally linked to 
current forms of neoliberal, and neo-fascist discourses – and on the other, relies on the fact that 
personal freedom is so often to be won at the expense of the freedom of others. Petropolitics 
rewards the exploitation of natural resources, labour and land – it is a colonialist project par 
excellence and one that relies on the declination of universal freedoms.  
 
The contradiction at the heart of liberalism (that individual freedom relies on both the 
unacknowledged work and unfreedom of others) is inherent in the project of contemporary art 
precisely because, while something like art practice (the practice of making art as a mode of 
commitment) can act to enhance freedoms, the products of art and their attendant economies 
and distributional effects rely on a liberal understanding of individual freedom whereby only a 
select few rise to the top by “leaning on” their counterparts.62 Yet the presentation of virtues, 
such as freedom, is a central component of contemporary art, even especially the work that 
commits itself to political transformation. This form of contradiction does not just maintain the 
virtuous nature of artistic activity whilst reproducing inequalities and power relations, but 
presents autocritique as a form of virtue. The similitude with the corporate environmentalism 
that is characteristic of neoliberal corporations (such as BP) and institutions (such as The Design 
Museum) is striking. This practice is known as exemplification. In the context of oil production 
and distribution, the drivers for exemplification emerge in the context of decreased legitimacy 
for extractive activities – the loss of public consent – and the need to increase or maintain 
shareholder value. In contemporary art, the drivers are no different. Economies of attention 
dictate that both economic and cultural capital accrue to the artists and institutions that are seen 
to express values desirable by investors of both forms of capital. This is evidenced by the 
phenomenon of financial support from mainstays of global capital for artistic activity meant to 
critique or attack those very same mainstays (corporate sponsorship for the arts). Thus, artistic 
value is determined by the artwork’s capacity to accrue critical and public consent and the best 
 
62 Cinzia Arruzza, Tithi Bhattacharya and Nancy Fraser (2019) criticise the “lean in” feminism of liberal feminists 
such as Sheryl Sandberg, suggesting their form of feminism tends to “lean on” the ‘poorly paid migrant women 
to whom they subcontract their caregiving and housework’ (Arruzza, Bhattaharya and Fraser, 2019: 11-12). 
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way to do this is through expressing virtues shared by the most people (or virtues people would 
prefer to express). As I have shown, the progressive values that supposedly underwrite much art 
production are also shared by major players in the corporate world as well as in the art 
institutions that ratify neoliberal ideology and power relations – having the “right” values is not 
enough.  
 
In these politically turbulent times it is important to maintain and reinforce our political 
commitments. Artworks are often seen as the medium by which to participate in this process of 
commitment, yet the liberal conception of contemporary art frames this commitment in a certain 
way. Instead of a collective articulation, this frame overwhelmingly enjoins us to think and act as 
individuals, whereby the experience of viewing art is an individual act of contemplation and 
cognition. Many theories of change regarding art have repeated this conception – transformation 
occurs primarily through the accretion of like-minded individuals acting as individuals rather 
than through a principle of organisation. The myopia this relies on is a symptom of being cast 
adrift in a society in which the social institutions that would increase, support and modify our 
democratic demands have been in decline for decades. While this is not a direct result of only the 
massive growth and enormous market cap of the petroleum industries, these industries have 
historically been instrumental in increasing corporate interference in global politics, contributing 
to global carbon emissions that destroy our lifeworld in uneven ways and the increase in 
inequality – all of which lead to a democratic deficit. As identified in this thesis, petropolitics is a 
threat to a healthy democracy. How we conceive of the capacity for art to have transformative 
power is important for how we engage in politics in general as theories from the art sphere map 
across to the sphere of political organisation. Thus, the necessity to reconceive of the artwork 
goes hand in hand with the necessity to reimagine the figure of the human in the world.  
 
The last chapter in this thesis takes on that task. Focusing on the work of Sylvia Wynter, Reza 
Negarestani and CS Peirce this chapter looks at how the economic script that underwrites our 
current paradigm “dyselects” certain subjects, and how an engagement with what it means to be 
human can open vistas of opportunity for rethinking the political conjuncture. I also introduce 
the concept of the rebound – or Jevons’ paradox – and ally it with Gregory Sholette’s idea of 
dark matter, in order to discuss how attempts to utilise art for the sake of progress can backfire. 
Olufar Eliasson’s work here is exemplary in that regard – what could seem to be a politically 
virtuous project brings with it a set of unintended consequences that undermine its objectives. 
This is accompanied by a discussion of normativity; here I made the claim that in order to think 
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about political power, we must theorise how causality works in groups, as grouping amplifies 
power. This could be used as a way to think the use of political organising as a model for activity, 
or be a theoretical tool within the epistemological field of the curatorial. What is intrinsic to this 
discussion is an idea that amplificatory power can reside within the people and not be proper 
only to already existing institutions. Precisely, this power is in itself an act of instituting.  
 
Chantal Mouffe (in Gielen 2013) asks how art should relate to already existing institutions, 
whether art should ‘engage with the current institutions with the aim of transforming them, or 
should they desert them altogether?’ (Mouffe in Gielen 2013: 64). Mouffe here is recalling, and 
critiquing, the tactics employed by some critical art practices that attempt to escape from the 
institution, but we have to ask, how can one escape “the institution”? This seems to rely on a 
somewhat prosaic understanding of the institution that exists only as bricks and mortar (equally, 
the either or binary around which this question is posed misunderstands the systemic conditions 
inherent in our contemporary world). Instead, as I hope to have shown, the current institutional 
boundaries are porous, there is a flow of material, energy and information across these 
boundaries and the dialectical nature of the institution means escape is not the right tactic to use. 
This critical approach, as I suggest, legitimises the existence of the institution. Furthermore, the 
act of instituting itself does not begin and end with this thing called the institution. All activity 
within an inferential system works to institute some norm, law or continuity. It is the recursive 
nature of systems that allows for institutional action to occur at lower levels. As such, the 
question should not be “what do we do with existing institutions?”, but, “how do we leverage 
the institutional capacity of our actions to produce transformations we wish to see?”.  
 
As Mouffe recognises, the escape or exodus approach forecloses ‘an immanent critique of 
institutions, whose objective would be to transform them into a terrain of contestation of the 
hegemonic order’ (ibid.: 66). Her critique suggests these practices and theorisations (she does not 
name them, but we can imagine what type she means) view the institution as a monolith, and 
that the strategy taken is to escape or withdraw from them. Mouffe’s approach, on the contrary, 
understands that the encounter between art and politics occurs not only within the ‘traditional 
political institutions’ but it also takes place ‘in the multiplicity of places where hegemony is 
constructed, i.e. the domain of what is usually called “civil society” […] where a particular 
conception of the world is established and a specific understanding of reality is defined’ (ibid.: 
67). This understanding is useful for us. If we can appreciate that critical artistic practice can 
have traction at higher levels from a multiplicity of places, then the capacity for transformative 
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political work to be done from the margins is increased. The role I see institutional practice 
taking (work that understands its capacity for creating change through an institutional 
methodology), is through the way it intervenes within what is continuous about society – what 
makes up the laws and norms within a given conjuncture – precisely this is work that occurs at 
the level of the axiological. To change society, the axioms need to change. This thesis 
understands how transitioning up levels, or increasing capacity, is not thunderlike nor aleatory, 
but a work of commitment and struggle. The work of hegemonic construction that Mouffe 
advocates for requires processes that I am not convinced she conceives of – for her, artistic 
practice can ‘play a part in the process of disarticulation/rearticulation which characterises a 
counter hegemonic politics’ (ibid.). However, she does not seek to provide an adequate analysis 
of art in the sense I have provided here. “Art” seems to be untroubled in Mouffe’s analysis. We 
have to be aware that if we wish to use art as an instrument of political transformation, art itself 
needs to reformulate its axioms as well.  
 
This thesis has, in large part, been about identifying the axioms of what I call petroculture, within 
which the genre of contemporary art exists as a paradigmatic form. I have chosen to focus on 
contemporary art for this reason, not because I think it has any privileged access to 
transformative potential, but because it exemplifies in significant ways the axioms I have 
identified. Thus, the question of whether we can use an instrument such as contemporary art, 
that is so intrinsically linked to the socio-political conditions of our time, whether we can, to 
paraphrase Audre Lourde, use the masters’ tools in order to change that system, is pertinent. My 
contention is that unless the axioms of this form of art are reimagined, art will forever rehearse 
the same script, ratifying the already existing power relations and only offer some the chance to 
participate in the privileged space of socio-political change. Art is formed in a certain image 
coherent with the historical period it emerges within, and in order to alter those conditions it 
needs to be out of time, from the future. It cannot hope, however, to have that capacity merely 
as an image of the future – as Hägglund suggests, it is not sufficient for some of us to have the 
“correct” set of principles, hard work needs to be done. In order for art to truly say it is useful in 
the project of transformation, it should become a labourer in that process; dedicated to freedom 
not as an escape, but as a commitment to a project, understanding the necessary work that needs 
to be done at the level of art’s extra-artistic consequences (labour rights, environmental impact, 
redistributive work and so on), and how the relation between the particular and the universal 
should play out as a form of capacity increase.  
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As I suggest in the last chapter, this project can utilise the power of social institutions and the 
instituting power of grouping to leverage the multiplicatory factor of norm circles within the 
context of the continuum. The non-trivial transition between the particular and universal that 
Peircianism imagines is a coherent methodological approach to thinking the capacity for art to 
have traction at a political level. Without a theory of change that incorporates how to replace the 
lost – or redefine the existing – political, social and cultural institutions, there is no sense in 
placing the responsibility for that change on art. As Unger suggests, the ambition for social and 
political change must be taken up by all of society. Without the democratic involvement at the 
level of social, the capcity for change will only be held by a small group of elites. As he suggests: 
 
The guiding impulse of this Leftism is not the redistributive attenuation of inequality and 
inclusion; it is the enhancement of the powers and the broadening of the opportunities 
enjoyed by ordinay men and women on the basis of the piecemeal but cumulative 
reorganization of the State and the economy. Its watchword is not the humanization of 
society; it is the divinization of humanity. Its innermost thought is that the future belongs 
to the political force that most credibly represents the cause of the constructive 
imagination: eveyone's power to share in the permanent creation of the new. 
(Unger 2005: 23) 
 
This approach to radical left democratic transformation is fundamental to my conception of the 
ways in which art must transform its axioms in order to create significant political change. 
Holding Unger’s work in constellation with Castoriadis’ concept of the institution would be a 
useful theoretical starting point to enlarge and develop our commitments to the task at hand.  
 
For Castoriadis, social institutions in their broadest sense, are sedimentations of the ways in 
which social activity and patterns emerge and proliferate over time. As suggested by Johann P. 
Arnason (in Adams ed. 2014), these institutions are ‘patterns of action and thought, imposed on 
the individuals but also subject to changes in the course of historical events’ (Arnason in Adams 
2014: 103). The institution in Castoriadis’ work appears as a fundamental aspect of power, 
providing what he calls the “impersonal” paradigm of power. In this sense, the institution is 
more fundamental than intersubjective relations in that it grounds and animates those relations. 
The potentialities in Castordiadis’ theory of institutions and institutional power would be vital 
for a thoroughgoing future study of this area, and it is unfortunately beyond the scope of this 
thesis to expand these ideas much further than to merely point to their utility.  
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There are many routes this thesis could have taken, and could, hopefully, lead on to. A 
thoroughgoing critique of liberalism’s foreclosure of the social power of institutions, or an 
analysis of how contemporary art and the emergence of the far-right could be related, for 
example. For my own part, the next stages of this research have led me on to developing two 
further projects. I am currently working on an edited book project about freedom that speaks to 
the need to reimagine the concept for the left. This book, Constructing Cultures of Collective 
Freedom, embarks on an analysis of current discourses around freedom from multiple 
perspectives, and seeks to reinscribe the concept with new articulations. The second direction I 
am taking is research into how the political theory of liberalism emerges within the context of 
the Anthropocene, specifically understanding how the current conditions provide fertile ground 
for new forms of fascism to grow. Both of these projects feed from the theorisation contained 
herein. And allow for a further expansion of these ideas.  
 
This thesis could also feed into a project to reimagine the art world. What would an art world 
look like that took on characteristics of more democratic or socialist values? Would we 
experience significant shifts around who has control, or who is included? In order to make 
significant changes, a radical rethinking of the structures of the system is needed, not just to 
increase the representation of diverse subjects, but to redistribute power within the system in 
more equitable ways. This is, of course, a worthwhile project, and while the art world is certainly 
an exemplary site of exploitation and injustice, it is not unique, however, the practical 
implications of these changes at broader systemic level, at the level of politics in general, would 
not be immediately apparent. As is so often the case with art, one would imagine changes to 
make the art world more equitable would be narrativised as a “model” for broader systemic 
change, and would never seek to utilise the causal power that would be inherent within groups of 
artworkers. If, for example, the art world could be reimagined, as many are now doing, as a site 
of labour, then contestations could be reformulated along the lines of workers rights. Equally, the 
work done on Fernando Zalamea’s conception of Peircian pragmatism has connotations for the 
inferential system of the curatorial. The way we conceive of the curatorial has been under 
discussion for a number of years, and this thesis cannot hope to intervene in that discussion 
(especially within the final pages), but a future project could attenuate a reading of the concept of 
the continuum through the field of the curatorial in quite successful ways.  
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As if to exemplify arguments contained herein, the coronavirus crisis that has beset our world 
over the last months has brought some very important articulations to the fore. Questions 
around freedom, personal autonomy and society have emerged in relation to public health and 
infection, where those that hold freedom to signify only “freedom from coercion” assert their 
own autonomy not to wear masks or get vaccinations. These arguments rest, of course, on the 
forms of freedom I have been keen to critique in this thesis. Furthermore, the modes by which 
social support has been rendered across different nation states has pointed up their underlying 
political ideologies – the more neoliberalised nations, those in which public health or social 
services have been in decline, the greater likelihood of high infection rates. While this is not a 
universally accurate analysis, the trend in countries such as the United Kingdom and the United 
States, both enthral to market logics, has been towards higher rates of infection in contrast to 
countries in which state intervention is greater. One interesting piece of data that also emerged 
during this time is the apparent reduction in CO2 emissions due to decreased air travel, personal 
travel and general demand. As more people worked from home and planes were grounded 
during the forced “lockdown” periods, demand for energy dropped considerably. According to 
some reports the global demand dropped more precipitously than it had done during either the 
2007-8 crash or just after the second world war. However, despite the significant drop in 
emissions, the almost total shut down of global movement only accounted for approximately 5% 
drop in CO2 emissions (Le Quéré et al 2020).   
 
What this points to is the idea that global production of greenhouse gases is overwhelmingly the 
responsibility not of the world’s citizens who remained in their homes, but of large-scale 
industrial production, activity that did not stop during the period. This analysis suggests that it is 
almost nonsensical to approach the climate crisis through the lens of personal choice whereby 
individuals are entreated to take responsibility for their own carbon emissions, instead, what is 
needed is a systemic transformation that reimagines the entire value chain and the intersecting 
economic, social, political, cultural and ecological systems in line with new axiomatics. It is only 
this approach that will produce a radical enough transformation to prevent the worst effects of 
climate collapse. To achieve this, I suggest, is not something that should be left to a miraculous 
break, but a project dedicated to the progressive, stepwise, trans-strata increase of our capacities 
that seeks to produce counter-hegemonic operations utilising both normative processes and 
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